The Berkeley Undergraduate Journal

University of California • Berkeley
Spring 1993 • Volume 6, No. 2

The Berkeley Undergraduate Journal

University of California • Berkeley
Spring 1993 • Volume 6, No. 2

Nondiscrimination Statement

The University of California, in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, or age in any of its policies, procedures, or practices; nor does the University discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The nondiscriminating policy covers admission and access to, and treatment and employment in, University programs and activities, including but not limited to, academic admissions, financial aid, educational service, and student employment. Inquiries regarding the University's equal opportunity policies may be directed to the Assisstant Chancellor—Affirmative Action and Special Projects, 200 California Hall, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, (510) 642-1991, or TDD 642-6376. Inquiries regarding Title IX (sex discrimination) may be directed to Elaine Kim, Faculty Assistant for the Status of Women (Title IX Coordinator), 230 California Hall, (510) 642-7609.

The *Berkeley Undergraduate Journal* welcomes submissions from all undergraduates at the University of California, Berkeley.

Address inquiries to:

The Berkeley Undergraduate Journal
Undergraduate Programs
221 California Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720
(510) 642-8378

Table of Contents

Foreword

On behalf of the faculty and administration of the University of California, I welcome this new issue of the *Berkeley Undergraduate Journal*. As one of the country's preeminent research institutions, Berkeley fosters the spirit of academic excellence that is everywhere evident in the pages of the *Journal*. Thousands of our undergraduates engage in original research every year in the labs and libraries of this campus. For many of these students, an early opportunity to conduct research will help integrate them into the scholarly community. For others, research provides a capstone to their undergraduate careers, and a stepping stone to graduate or professional work. The *Journal* provides an important forum for the best of these efforts. I am confident that you will be inspired by the lively intelligence displayed in the pages of this semester's *Berkeley Undergraduate Journal*.

Professor Arnold Leiman
Special Assistant to The Vice Chancellor

Preface

The hard intellectual work that undergraduates put into their papers too rarely finds an audience outside the classroom. *The Berkeley Undergraduate Journal* provides a means for outstanding undergraduate essays to be read and recognized. The *Journal* celebrates the accomplishments of its contributors, and the Editors encourage fellow students to take advantage of this forum by submitting their best endeavors for publication.

The Board of Editors would like to express its appreciation for the faculty and administrative assistance that made the *Berkeley Undergraduate Journal* possible. The Office for Undergraduate Programs generously provides full funding for the the *Journal*. The board is particularly grateful to Alix Schwartz for expert advice and sage council. Professor Bil Banks deserves special thanks for creating the *Journal* and giving his continued support. Finally, the Board appreciates the support and assistance of Vice Chancellor John Heilbron; Professor Arnold Leiman, Special Assistant to The Vice Chancellor; and Manina Harris of Moffitt Undergraduate Library.

We at the *Journal* are proud to present incisive new scholarship emerging in a variety of disciplines at the undergraduate level at UC Berkeley.

Capturing Divinity: Sacred Art and the Athena Parthenos

Naomi Leite

The study of the "sacred art" of other cultures is riddled with problems. Those objects which have been identified as "sacred" (itself a problematic label) invite study in terms of a religious system for which they were produced. Yet such an approach has its pitfalls. As contemporary scholars of religion have pointed out,[1] there is no such thing as a discrete "religious system". Religion exists only within the context of a greater cultural matrix, involving (among others) sociological, economic, political, and psychological factors. A second problem for the historian of art lies in those studies of religion which have relied in part on a culture's art to understand its religion. This allows the possibility of a dangerous cycle: art that appears to be "sacred" may be used to construct an understanding of religion, which is then used by others to explain that same art.[2]

These limitations present important methodological problems. The following paper certainly does not pretend to transcend these problems; however, I hope to refrain from making unwarranted assumptions about the nature of religious objects. I would like in this paper to offer a new understanding of a particular piece of "sacred art", an ancient Greek temple statue, moving away from its standard art historical interpretation as a votive or an object of worship. My study will rely on the primary evidence at hand—what we know of the object and its original context—to understand the statue. I will first examine the specific strategies the sculptor employed in representing the goddess, looking at the statue in its physical context (within a larger sculptural program) and in relation to similar kinds of images. I will then place the statue in a broader political and social context, attempting to discern what some possible functions and meanings may have been at the time it was created. In the

process I hope to demonstrate how the statue reveals and negotiates some of the limitations endemic to sacred art, as well as the complexities of the significance attributed to gods in Classical Greek society.

Beyond the frustration its study creates for scholars, sacred art is an inherently problematic type of representation. As others have noted,[3] any visual image of a god is necessarily limited. For to depict divinity is to imagine that which is beyond form in a vocabulary consisting only of form. This basic limitation is compounded by the practice in some cultures of invoking a specific aspect of a divinity for worship or supplication in one situation, a different aspect in another. The god or goddess becomes in effect an actor who plays a variety of roles. To depict only one of these roles is to create a partial rendering of the god. Sacred art of this kind is doubly constrained (and constraining): it captures a partial glimpse of divinity using an insufficient medium. In the following paper I will discuss a temple statue in which these two limitations work in concert: the fundamental limitation of sacred art and the limitation of the specialized roles a god is assigned. The culture I will be working with is that of Periklean (fifth century BC) Athens; the goddess, Athena.

Ancient Greek religion certainly involved specialized invocation. Athena was worshipped in at least five forms in Athens alone,[4] and visual representation of the gods in specific roles was not uncommon. Yet Classical Greek cult statues (monumental temple statues of a god or goddess), as far as I know, tend *not* to depict a single guise of the god. Extant and reconstructed cult statues generalize rather than specify. It is in this light, looking at the cult statue as an attempt to depict a god in *all* its power through a generalized image, that I want to examine the Athena Parthenos (figure 1).

The Athena Parthenos is an especially problematic object of study, for nothing of the original statue survives. What we have instead are the temple in which she stood (the Parthenon) and texts describing the figure; copies of the original have been identified by correspondences with those descriptions. We know that the statue was completed in 438 BC and that it stood around forty feet tall. The body was made of cedar, overlaid with ivory and garments of hammered gold. In all reconstructions, Athena wears an ornate helmet and her customary *aegis*,[5] rests her left hand on a shield at her side, and holds out a winged Nike (Victory) in her right. A colossal snake curls inside the shield. The statue is covered with mythological narrative:[6] depicted in relief on the outside of her shield and painted on the inside are the battles between the Greeks and

the Amazons (*Amazonomachy*) and the gods and the giants (*Gigantomachy*), respectively. The battle between the Lapiths and the Centaurs (*Centauromachy*) appears in relief on the edges of the soles of her sandals. Finally, on the base of the statue the gods create Pandora.[7]

I would like in this paper to address (in varying degrees of directness) a series of questions: what is the nature of this goddess as represented? how is this communicated? what purpose might the statue have served? to what extent can we consider it to be a partial or limited representation of divinity? and what might its significance have been for Periklean Athens? Central to my treatment of these questions will be an examination of the specific ways in which the statue represents the goddess. In order to carry out this examination, I have isolated a series of visual strategies of communication used in representations of deities in Greek art. Before proceeding with my analysis of the Athena Parthenos, I would like first to outline these strategies. I will bring in depictions of Aphrodite to illustrate. These images offer particularly clear examples, for Aphrodite's significance or power is relatively easy to pinpoint: (illicit) sexuality or love without the goal of procreation.

Describing the nature of the deity

The strategies I will describe are used to indicate a given god's nature in its entirety or to identify the specific guise which is being represented. From a range of roles the artist selects one and uses these tactics to indicate which it is—the greater the number of strategies employed, the greater the precision in representation. I place these strategies in two categories: those which are employed in the depiction of an individual deity and those which are used in the description of the god's relation to other figures.

1. Figure (identity)
    a. depiction of body and drapery
    b. inclusion of attributes
    c. depiction of characteristic behavior
2. Context (nature)
    a. proxemics
    b. juxtaposition
    c. choice of narrative moment

Perhaps the most basic of those in the first category is the depiction of the body and its drapery, illustrated by figure 2. The extreme transparency of the drapery on the upper torso marks this body as a

sexual one: the right nipple as well as the navel are clearly delineated, and the vertical wet folds from breast to stomach lead the viewer's gaze to slide gently down across the belly to the suggestive shadows below. In a culture in which citizen women were expected to cover themselves entirely from head to toe,[8] the overt sexuality of the torso and confident, seductive stance would have immediately suggested Aphrodite. Yet there is something more here. As Andrew Stewart has argued, the drapery "flaming up and around her in wildly billowing eddies," dramatically juxtaposing vertical and horizontal folds, indicates in its chaotic rendering an understanding of Aphrodite as specifically an "overwhelming and incalculable cosmic power."[9]

Figure 3 exemplifies the second strategy: the employment of attributes, objects which serve as signposts identifying the figure. In her left hand the figure holds a golden apple. This attribute refers to a myth known as "the judgement of Paris". Paris, a shepherd, is chosen to judge between Aphrodite, Hera, and Athena in a contest of beauty. The winner is to be awarded a golden apple. Aphrodite wins; the apple is hers. There can be no mistake regarding the identity of this figure.

The third strategy I have isolated is that of representing characteristic action: identification through behavior. Both figures 4 and 5 demonstrate this tactic. In the first, the figure pulls aside her gown to reveal her genitals and lifts it off her behind entirely. She glances over her shoulder at what she has bared, guiding us to look in the same direction. Only the goddess of sexuality would so brazenly reveal herself; certainly for Athena or Artemis, virgin goddesses both, it would be unthinkable. This is also a representation of a specific guise in which Aphrodite was worshipped—Aphrodite Kallipygos—which can be translated, according to Stewart, as "Aphrodite of the lovely bum."[10] Aphrodite's action here (willing disclosure of her "bum") places her in this role. Figure 5 demonstrates a different type of specific action. Rather than depicting behavior peculiar to Aphrodite, it makes reference to a specific action within the myth of her birth. As the goddess emerges full-grown from the sea, she wrings the salt-water from her hair.

Figures 3, 4, and 5 also employ the first strategy—representation of the body and its drapery—to describe this goddess as a sexual, seductive being (note the bare left breast and transparent, wet-fold drapery in figure 3, the revealed right breast in figure 4, and, along with near nudity, the large knot directly over the genitals in figure 5). This increases the precision with which the identity of the goddess is located.

The strategies which fall into the second category employ interaction between figures in a group to indicate the nature of those involved. These are used in conjunction with one or more strategies from the first category: where the latter establishes identity (and perhaps also subtleties of the god's nature), the strategies outlined below can be effective only if the deity's identity has already been communicated. The simplest of these is the placement of figures in relation to one another: identification through proxemics. In her 1967 article on the east pediment of the Parthenon (figure 11), Evelyn Harrison bases much of her reading on this tactic.[11] The scene depicted focuses on Athena's birth; Aphrodite (M) is placed at a disinterested distance in the far right corner of the pediment with her head turned away. This marks the goddess as *not* involved with any of Athena's affairs: Aphrodite's realm, that of sexuality and desire, has no overlap with that of Athena, the world of an eternal (asexual) virgin.

I will use a single image (figure 6) to illustrate the next two strategies. It is particularly rich for our purposes, as it uses several of the above mentioned tactics simultaneously. Aphrodite, Athena, and Hera are made readily identifiable through the employment of the first group of strategies: Aphrodite, seated on the right, through the sexualized depiction of her body and drapery (see in particular the clear outlines of her breasts, compared to the lack of such visibility on Hera and Athena); Athena, standing to the left of center, through the inclusion of her attributes of shield, helmet, and spear; and Hera, immediately to Athena's right, through her characteristic action of lifting her veil in the "wedding gesture" (a standard motif marking her as the wife of Zeus). Such identification is necessary, for the grouping of these three goddesses around a central seated male tells us that this is a representation of the judgement of Paris.

Central to this myth is the notion of conflict between the gods. The visual representation of divine conflict is a strategy which I will term "juxtaposition", for it sets one against the other and heightens our understanding of each.[12] This differs from the strategy of manipulating proxemics insofar as my usage of the term will refer only to *contrastive* juxtaposition. The depiction of the seated Aphrodite as compositionally opposed to her standing adversaries leads the viewer to consider her as neither Athena-like nor Hera-like. We are made to understand her nature as diametrically opposed to that of Athena and Hera, both of whom in some way represent the respected structures of Athenian society (Athena = virgin, Hera = married woman; Aphrodite = illicit sexuality).

This reading brings me to the final strategy, the choice of a specific moment in a mythological narrative. The event depicted, as I have noted, is the judgement of Paris. In this story, each goddess attempts to bribe Paris into deeming her the most beautiful. Where Athena's offer of military prowess and wisdom fails along with Hera's offer of wealth and power, Aphrodite wins him over with the promise of the most beautiful mortal, Helen of Troy. The precise moment depicted here is that of persuasion.[13] This is indicated by the eye contact between Paris and Aphrodite: looking toward the goddess as he is persuaded by her messenger (who is none other than love personified, Eros), Paris turns his back on Athena and Hera. This creates a smaller frame in which he and Aphrodite, each seated and accompanied on the left by an Eros, echo each other. They are linked; Aphrodite has won. It is the choice of this moment which alerts us to an essential part of Aphrodite's nature: she is irresistable, a force which can break through even the most important social structures.

In this last image, Aphrodite's identity and nature are precisely located through depiction of the body and its drapery, inclusion of attributes, juxtaposition, and choice of a specific narrative moment. This combination of several strategies sharpens identification, for each reinforces the message sent by the others. Of course we must remember that any representation of a more wide-ranging deity, particularly Athena, will necessarily be more complex. For where Aphrodite represented a small range of related forces, Athena's significance, in particular for Athenians during the fifth century, was remarkably diverse. There were at least five cults located on the Acropolis: Athena Nike (goddess of the victory), Athena Promachos (goddess of military prowess), Athena Polias (goddess of the city), Athena Hygeia (goddess of health), and Athena Ergane (goddess of crafts). The question of how one might represent all of these in a single cult statue—or, rather, represent a generalized Athena—is accordingly a difficult one. Any discussion of the Athena Parthenos must consider the extent to which it represents such an attempt. The strategies of representation outlined above will be essential to my treatment to this issue. I will use them to discern which specific role(s), if any, are represented by the Parthenos.

The Parthenos: identity and nature

One of the most intriguing aspects of the figure is that the form of the goddess she would seem to represent—Athena as *parthenos*, 'maiden' or 'unmarried girl'—is not a role with which any religious activity has been connected. Rather, the epithet appears to be a literary one, "Athena

the maiden", attached to her in epic just as Hera is called "Hera the ox-eyed lady" and Zeus dubbed "Zeus the cloud-gatherer".[14] No documentation of formal worship or cult activity related to the goddess Athena as Parthenos exists. I will accordingly turn to other aspects of the image to explore the nature of the deity it represents; in my concluding remarks I will return to the puzzle of its name.

In fifth century Athens, Athena was certainly worshipped as a goddess of crafts, victory, battle, health, and as the patron goddess of the city; she was also recognized as the power of wisdom and of order. But which of these is represented by this image? Is it a generalized representation of the goddess? A comparison between a copy of the Parthenos (figure 7) and a bronze cult statue of Athena (figure 8) seems to indicate otherwise. For where the Parthenos is covered with specific mythology and attributes, the bronze Athena retains only the minimal attributes needed to identify the figure as Athena—the ever-present helmet and *aegis*.[15] In its lack of specifity, the latter image achieves a generalized representation. Something more complicated appears to be going on in the Parthenos.

The statue was created as the culmination of a larger sculptural program. She and the Parthenon were designed simultaneously, and the two refer back to each other in a number of ways. As the statue's original context can therefore be expected to add to an understanding of the figure, I will look first to the Parthenon (figure 9) to explore the nature of the deity represented.

The building is in many ways an anomaly in Greek architecture. Beyond a series of structural innovations,[16] the Parthenon is notable for the sheer quantity of its architectural sculpture. The program (figure 10) includes more than the usual pedimental sculpture and carved metopes at the two ends of the temple; here metopes appear on all four sides above the outer columns and a continuous frieze wraps around the exterior wall of the *cella*, or temple proper. Equally unusual is the presence of Athena in several different places on the building. According to Stewart, the Parthenon's emphatic inclusion of the goddess in the pediments, metopes, and frieze is unique in Greek architectural sculpture.[17] John Boardman notes this as well, as does Harrison: "In no other Greek temple was the sculptural decoration so directly related to the resident divinity as the Parthenon."[18] The obvious conclusion is that the representations of the goddess on the building's exterior relate in some programmatic way to the statue inside. A quick look at these images will give us an idea of which aspect of the goddess the Parthenos

represents. I will discuss them individually, using the strategies isolated above to identify the role in which she appears.

The east pediment (figure 6) depicts the birth of Athena. Although reconstructions vary, all seem to agree on the general characteristics of the pediment: Athena, Zeus, Hera, and Hephaestus constitute a central group; the remaining Olympian gods (along with other, lesser figures) are present, placed closer to or farther from Athena as their relationship to her dictates. In this reconstruction, the central group (including Poseidon) is set off from the others by a chariot group on either side. The scene represented is taken from Greek mythology. Unlike that of the other Olympian gods (except Hephaestus), Athena's birth is parthenogenic. One of Zeus' lovers, Metis, becomes pregnant. Fearing that she will produce a son who might overthrow him, he swallows her. When he later complains of a headache, Hephaestus splits open Zeus' head with an axe and Athena bursts out, fully grown.

In considering the representation of Athena in figure 11, it is important to keep in mind that this is a reconstruction, and therefore conjectural. Nothing of the actual statue of Athena survives; accordingly, the representation cannot be analyzed in terms of the first category of strategies discussed above. The location of the central figures, however, has been reconstructed based on contemporary representations of the same scene and on the floor cuttings into which the figures were inserted.[19] I will look to proxemics and choice of narrative moment, then, to understand this image of Athena.

Standing immediately to her father's left, Athena is the only of Zeus' children within the central group. To his right stands his wife, Hera. This image grants Athena equal importance to Hera in her relationship with the king of the gods; proximity to her father thus brings out her uniqueness as his only parthenogenic child and as the primary recipient of his wisdom. Stewart has described this pediment as representing the precise moment of Athena's birth.[20] Horses rear back in alarm at the scene, Hephaestus leans on his axe in exhaustion from the effort, and the news filters out to the wings (note in particular groups D-E-F and K-L-M, in which figures are in the process of receiving the news). If Stewart's reading is correct—I see no reason to doubt it—then the choice of the specific moment depicted adds to our understanding. At the instant of her birth Athena pops like a thought from her father's head. This is an image which stresses Athena's role as goddess of wisdom.

The west pediment (figure 12) represents a contest between Athena and Poseidon. Here again a central group is flanked by a chariot and

horses on either side. The (mythological) first kings of Athens and their families look on as the two gods vie for patronage of the city. According to the story, Athena and Poseidon each offered a gift to Athens: Poseidon a salt-water spring, Athena an olive tree. Athena's gift was judged the more valuable, and the city became hers. Enraged, Poseidon caused the sea to flood the area and Zeus was obliged to intervene with his thunderbolt.

The pediment presents a clear case of juxtaposition: Athena and Poseidon engaged in a contest. Anthony Bulloch has shown that the frequent contrast between the two in Greek myth is significant. He sees Poseidon as representing "primal urges" (as evidenced by his connection both to the sea and to horses) where Athena represents the civilizing power of "order" (witness her invention of the bridle).[21] The juxtaposition of the two thus heightens our understanding of the goddess as embodying order in opposition to chaos, and underscores the on-going nature of the tension between the two forces.[22]

As Stewart points out, there is some difficulty in discerning which specific narrative moment is represented here.[23] Where some scholars read it as the simultaneous creation of the two gifts, others see in it the subsequent conflict between the gods. Both in contest and conflict, however, Athena emerges victorious. Either of these moments describes Athena as the triumphant power of order; also, and more importantly, either marks her as Polias, the city's patron goddess. For at the instant of victory, she becomes the guardian of Athens.

The eastern metopes offer yet another image of Athena.[24] Although these are extremely damaged (as figure 13 shows), Boardman seems fairly confident in his description of panel four as "Athena with Nike flying beside her."[25] The subject of the metopes is the Gigantomachy. Angered by Zeus' rise to power, the previous generation of beings (the Giants) revolts. In the insuing battle, Athena shines. For not only does she show herself to be an accomplished warrior, but her protege, Herakles, saves the day.

This image employs several strategies at once. Nike functions here as an attribute, alerting us to Athena's role as the goddess of victory. At the same time, proximity marks her as the goddess of battle: she appears directly to the right of Ares (panel 3), god of war. The general narrative context is one of battle, the specific moment depicted clearly one of victory: her foe stumbles to the ground and Nike flies beside her. This, then, is Athena as triumphant warrior, both Athena Promachos and

Athena Nike. This particular combined identity is not unusual in visual representation of Athena, as the two roles are of course related.

The representations of Athena in the two pediments and on the metopes are relatively uncomplicated. The image of Athena in the eastern frieze, however, is far more problematic (figures 14 and 15). Where the others present the goddess in a specific role within a mythological context, the frieze places her in the midst of a contemporary Athenian religious festival in which she acts only as recipient of an offering. The nature of Athena as represented here is particularly important, for this section of the frieze lies directly over the temple's entrance and would be the final image of the goddess seen before the Parthenos itself.

The festival depicted here is the Panathenaia, an annual celebration of the goddess. The central event was a great procession from Eleusis to the Acropolis, where offerings were made to Athena at several altars (one for each of her roles) and an ancient olive-wood statue of the goddess was clothed in a new *peplos* (long tunic) woven for the occasion. The entire frieze depicts this procession; the east side focuses specifically on an assembly of the gods (figure 14: 24-30 and 36-42) which frames the presentation of the *peplos*. Although she is positioned to receive the garment, however, Athena certainly is not represented as an olive-wood statue. This is instead an image of the living goddess.

Athena and her neighbor form a closed composition; with their heads turned toward each other, they do not interact with or even acknowledge the figures on either side. We are thus led to consider the relationship between the two. Her companion is Hephaestus, god of metalwork and ceramics.[26] Proximity (location at his side) marks Athena as Ergane, goddess of crafts. This is reinforced by the moment depicted: the presentation of the woven *peplos* recalls her gift to the Greeks of the art of weaving.

But there is much more to be found in this deceivingly simple figure. The depiction of Athena herself displays a notable *lack* of those strategies in the first category. In fact even her most basic attributes, the helmet and *aegis*, are not present. I believe that this lack is essential for an understanding of the image. The absence of any attributes or other characteristics which might signal one role or another is crucial. Rather than depicting the goddess in one of the specific roles in which mortals have imagined her, the frieze presents Athena in casual conversation among her peers (note, e.g., the relaxed manner in which she slouches,

one foot kicked forward, and the informality with which Hephaestus twists around in his chair).

This is an image which imagines Athena outside of her role as a powerful figure effecting change in the mortal realm. Such a casual, snapshot image of the goddess effectively removes her from human time and space: in an assembly of the gods Athena exists beyond the specificity of the roles she must play in an epiphany. She is neither Polias nor Hygeia, neither Promachos nor Ergane.[27] In its depiction of a generalized Athena observing the presentation of the *peplos*, the frieze departs from earthly reality in yet another way. At the festival no sacrifice or offering was made to a *general* Athena. Rather, individual recognition was given at altars to each specific role.[28]

On the outside of the Parthenon, then, Athena is present in all her guises: Nike, Polias, Promachos, Ergane, and the powers of wisdom and order. Although not overtly depicted, Hygeia may not be entirely absent, as the representation of an unspecific Athena as the subject of the Panathenaia frieze would seem to stand collectively for the particular roles in which she was honored at the festival (Hygeia being one of them). Given such an attempt to allude to each of Athena's roles on the temple's exterior, one would rightly expect the statue inside to present an equally broad view of the goddess. Rather than capturing Athena's roles through a generalized image, however, the Parthenos moves in the opposite direction. It incorporates specific elements of every manifestation of the goddess discussed and more (figures 1 and 7).

Attributes overwhelm the viewer with information. The figure's identity is established by the presence of garments peculiar to Athena: she wears the *aegis* and, as Boardman points out, "a *peplos* with a long overfall, tucked into the belt in a manner peculiar to the goddess."[29] Her spear, shield, and helmet identify her as the goddess of war. The figure of Nike in her outstretched hand suggests the goddess of victory. The snake curled inside the shield marks her as Polias, the patron deity of Athens, for it alludes to the sacred snake belonging to Erechthonios, legendary first citizen of Athens. A descendent of the snake could still be found under a sacred building on the Acropolis (the Erechtheon), where it was fed and revered. Its inclusion in an image of the goddess makes reference to her relationship to the city.

Athena's helmet (figure 16) offers still more information. It is topped by two *pegasoi* and a sphinx. Throughout Greek mythology the latter represents wisdom. The *pegasoi* (winged horses) refer to the myth of Bellerophon, a mortal who attempted to fly to Mount Olympus on

the back of Pegasus (said by some to have been given to him by Athena) and thus demonstrated desire to be immortal. Bellerophon was promptly punished for his *hybris*. Such a reference would remind the viewer that Athena was also goddess of *sophrosyne* (self-knowledge which results in self-control). As the goddess of order, it is only fitting that she should represent that which maintains the proper balance between mortal and immortal.

Yet references to the goddess' significance are not located in attributes alone. Several surfaces of the statue serve as loci for entire mythological narratives. The Gigantomachy painted on the shield's interior indicates Athena's triumph as a warrior, just as it did on the metopes. Embossed in relief on the exterior of the shield and on the soles of her sandals are the Amazonomachy and Centauromachy, respectively. The inclusion of these myths here (and on the building's exterior: see figure 10) suggests that Athena sanctioned Greek victory.[30] The Athenians considered the Amazons and Centaurs to represent chaos and the irrational; Athena's blessing is appropriate, for civilization (order) has defeated the barbarians.[31] The creation of Pandora, depicted in relief on the base, addresses a different side of the goddess. Pandora was formed by the gods to be the first woman. Her name, 'all-gifts', refers to her role as the bearer of a gift from each one of the gods. Athena provides her with the skill of weaving; this is a reference to Athena as Ergane.[32]

As on the temple's exterior, then, here is a representation of Athena's many roles: the wise preserver of civilization; the goddess of crafts, victory, the city, and battle. Yet there is an essential difference between the architectural sculpture and the cult statue. In the former, these roles are spread out over various narrative contexts. The viewer engages with a single (or a few related) guises of the goddess in each representation. They provide not an all-encompassing image, but rather specific examples of the goddess' power (except the frieze, as I have shown). The cult statue, on the other hand, layers these roles upon a single figure. The viewer must extrapolate from specific details to find a sense of Athena in her entirety. Yet the way to find the actor behind these disparate roles is neither apparent nor provided.

The statue's total impression is one of confusion. Modern communication theory claims that "an increase in 'information' leads to a decrease in 'communication'";[33] this is true of the Parthenos. For in its apparent attempt to provide an exhaustive definition of the goddess, the statue offers instead an accretion of limited references and symbols. This

would seem to contradict my previous claim that an increase in the number of representational strategies employed should result in a more precise description of a divinity's nature. A comparison between the Parthenos (figure 1) and a pedimental statue of Athena (figure 17) demonstrates that this is no contradiction at all.[34] In the latter image each strategy describes the same role: Athena as Promachos. The figure's attributes (helmet, *aegis*, shield, and spear) identify her as Athena and suggest that she may be the goddess of battle here. Characteristic action (epiphany at a decisive moment in battle) and the precise moment depicted (Athena's appearance in the midst of the battle of Troy) allow no doubt as to which role this is.

The Parthenos, on the other hand, fails to communicate a coherent notion of the goddess in any guise, let alone a sense of Athena in her entirety. This is not simply due to an overabundance of information; the problem lies rather in the lack of cohesion in the information transmitted. That is, it is the increase in different *kinds* of information that decreases communication. For not only does the image employ different strategies to identify several disparate roles (snake as attribute = Polias; narrative moment of creation of Pandora = Ergane), but the same strategy is used repeatedly to indicate several different guises at once (e.g. attributes give us Polias [snake], Promachos [shield], Nike [Nike]). Such use of these strategies muddies rather than clarifies.

The statue presents all that Athena is known to be, but there is no coherence. It therefore fails to provide a sense of Athena as a goddess who exists beyond her individual roles. A second comparison elucidates this point. As I have mentioned, the contrast between figures 7 and 8 (both cult statues) points up the Parthenos' reliance on specificity rather than generalization. The Parthenos attempts to create a sense of Athena as a whole by emphatically describing each of her roles. This is where the image fails. The bronze Athena, precisely because it lacks reference to individual roles, contains no boundaries. It allows the viewer to interact with the statue in any number of ways: this can be Nike or Ergane or Promachos or simply Athena. By being overtly none, the figure encompasses all. The image of Athena on the frieze, too, succeeds in this sense. As I have shown, the placement of an unspecific Athena as the object of the Panathenaia frieze intimates that this single figure stands in for all the individual forms in which she was worshipped at the festival and thus includes all without describing any.

Both the bronze Athena and the image of the goddess on the frieze also succeed in capturing Athena's entirety in another way.[35] The Greeks

imagined their gods in entirely anthropomorphic terms: they fight, make love, throw tantrums. The texts which explore and indirectly define the nature of each god are myths (stories), in which the deities are understood as actors within coherent narratives. Just as the many roles each human being plays (e.g. parent, child, sibling) are united in the life of a single individual, so the disparate roles of each Greek god are brought together in these mythological actors. Both the frieze and the bronze Athena offer a narrativized image of Athena; she is granted emotional presence and personality of a kind. Note, for example, the tilt of the head and slightly slumped shoulders of the cult statue and the casual conversation depicted in the frieze. The viewer is led to imagine the goddess as a living being who acts and feels. The Parthenos in no way captures this effect, appearing to be little more than a showcase for sculpture, a shelf for props and a surface for story-telling.

The ultimate problem here is the mistaking of the sum of Athena's individual roles for the goddess herself; that is, a mistaking of Ergane + Promachos + Polias + Nike + wisdom + order for Athena. The statue's bid to capture divinity is undermined by overdefinition, for such specificity allows no room for creative interaction with the goddess. Judged on these terms, the Athena Parthenos can be no more than a limited or partial representation.

The Parthenos: goddess and possession

The preceding discussion of the Parthenos has itself been partial. One of the goals of this study is to reconstruct what a possible meaning or function of the Parthenos might have been in Periklean Athens; any such study must look beyond both the object itself and its apparent religious significance. As I noted at the beginning of this paper, religion involves and is involved in many areas of human experience. For Periklean Athens, formal religion and politics were effectively inseparable. Having offered a reading of the Athena Parthenos as an internally incoherent representation, I would like now to show how an understanding of the statue in its broader political context lends external coherence to the image.

In so doing, I hope to demonstrate the connection between three seemingly unrelated points which appear repeatedly in scholarship on the statue: 1) the Parthenos was not the only cult statue of Athena on the Acropolis, as a much older and more revered olive-wood image already existed; 2) the Parthenos celebrated the gifts Athena had brought to Athens; and 3) there is no record of any cult ritual or formal worship connected with the Parthenos or the temple.[36] I will discuss these points

and show that they reveal the statue to be not only an image of Athena defined by her various roles, but also and more successfully an image of the goddess defined by Athens' own political concerns.

It may be helpful at this point to give the briefest of historical orientations. In 490 BC, Athens singlehandedly defeated the Persian army at the Battle of Marathon. Ten years later the Persians invaded again, only to be conquered by a coalition of Greek city-states led by Athens. The two wars quickly reached the status of legend for the Athenians. Representations of the mytho-historical battles between the Greeks and the Amazons and between the Greeks and the Trojans took on added significance as references to the wars with the Persians, all three being struggles against an eastern, "barbaric" foe.

When Perikles came into power around 460, Athens was emerging as a major force in Greece. It led the Delian league, a loosely affiliated confederation of city-states united against the Persians. By 450, however, the league had become an Athenian empire, with city-states paying tribute to Athens for protection. It was with these funds that Perikles financed a massive building campaign, planning the construction of hundreds of projects.[37] Athens was to become a model city for the rest of Greece.[38] Completed in 432, the Parthenon was one of the first buildings to be erected. The Parthenos was made at the same time as the temple.

An ancient wooden statue of Athena existed on the Acropolis at that time. It is this image that was draped with the *peplos* during the Panathenaia. Considered the holiest of all things,[39] the icon was brought along when the Athenians fled from the Persian sack of the city in 480 BC. Although it is now called "the Athena Polias", no documentation of such a specific name for it exits before the second century AD.[40] The question presents itself: why was the Parthenos created if an extremely sacred image of the goddess already existed?[41] The explanation can only be that the two images served radically different purposes. Although both were referred to simply as "Athena", the contrasts between them were numerous. Where the "Polias" was apparently an ancient, wooden, under life-size figure, the Parthenos was a contemporary, colossal statue of gold and ivory. The ancient image was given offerings and carried to the sea annually for a ritual bathing; the Parthenos obviously could not be moved and apparently received nothing. Clearly the Parthenos was designed as a very different kind of image. But what was its purpose?

Scholars have offered an answer: the Parthenos was a political image which stressed Athena's importance for Athens. The statue and the

architectural sculptures which preface it make reference to the "gifts" which Periklean Athens thought itself to have received from the goddess. As this point has been argued exhaustively by others, I will not discuss the temple's sculpture here.[42] I might note before going on that the Panathenaia was a pan-Hellenic festival; the message that the Parthenon and its cult statue carried was therefore designed not only for Athenian eyes, but for an outside audience as well. Any visitor to the Acropolis would undoubtedly have gone to see the spectacle of such a statue.

That the attributes and mythology on the figure are to be read in relation to Athens' socio-political identity is signaled by the inclusion of the snake. No other city-state would associate a snake with the goddess. Beyond being a reference to the sacred snake of the city's founder, Erechthonios, it alludes to a mythological lineage according to which all Athenians are indirectly descended from Athena herself. According to myth, Hephaestus attempted to have intercourse with the goddess. When she pushed him away in disgust, some drops of semen fell onto her thigh. She wiped them away with a piece of wool and threw it to the ground, accidentally impregnating Gaia (the Earth). Upon Gaia's refusal to raise the child, Athena claimed him as her own. This was Erechthonios, the founder of Athens and father of all Athenians. He was said to be half-man, half-snake. Thus the snake refers to the special relationship between Athena and Athens.

Within this context, the Nike in Athena's hand is less a representation of a potentiality for all viewers ("Athena can, if she wishes, grant you victory") than a recognition of the successes which have already occurred. Recall that Athena had in fact recently blessed the Athenians with victory not once but twice. The mythological battles which decorate the statue also celebrate Athens' military triumph. Mid-fifth century representations of both the Centauromachy and Amazonomachy functioned as veiled references to both the Persian wars.[43] To include them on a statue of the goddess is to claim divine sanction for the recent historical victory.

At the same time, these battles (along with the Gigantomachy) describe unsuccessful challenges to the rule of *sophrosyne*. In each case a "barbaric" culture attempts to overthrow the representatives of civilized order. The Athenians believed *sophrosyne* to be the most important gift given them by the goddess and held it as their ideal.[44] The Parthenon and the Parthenos overtly demonstrate this interest. Not only do the three battles appear both on the metopes and on the goddess herself (thus reiterating the theme six times), but the *pegasoi* and sphinx on

Athena's helmet allude to *sophrosyne* as well. The viewer cannot miss the underlying message: Athena has selected Athens above other city-states to receive her greatest gift.

Boardman points out that the Pandora relief makes an implicit comparison between Pandora and Athens itself.[45] The Olympians created the first woman to bring their gifts to humankind; contemporary rhetoric in Athens described the city as transferring its virtues (Athena's gifts) to the rest of the Greek world by serving as a model of culture and success.[46] This relief, like other elements of the statue, lends justification to Athens' self-designated role as guide to the rest of Greece. The Parthenos persuasively describes a divine cause for Athens' rise to pre-eminence: Athena made it happen.

The recognition of the statue as celebrating Athena's gifts, though compelling and seemingly complete, nevertheless does not explain the apparent lack of religious activity associated with the Parthenos. Certainly the goddess could have remained an object of worship even in a form which reflected Athens' self-image. More remains to be explored here. What is this cult statue with no cult? What is this temple which appears not to have been used as a religious building? I will address the latter question first, for an exploration of the issues it raises will help to answer the former.

According to some scholars, the Parthenon is stylistically closer to a treasury than to a standard Greek temple. Both Boardman and Stewart point to the ornate sculptural decoration as an element more appropriate to an Archaic treasury; Stewart notes in particular that the Athenian treasury at Delphi sets a clear precedent "not only for the lavish embellishment with patriotic themes, but more specifically for the ring of carved metopes below carved pediments."[47] This is only appropriate, for the temple was in fact itself a treasury: stored in the back room were offerings to Athena and perhaps the tribute collected by Athens from the Delian league.

The temple has also been described as a massive votive, an offering to Athena in thanks for the glory she had brought to Athens. This is based in part on the resemblance of the Panathenaia frieze to contemporary votive relief plaques and in part on the need to offer an explanation for the temple's extreme ostentation. Stewart argues that the Parthenon was "not a cult temple proper but a votive, simultaneously flaunting the city's success over Persia (and others) and offering its fruits as an *agalma* to Athena."[48] This may be true, but I am inclined to see even less religious significance than that. For, as Walter Burkert puts it,

"religious fervor of the kind inspired by the Zeus at Olympia is curiously never mentioned in connection with this image; instead, the weight of the gold is faithfully recorded."[49]

I would like to suggest a new way of looking at the Parthenos and what it tells us about the relationship between Athens and Athena. Consider the following: 1) A cult statue is generally considered to be a locus in which the divine is temporarily fixed or localized; the goddess is in effect present (however briefly or incompletely) in the figure. 2) She is placed within human space—the viewer can walk up and encounter her directly—and, in spite of the Parthenos' colossal stature, is therefore limited and in some ways controlled.[50] 3) Athenian interests and concerns are mapped onto Athena in the figure of the Parthenos, as I have shown, for she is clothed in and accompanied by overt references to the greatness of the city. 4) This image stands within a treasury and is thus equated with that which can be accumulated and owned. 5) The statue itself is constructed out of Athens' treasure: the gold which clothed the Parthenos included melted-down coins from tribute. According to Thucydides, Perikles described that gold as a source of emergency cash.[51] In fact Plutarch notes that Perikles had asked that the statue be designed in such a way that the gold could be easily removed and weighed.[52]

Taken together, these points lead to a notion of the goddess herself as yet another possession claimed by Athens. Standard scholarship describes the Parthenos as representing Athens more than Athena, or even as equating the two. The image is seen as a patriotic reflection of the relationship between city and goddess, for it represents all the virtues that Athens has received. My understanding of the statue is different. Rather than defining Athens in terms of the gifts brought by Athena, I see this image as defining Athena in terms of Athens. References to the recent wars and to qualities which Perikles apparently thought to be uniquely Athenian cover the statue. Her powers are thus described in an Athenian vocabulary, her nature understood as manifested in Athenian history.

Although she was the patron goddess of several other Greek cities, Athena's greatest festival took place in Athens. Every four years, visitors streamed into the city to take part in the celebration. They would undoubtedly have stopped by the Parthenon to view the image, and could not have missed its patriotic claims. The placement of the snake by Athena's side intimates that Athens is her favored city. It suggests as well that the snake (and therefore the city) defines an essential part of

her nature, for it is included among other attributes which have that function. In this way Athens has announced to the world that the goddess is its own: the relationship between Athena and Athens is transformed into a defining element of the goddess as a whole and is no longer understood as one of many roles.

This suggestion of possession becomes tangible reality in the form of the statue itself. It stands within a treasury and is actually clothed in Athens' wealth. Perikles' comment demonstrates the degree to which the goddess is objectified. For in spite of any other significance the figure might have had, it could still be viewed as little more than part of Athens' financial reserves. Insofar as a deity is present in its cult statue, Athena is equated with all the other good things Athens has accumulated. This is not a representation of a goddess who brings gifts; rather, it is a covert claim to ownership of the goddess herself. Athens is accordingly able to assert its superiority over the other city-states more emphatically than ever.

Yet this is once again a limited image of divinity, here because it describes the deity entirely in terms of the mundane. Athena's importance is indicated not by reference to her unlimited power, but instead by evocation of the earthly glory of Athens. This is, metaphorically speaking, to image that which is beyond form in a vocabulary consisting only of form. As a propagandistic statue, however, the Parthenos overtly and persuasively celebrates the seemingly limitless potency of the city and furthers its claim to divinely sanctioned pre-eminence. The absence of formal religious activity is appropriate: the Parthenos could be an object of reverence only insofar as she demonstrated the wealth and power of the city which owned her.

The "Parthenos": side-stepping the problem of overdefinition

However revealing such a reading of the statue may be, it does not solve an intriguing problem: why was the figure called "Parthenos"? As I noted above, no religious activity has been connected with Athena under this title; it appears instead to be a literary epithet. A clue lies, I believe, in the fact that in all the texts which survive regarding the plans for and construction of the Parthenon and its sculptures, not once is the statue called "Athena Parthenos".[53] The first documented reference to the statue under this name comes some twenty years after its completion, not in a religious inscription but in a comedy by Aristophanes.[54] Rather than a name given to the statue by those who designed it, "Parthenos" is instead perhaps a nickname; if it were an official title one would expect to find it in at least one decree or religious inscription. I

would like to describe a purpose this "nickname" might have served, as well as offer an explanation for its creation. My discussion will be pertinent to the conclusions I came to above, for I see the new name as an attempt to grapple with some of the problems raised by the statue.

The word *parthenos* is most often translated as 'virgin', but this is imprecise. Guilia Sissa argues that the term refers rather to the state of being an unmarried woman, "the expectant hiatus between childhood and *gamos* [marriage]."[55] According to her study, a *parthenos* need not be a virgin at all. The assumption that for the Greeks the two concepts were synonymous is widespread, however, and has engendered some odd interpretations of the Athena Parthenos' significance. C. J. Herington, for example, attempts to explain the name as a possible cult epithet. He states that "in antiquity the notion 'virgin' was particularly associated with pugnacity. . . .the unwedded Amazons were essentially warriors....'Athena Parthenos' [thus] referred to a warlike aspect of the goddess."[56] Aside from his obvious error in assuming that the Amazons were not sexually active (myths indicate that they were), his explanation leans heavily on specious etymological relationships (e.g. *virgo*, 'virgin', and *virago*, 'masculine woman').

I believe that when applied to Athena, "Parthenos" is a literary epithet with no such hidden etymological significance as Herington finds. For the term refers not to a biological state (virginity), but to a lifestage (unmarried woman). It is an appropriate title for any representation of Athena, for an essential part of her nature is that she is eternally between childhood and marriage, never demonstrating any inclination to cross either line. Yet the *application* of this term to the statue has particular significance which should not be overlooked. I would like to introduce an angle from which we can view the Parthenos which suggests that its name may be closely connected to its failure to offer a generalized image of the goddess.

Mircea Eliade describes the development of representations of divinity in terms of "symbols" (defined as images which are not human) and anthropomorphic figures. According to his history, the earliest depictions of gods were purely "symbolic" (e.g. thunderbolt = Zeus). At some point these symbols were supplanted by anthropomorphic images; the symbols then became attributes (e.g. Zeus holds the thunderbolt).[57] The locus of meaning has not changed; although the human form has emerged as the primary visual element, it is still the attribute (symbol) that identifies the god and reminds us of the figure's divinity.

Although I would not argue that Eliade's claim is accurate for all (or even most) cultures, I find it helpful in understanding the Parthenos. For the statue could be said to add a final step to his history: here the "symbols" have once again emerged as the dominant element. The Parthenos clearly belongs to a tradition of anthropomorphic images. Yet, as I have discussed, the figure gives no sense of a living presence beneath the symbolic elements (i.e. attributes and myths) which cover her. The body is instead a showcase for disparate units of meaning. Where Eliade's notion assumes cohesion and balance between the anthropomorphic figure and its attribute(s), the Parthenos offers none. The result is a conflicted image. The form beneath the attributes, which should theoretically unite them, almost disappears in the chaos of their insistent presence.

To call the statue "Parthenos", a term which necessarily describes a human (or human-like) being, is to place emphasis on and establish the primacy of the anthropomorphic character of the image. The effect is similar, though different in kind, to that achieved by the frieze and the bronze cult statue discussed above. In each case a narrative of some kind is created around the goddess. At the same time, to title the statue with a specific lifestage is to side-step the problem of her incoherent identity altogether. For the name unites all of Athena's individual roles by appealing to the one thing each guise has in common: she is consistently a *parthenos*. Such an inclusive epithet transforms the Athena Parthenos into something closer to a generalized image of the goddess.

By the time Aristophanes used the "nickname" in his play, twenty years had passed since the statue's creation. Athens' socio-political position had changed dramatically; beginning in 431 the city-state was engaged for twenty-seven years in a losing war against Sparta and its allies. A devastating plague hit in 430, killing Perikles. By the war's end in 404 Athens had lost a third of its male citizens and was starved into surrender. As I have shown, the Athena Parthenos and its patriotic claims were specific to a particular political moment. The statue, in and of itself an incoherent image, was coherent only as a political statement to the rest of Greece. Once that political moment passed, the statue would have been reduced to an incoherent representation. The "nickname" recorded by Aristophanes may indicate an attempt to restore coherence to a figure which could function only within an extremely specific cultural context.

Such a history of the Parthenos demonstrates the fluidity of meaning inherent in images; here as in most kinds of visual representation it is

context and words which create and reveal significance. Perhaps the most basic limitation of sacred art is that it can never capture a universal or permanent sense of the divine. One could speculate that any religious image, by virtue of the limitations of its mundane vocabulary, is coherent only within the specific cultural moment of its production.



Fig. 1. Reconstruction of the Athena Parthenos (447-438 BC) and the interior of the Parthenon, after Stewart. Drawn by Candace Smith.



Fig. 2. "Aphrodite" from the Agora, c. 420 BC. Athens, Agora Museum.



Fig. 3. "Genetrix Aphrodite". Roman copy of Greek late 5th c. BC original. Paris, Louvre.



Fig. 4. Aphrodite Kallipygos. Roman copy of Greek 3rd c. BC original. Naples, Museo Nazionale.

Fig. 5. "Aphrodite Anadyomene". Roman copy of Greek 3rd c. BC original. Rome, Vatican Museum.



Fig. 6. Attic red-figured hydria, c. 420 BC. Beazley ARV 1315,1.

Fig. 7. "Varvakeion Athena". Roman small-scale replica of the Athena Parthenos. Athens, National Museum.

Fig. 8. Athena from the Piraeus, c. 350 BC. Piraeus Museum.



Fig. 9. Cut-away view of the Parthenon (447-432 BC).



Fig. 10. Sculptural program of the Parthenon. After Stewart.



Fig. 11. Reconstruction of the east pediment of the Parthenon (438-432 BC). After Boardman: the Basel reconstruction. (Athena is just left of figure H)

Fig. 12. Reconstruction of the west pediment of the Parthenon (438-432 BC). After Boardman: the Basel reconstruction.



Fig. 13. Drawing of the east metopes of the Parthenon (447-442 BC). After Boardman. (Athena is in panel 4)



Fig. 14. Drawing of the east frieze of the Parthenon (442-438 BC). After Boardman. (Athena is figure 36).



Fig. 15. East frieze of the Parthenon. Detail: Athena and Hephaestus. London, British Museum.

Fig. 16. "Varvakeion Athena". Detail.

Fig. 17. Athena from the temple of Aphaia at Aegina, west pediment (c. 490-475 BC). Munich, Glyptothek.

1. See, e.g., Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 1-4. This paper evolved out of an informal presentation given in a seminar. I am indebted to Professor Andrew Stewart and the other students in the seminar for general help and specific suggestions throughout. Whenever possible I have noted their particular contributions. Special thanks are due to Rainer Mack for his patient midwifery.
2. In the study of ancient cultures this problem is often exacerbated by a paucity of texts; these objects may be the only remaining "evidence" for religious activity. The "mother goddess" controversy offers an instructive example: some archaeologists, upon finding stone figurines of women, hypothesized the existence of a mother goddess cult. Various scholars subsequently drew on that hypothesis to explain these and other figurines of women as being part of the same type of religious expression. For a discussion of this particular issue, see Joan B. Townsend, "The Goddess: Fact, Fallacy, and Revitalization Movement" in L. Hurtado, ed., *Goddesses in Religions and Modern Debate* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 179-203, esp. 187. I owe this reference to Danielle Aiello.
3. See, e.g., Mircea Eliade, "Divinities: Art and the Divine" in Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, ed., *Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts* (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1986), 55-63.
4. This will be discussed in more detail below. Most of the knowledge of Greek religion in this paper comes from lectures given by Professor Anthony Bulloch (UC Berkeley: Classics 121, Spring 1992).
5. An *aegis* is a protective covering made of animal skin, worn over the shoulders and chest in battle. Athena's *aegis* is an essential attribute; she wears it in virtually every extant representation.
6. Throughout this paper I will use "mythology", "mythological narrative", and "myth" to refer broadly to both myths and legends. Although in a strict folkloristic sense this is incorrect, it follows standard practice in the field of Classics. The more precise terminology of folkloristics distinguishes between the two genres on the basis of the point in time at which the narrative is located: *myth* is defined as a sacred narrative explaining the origins of the universe up to the moment of the creation of human beings; *legends* are those narratives told as historical truth which take place after the moment of creation. For an extremely clear discussion of these terms, see Alan Dundes' introduction to William Bascom, "The Forms of Folklore: Prose Narratives" in Dundes, ed., *Sacred Narrative* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 5-6.
7. For the original descriptions on which scholars have based their reconstructions, see Pausanias I.xxiv.5-7 and Pliny, *Natural History* 36.18.
8. Women in Classical Athens were effectively in purdah; the closest contemporary analogue might be the place of women in traditional Muslim societies today. For a penetrating discussion of the perception and role of women in ancient Greek society, see Anne Carson, "Putting Her in Her Place" in David Halperin et. al., ed., *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 135-169.
9. Andrew Stewart, *Greek Sculpture: An Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 167.
10. Personal communication: May 18, 1992. This definition was not entirely in jest, for the literal translation of *kallipygos* is "beautiful *(kallos)* rump or buttocks *(pygos)*".
11. Evelyn Harrison, "Athena and Athens in the East Pediment of the Parthenon," *American Journal of Archaeology* 71 (1967):27-58. This appears to be a standard interpretive technique; I found it in studies of the Parthenon as diverse as Charles Walston's *Essays on the Art of Pheidias* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1885) and Stewart's *Greek Sculpture* (1990).
12. Anthony Bulloch suggests that juxtaposition (what he called "polarities") works in mythological texts to indicate a god's nature; his idea is applicable as well to art. Lecture, UC Berkeley: Classics 121.
13. The following reading owes much to a conversation regarding the vase with Rainer Mack.
14. Homer, *Iliad* 1.551 (Hera) and 1.560 (Zeus). Andrew Stewart alerted me to the literary use of 'Athena Parthenos'; C. J. Herington mentions it in *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias*, 9-10.

15. Some scholars have suggested that she held a spear and perhaps an owl in her right hand. This possibility does not undermine my reading of the image, for neither of these attributes is specific to any one of the five forms in which she was worshipped on the Acropolis.
16. See Martin Robertson, *A Shorter History of Greek Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 90.
17. Stewart, *Greek Sculpture,* 151.
18. John Boardman, *Greek Sculpture: The Classical Period* (London: Thames and Hudson, Ltd., 1985), 169; Harrison, "Athena and Athens in the East Pediment of the Parthenon," 70.
19. The subject matter of this and the west pediment is known from Pausanias' description of the temple in the second century AD. See Pausanias 1.24.5. Harrison's article provides an instructive example of the methodology involved in the reconstruction of architectural sculpture. Her study is an often technical attempt to imagine how the figures in the east pediment may have been grouped.
20. Lecture, UC Berkeley: Art History 141B. February 25, 1992.
21. Lecture, UC Berkeley: Classics 121. March 5, 1992.
22. The notion of a continual struggle between order and chaos (the civilized and the barbaric) was central to contemporary Athenian thought. J.J. Pollitt provides a detailed discussion of the issue in the first chapter of his *Art and Experience in Classical Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 3-14. The Athenians thought of themselves as a rational, ordered civilization, one which must fight continuously against irrational neighboring groups: mythologically, the Centaurs and Amazons; mytho-historically, the Trojans; historically, the Persians. Representations of each of these battles appear throughout Classical Athenian art and indicate the city-state's desire to define itself by its victory over these groups.
23. Stewart, *Greek Sculpture,* 153.
24. Some consider north metope 32 to represent her as well. I am not entirely comfortable with this identification, so I will not discuss the image here. For a reproduction of north 32, see Boardman, *Classical Period,* figure 88.
25. Boardman, *Classical Period,* 120.
26. The identification of this figure is based on the presence of an attribute. Tucked under the god's right arm is a crutch; Hephaestus is the only lame Olympian.
27. The image suggests rather that she is all these things simultaneously. Richard Neer pointed out to me that the *peplos* itself strengthens this reading, for a representation of the Gigantomachy (signalling Athena as Promachos) is physically *woven into* the fabric. The two roles are inseparable, or even one and the same; neither is overlaid onto the other.
28. For decrees concerning sacrifice and other aspects of the Panathenaia, see David G. Rice and John E. Stambaugh, *Sources for the Study of Greek Religion* (Atlanta:Scholars Press, 1979), 119-120.
29. Boardman, *Classical Period,* 111.
30. My analysis of the relationship between these narratives and the particular roles of the goddess they suggest diverges from the approach I have taken elsewhere in this paper. This is because the narratives on the statue present a very different problem than that posed by the location of the deity *within* a specific narrative context. Here the goddess does not appear in the myths depicted. Instead, a connection between the goddess and the outcome of the myth is suggested by virtue of the presence of the latter on the statue. Rather than attempting to fit these narratives into the second category of strategies, one might better understand them as a complex form of attribute.
31. See note 16 for a discussion of contemporary thought regarding the struggle between order and chaos.
32. The myth functions simultaneously as a warning against *hybris,* for Pandora disobeys an order (an offense which runs counter to the ideal of *sophrosyne* for women) and opens the box containing all things which trouble humankind. For *sophrosyne* for women, see Helen North, "The Mythology of Sophrosyne," in her *From Myth to Icon: Reflections of Greek Ethical Doctrine in Literature and Art* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 23-86, esp. 47-54.

33. Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1983), 101.
34. Figure 21 is an example from a different genre; this is not a cult statue, but the central figure from a group of pedimental sculptures. As such, the question of presenting a generalized (all-encompassing) image is not an issue. Rather, the comparison is included here to discuss the use of these strategies to *specify*.
35. The following paragraph grew out of an initial suggestion from Rainer Mack.
36. See, e.g., Herington, *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias,* 16-27 (point 1), 56 (point 2), 37 (point 3); Harrison, "Athena and Athens in the East Pediment of the Parthenon," passim (point 2); Boardman, *Classical Period,* 96 (points 1,2,3); Burkert, *Greek Religion,* 143 (point 1); Stewart, *Greek Sculpture,* 157-158 (point 2), 152 (point 3).
37. On the Periklean building program, see e.g. Plutarch, *Life of Pericles* 12.1-13.8.
38. Thucydides 2.41.1.
39. Pausanias 1.26.7.
40. Herington, *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias,* 7.
41. This question provides the basis for much of Herington's discussion of the two statues. Although I am not entirely in agreement with several of his conclusions, he lays out the problem extremely clearly. The following analysis owes a great deal to his work, for at points where I was not convinced by his theories I was inspired to develop my own ideas in the opposite direction.
42. For this understanding of the sculptures of the Parthenon, see Herington, *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias,* 59-66; Harrison, "Athena and Athens in the East Pediment of the Parthenon," 53; Boardman, *Classical Period,* 168-174 (esp. 173-174); and Stewart, *Greek Sculpture,* 43, 158-159.
43. Indirect rather than direct representation of the Persian wars was necessary, for to celebrate such a recent victory openly would be hybristic.
44. Stewart, *Greek Sculpture,* 158.
45. Boardman, *Classical Period,* 174.
46. See Perikles' funeral oration (431 BC), Thucydides 2.35-41.
47. Stewart, *Greek Sculpture,* 152; Boardman, *Classical Period,* 96.
48. Stewart, *Greek Sculpture,* 152. An *agalma,* as defined by Stewart, is "a statue, especially one offered to a god." *Greek Sculpture,* 367.
49. Burkert, *Greek Religion,* 143. The Zeus of Olympia was another colossal gold and ivory image made by the same sculptor, Pheidias. It was created after the Parthenos.
50. Bulloch has suggested that sanctuaries create a space in which the god can be met safely, since myths show unprotected encounters with the gods to be extremely dangerous. (Lecture, UC Berkeley: Classics 121.) Is this perhaps because the divine is in a sense captured (tamed) within the walls of the temple and in the form of the cult statue?
51. "[Perikles] added still further that...if they should be cut off from all other resources, they could use the gold plates which were placed on the goddess herself. For the statue, he pointed out, had forty talents of pure gold, and it was all removable." Thucydides, 2.13.5. As translated in J.J. Pollitt, *The Art of Ancient Greece: Sources and Documents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 58.
52. Plutarch, *Life of Pericles* 31.
53. See Pollitt, *Sources,* 190 for references to inscriptions regarding the construction of and expenses for the Athena Parthenos and the Parthenon.
54. Aristophanes, *Birds* 670: "what a quantity of gold she has, like the Parthenos!" (as translated in Walter Miller, *Daedalus and Thespis: The Contributions of the Ancient Dramatic Poets to Our Knowledge of the Arts and Crafts of Greece* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970), Vol. 2: 370. Andrew Stewart alerted me to the presence of the name in one of Aristophanes' plays.
55. Giulia Sissa, *Greek Virginity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 76.
56. Herington, *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias,* 11-12.
57. Eliade, "Divinities: Art and the Divine," 59.

From the Village to the Front: Cambodian Peasants and Revolution 1970-1975

Justin Horner

On April 17, 1975, the United States-supported government of Lon Nol was overthrown by the forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, thus creating the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea. The years that followed were to be reflected upon by many scholars as the worst in the history of 20th century revolutions. Although scholars have extensively chronicled the violence of the "Pol Pot clique" after victory, there is a marked lack of consideration of pre-revolutionary Khmer Rouge recruitment and mobilization. In the case of the Cambodian revolution, scholars tend to imply that the repressive "revolutionary" regime was simply the ends of an equally coercive means of mobilization.[1] I will attempt to disprove this line of reasoning. In the first section, through an economic and sociological examination, I will argue that the Cambodian revolution in fact enjoyed mass popular support in its earliest defining stages. In the second section I will discuss the Cambodian revolution and its significance to the study of theories of social change. In handling the Cambodian revolution, scholars often focus on the behavior of various "players" in their race to control the state.[2] How these groups are formed, enriched, and expanded is not as important as the power these groups possess, the actions of their leadership, and the consequences of their activity. This emphasis on the ends of revolutionary processes ignores what I believe to be the most important impact of social movements: the inspiration and mobilization of people to change their own lives. I will provide a more fundamental understanding of the Cambodian revolution by accounting for the creation and consolidation of the Khmer Rouge. By discussing the revolution's particularity and conformity in relation to theories of

social change, I will also emphasize the importance of a broad-based, "bottom-up" sociological outlook, as opposed to a more political power-based perspective, in understanding revolutionary movements and their outcomes.

I Pre-Revolutionary Cambodia

In order to understand Cambodia and its revolution, one must understand the Cambodian peasant. To examine the peasant is to gain insight into the nature of Cambodian village organization and economy. From a comprehension of village life, one then learns the importance of other elements (moneylenders, merchants, etc.) from outside the village. These village-level discussions and the pre-revolutionary policies of the central Cambodian government need to be examined together. Therefore, the pattern of social organizational handicap and economic mismanagement which laid fertile ground for revolution becomes apparent.

In his book, *The Warrior Heritage*, Dr. Seanglim Bit outlines the psychology of the Cambodian peasant. At the center of the Cambodian belief system are Theravada Buddhism and folk practices, which "hold resignation and passive acceptance to be the proper course of human existence."[3] Within this setting, the individual is not encouraged to pursue material or psychological distinction. Codes of behavior among individuals are passed from generation to generation in traditional folk laws *(chbab)*. These codes emphasize maintenance of hierarchy, conformity, and self-control. Bit claims that the Cambodian has a dual self-perception. Coupled with the conformity and order of *chbab,* is a pride in the ancient glory of the Khmer Empire. This contradiction between past glory and present condition is resolved by a "denial of reality," and a deterministic outlook that sees hierarchy and dominance as essentially Cambodian. Since the structure of society is considered immutable, an individual's particular position in society is seldom questioned or challenged. At the same time, Cambodians also believe that no one else should be depended upon to guarantee one's security; that is each person's own concern. It is this set of cultural beliefs which inhibits "new responses and innovations which might move the society forward...and generate the 'human capital' so critically needed to modernize society."[4] The traditional Cambodian psychology is a major impediment to revolutionary mobilization. It discourages the envisioning of a different egalitarian society, and undermines the self-confidence needed to achieve it.

Whether modernization or revolution were halted just because of individual inaction is a serious question. Cambodia's psychological "tradition" both helped to create and perpetuate a social structure that also discouraged change. An analysis of this structure is essential to understanding the course of the Cambodian revolution. May Ebihara, in her 1959 investigation of a single Cambodian village, states that the majority of peasants in her village were owners and cultivators of land, as well as owners of their own agricultural means of production. Men and women were both allowed to own land, and subsequently passed it down to both daughters and sons in a system of partible inheritance.[5] Families produced their own subsistence, and supplemented their economic position with other foods and handicrafts produced within the household. The village operated by what Ebihara terms a "domestic mode of production," a system characterized by the use of low-technology means of production to meet household demands.

In addition to its role as an economic locus, the village also had a cultural function. The village was "an aggregate of known and trusted kinsmen, friends and neighbors."[6] Bilateral inheritance, that is inheritance through both the maternal and paternal lines, guaranteed that each member of a family would have many relatives with whom to associate, since successive generations would be tied to the same plot of land. Ebihara goes on to note that there were no organized kin groups beyond the extended family, few communal activities, and no organized clubs or associations. There were observable differences in prosperity among villagers and peasants often classified others according to their ability to meet subsistence. However, this awareness of difference did not carry a connotation of superiority or inferiority. Ebihara notes:

> ...material wealth in and of itself was not the basis for high status among fellow villagers. Rather, individuals were given special respect or prestige based on qualities such as age, religiosity, and especially "good character."[7]

Most villagers considered themselves modest to poor peasants, and the lack of conspicuous displays of luxury by those with greater means fortified this image.[8]

Basically, the Cambodian village was a collection of families who acted to protect and reserve resources for their members—there was no tradition of Cambodian village communalism which could be called upon to aid in revolutionary mobilization. However, there were other "agents" which lent unpredictability and fluctuation to village life. The Cambodian village was primarily made up of subsistence cultivators.

Ebihara points out that "villagers were by no means economically self-sufficient but were tied into a national (and ultimately global) market economy that required money."[9] The precarious balance between meeting subsistence, obtaining capital, and assuring a stable future typified the market-peasant relationship in Cambodia which ultimately led to widespread peasant dissatisfaction.

Before an analysis of market forces will be valuable, it is important to trace the changes in land tenure in twentieth century Cambodia. These changes are important for two reasons. First, they outline the problem of insufficient agricultural modernization and modification. Second, they explain the resulting development of the two main peasant groups who found the Khmer Rouge program attractive: the debt-ridden middle peasantry, and the landless.

According to the system of partible inheritance, upon death, a peasant's land was divided equally among his or her children. This system tied all family members to the same general plot of land. According to Hu Nim, land parcellization was one of Cambodia's grossest economic problems. In his 1965 doctoral thesis, Nim contends that parcellization in Cambodia created two major developmental problems: lower productivity and hindrance to innovation. Lower productivity resulted from both reduced production and higher cost. Because of repeated division and subdivision, border regions between plots (estimated at between 200,000 and 400,000 hectares[10]) were neglected and plots themselves become too small and scattered. Higher costs resulted from both wasted time and inefficient use of tools that were designed for use on larger plots. Hindrance to innovation was the result of a lack of large-scale collective developmental enterprises (such as irrigation) which were not possible given scattered holdings. Parcellization obstructed modernization, locked the peasant into routine, and prevented a rise in the standard of living.

Parcellization also facilitated the concentration of lands into the hands of large landowners, as peasants had to sell their small plots in hopes of survival. According to Ben Kiernan, throughout the middle of the twentieth century there was a growing polarization within the peasant population. As some peasants had been able to consolidate a few more hectares to assure subsistence, others sold their lands in hopes of survival. Kiernan argues that by the late-1960s:

> Alongside a landowning and (in that respect) more independent middle peasant group, there was also a class of rootless,

> destitute rural dwellers *with very few ties to the land*...[who] had nothing at all to lose in any kind of social revolution.[11]

Although the majority of the rural population was of the "middle peasantry," a sizeable landless underclass had begun to appear for the first time in Cambodian history.

Though inequitable land distribution was a problem for the peasantry as a whole, the middle peasants faced additional problems. Although many owned their own land and means of production, they lacked operating capital as well as village-based cooperative associations to help muster that capital. According to Hon Yuon, "At every point the peasant needs money, to pay debts, pay taxes, buy seed, and rent land, farm equipment and stock..."[12] It was in search of this cash that many peasants were drawn to the village moneylenders, who were often ethnic Chinese. Once an initial loan was taken out, the process of repayment at exorbitant interest rates (sometimes 10% to 12% monthly) consumed sizeable portions of an already tenuous harvest. Ben Kiernan points out that "the fact that large numbers of Khmer peasants owned small holdings gave their land very little scarcity value...Land was not accepted as collateral on loans."[13] However, land was confiscated and labor appropriated for the inability to pay loans. According to Jean Delvert's 1952 study, an estimated 75% of the Cambodian peasantry owed debts of more than 1000 riels each (30 riels=1 US dollar). Similar studies estimate common rates of indebtedness among the peasantry above 60%, and comparable percentages of loans unpaid.[14]

It was not only the moneylender who laid claims upon the peasantry. To obtain cash peasants had to take their rice to market. Yuon diagnosed the problem of rural trade as one of a lack of peasant organization:

> Peasants do not organize themselves...They *compete* to sell their produce...Confronting the peasants who are not organized, who are individualistic and independent-minded, are the merchants who have their institutions and leaders.[15]

This lack of organization can be related to both individual psychological priorities and atomized village structures. Yuon sees market organization as a problem of culture: traditional Cambodian versus capitalist French. "Feudal Kampuchea did not lack for buying and selling, but they were not the bases of its existence, as in modern society."[16]

Rate of sale was not the only market threat. W. E. Willmott explains the role of the ethnic Chinese merchant most clearly:

> The rural merchant exploited the peasant in three capacities: as retail storekeeper, as rice-buyer, and as money lender...he encouraged rural consumption of urban commodities and made a profit between city and peasant. By buying the harvest surplus at low prices and selling it to urban mills, he made a profit between peasant and city. By providing credit...he made a profit from usurious interest rates.[17]

Laura Summers states in her examination of pre-revolutionary Cambodian economy: "the principal problem in agriculture was *Chinese* control of rural commerce and credit and *Chinese* diversion of wealth from primary producers and the Khmer state."[18] Summers sees economic problems stemming from ethnic Chinese infiltration into the rural economy.[19] But can the Chinese be blamed completely? Did not the central government of Cambodia have any available resources to spur production and modernization?

According to Summers, the central government did have some resources with which to aid the peasantry. However, she goes on to point out that while resources were by no means extravagant, the few resources that were mobilized were misguided and subject to embezzlement. Throughout the regime of Prince Sihanouk, poor accounting, unstable weather conditions, growing population, and the irregularity of the international rice market all contributed to a shortfall in state tax revenues. Summers attributes Sihanouk's inability to deal suitably with these crises to the "contradiction between a political economy of growth and a political economy functioning in accordance with *status* considerations".[20] Central Cambodian economic policy was grounded in the preservation of elite status, consumption, privilege, and domination, rather than principles of rural development and productivity. Resources were optimized by the central government in accordance with traditional Khmer status criteria, and not international and national capitalist market criteria.

Khmer Rouge ideology focused on the Maoist contradiction between the oppressive landlord and the peasant. In actuality, the problem of the peasantry was its own disorganization coupled with exploitation by the rural merchant and the faulty economic priorities of the centralized administration. In conclusion, those with available resources had a vested interest in continuing the cycle of indebtedness, default, and dependency. Since the producing class had no cultural or structural avenues for development, Cambodia in 1970 remained a country

operating with 19th century technologies and a traditional social structure within a largely pre-industrial economy.

The Cambodian Civil War and Revolution

From 1970 to 1975, Cambodia was embroiled in a civil war. On one side stood the nationalist troops of U.S.-supported dictator Lon Nol, who overthrew the popular regime of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970. On the other stood various rebel groups, both Communist and non-Communist, residing primarily in the countryside. The rural society and economy were drastically disrupted, and in many areas completely eliminated by the effects of the civil war. The Khmer Rouge, as well as all other Communist groups, were driven underground by Prince Sihanouk after the 1967 Samlaut tax rebellion. Once U.S. bombing of the countryside began in 1969, surveillance and counter actions against the insurgent Khmer Rouge became more difficult, not only because of disrupted communications, but because of growing peasant support for the Khmer Rouge. After the coup of 1970, the immensely popular Prince Sihanouk announced, from exile in Peking, the creation of the Royal Government of National Unity of Kampuchea (French acronym: GRUNK). The organization of this group in the countryside was delegated to and undertaken by formerly small Khmer Rouge forces. In the first two years of the civil war, much of the heaviest fighting against Lon Nol's troops was waged by North Vietnamese forces defending the Ho Chi Minh trail. These clashes gave the Khmer Rouge plenty of time and room to move throughout the countryside garnering peasant support.

But why did peasants join and support the Khmer Rouge? W.E. Willmott posits three reasons. First, Sihanouk's popularity won many peasants over to the rebel forces. Second, in 1970, as Lon Nol needed help establishing order in the countryside immediately after his coup, he called upon Saigon to send forces into Cambodia. Given centuries-old Vietnamese-Cambodian animosity this plan was a major blunder with considerable negative political consequences which manifested themselves in support for the rebels. Finally, Willmott claims that the U.S. bombing, which uprooted many peasants, led to increased peasant backing as their only alternative was refugee status and movement to the U.S.-controlled cities.[21]

All of these explanations hold a certain degree of truth, but a major problem remains unaddressed. Willmott tries to account for peasant support of the Khmer Rouge by giving reasons why the peasantry chose not to support the government. Willmott's proposals are useful in

explaining initial membership and support, but fall short when accounting for peasant willingness to sacrifice their lives. Although Willmott sets up a choice for the peasants between joining the rebels or fleeing to the cities, he does not explain why peasants would choose to die to defend the rebel movement rather than flee to the cities. To answer the question of why Cambodian peasants were eventually willing to reorganize their individual lives, relocate, fight, and die for the cause of the Khmer Rouge, it is important to examine the factors of "pull:" those concrete benefits the Khmer Rouge offered the Cambodian peasantry from the earliest days of liberation in 1970.

It is important to keep in mind that although GRUNK was organized by the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer Rouge's overtly Communist ideology and identity were kept secret from the people of Cambodia until 1977, two years after the victory of the revolution. Although Willmott contends that peasant support sprouted from a nationalist spirit within the rebel movement, he does not address the fact that much of what the Khmer Rouge introduced into the countryside was strikingly non-traditional, and therefore, non-*Khmer*. Concepts of "nationalism" and "patriotism" were not predominant aspects of Cambodian peasant psychology, making reliance upon them insufficient for mobilization.[22] Similarly, "communism" was not a welcome concept to the peasantry because of its association with the Vietnamese, as well as its traditional identification as an extremely radical idea. The Khmer Rouge did not initially offer the peasantry of Cambodia a conventional ideological package, but a new and effective system of agricultural production, and an unprecedented sense of individual worth and dignity. This offered possible remedies to both the structural and psychological impediments to Cambodian modernization and cooperation.

Although reconstitution programs were instituted by the Khmer Rouge after their 1975 takeover, many of the same land reforms had been undertaken in certain rural areas as early as 1970. According to George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, there were six basic agricultural reforms: reduction in rents and interest rates, matching of landless peasants and untilled land, reorganization of labor from family-based to cooperative labor and mutual-aid teams, mobilization of previously unproductive peasants (monks, children, the elderly), centralized rice storage and redistribution, and most importantly, irrigation construction which allowed for two, and sometimes three crops per year (as opposed to the traditional one).[23] These programs promised to end the particular problems of both the landless and debt-ridden middle peas-

antry. They also addressed and solved many of the structural problems of Cambodian village economy: nonproductiveness, parcellization, and an atomized agricultural labor system.

However, these material considerations may not have been as decisive in earning peasant loyalty as the psychological and cultural reforms implied by the behavior of Khmer Rouge cadre. Ith Sarin, a Khmer Rouge cadre who spent much of 1972 in the Cambodian countryside, and who later left the Khmer Rouge, describes their relations with the peasantry:

> The object of the discipline of the Khmer Rouge *Angkar* ["The Organization"] which is most important is not to disturb the "ways of the people." Each Khmer Rouge must absolutely take a modest and simple attitude with the people...being "together with the people" in order "to serve the people."[24]

These Maoist principles of respect and admiration for the people in order to learn from them and serve them were highly influential. Sarin continues:

> These kinds of psychological activities were really successful and deeply affected the people more than the instruction in theory did. The farming people of the base areas who knew nothing of socialist revolution quickly began to love and support the *Angkar* because of its sentiments of openness and friendliness.[25]

It was not only respectful behavior that won peasant support. As more peasants chose to support the Khmer Rouge, political education programs enlightened many of them to the connections between their own rural situations and national and international economic trends. Although Sihanouk had permitted peasants to enter governmental posts, it was only after elite education and socialization. The Khmer Rouge took peasants on their own terms. Elizabeth Becker writes:

> The Khmer Rouge combined appeals of Khmer national pride with communist prescriptions for greater economic and political justice. It was the first time in Cambodian history that the rural people were being asked to play a significant role in a social movement, and the effect was profound.[26]

Although material incentives do explain to a certain extent peasant support of the Khmer Rouge, dying for land reform makes far less sense

then a willingness to kill and die to preserve a powerful new found identity, and the promise of a fairer life.

II The Cambodian Revolution and Theories of Social Change

How well does the course of this revolution's development correspond to contemporary theories of revolutionary change? To answer this question, I will consider certain aspects of the theories of James Scott, Samuel Popkin, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly. In my analysis, I will show that pre-revolutionary Cambodian village structure differed in many important ways from Scott and Popkin's ideas of the "typical" Southeast Asian village. Skocpol's discussion of the agrarian situation in China before the Chinese Revolution creates a broader framework in which to examine Cambodian village-level situation. However, her overall structural approach is inadequate for explaining the mechanics of the entire revolution. I find that Charles Tilly's "resource-mobilization" theory, by leaving the most room for individual peculiarities within social movements, is the most appropriate theory to explain the Cambodian revolution.

But first the question, "why theory?" needs to be asked. Why attempt to fit a particular historical event within the limits of a theoretical model? Theory has two explanatory powers: a positive aspect and a normative aspect. The positive aspect works to explain the phenomenon. It is the *how*. The normative aspect works to either offer or imply the solution, reason, or significance of a phenomenon. It is the *why*. By using an accurate theoretical model, causes and effects can be more conveniently determined, methodologies can be tested, and relevances confirmed. The four theorists under consideration all attempt to account for the phenomenon of revolution using different requirements, interactions, and consequences. Since their positive aspects differ, their normative conclusions will suggest different explanations, and draw different conclusions. Comparative theoretical considerations help us understand not only what is necessary and instrumental, but what is supplementary and irrelevant.

For Scott and Popkin, both writing specifically about rebellion and revolution in Southeast Asia, the character of any particular revolt is directly influenced by the structure of traditional village life. In Scott's view, a rebellion is an act of outrage, an act of moral repugnance against the "penetration" of non-traditional economic and social relations, namely, market capitalism. Therefore, "moral economy theory" (as Scott's school is called) sees rebellions as "backward looking." Scott's observation of peasant unwillingness to risk minimum subsistence

would indicate that a peasant would fight for the *most reliable* means of subsistence known to him or her: the traditional means. Along the same lines, Popkin sees rebellion as a means of ushering in a change which will increase an individual's resources. For Popkin, the peasant is not working to eliminate the disruptive effects of capitalist market relations, but rather to "tame" them and allow for resource maximization. This idea comes from Popkin's assumptions that village life is an arena for individual competition and mobility, hence his emphasis on peasant "political economy."

In the case of Cambodia, both of these assessments of village structure are incorrect. The Cambodian village was *traditionally* ineffective in guaranteeing subsistence. The true exploiters of the peasantry, the merchants and moneylenders, were part of the traditional structure. Nothing "penetrated" the Cambodian village; the village's inherent problems were only exacerbated by outstanding circumstances, most notably, the Vietnam War. At the same time, Popkin's emphasis on individual mobility is irrelevant in the face of Cambodian cultural concerns.[27] Although Popkin indicates that his theory is not solely material,[28] the great majority of his analysis is based on the "natural" desire to increase one's material position.

Both Scott and Popkin take for granted the existence of village institutions, whether effective (Scott) or ineffective (Popkin), as the keys to their positive theoretical considerations. It is the conflicts within and between these institutions that lay the foundation for peasant rebellion. Cambodian villages however, did not possess any village institutions outside of family and kin networks. Thus, the very village structures that should produce rebellion when aggravated are nonexistent in the Cambodian context. Both Scott and Popkin's emphasis on terms of tenancy ignore the true exploitative groups in the Cambodian countryside: independent moneylenders and merchants.[29] There was no traditional Cambodian aggression towards exploitative groups.[30]

Although some of what Popkin and Scott discuss is appropriate to the Cambodian situation, their underlying theoretical bases are incompatible with the Cambodian reality. This basic discrepancy makes further application of the theories troublesome. There was neither a Cambodian legacy of collectivity nor a traditional peasant frustration an organization could capitalize on to facilitate mobilization. This frustration and awareness had to be cultivated, so to say, by the mobilization efforts of the Khmer Rouge.

In the context of the Chinese Revolution, Theda Skocpol gives historical parallel to the actions of the Khmer Rouge. The Chinese Communist Party used the militarily secured liberated areas to reorganize local politics "in a fashion that afforded Chinese peasants the collective leverage against landlords they had traditionally lacked."[31] The Khmer Rouge used this strategy in their liberated areas as well. Their ideological calls to mobilize against allegedly oppressive landlords however, were irrelevant to the real Cambodian situation, based as it was upon the exploitative practices of moneylenders and merchants. While Skocpol places emphasis on the need for external coercion to control peasant activity, she does not leave room to address the cultural force of Buddhism as a self-policing mechanism of the Cambodian psychology. The collective tradition in Cambodia, because of cultural and psychological constraints, was even more embryonic than that of China.

Skocpol does provide insight into the village, but other elements of her structural approach are inapplicable to the Cambodian revolution. There was no tie, strong or weak, between a centralized monarchical authority and a landed gentry class. Friction within this relationship was supposed to lead to the "elite alienation" necessary for a social revolution.[32] First, in the case of Cambodia, elite support was not as necessary as it may have been in other revolutions (the French Revolution, for example). Second, even if it were necessary, Skocpol, in her concern for structures, does not account for the possibility of an *external* agent leading to alienation (United States support of Lon Nol, in the Cambodian case). Above the village level, Cambodian structural troubles were limited to the misdirected actions of the centralized bureaucracy, not to that bureaucracy's relationship to any other party. Although Skocpol may aid us in understanding actions at the village level by broadening the initial basis, her theory, when taken altogether, overextends its positive aspect, and cannot therefore account for the success of the Cambodian revolution.

Charles Tilly's far-reaching "resource mobilization" approach is the most appropriate theory of revolutionary change to apply to the Cambodian revolution.[33] In his *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Tilly outlines four requirements for successful mobilization. These requirements are those taken into account by an individual in choosing to support or join a social movement:

- interests: shared costs or benefits of a particular course of action
- organization: shared values, identities, unifying structure

- repression: cost of interaction with other groups "as it may discourage support"
- opportunity/threat: chance of interaction with other groups[34]

This theory's strength is its broad basis. The fact that it seems self-evident is a product of hindsight and perhaps testimony to this theory's influence. Tilly's theory includes much of what was excluded from previous theories of social change. "Relative deprivation theory," espoused most clearly in Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel*, sees revolt as occurring at that point in time when the discrepancy between rising expectations and the actual fulfillment of those expectations becomes intolerable. The "structural-functional" approach sees revolution as an undesirable disruption of the social "system" brought about by the failure of social institutions to condition (socialize) against revolution, as well as the state's inability to organize against insurgency. The shortcomings of these theories are obvious. "Relative deprivation" theory does not explain how individual frustration and dissatisfaction are turned into collective, organized resistance. "Structural-functionalism," with its disapproval of revolution, does not address the possible reasons for or benefits of social change. Neither theory attempts to explain how social movements are consolidated or mobilized. Both theories characterize rebellion as purely reactionary. Both attribute revolution to a failure in the depth of the efforts of the state, as opposed to an expression of a new popular will.

The elements of Tilly's theory as they apply to the case of the Khmer Rouge, have been discussed above. Both material and psychological incentives drove peasants with interests, real or perceived, into a group which, through political education and social restructuring, forged an organization of shared identity, loyalty, and discipline. As U.S. bombing and the civil war continued, more peasants joined the Khmer Rouge for survival, as these same conditions decreased the government's repressive ability and increased the chances of revolutionary opportunity and victory. Both of these changes would presumably draw into the organization those uncertain elements who, as Mao said, "still want to wait and see." Tilly's stress on the importance of revolutionary coalitions to both enlarge a revolutionary group and to eliminate other possible political opponents is evidenced in the Khmer Rouge's earlier alliance with Prince Sihanouk and the initial courting of his cause. By taking what would seem to be the most common sense approach, Tilly has, in fact, designed a theory that can account for the mobilization and effectiveness of the Khmer Rouge. Additionally, Tilly's theory addresses

the voluntary cooperation of individuals, and sees mobilization efforts influenced and catered to these interests. This outlook differs from the predominant scholarship on the Cambodian revolution which envisions groups of manipulated, destitute peasants under the thumb of powerful leadership.

Conclusion

Despite the tone of this work, I do not condone or apologize for the actions of the Khmer Rouge leadership after its seizure of power in April, 1975. I do address, however, a common misconception about the Khmer Rouge. The aggressiveness of the Khmer Rouge ideology and leadership made the problem of state-building after victory immensely difficult. With the reins of state power firmly in their hands, and responsiveness to the peasantry ignored, the Khmer Rouge leadership's betrayal of their own ideology produced a barbarism and cruelty unprecedented in the history of modern revolutionary history. Perhaps the violence of post-revolutionary Cambodia is in contrast to the pre-revolutionary situation, as opposed to simply a continuation of similar means on a larger scale. As theories of social change point out, there must be a fundamental difference between a revolutionary organization before and after victory. Support in the face of other political "players" is not as important, and the group changes and perhaps perishes for its ignorance. Karl Kautsky revealed the troubles a revolution would have to tackle when faced with an entire economy to control the day after the revolution. Needless to say, the Khmer Rouge were not successful in their efforts.

This does not, however, belittle the choices and roles of the peasantry. It is only too tempting to talk of manipulative "political entrepreneurs" within the context of the Cambodian revolution, especially with such menacing and enigmatic figures as Pol Pot. But it is important to remember that peasants *did* have a choice of which path to take in the civil war, albeit not a great one. As we have seen, the Khmer Rouge offered the peasantry solutions to their problems, and one cannot blame them for not only choosing the Khmer Rouge, but making their choice enthusiastically. Revolutionary romantics often praise the courage and perseverance of peasants in abstract, but rarely awaken to the real bravery of those with little to lose. As I have attempted to demonstrate, often the greatest victories of revolutions are achieved months or even years before recognized victory—in the empowerment of a people—only to be demolished and mutated by the actions of a demented few. The Cambodian is such a revolution, "a forlorn monument to the horrible consequences of any socialist revolution that ignores its own history and culture."[35]

1. See Kenneth Quinn; or Craig Etcheson *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, (Boulder, CO: Westview press, 1984).
2. See Karl Jackson, ed., *Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous With Death,* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).
3. Seanglim Bit, *The Warrior Heritage* (El Cerrito, CA: Seanglim Bit. Pub., 1991), 97.
4. Ibid, 107.
5. Bilateral inheritance, inheritance through both the maternal and paternal lines, is different from partible inheritance. Partible inheritance describes a scheme that divides land equally among all of the children. This is contrasted with primogeniture, which grants the entire plot to the eldest child exclusively.
6. May Ebihara, "Revolution and Reformulation in Kampuchean Village Culture," in *The Cambodian Agony*, ed. David Ablin and Marlowe Hood (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990), 19.
7. Ibid, 21.
8. Although Samueal Popkin does reveal that stratification preceded colonialism and large-scale capitalism, Cambodian culture did not necessarily link this stratification to domination and victimization, as does Popkin. (Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 61-62)
9. Ebihara, "Revolution and Reformulation in Kampuchean Village Culture," 18.
10. Ben Kiernan, Introductory Note. *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981,* ed. Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (London: Zed Press, 1982), 70.
11. Ibid, 7.
12. Hou Yuon, "The Peasantry of Kampuchea: Colonialism and Modernization,"*Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981*, ed. Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, (London: Zed Press, 1982), 63.
13. Kiernan, Introductory Note, 10.
14. Ibid, 8-9.
15. Ibid, 11. Emphasis added.
16. Yuon, "The Peasantry of Kampuchea: Colonialism and Modernization," 39.
17. W.E. Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party." *Pacific Affairs*(Summer, 1981): 209-227.
18. Laura Summers, "The Sources of Economic Grievance in Sihanouk's Cambodia," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 15 (1986): 16-34.
19. In pre-revolutionary Cambodia, people of Chinese ethnic origin were legally forbidden to own land. Thus, the surplus capital merchants and moneylenders received was not reinvested in agricultural development or speculation, but rather channeled into other types of investment or consumption. This small-scale "capital flight" was yet another reason for Cambodian rural underdevelopment. Willmott claims that the peasant did not rise up against ethnic Chinese because "his different standard of living, as well as his different functions, could be seen as a part of a foreign culture rather than an aspect of exploitation...[it was] not an object of moral or ethical consideration." (see Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party," 223)
20. Summers, "The Sources of Economic Grievance in Sihanouk's Cambodia," 23.
21. W.E. Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party," 224-226.
22. Craig Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 80.
23. George Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 71-78.

24. Timothy Michael Carney, *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion* (Data Paper 106, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asia Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1977), 46.
25. Ibid, 46.
26. Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over* (New York: Simon and Scuster, 1976), 151.
27. See pp. 3-4.
28. Samuel Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1979), 31.
29. Popkin describes patrons as "monopolists," (Popkin *The Rational Peasant*, 4.) implying that their functions are many (landlord, creditor, AND merchant). Although Scott makes account for independent moneylenders, moral economy theorists, according to Elizabeth Perry (lecture: 10/22/92), consider "patrons" to be those who : 1) guarantee minimum subsistence; 2) provide means of crisis alleviation (credit); 3) protection; and 4) brokerage and influence with extra-village groups. There are no such universally responsible patrons in the Cambodian tradition.
30. See note 18, above.
31. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 153.
32. Ibid, 47.
33. My discussion of Tilly will be based upon an outline by Jack Goldstone (Jack Goldstone, Tedd Gurr, Farrokh Moshiri, ed. *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1976), 24-26.).
34. Tilly, in Ibid, 24.
35. Willmott, *Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party*, 227.

Little Brown Brother: The Bitter Legacy of the Crimean Tatars

Alexy Kochowiec

The cloak of lies and secrecy which has always surrounded the Soviet Union has left little substance for most to see. Possibly the most recognizable image of the Soviet Union is the gray, monolithic line of multi-starred generals and high Communist officials which used to occupy the roof of Lenin's Tomb on Red Square for the annual May Day parade. The repressive totalitarianism of the Soviet system has always been known. However, there has been little opportunity to determine the precise nature and support for this repression, or the extent of any dissent. Documents smuggled out of the USSR as well as the accounts of immigrants and defectors have been widely used to balance relatively unreliable official Soviet sources. Recently, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it has been possible to corroborate and elaborate on these sources. For the most part, the "unofficial" sources have been vindicated. The accounts of events that were pieced together before the fall of the USSR do provide a fairly accurate picture of what was occuring behind the "Iron Curtain."

The totalitarian structure of the Soviet system placed all aspects of economic, cultural and political life under centralized planning and control. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a high degree of uniformity in official Soviet publications. Indeed, patterns and anomalies in official Soviet publications, when combined with the unofficial sources mentioned above, have been used effectively to investigate the hidden details of the Soviet system. Prolonged silence on a certain subject can sometimes be more informative than a whole volume of high-flown official rhetoric. Through the interpretation of such patterns the blindness imposed by the Iron Curtain can be partially penetrated.

Generally, it appears that the history and politics of the Soviet Union can be summarized as a series of internal ideological and power struggles among the ruling elite. However, one must be careful on this account, since ideas about who constituted the "elite" and thus what is merely an "internal struggle" as opposed to open dissent are quite relative and changeable. For example, although Boris Yeltsin is now usually seen as a staunch enemy of the old Communist regime, he in fact made his career through the ranks of this same Communist Party. Compared with internal power struggles, dissent in the Soviet Union has often had a receptive audience in the West. Western governments and the press have in fact made such an issue of the suppression of dissent that such names as Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn are relatively well known. Quite often these people were simply individuals fighting for the right to freely criticize their government. The case of the Soviet Jews and their struggle to emigrate to Israel is an example of a possibly more widespread expression of dissatisfaction.

The Soviet Union has long been the target of charges of racial and ethnic discrimination. In a country sometimes called "the world's last empire," the existence of over one hundred different ethnic groups, each with its own language and customs, has been a constant source of internal friction. The differences between these ethnic groups are not minor; these peoples include the Finnish peoples of Estonia, widely-scattered Jews, Orthodox Russians, Catholic Ukrainians and Poles, Moslem Uzbeks, Volga Germans, and native Siberian tribes, among others. In 1979 ethnic Russians constituted only 52% of the population of the Soviet Union, and their share continued to shrink due to the higher birth rates of other nationalities.[1] The Soviet task (by no means easy) was to discourage ethnic group identity in favor of increased loyalty to the state and thus create a "Soviet people."

This paper investigates a civil rights trial which took place in the Soviet Union in 1969. The ten defendants were all members of a small Soviet ethnic group: the Crimean Tatars. During their attempts to redress wrongs committed under Stalin, the defendants ran afoul of official Soviet policy and were prosecuted as slanderers of the Soviet state. Their trial is unique in that a nearly complete transcript as well as many related documents were smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published in the West. An examination of the methods and arguments used by both sides can reveal much about the causes of and suppression of dissent in the Soviet Union. Such an investigation will also reveal much about Soviet treatment of national minorities, a constant source

of trouble for Soviet authorities. However, before the details of the trial are investigated, the general background and causes of the trial must be discussed.

The fact that the Soviet state succeeded in holding all of its peoples together for nearly three quarters of a century indicates the existence of a remarkable coercive power. Under Stalin the coercive power was clear enough: pure physical terror and violence. After his death in 1953 the level of violence and destruction was greatly reduced. The trials, secret police, and concentration camps did not disappear, but the scale and intensity of their use was in no way comparable to Stalinist days.[2] Although the threat of terror cannot be discounted as an ultimate motivating factor in controlling the population, in the majority of cases the government no longer considered it necessary to resort to this violence.

For nearly forty years after Stalin's death the Soviet system functioned relatively smoothly. What kind of a structure had Soviet society assumed which allowed it to retain the discipline of Stalinism without Stalin? On the most immediate level, control was maintained through the effective and widespread use of state-building propaganda. This propaganda was the foundation of the Soviet system, the tie binding the diverse elements of society in common servitude to that elusive construct, the "Soviet system."

The many years of general fear which were the consequence of Stalin's rule succeeded in inculcating a certain unquestioning toleration and sense of fatalism in regard to the activities of the government. These qualities were not at all new and had been found in pre-revolutionary Russia, but they did not acquire their real overriding power until after Stalin made his mark. Thus, during and after Stalin's tenure it was possible for the government to openly make the most extravagant claims about the degree of freedom and liberty which existed without being challenged for its hypocrisy.[3] Under Stalin the foundations had been laid for a system which gave power precisely to those who were most willing to use it to decisively crush dissent and thus forcefully maintain "the fraternal unity of the peoples."[4]

In this way the Soviet government did succeed, to a limited extent, in creating a new type of "Soviet nationalism," which promptly fell apart when the forced submission which formed its backbone began to disappear. When considered in this light, it is difficult to identify any specific Soviet policy toward the different nationalities. The different groups were treated in a way which directly corresponded to the

perceived threat their existence posed to the continued dominance of the "Soviet nationality." Soviet action was less the result of a specific policy than a short-term reaction to the demands of the various nationalities. This is not to deny the definite pro-Russian bias of much of Soviet policy. Russians constituted the majority of the population and occupied a yet larger share of the top governmental posts.[5] However, what is often perceived as pro-Russian policy in the Soviet government is perhaps better characterized as the result of a primarily Russian (or Russified) leadership which showed no great sensitivity to any other nationality.[6]

Especially as regards the Crimean Tatars, Soviet policy had its roots in historic racial prejudices and misconceptions and was often closely tied to Russian nationalism. The Stalinist system of unquestioned obedience was crucial in making it possible for the government to carry out these policies unhindered by strict legality, consistency, or public opinion.

The Stalinist Constitution of 1939, the "only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world," guarantees "the citizens of the USSR freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly and meeting, freedom of street processions and demonstrations."[7] However, there are a whole series of Soviet laws which punish "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and similar "especially dangerous public crimes."[8] For propaganda purposes the "freedom" aspect is stressed, while in practice the "anti-Soviet propaganda" aspect predominates.

The Soviet legal system is not alone in placing limits on the exercise of the freedoms of speech and assembly. American legal thought also prohibits exercise of free speech that poses a "clear and present danger." The Soviet restriction of free speech relies on a similar emphasis of the right of the many over the rights of the few, although the idea is taken much farther. "Anti-Soviet" speech is prohibited because it "discredits in the eyes of the citizens the Soviet state or social system" and can lead to the "undermining and weakening of Soviet power."[9] By such considerations even those who supported the Soviet system as such but merely wanted to change some aspects of it could be prosecuted; change from below was not acceptable. Thus the Soviet system made it possible to repress dissent without resorting to purely extra-legal means. Narrow interpretation and outright contradiction in Soviet constitutional and legal formulations allowed the Soviet rulers to "have their cake and eat it too."

Although the Soviet government usually refused to openly consider potentially embarrassing or damaging questions, the official (if unspoken) position on such questions invariably left deep tracks in many areas of Soviet life. One of the areas where this influence can be seen quite clearly is in the Soviet interpretation of history. It is not just the Soviet period which is of interest; Soviet interpretation of pre-revolutionary history can be very revealing. The particular period of Soviet history during which a work is produced can have a profound affect on the work. This paper examines many aspects of Crimean Tatar history, as well as various theoretical considerations of the role of minorities and nationalism in government. As regards history, this paper concerns itself primarily with the use of historical interpretation as an ideological tool. After all, policies and opinions are determined by perceptions of history, and not by an abstract historical "truth." This dependence on the historical-moment becomes especially important when examining the Crimean Tatars, who have a very checkered history both under the tsars and under Soviet power.

The Crimean Tatars are a group of Turkic speaking peoples who have inhabited the Crimean peninsula since the fourteenth century. In 1783 Russia annexed the Crimea, and the Crimean Tatars came under the jurisdiction first of the tsar, and later the Soviet government. In 1944 the Crimean Tatars were accused of betraying their country and siding with the Nazis during World War II . They were loaded into cattle cars and shipped to the deserts of Central Asia, on the Southern border of the Soviet Union. During the deportation and in the next few years many Crimean Tatars were killed or died from hunger and the terrible conditions of their new homes, the so-called "special settlements." The Crimean Tatars claim that 46.2% of their people perished, while the KGB itself admits to a mortality rate of "only" 20%.[10] For the next eleven years they lived under martial law, slaves to the whims of their police overlords. They were forbidden even to leave their place of settlement under pain of receiving a twenty five year hard labor sentence. In 1955 they were removed from martial law, and very soon after they formulated and began to lobby for their demands. These demands were the public removal of the charge of treason from their people, the guarantee of their right to return to the Crimea, and the restoration of the autonomous Republic status which Crimea had enjoyed before the Tatars' expulsion.

From this time well into the era of Gorbachev the Crimean Tatars showed a remarkable commitment to pursuing their goals in a highly

unified way, always adhering closely to the letter of official Soviet free speech law. They were rightly perceived as a great threat to the Soviet system and their protests were vigorously suppressed. The Crimean Tatars challenged not only the official interpretation of their own history, but even the Soviet government's loyalty to the guiding precepts of Marxism-Leninism.

In order to attain their goals the Crimean Tatars elected representatives to lobby for them. From 1964 on, they managed to maintain a permanent delegation in Moscow, at times numbering in the hundreds of representatives.[11] These representatives composed and sent numerous petitions and letters to various government institutions, officials, scientists, public figures and writers. Many Crimean Tatars also attempted to move back to the Crimea and obtain work. However, both those Crimean Tatars in Moscow and those in the Crimea met with little success. Usually they were intimidated, beaten, arrested, and forcibly sent back to Central Asia.[12] Nevertheless, they were so persistent that three times they were given receptions by important government figures including the head of the KGB, the president, and the attorney general of the USSR.[13] These leaders promised the fulfillment of the greater part of the Crimean Tatars' demands. However, these promises were at first entirely forgotten, and later fulfilled only in part.

Only in 1967, twenty three years after the initial charge of treason, did the Soviet government officially clear the Crimean Tatars of the charge of mass treachery and affirm that they had the right "as do all citizens of the USSR, to live anywhere in the territory of the Soviet Union in accordance with current labor and passport legislation."[14] However, those Crimean Tatars who attempted to make use of these rights to return to the Crimea met with the same discrimination and persecution they had experienced before. From 1961 to 1969 hundreds of Crimean Tatars were arrested and many trials were conducted against them. In the majority of the cases a trial was not required and the Crimean Tatars were simply detained without charges being pressed, or given fifteen days for "minor hooliganism." This blanket accusation, applied when other charges were lacking, was sometimes expressed as "violating the public order" (the equivalent of "disturbing the peace").[16] When criminal proceedings were instigated, however, the charge was always the same: "The compilation and distribution of slanderous documents, containing deliberately false fabrications, denigrating the Soviet state and social system."[17] Several of these trials were long-drawn-

out affairs and achieved something of a *cause celebre* status among the Crimean Tatars.

On the fifth of August, 1969, a crowd of more than one thousand Crimean Tatars clashed with reinforced detachments of police and the KGB in Tashkent, the capital of the Soviet Uzbek Republic.[18] The Crimean Tatars had arrived to witness the verdict in the criminal trial of ten of their countrymen. This trial, known by them as "the Tashkent trial," lasted for more than a month and involved some of the most active Crimean Tatar representatives. These representatives had compiled and distributed hundreds of documents, and even traveled to Moscow and the Crimea to work for their people. They were a very diverse group of young and old, men and women, and included simple laborers, a world famous physicist, and decorated veterans of World War II.[19] For the most part they were ordinary people with families and jobs who had devoted much of their free time to their cause. In some cases they had lost their jobs or spent time in jail for their actions and beliefs.

The Soviet state prosecutor claimed that the documents and letters these representatives wrote and distributed were false and slanderous. These documents speak of a continuing Soviet policy of racism and genocide against the Crimean Tatars. The prosecutor's position is extremely simple. The claim that the charges made in the documents are untrue and "deliberately false fabrications" is basically taken for granted. It is much easier for the prosecutor to simply state that the defendants are liars than it is to evaluate the Soviet state's treatment of the Crimean Tatars. The law calls for the punishment of statements which are both "deliberately false," and "blacken the Soviet state." While the second requirement is not difficult to prove, the first requires the court to pass judgment over the very system of which it forms a part. If the incriminating documents are judged to be true, the court by implication condemns the Soviet state when it frees the defendants. The danger to the Soviet state of any genuine discussion of the defendants' claims will become clear as the details of the trial are examined.

The court chooses to spend the vast majority of its time proving that the defendants wrote and distributed the incriminating documents, a fact which the defendants themselves do not deny. From the beginning of the trial the prosecutor stresses that this "trial is a criminal trial and not, as the defendants said, a political one."[20] Several times he interrupts the proceedings and reminds the court that "there is no need to go into an excursion into history, this diverts the court from the substance of the case being considered. I insist that the defendants testify on the

substance of the presented accusations, and not engage in propaganda."[21] The presiding judge almost invariably sustains all of the prosecutor's objections.[22]

The court's refusal to discuss "history" effectively halts any real discussion of the "slanderous character" of the incriminating documents, since these documents are concerned primarily with the history of the Crimean Tatar people. In spite of the prosecutor's objections, the defendants speak at length on the motivation and background of the incriminating documents. Among other things, they speak of the "falsification of history" in regard to their people, stating that this falsification is yet another manifestation of racism towards them. Their disagreements with Soviet readings of history extend to the very beginnings of the history of the Crimean Tatars.

The Crimean Tatars insist that the claim that they were traitors during World War II is without any basis. They argue that the "complete absence of any objective grounds" for such accusations made it necessary to condemn the Crimean Tatars through "lies, provocation and falsification of history." They claim that the goal of this propaganda is "to convince all peoples that Crimean Tatars . . . historically were and remain a parasitic, traitorous people," and therefore deserve any punishment.[23] These accusations concern not only Soviet history, but earlier periods as well.

The early history of the Crimean Tatars can be divided into the period of the independent or semi-independent Crimean Khanate and that of the Russian conquest and subsequent Russian imperial control. The Crimea, as well as Russia, was initially under the jurisdiction of the branch of Genghis Khan's clan know as the Golden Horde. Around the mid-fifteenth century an unsuccessful claimant to the Khanate of the Golden Horde established himself as an independent khan in the Crimea. His descendants ruled the Crimean Khanate as semi-independent vassals of the Ottoman Empire until the Russian conquest and annexation in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Beyond this basic outline, the details of the cultural level and internal functioning of the Khanate vary greatly with the source. As often as not with such disagreements, different emphases can produce radically different results in historical interpretation.

During his final speech to the court one of the defendants, Rollan Kadyev, speaks of the falsification of his people's history, "The falsification had already appeared under tsarism, and manifested itself in the fact that the tsarist government with the help of its scientists represented

the Crimean culture as barbaric."[24] He further laments the fact that his personal experiences in the Crimea attest to the continuation of such falsification:

> And here you have my trip to the Crimea. I became acquainted with tour guides, from whom [these lies] came like a flood. Everywhere you hear that the Crimean Tatars practiced only raiding and robbery, even the spoon appeared among them only in the nineteenth century. They did not prepare non-solid food [so presumably spoons were not necessary] and so forth.[25]

Although it is difficult to find any reference to the date of the adoption of the spoon by the Crimean Tatar people in Soviet literature, one can quite easily find different types of support for the purported low cultural level of the Crimean Khanate. In fact, most post-World War Two Soviet sources are remarkably consistent in providing examples of such cultural backwardness. As the defendant Izzet Khairov remarks, "In 1952 a whole system for the falsification of the history of the Crimea and the Crimean Tatars was worked out by the Crimean section of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR." He suggests that one "take *The Great Soviet Encyclopedia* of 1934 and compare it with the edition from the 50's, [in order to] notice what sort of sharp changes in conception have occurred."[26]

The centralized control of book publishing in the Soviet Union assured a high level of uniformity; there was about as much chance of finding strong differences of opinion among published authors as of seeing a hotly-contested public campaign for a seat in the Supreme Soviet. Thus one can be reasonably certain that any Soviet book, especially one published in large quantities and sold abroad, is representative of official government views. A colorful example of this concurrence is provided by the deletion of an article on Stalin's secret police chief, Lavrenty Beria. After his arrest and execution in 1953, all subscribers to the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* were dutifully sent lengthy articles on the Bering Sea to replace those on Beria.[27]

When one consults the same *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (1950's edition), one finds exclusively negative references to the Crimean Khanate. The Crimean Tatars are always the aggressors, always using and robbing others:

> The Crimean Khanate—a feudal parasitic state on the territory of the Crimean peninsula.... The wealth of the Tatar feudalists was founded on the robbery of neighboring countries (Russia

> and Poland), the slave trade with eastern countries, and on the collection of commercial duties from merchants, including Russians. Widely employing slave labor in their households and levying in kind dues on the enserfed agricultural population, the Tatars themselves turned to agriculture very slowly. . . . The principal activity of the Crimean Tatars was pillaging raids for the purpose of robbery and profit.[28]

It is clear from this harangue that according to the later official Soviet line the leaders of the Crimean Tatars were not good for anything and were basically the enemies of all. They are accused not only of abusing foreigners, but exploiting the truly useful people in their own country as well.

However, the defendant Khairov brings forth a pre-World War Two Soviet article which seems to directly contradict the previous characterization:

> Not very long ago it was considered an indication of good form . . . to talk of the barbarism and lack of culture of the Tatar conquerors, who destroyed "everyone and everything." . . . At the present time this cliché is without doubt being eliminated. The old legend is being destroyed before our eye ... Suffice it to say, that the Tatar cities of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as resurrected by new excavations, were well planned and flowering cities, with excellent buildings, palaces, schools, mosques, artisans' shops, aqueducts etc.[29]

The difference between these two official Soviet publications is not as large as it might at first seem. In fact they are nearly compatible. Even the disparaging article speaks of the Tatars' "wealth." However, only the source and not the results of this wealth are stressed. There is substantial non-Soviet corroboration for the Khanate's financial dependence on slavery. However, the claim that the peasantry was "enserfed" is (at least for the later periods of the Khanate) highly questionable. The peasantry of the Khanate before the Russian annexation was almost exclusively Moslem.[30] Although not immune to massive exploitation, Moslem peasants under Islamic rule were never subjected to the specific systematic approach (serfdom) which in Europe sometimes reduced the peasantry to slaves in all but name. For the most part, the agricultural population under Islam was never really tied to the land in the manner of the European serfs.[31]

Soviet sources refer to the Khanate as merely a province of the Ottoman Empire. Although it appears that the Khanate probably had a somewhat greater degree of independence, it is nevertheless true that the organization and institutions of the two realms had much in common. Even the origin of the two regimes was similar. Both the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate were founded by nomadic Turkic speaking peoples who adopted Islam and settled down. The historian Marshall Hodgson, one of the most respected historians in his field, has the following to say concerning the treatment of the peasantry under the Ottoman Empire:

> As the Ottoman Empire spread, the territories that came under its rule normally experienced an increase in prosperity, upon which Occidental travelers were wont to remark. In the Balkan peninsula in the fifteenth century, the displacement of the old Slavic nobility (often irresponsible) . . . seems to have resulted in greater productivity, in easier conditions for the peasants.[32]

Given such treatment of an infidel Christian peasantry, there can be little basis for the Soviet implication that the "enserfed" Crimean Tatar peasantry could only benefit from Russian rule.[33] As for the "robbery of neighboring countries," there is no question that forced tribute payments as well as the ransoming and sale of slaves were vital components in the Khanate's economy. These tribute payments often served as excuses for further extortion on the part of those nominally charged with paying the tribute; for example, the Polish tribute to the Khanate was raised through a special poll tax on Polish Jews.[34]

The question of who paid the Khanate's bills does not affect the fact that wonderful palaces and mosques were built, poetry and chronicles were written, and a court and administrative system on the Turco/Islamic models were organized. The sad fact is that quite often throughout history the traditional achievements of culture have been built on the scarred and bent backs of others.

The first edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia,* published in the 1930's, contains articles which are similar to the article quoted by the defendant Kadyev. It even has favorable entries on Crimean Tatar language, literature, and art as well as a full page devoted to photographs of various Crimean Tatar architectural monuments.[35] The second edition, published in the 1950's, confines its references on Crimean Tatars to denunciations of the aggressive and predatory nature of the Crimean Khanate. There are no entries on Crimean Tatar language, literature, art, or architecture. The second edition does not disparage Crimean Tatar

culture, it simply denies the very existence of such a culture. The further one reads in these two articles, the more these differences become accentuated.

The motivations for the Russian conquest and annexation of the Crimean Khanate are also depicted differently in various sources. The second edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* speaks at length about the necessity of the Russian conquest:

> At the end of the fifteenth century the Turks . . . placed the Crimean Khanate in the position of vassal dependence and spread their power all along the Black Sea. Turkey's aggressive plans concurred with the plunderous aims of the local feudalists. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries the Crimean Khanate, with Turkey standing behind it, was a force hostile to Russia, a force which Russia's enemies tried to use. . . . Taking into account the ever increasing Crimean-Turkish aggression, [Tsar] Ivan IV in the years 1556-9 attempted to liquidate the Crimean Khanate.[36]

The remainder of this entry consists, for the most part, of elaborations on the barbarisms and robberies practiced by the Crimean Tatars. They are even accused of siding with an early Ukrainian nationalist in a war against Poland, and then at the last minute betraying him, thus driving thousands of Ukrainians into captivity because "the Tatars were not interested in the defeat of the Polish feudalists."

It is also suggested that the Crimea really was part of Russia before the Mongol invasion and subsequently "turned into an ulus (province) of the Golden Horde and was for many centuries cut off from the Russian people." This assertion is supported by the statement, "The history of medieval Crimea is inseparably connected with the history of Kievan Russia," which is followed by a listing of several ancient Slavonic archaeological finds.[37] Other Soviet works are even more emphatic:

> As is known, for a long time before the Tatar-Mongol invasion, from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, during the time of Kievan Russia, the Russians possessed the Crimea and were paramount on the Black Sea which was called the Russian Sea. . . . The [later] struggle for an outlet to the Black Sea, [and thus] for routes to external markets, was at the same time the Russian people's struggle for the return of their ancient land, and was historically progressive, removing the barriers to the development of the Russian government.[38]

The Russian conquest of the Crimea may have been "historically progressive" for the tsar and the Russian nobility. However, it can hardly have been so for the Crimean Khanate. This passage implies that such considerations are unimportant, since the land really belonged to Russia and the Tatars were just trespassers and thieves. Yet such declarations of "previous historical ownership" can be quite problematic; the Crimea, like most other places, has over time been associated with many different ethnic groups. What is of interest is that the Soviet state found it both useful and acceptable to support such "historical" claims which linked the Crimea with Russia.

To find a more plausible motive for the Russian conquest one need look no farther than the same Soviet source just quoted:

> The Crimean peninsula by virtue of its geographical position dominates the Black Sea. Whoever controls the Crimea becomes the natural master of the Black Sea and is able to establish control over the Black Sea routes. . . . Surrounded on all sides by the territories of such powerful empires as Russia and Turkey, [the Crimean Khanate] was inescapably bound to become dependent on one of these governments.[39]

The tactical significance of the Crimea will become important in considering the Soviet government's refusal to repatriate the Crimean Tatars even after the return of other Soviet peoples who were similarly deported under Stalin. Finally, it is asserted that the Russian conquest and annexation "had a great progressive significance in the history of the peoples of the Crimea and led to the liquidation of the hearth of Turko-Tatar aggression in the Crimea."[40]

In the first edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, the period of forced tribute and slave raiding by the Tatars is simply passed over. Instead, the later Russian attacks are emphasized: "In 1478 the Crimean Khanate acknowledged a position of vassal dependence on Turkey. In the seventeenth century the Crimea became the object of attacks from the Russian government."[41] Instead of concentrating on Tatar attacks on Russia, this edition then goes on to enumerate the various unsuccessful and later successful Russian attacks on the Crimea.

By combining these two accounts one arrives at a reasonably accurate picture of the position of the Crimean Khanate in relation to Russia. It is a question of representation. Is one to see the Tatars or the Russians as the aggressors? This is not merely an academic question, since all those involved attempt to use these characterizations as vindication for their subsequent actions. Characterizations based on such

considerations appear in the trial as well. Zorina Stepanovna, a witness for the prosecution claims, "One cannot accuse the Russians of cruelty, the Russians were never cruel, while the Tatars were always noted for their cruelty, this is known by everyone."[42]

The defendants argue that the recent Soviet mistreatment and repression of their people was merely the continuation of centuries-old tsarist policy. In evaluating these claims it is quite revealing that one of the Russians closely connected with the Russian annexation of the Crimea, Count Alexandr Bezborodko, offered the following explanation:

> The Porte [Ottoman Empire] has not kept good faith from the beginning. Their primary goal has been to deprive the Crimeans of independence.... The Porte never ceased to drink in each drop of revolt among the Tatars. . . . Our only wish has been to bring peace to the Crimea ... and we were finally forced by the Turks to annex the area.[43]

Three different stories are told, each with a different villain. But, of course, the situation cannot be reduced to any of these simple formulae. Even taking into account the harm caused by Tatar attacks, slave-raiding and forced tribute, one must not forget that the Tatars were not the only aggressors and that some fates could be just as horrible as enslavement. Very few rulers or governments of those times can claim not to have been intimately involved with the overwhelming violence and cruelty which has held on with fingers of steel even into this century. Even a cursory glance in any of a number of chronological summaries of world events shows that these activities were not anomalies. In 1570, a year before the Crimean Tatars burned the suburbs of Moscow, Tsar Ivan the Terrible . . .

> enters the city of Great Novgorod January 8 and begins a 5-week reign of terror. A man of dubious character has accused the Novgorodians of being sympathetic to Poland in the ongoing Livonian War. Ivan has ravaged the approaches to the second richest city in the czardom, and he has batches of Novgorodians from all classes of society massacred each day. Ivan has his men plunder every church, monastery, manor house, warehouse, and farm within a radius of 100 miles.[44]

The purpose of this digression is not merely to obscure the whole picture with a coating of blood, but rather to suggest the inadequacy of traditional approaches which attempt to pin down that elusive shadow known as "moral certitude." There were, of course, varying degrees to

this violence as well as periods when certain groups enjoyed peace and plenty. For the purpose of this paper however, it is sufficient to realize that during the flowering of the Khanate the Tatars were strongest militarily, and thus the aggressors, while later the Russians appropriated that role.

The defendants characterize the pre-revolutionary period of Russian control of the Crimea (1783-1917) as a most tragic time in Crimean Tatar history:

> The more than 130 year dominion over the Crimea of the colonizing and Russifying regime of the tsarist autocracy, under which was applied a system of brutal measures (economic, political and moral pressure, "voluntary" and forced eviction, and also physical destruction) led to the fall of the native Tatar population from several million to several hundred thousand. "The Crimea without Crimean Tatars!"—Such was the essence of the politics of the tsarist autocracy.[45]

It is in the evaluation of this period that we find yet sharper differences between the two editions of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*. Again, as might be expected, the second edition has only words of praise for the Russian administration:

> The addition of the Crimea to Russia had a great progressive significance for the socio-economic and cultural development of the Crimea. . . . The construction of new cities was begun, roads were built, highly valuable agricultural cultivation began to be introduced, and the area given to orchards, vineyards and tobacco growing increased.[46]

In discussing the history of the Crimea this article fails to mention the Tatars after the Russian annexation. Instead the Crimea is spoken of as merely a geographical unit, without reference to the various ethnic elements of its population or their fates. For this information one must turn to the corresponding first edition:

> Having acquired the Crimea [in 1783, Tsarina] Catherine II quickly set about seizing land from the laborers of the Crimea and assigning it to her functionaries and nobles. . . . The Crimean Tatar peasants were deprived of their land and driven back from the rich and wide steppes of the Crimea into the barren and scorched-out "yailu." The area was entrusted to the "cares" of Prince Potemkin. As a result of these "cares" the

> laboring population of the Crimea, especially the Tatar poor, were subjected to brutal exploitation.[47]

Again, these accounts do not have to be seen as contradictory, although some flexible interpretation is required for such a conclusion. The second edition makes no mention of, and therefore does not deny, the harsh treatment of the Tatars. Likewise, the first edition speaks primarily of the Crimean Tatars and not the Crimea itself. With the ever increasing Russian settlement of the Crimea (by 1854 more than 70,000 had arrived),[48] it soon became possible for the Crimea to prosper without the Crimean Tatars' participation. In spite of considerable statistical discrepancies, there can be little doubt that during the period of Russian imperial control at least 100,000, and possibly many more, Crimean Tatars left the Crimea.[49]

Prior to the annexation of the Crimea, Moslems had received very poor treatment in Russia. The law code of 1649, still technically in force at the time of the annexation, stipulated that "proselytizing in the name of Mohammed was [to be punished by] burning at the stake." The function of the "Kazan Office of New Converts," active in the first half of the eighteenth century, was "to baptize, forcefully if necessary, all Moslems."[50] Tsarina Catherine II, who annexed the Crimea, reversed some of these policies and insisted that Moslems be "well treated." Nevertheless, there remained a consistent attitude on the part of the Russian government that the Crimean Tatars were at best a nuisance and at worst a danger to Russia. Upon being informed of the mass emigration of Crimean Tatars of 1860, "his majesty [Tsar Alexander II] . . . deigned to indicate that not only would it not do to hinder the Tatars' emigration, but that the present opportunity must be seen as entirely favorable for the liberation of this area from them."[51] There were, after all, some Russians who stood to gain by the Tatars' departure, often through acquisition of the abandoned land. In times of trouble, relations between nationalities became strained and the Tatars were easy scapegoats for the Russians.

After Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1854-55) the Tatars were accused of having betrayed Russia by aiding the enemy. These charges played a part in assuring the Crimean Tatars' subsequent persecution, which resulted in one of the largest waves of Tatar emigration. Here is what a "well known Russian historian of the late nineteenth century," Ye Markov thought of the charges:

> But perhaps it is true that the Tatars committed treason and that their departure was necessary, no matter how pitiable it

> was? That is what I thought when I went to the Crimea.... But I have not met a single long-time resident there who does not have the utmost contempt for all the vile allegations against the Tatars—which resulted in such a disaster for the entire region. They agree unanimously that without the Tatars we would have lost the Crimean War [*sic*]—all the means of local transport and vital necessities were entirely in their hands.[52]

Markov was not the only Russian who condemned the expulsion of the Tatars, although those who did were usually radicals, such as the revolutionary writer Herzen.

The majority of officials in the tsarist administration seem to have had an attitude of neither sensitive accommodation nor open hostility. For them the same standards of measurement were to be applied to all citizens, and the only important point was a citizen's ability to function in the Russian imperial milieu. Insofar as a Tatar was able to master Russian customs and language and assimilate into Russian society, he was treated neither better nor worse than others. However, for the majority of the Tatars such assumptions assured them of second-class citizenship. The vast difference between Islam and Russian Orthodoxy was only one of the barriers which prevented them from even desiring to "fit-in." When confronted with such "recalcitrance," the Russian conclusion often corresponded to that of Count Tolstoi, who in 1870 declared, "The official aim of education for all natives must indisputably be their Russification and their merging with the Russian people."[53] Some may have expressed the idea more discreetly, but the idea was still the same. There are, after all, quite a few examples of tsarist lip-service to liberalist principles without much regard for actual practice.[54]

By rejecting Russian culture and language, the Tatars were subject to harassment and discrimination, often leading to eventual escape through emigration. However, their complete assimilation was equally undesirable. What was needed was a degree of assimilation which would permit the Tatars to not only interact effectively with the imperial government, but also to retain the bulk of their culture. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, and around the beginning of the twentieth, the Tatars developed just such a formula which remained basically unchanged throughout the Soviet period. Understandably, the language in which these ideas were expressed changed from that of liberalism to that of Marxism-Leninism, but many of the basic ideas remained unchanged.

In the last months of 1914 the Tatar journal *Shura* published a four-part obituary for the journal's founder, the Crimean Tatar leader Ismail Bey Gaspirali. It quoted and explained his ideas for the revitalization and future success of his people:

> [Ismail Bey] wrote, "Our ignorance is the main reason for our backward condition. . . . We must be able to read in order to overcome our isolation; we must learn European ideas from European sources. . . . To add new ideas and ideals is not to reject what is good and useful in our national and religious heritage.[55]

Ismail Bey wished to emphasize the increased opportunities and possibilities which Imperial Russian control offered. His message was not merely, "Make the best of a bad situation" but that it is counterproductive and useless to dwell on any negative aspects of Russian rule. He even went so far as to declare that the Russian annexation had brought the Tatars "peace under the patronage of just laws," while mentioning only "those good deeds by which [the Tatars] have already profited."[56]

In a similar way, the defendants have only praise for the early Soviet period in Crimean Tatar history. They declare that the "era of poverty and ignorance [under the tsar] was changed for an era of happiness and free labor in the homeland, an era of continuous flourishing of the economy, science and culture."[57] In both cases the Crimean Tatars have decided that they cannot accomplish anything through direct confrontation and rejection of the central government controlling them. Such a confrontation could only be self-destructive, so it was necessary to work within the system as much as possible. A more careful reading reveals that it is not Soviet power in and of itself which receives the place of honor, but rather, "the law concerning the granting of autonomy to the native population of the Crimea, [which] signified the beginning of a new era."[58]

Ismail Bey advocated reform on a pan-Islamic international scale, making use of a common Islamic culture. But more importantly for our purposes, he also worked very closely on the specific question of how this renewal was to be accomplished for those Muslim Tatars within the Russian Empire. He saw for them a special place not only in Russian society but in Islamic society as a whole:

> I believe that Russian Muslims shall become more civilized than any other Muslim nation. You, great brothers [Russians], give us knowledge. . . . The key to the future of both the

> Islamic community and the Russian Empire [is] the active cooperation of an enlightened Russian government with an awakened Muslim people.[59]

The problem with this prescription for change is that it required the cooperation of the Russian government. What guarantee is there that the "enlightened" tsar will see the value of "active cooperation," and not merely continue to view the Tatars' culture as subversive to the foundation of Russian government? After all, it was not so long since the Imperial Minister of Education (in 1833) formally enumerated the three principles of the doctrine of "Official Orthodoxy": the Russian Orthodox faith, autocracy, and nationality.[60] Ismail Bey's formula directly contradicted two of these prime principles with its adherence to Islam and its insistence on the value of non-Russian culture.

Before Ismail Bey's plan could be fulfilled, the Revolution of 1917 set the Russian Empire on a violent path toward complete rejection of both the autocracy and the budding liberalism of the past. Yet in spite of this deliberate rejection, much was unconsciously retained; the ideas of Ismail Bey, the actions of the revolutionary government, and the arguments of the defendants in the Tashkent trial show a remarkable continuity. Similarly, the Stalinist government, as well as its successors, exhibit striking similarities with the old autocracy.

In many of the documents written by the defendants one finds ideas reminiscent of those of Ismail Bey. For example, one of the documents states that "the Crimean Tatar people clearly understood, that tsarism and the bourgeoisie were guilty of their tragic fate. *In the Russian people they saw a staunch and loyal friend, a strong and honest ally in the fight for their liberation.*"[61] (author's emphasis)

Throughout the trial, as well as in the incriminating documents, the defendants speak of the "Marxist-Leninist solution to the nationalities' question."[62] The works of Lenin are repeatedly quoted, and much is made of the Leninist "solution" to the problem of the Crimean Tatars in particular. The defendants' entire line of argumentation relies almost exclusively on these ideas (some references are also made to United Nations treaties and resolutions endorsed by the Soviet Union).

For many months before the trial actually began, nine of the ten defendants were held in the KGB's "investigative detention facility." From here they sent several statements to the chairman of the KGB (Yuri Andropov) and the General Prosecutor (Attorney General) of both the Uzbek Republic and the USSR. In one of these statements the

defendant Bariev quotes extensively from the resolutions of the early Communist party:

> The politics of tsarism, the politics of the landlords and the bourgeois with regards to the [non-Russian] nationalities, was to crush among them the rudiments of any [self-] governing, cripple their culture, constrain their language, hold them in ignorance, and finally, Russify them as much as possible. Now that the landlords and the bourgeois are overthrown, and Soviet power has been proclaimed by the national masses in these countries, the task of the Party is to help the working masses of the non-Great-Russian peoples . . . a) develop and strengthen their Soviet government in forms corresponding to the national character of these peoples; b) restore among them courts, administration, economic institutions, institutions of power operating in their own language and composed of local peoples who know the lifestyle and psychology of the local population; c) develop among them a press, schools, theater, club affairs and, in general, cultural educational institutions in the native language. . . . The Party demands the inclusion in the Constitution of a fundamental law which would declare illegal any privileges of one of the nationalities, or any violation of the rights of national minorities.[63]

This Party resolution places all of the blame for former injustices and inequalities on the tsarist system, which is supposedly guided by the desires of the landlords and bourgeois. A good deal of time is spent praising self-rule, but this self-rule is always connected with "Soviet government" and it is "the Party" which "demands" and will provide the necessary "help." In the final analysis there can be little doubt as to who is really in charge.

Under such a structure there can be only as much national self-rule as is sanctioned by the Marxist-Leninist beliefs of the ruling Communist party. Traditionally, Marxist-Leninist thought has been somewhat ambivalent on the issue of nationalism. Up to a point nationalism is tolerated, and sometimes even encouraged as a weapon against imperialist exploitation. Ultimately, however, national distinctions are assigned to the same refuse heap as religion and government, destined to disappear under true Communism.[64] Thus the Communist party's views on nationalism are, at least in theory, determined by the perceived stage of the advancement of Communism in Soviet society. But beyond the surface level, the Soviet system was never successful in creating a

people "monolithic and united . . . through possessing a single ideology."[65] The "international culture" composed of only "truly progressive national values" was never more than an ethereal, although much lauded, phantom.[66] In practice, ignoring the existence of fundamental national differences meant giving tacit support to the dominant Russian nationality. Lenin's explanation of the granting of Crimean autonomy, as quoted by the defendants, hints at such problems, "Precisely on [the national] question many of us Bolsheviks most often stray from the correct path. . . . Let the small Crimean Republic become one of the torches throwing the light of the proletarian revolution to the East."[67]

This "incorrect" attitude mentioned by Lenin is referred to by the defendants as "great-power chauvinism." They blame the Crimean Tatars' predicament on such chauvinists and bolster their argument with a quote from Stalin, "The essence of an inclination towards great-power chauvinism consists in striving to circumvent national distinctions of language, culture, and life-style . . . and undermining the politics of the Party."[68] During his last few years in power, Lenin began to deal extensively with what he saw as an ever growing problem, the nationality question. He spoke of "the aggressions of that truly Russian person, a Great-Russian chauvinist, in essence a scoundrel and aggressor, among whom is the typical Russian bureaucrat."[69] To guard against such people he wrote to the Politburo, "We must *absolutely* insist that ... the *presidency* [of the legislature] shall go in turn to a Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, and so forth. *Absolutely!*"[70] He even tentatively proposed to "retain the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics only in the spheres of military affairs and diplomacy, while in other matters each of the people's commissariats will be fully independent."[71]

For Lenin simple equality of nationalities was no longer an acceptable option. He felt the Soviet government should adopt a sort of "affirmative action" policy. The defendants find such words to be especially applicable in proving the theoretical basis of their claims and provide the following quote from Lenin:

> I have already written in my works on the national question that abstract conditions of the nationalism question are not, in general, applicable anywhere. One must distinguish the nationalism of the oppressor nation, the nationalism of the large nation, from the nationalism of the small nation. As regards the second nationalism, we, the nationalists of the large nation, have almost always in historical practice been guilty of an endless amount of violence and give insults. . . . Therefore,

> internationalism from the side of the oppressor . . . should consist . . . of such an inequality which would compensate for the inequality which in life actually arises from the oppressor nation.[72]

The remainder of this document is highly self-critical and speaks of the insufficiency of the measures taken to defend the Soviet Union's minorities. Lenin speaks of the "great offense against the workers of Russia" which he has committed by not being sufficiently active in his fight for national freedoms.[73] This is a powerful argument for the granting of Crimean Tatar autonomy, especially when one considers that the Tatars, in 1936, composed only 23.1% of the population of the Crimea (trailing the Russians who had 43.5%).[74] Interestingly enough, Lenin chose to place the "political responsibility for this whole truly Great-Russian nationalistic campaign . . . squarely on the backs of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky."[75] It is just these two people who probably did more than anyone else to introduce the terror of secret police rule and to establish its supremacy. Such a development did not bode well for the young Crimean Autonomous Republic created by Lenin in 1921.

Lenin, especially during his last years, must be seen as something of an anomaly in the context of Soviet history in general. By even the most generous estimates his power lasted only a little over seven years (1917-24). These seven years were desperate times for Lenin. He was entirely preoccupied first with a bloody and desperate civil war, then with the devastated economy, and finally with his deteriorating health. He spent the final part of his life as an invalid, sometimes not participating in government at all. He realized that his creation was somehow not turning out as he had wished, but nothing seemed to help.[76] Lenin's final thoughts, his "testament," criticized many of his colleagues and even urged the dismissal of Stalin.[77] However, it was Lenin's example, and not his words which were to provide the pattern for future Soviet leaders.

As numerous examples of Lenin's behavior show, even the early Soviet government was quite ready to use or sacrifice almost any creed for its use. This is not to imply a lack of direction or mere flippant acceptance of any popular policy. The post revolution elections held in 1918 showed the "popularity" of Soviet policies: the Bolsheviks (Lenin's Party) won only 25% of the popular vote while the Socialist Revolutionaries received 58%.[78] The precarious position of Soviet power convinced Lenin to renounce his earlier ideas in the name of survival.

One of the first steps of the new government was the reinstatement of much denounced tsarist practices: censorship and restrictions on opposition political activities. The protracted bitterness of the civil war and foreign intervention soon brought political and extra-judicial executions, as well as the officially approved use of "terror."[79] Even capitalism was reintroduced in the form of the New Economic Policy. To a great extent these measures were adopted as extreme solutions to extreme crises. Yet they all were directed towards the same simple goal: the survival of Soviet power at any cost.

This paramount importance of the state produced a system of double standards, with its own peculiar language. During the Tashkent trial the judge asked the defendant Bariev to explain what he meant by the statement that his people are the targets of racism. The ensuing dialogue shows the extent to which Lenin's final message on nationality was heeded:

> *Bariev*: Maybe this is called something else. I consider it racism. The local population—Russians, Ukrainians tried to help us, but the [KGB and militia] restrained and intimidated them.... The answerable workers of the [KGB and militia], appearing there, ripped apart our shelters and insulted the women, insolently saying, "I'm going to use [violate] you." What does one call this?
> *Judge*: One could have written "great-power chauvinism," but not in any way racism!
> *Bariev*: Maybe you are even correct. But I know that similar actions in other countries are called racist here.[80]

The judge sees the charge of chauvinism as distinct from and much less serious than the charge of racism. A recent Soviet dictionary defines racism as "reactionary bourgeois theory and humanity-hating politics of the domination of a supposedly higher, fully valued race over a supposedly lower, less-valued race."[81] Bariev's charge now seems especially blasphemous and unacceptable since he is in essence accusing the KGB of carrying out "reactionary bourgeois" policies. The existence of chauvinism does not bother the judge as much, so it must be more acceptable. The same Soviet dictionary defines chauvinism as "extreme nationalism, preaching national and racial exclusivity and inflaming national hostility and hatred."[82] Although in essence very similar, the two terms have entirely different connotations. This system of dual attitudes, of an "us vs. them" mentality, insures that the same standards will not be applied to the Soviet system as to the rest of the world.

From the very beginning the Soviet state was imbued with a sense of special significance and uniqueness. Lenin put it this way, "To us, all is permitted, for we are the first in the world to raise the sword not in the name of enslaving and oppressing anyone, but in the name of freeing all from bondage."[83] This feeling of uniqueness included a sense of danger and urgency. In the first years after the revolution, the survival of Soviet power truly did hang by a thread. But the air of urgency, as well as many of the measures and methods of War Communism, never really disappeared.[84] If anything, the general attitude became one of increased hysteria.

Under Stalin the Soviet people were engaged in a continuous series of "struggles" against ever new enemies, most of them internal. In their turn, the "kulaks," "bourgeois nationalists," "wreckers," "Trotskyites," and various other "anti-Soviet" elements were "liquidated." These "enemies" were attacked with a ferocity and viciousness which was even greater than their supposed crimes. A fourteen-year old boy, Pavlik Morozov, was declared a hero for informing on his father for "hoarding" grain (his father was shot).[85] Such "enemies" were not even considered human and any punishment was too good for them.[86] In this way all relationships and associations, even blood ties, were subordinated to the demands of the Soviet state.

The commanders of the Soviet secret police carried out the deportation of the Crimean Tatars with the same brutality and disrespect for human life which accompanied all their other "resettlement" projects.[87] The defendants present the eyewitness testimony of one of the Crimean Tatar victims:

> At three in the morning, when the children were still sleeping, the soldiers entered [and ordered us] to assemble and come out of the house within five minutes. They did not allow us to take any possessions or food. They treated us so roughly, we thought we were being taken to be shot.[88]

Anyone who offered resistance or "lagged" was shot.[89] Such measures were used to deport a population consisting primarily of women, children, and old men. According to data collected by the Crimean Tatars, over 80% of the deportees were women and children.[90] The majority of the men were fighting in the Red Army and only after demobilization did they join any remnants of their family in exile. Such cruelty did not entirely end with the deportation. In "special settlement" areas there was no appeal against the arbitrary rule of the local commandants. One such commandant arrested a bride in the middle of her

wedding because she was marrying "without his knowledge."[91] Even matrimonial bonds were not above the whims of authority.

In a 1938 highly publicized show trial, Bukharin and seventeen other defendants were sentenced to be shot for "being irreconcilable enemies of Soviet power."[92] Faizulla Khodjayev, one of the condemned, pleaded guilty of adherence to the "theory of organizing a self-contained economy, that is to say, of making the economy of the [Uzbek] republic develop independently of the other parts of the Soviet Union, of making it possible for the republic to live without need for the rest of the Soviet Union." What is surprising is that such a "crime" should even be mentioned in the company of such charges as "[mixing] glass and nails into foodstuffs" and "[aiming] to arrest and assassinate V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin and J. M. Sverdlov."[94] After all, the Crimean Tatars' desire for autonomy is essentially quite similar to Khodjayev's "crime."

Since not even the most heinous crimes could have justified the Stalinist slaughter (especially where children were involved), the existence of the mass killings was simply not admitted. During the great famine which accompanied Collectivization, starving peasants used to beg from passing trains, until "an order was issued: when the train passed through the starving regions, the guards closed the windows and drew the curtains. The passengers were not permitted to approach the windows."[95] This secrecy was maintained in Stalin's treatment of the Crimean Tatars as well. The only official notice of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars was a short newspaper article issued two years after the fact.

The propaganda and falsification which was the mainstay of this system and was responsible for the "us vs. them" polarization had two goals: the association of the "enemy" with everything degenerate and harmful, and the association of the Party and Soviet system with everything advanced and good. During the terrible years of World War II, the Party was explicitly associated with Russian culture. In fact, in some of Stalin's wartime speeches the "Russian" element is given decidedly more weight than the "Soviet" element:

> And it is these [Nazis] . . . who have the effrontery to call for the extermination of the Great Russian nation—the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, . . . of Pushkin and Tolstoy, of Suvorov and Kutuzov! The German invaders want a war of extermination against the peoples of the Soviet Union. . . . Comrades, Red Army and Red Navy men, officers and political workers, men and women partisans! . . . May you be inspired in this war

> by the heroic figures of our great ancestors, Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Minin and Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Michail Kutuzov![96]

By arguing that Russia is "the nation of Lenin," Stalin in effect repudiates the entire supra-nationalist message of Leninism, as well as the fact that Lenin was the leader of not merely Russia, but the entire Soviet Union. Stalin's words are an example of what was a common enough mistake in the West: confusing the Soviet Union with Russia. Possibly one of the causes of this problem is historical. Before the Revolution, many areas which later became separate Soviet Republics were in fact part of the Russian Empire, and as such it was possible to speak of them as "part of Russia." But such a construction implies colonial areas under Russian imperial rule, an element of tsarist Russia which the early Soviet government fiercely denounced. Nevertheless, Stalin's speech makes it appear as if the Red Army was composed exclusively of Russians and only Russia was under attack. How is a Crimean Tatar soldier in the Red Army to be inspired by "his ancestor," General Alexander Suvorov, the Russian conqueror of the Crimean Khanate?

Although some of this pro-Russian shift in Soviet policy can perhaps be explained as the result of wartime demagogy, the substance of this policy lasted well beyond the war. In fact, as previously mentioned, the Soviet Union (especially under Stalin) always existed in a self-perceived state of war, "surrounded by enemies" both internal and external.[97] The "need" for extreme vigilance never disappeared, so extraordinary measures became the norm. As the defendant Kadyev put it, "The most important thing was that [the Party] led the people to communism, and 'if one hews wood—the chips are going to fly.'"[98]

The prosecutor's final speech in the case of the Crimean Tatars rests precisely on such considerations of the establishment of communism:

> In the present time historical development is characterized as an ideological struggle between socialism and imperialism. Imperialism tries to undermine from the inside, to blacken the social and governmental structure of the country of the Soviets. In this goal the politically immature, the morally unstable elements are made use of . . . . As Brezhnev has indicated: "In the realm of ideology there cannot be peaceful coexistence." ...Bourgeois writers have already for fifty years been slandering our government. In the persons of Bairamov, Kadiev and others they have found worthy imitators. . . . It remains to be

> asked: For how many kopecks have they undertaken to slander their government?[99]

By connecting the defendants with imperialism, the prosecutor attempts to magnify their crime from simple "slander" to being in the hire of foreign enemies, that is, treason. Throughout the Stalinist period and especially during "the Terror" such accusations were the principal ideological weapon of the Stalinist executioners. When supported by torture-induced admissions of guilt, such accusations had been quite effective; but the Crimean Tatars' refusal to obediently confess leaves the prosecutor in a much weakened position. It is then even more revealing that the court should choose to uphold all of the major points of the accusation and convict all of the defendants.[100] Occasionally one gets the impression that the judge himself tires of the whole farce. At one point he asks the defendant Kadiev, "Can't you make it shorter? It's hard to write the transcript."[101] Or in other words, no logic or arguments will help, so why waste everyone's time? The prosecutor hints at this when he warns Kadiev that, "Any lies, . . . in whatever literate or high-flown form they are expressed, will be punished to the full extent of Soviet laws."[102] The lessons of Stalinism had been learned so well that the victim's active cooperation was no longer necessary.

No aspect of society remained unaffected by the crude simplification and brutalization of Stalinist policies. The Soviet treatment of Crimean Tatar history is only one of the many areas which was affected. Under Stalin, Shostakovich and Prokofiev were denounced for "failing to write melodies which could be whistled by a worker." Genetics was branded "unMarxist" and even cell-theory was rejected for a time.[103] In some ways the falsification of Crimean Tatar history begins to appear relatively minor.

In many cases this falsification went hand in hand with the glorification of Russian culture. Among other things, the invention of the incandescent lamp, radio and even the airplane were attributed to Russian scientists.[104] The power of such large-scale falsification should not be underestimated. Throughout the trial the Crimean Tatar defendants reject much of official Soviet dogma, yet in his closing speech the defendant Kadiev mentions "the inventor of the radio—Popov."[105] One must assume that the Soviet (post World War II) version of the history of the Crimean Tatars enjoyed similar acceptance among those Soviet citizens not so directly affected.

The Crimean Tatar defendants tell of numerous times when they were labeled traitors because of their supposed collaboration with the

Germans during World War II.[106] The charge of treachery is the official justification for the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944. This crucial period in Crimean Tatar history, from the German occupation to the mass deportation in May 1944, exemplifies many of the previously discussed elements of the Stalinist Soviet system.

Contemporary Soviet sources did not even mention this deportation, or similar deportations of other minorities. Only two years later, in 1946, did a short article in the Soviet press speak of their fate. This article constitutes the only official Soviet explanation for the deportation ever offered:

> During the Great Patriotic War [World War II] when the peoples of the USSR heroically defended the honor and independence of their motherland in the struggle against the German-fascist aggressors, many Chechens and Crimean Tatars, on the instigation of German agents joined [military] units organized by the Germans and together with the German armed forces conducted an armed struggle against sections of the Red Army, and also on the orders of the Germans created diversionary bands for the fight against Soviet power in the rear, while moreover the main mass of the population of the Chechen-Ingush and the Crimean ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] did not show any resistance to these betrayers of the motherland. In connection with this the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars were resettled in other regions of the USSR, where they were provided with land and rendered the necessary state aid for their economic disposition.[107]

One of the most salient points in this article is the blatant disregard for the actual facts. As the historian Alexandr Nekrich so ably argues, the justification given for the "resettlement," that "the main mass of the population" of the Crimean Republic was guilty of complicity in treachery, is not logical.[108] After all, according to official Soviet statistics, in 1936 the ethnic composition of the Crimean Republic was: 43.5% Russian, 23.1% Tatar, 10% Ukrainian, etc.[109] Even if every single Crimean Tatar man, woman and child had been a traitor, they still would not account for "the main mass " of the population of the Crimea. Yet only the Tatars were deported.

In addition, the article does not even dignify the Crimean Tatars with the status of "one of the peoples of the USSR" since the article begins with the statement, "the peoples of the USSR heroically [fought

the Germans]." As is often the case with propaganda, these innacuracies are primarily semantic. Yet in an article of such importance, phrases like these serve to subtly reinforce the condemnation of the Crimean Tatars and justify their treatment. Oversimplification and inaccuracy make it appear as if the Crimean Tatars were wholly treacherous while all other Soviet nationalities were wholly faithful.

The charge that the Crimean Tatars created "diversionary bands" to fight the Red Army in the rear is not terribly damning. The Germans were not fully defeated in the Crimea until about May 13, while the deportations took place on May 17-18.[110] One could hardly claim that there was much opportunity for diversionary activity, especially as the intervening time was spent hanging any Tatars for whom two accusers could be found.[111] How can one accuse the "main mass" of the Crimean Tatars of "not showing any resistance" to actions which were never committed?

The article does not say that "most" of the Crimean Tatars actively aided the Germans. Instead, the entire people is punished because "many" Crimean Tatars were disloyal. The precise meaning of this "many" is what is disputed by the defendants. They do not dispute the fact that some Crimean Tatars aided the Germans. But they declare that "it is not given to anyone to accuse the Russian people of treachery because of the Vlasovist traitors and others who went over to the side of the enemy. It is [also] not given to anyone to accuse the Crimean Tatar people because of individual renegades having gone over to the side of the enemy."[112]

The defendants' rebuttal to the charges of mass betrayal during World War II consists of descriptions of Crimean Tatars who fought against the Germans. They quote figures from several regions in the Crimea, in which "of the adult population older than 18 at the start of the war, 2324 out of 4242 people were called up for service, that is 54.9% of the entire [Crimean Tatar] adult population." Furthermore, it is claimed that "at the front, in partisan divisions, and in the underground, . . . the Crimean Tatars lost 26.4% of the entire adult population."[113] For further proof of the Crimean Tatars' heroic participation in the war, the names and deeds of Crimean Tatar "Heroes of the Soviet Union" are told.[114] This decoration was the most prestigious military award given in the Soviet Union. One Crimean Tatar pilot, Amet-Khan Sultan, even received this decoration twice.

Regardless of Soviet pronouncements, there can be little doubt that the Crimean Tatars played a substantial role in fighting the Germans. If

one considers only those Crimean Tatars called up for service in the Red Army (often fighting far from the Crimea), their contribution to Hitler's defeat is quite significant. After much study of the subject, using sources not available in the West, the Russian historian Alexandr Nekrich concludes that, "The Crimean Tatars took part in the war against Hitler's Germany just as much as any of the other peoples of the USSR."[115]

Only after 23 years and much lobbying by Crimean Tatar representative, did the Soviet authorities finally issue the decree which admitted the error of the previous mass condemnation of the entire Crimean Tatar people:

> The facts of the active cooperation with the German invaders of certain segments of the Tatars living in the Crimea was without basis applied to the entire Tatar population in the Crimea. These indiscriminate accusations in relation to citizens of Tatar nationality formerly residing in the Crimea should be removed, the more so since a new generation of people has entered the labor and political life of society.[116]

This decree did not satisfy the Crimean Tatars for several reasons. First, it was published only in Uzbekistan, where the majority of Crimean Tatars were then living. More importantly, it stated that the Tatars had "taken root" in Uzbekistan and by its very wording ("Tatars formerly living in the Crimea") denied the existence of the Crimean Tatars' homeland. Concerning the charge of treason the decree implied that the charges were being lifted for the "new generation," thus never entirely admitting the error of the accusation. The defendant Khairov claims that this notion was even explicitly taught to Crimean Tatar children, "The secretary of the Komsomol [Young Communist] Organization . . . [said to Crimean Tatar childen] that all Tatar adults are traitors, that they, that is, their children, are being brought up by Soviet authority, and he called on the children to denounce their parents."[117]

For the sake of comparison it is useful to bear in mind that every Soviet nationality had some collaborators who joined various German-sponsored "self-defense" organizations. It is estimated that one million Soviet citizens were enrolled in the Wehrmacht, and out of these 300,000 were Russians under the command of General Vlasov.[118] Nevertheless, any chance of mobilizing massive popular support against Soviet rule quickly disappeared as the full truth of Nazi policy and actions became known.[119] It appears that the Crimean Tatars were judged by standards quite different from those applied to other Soviet nationalities.

In what is termed his "secret speech," Khrushchev spoke of the Stalinist mass deportation of nationalities during World War II. He added, "The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise they would have been deported also. (Laughter and animation in the hall.)"[120]

Although in his secret speech Khrushchev does not specifically mention the Crimean Tatars, his condemnation of mass deportations can be seen to apply to them as much as to any other deported nationality. Yet thirteen years after this speech, one still finds that even the Soviet "popular" literature on the Crimean Tatars adheres closely to the Stalinist line. One Soviet autobiography speaks of the Crimean Tatars particularly harshly:

> The first fascist motorcyclists met these very deserters—armed, ready for sycophantic service....Here the mullahs and bourgeois nationalists undefeated by the revolution were in charge. They had conducted themselves quietly and obediently.... Simply put, from the outside everything was in order, as if Soviet power had triumphed. [Apparently] some people had forgotten how these same people had smothered the revolution and killed the activists. Their treachery began on the very first days of the [German] occupation.[121]

Significantly, the Tatars' treachery is extended back to the very beginnings of Soviet power. It is implied that the Tatars were eager to see Nazi victory and even volunteered their service unsolicited. For their part, the defendants include the author of this work, I. Vergasov, among "the pack of Stalinist scribblers who made their careers on the unhappy case of the Crimean Tatars. These are Vergasov, Nadinskii, Rylskii and others."[122] The defendant Khairov specifies exactly wherein lies their fault: "In these works there is not one favorable Crimean Tatar hero. But the Crimean Tatars played a large role in the partisan movement."[123]

During the war, this same Vergasov ordered attacks on Tatar villagers in order to "raise the level of partisan combat activity."[124] According to Nekrich, there is evidence in the Party archives which shows that leaders of the partisan movement wrongly accused the Tatars of treachery, often in order to hide their own failures. Furthermore, loyal Tatars were killed and others were refused admission to the partisan movement.[125] Nekrich gives four causes for these false accusations: Nazi attempts to court the Crimean Tatars, the false information provided by the partisans, the resulting false information provided to higher Soviet authori-

ties, and "the reawakening of the traditionally suspicious attitude toward non-Russians within the Russian element of the population, an attitude that apparently had deep roots in the past."[126] The last point is the most important, as it also provides the main explanation for the two previous points.

The wartime comments of Konstantin Oumansky, an important Soviet official, show this predisposition to condemn the Crimean Tatars:

> Even when a Russian or a Ukrainian is not particularly pro-Soviet, he still remains patriotic; he will fight for a United Russia, or the Soviet Union, or whatever you call it. But the Tatars in the Crimea are, to a large extent, disloyal. . . . They never liked us. It is well-known that during the Crimean War they gladly "collaborated," as we'd now say, with the English and the French.[127]

Oumansky very casually equates "a United Russia" with "the Soviet Union," or even "whatever you like to call it," on the supposition "that which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." However, these differences are crucial, for one must know to whom the Tatars are disloyal and who they never liked. The reader's difficulty in determining if Oumansky is referring to Russians or Soviets is a reflection of the Soviet government's own confusion on this account.

The Crimean Tatars acknowledge that they received their great injury under Stalin and that "since that time . . . fundamental changes have taken place in [the Soviet Union]." Yet they insist that "only for us, the Crimean Tatars, has everything remained the same."[128] While they feel safe in condemning the Stalinist excesses, for the most part they carefully avoid such direct condemnation of the contemporary Soviet government.

The law under which the Crimean Tatar defendants are prosecuted speaks of "false fabrications denigrating the Soviet state and social system." In asserting their innocence, all of the defendants deny that their documents contain "false fabrications."[129] However, for obvious enough reasons, they avoid discussing the question of whether their documents "denigrate the Soviet state and social system." By the very act of complaining of mistreatment, the defendants are, to a certain extent, condemning the Soviet system. The extent to which the Soviet system is denounced depends on how the defendants choose to distribute the blame.

During her final statement the defendant Munire Khalilova insists that "my people and I are entirely satisfied with the present social and

state system." Although several defendants reiterate Khalilova's statement, this expression of support can only be taken in the most abstract sense. It is on the question of to what extent the Soviet system is to blame that one finds the most difference of opinion among the defendants. The defendants unanimously condemn the actions of officials in the KGB, militia, and judicial departments, all collectively referred to as "the investigative organs."[132] Such a condemnation, as the defendant Izzet Khairov shows, leads to crucial questions:

> Listening to me, citizen judges, you might think: "What naivete from the defendant! As if the investigative organs and the organs of the prosecution acted exclusively on their own discretion, as if they did not fulfill the directives of the higher institutions." I personally refuse to believe that the higher party-governmental institutions could sanction illegality. If I am mistaken, then ascribe this to my naivete. But such a reality would be too sad and too tragic.[133]

Khairov's appeal to the goodness of the leaders is reminiscent of the oft-repeated adage, "If only the tsar knew . . .". This sentimental trust did not in any way die with the last tsar. There were a remarkable number of otherwise practical people who accepted at face value all of Stalin's self-aggrandizement. Even in Stalin's dungeons and death-camps one could hear the sigh, "If only Stalin knew . . .".[134]

Most of the defendants, however, do not stop at the investigative organs, but extend the culpability to include at least "separate individuals from among the leaders of the party and government [who] attempt to use Leninist principles against Soviet people."[135] One of the defendants' documents expresses very clearly their ambivalence as to how far the blame should be extended among top leaders; "The Party and Soviet organs of Uzbekistan, in order to misinform the Party and government (and maybe even on the latter's instructions), began to use extremely provocative methods."[136] The defendant Svetlana Ametova explains that while the top leaders may not be directly responsible for the persecution of the Crimean Tatars, "few of them shed light on the national question of my people, the majority of them approach this question one-sidedly, not burdening themselves with unnecessary discomforts."[137] What for Ametova is simply laziness is for other defendants criminal negligence.

The defendant Reshat Bairamov questions the innocence of the top leaders in regard to both past and present wrongs:

> Allow me to ask you, comrade members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, workers of the KGB, prosecutor's department and court: . . .Were you afraid of turning up among those shot, exterminated in Stalinist camps? And now you pass off your silence as Party discipline. Are you really not in charge when [Crimean Tatars are persecuted now]? . . . And you try to pass this off as independent actions of local authorities.[138]

Bairamov directly rejects Khairov's claim that the subordinates are primarily to blame. However, with Stalin no longer around, the motivation for continuing to persecute the Tatars is not immediately clear.

The defendant Rollan Kadyev introduces a quotation from Alexei Kosygin in which the Prime Minister declares, "All nationalities, I emphasize, absolutely all peoples in our country are equal . . . Each nationality in our country feels itself a complete master of the situation."[139] Given the inapplicability of this claim to the Crimean Tatars Kadyev remarks:

> In these words I perceive a deliberate lie, accepted by the leaders of the Party and government. . . . That which I am saying is completely supported by the Decree of 1967 [which clears the Crimean Tatar people of the charges of mass treachery]. And if I am not right, then why did the Decree, one year after [Kosygin's speech,] confirm that there really was an indiscriminate accusation. Do you say that Kosygin did not know this? As a leader of the state and a member of the government issuing this Decree, he knew.[140]

Since all of the top leaders must have known about the situation of the Crimean Tatars, Kadyev insists that they should have done something. He accuses all of them with the question, "What concretely did the prosecutor do, or other Communists, including the judges, before the issuance of the decree [rehabilitating the Crimean Tatars]?"[141] He soon concludes that "no one can answer this question. No one could answer when I addressed myself to the Party and Soviet organs." No one can answer this question because, "All of those people who made the decision, who led and took part in the deportation of my people, in the destruction of the cultural heritage of my people, remain in power. . . . The entire central power resides in these same bloody hands."[142] The defendants are clearly *not* satisfied with the present Soviet state and social system.

In the incriminating document "Genocide in the politics of the government of the Soviet Union," Reshat Bairamov ominously quotes from a UN resolution approved by the Soviet Union, "For genocide every government bears international, political, and material responsibility. Organizations pursuing the aims of genocide, and in the name of which crimes are committed, should be declared criminal and dissolved."[143] Bairamov does not explicitly apply these assertions to his government, yet the message is clear enough.

Before the trial the defendant Kadyev addressed a biting letter to the General Prosecutor of the USSR. In this letter Kadyev reminds the General Prosecutor Rudenko of his role in the Nuremberg Trials as the "representative of Soviet power, of the millions who died at the front during the Great Patriotic War." Kadyev praises Rudenko for not being swayed by the Nazi defendants' claims that they "were only fulfilling the will of the Fuhrer and the orders of the High Command."

Rudenko's behavior at Nuremberg is unfavorably contrasted with his lack of action against those responsible for the Stalinist crimes. Kadyev, not satisfied with Khruschev's secret speech, declares that the Party, as "the organizer and inspiration of all victories," could never admit its leading role under Stalin and "therefore, that well-rehashed 'scapegoat,' 'the Cult of Personality' was found, on which it was possible to dump the entire heap of crimes."[144] Kadyev then questions Rudenko's past and present honesty:

> Why then did the Public Prosecutor's Department of the USSR not recall its functions and obligations? Is it not because everything is connected through mutual responsibility?... You, citizen General Prosecutor, made your career even under Stalin. And it would be absurd to suppose that in the Stalinist pack of wolves there was one sickly sheep. You, as a prosecutor, in that other world surely condemned not a few real people. How many of them passed through your hands, steeped in blood. Hundreds? Thousands? I think that you would hardly wish to initiate me into this, "your secret."[145]

Not surprisingly, a recent Soviet book on the Public Prosecutor's Department has nothing but the highest praises for Rudenko. Even his years under Stalin receive approving (although quite brief) mention, "In the ranks of the Public Prosecutor's Department, Roman Andreevich Rudenko trod a difficult and glorious path from investigator to General Prosecutor of the USSR." Of all things, Rudenko is praised for "putting into practice the measures of the CPSU on the liquidation of the

consequences of the Cult of Personality."[146] Kadyev, however, criticizes this "act of great humanity," declaring that such measures were mere empty gestures "if the murderers remained unpunished and continued to occupy the highest posts in the government."[147]

There can be little doubt that higher Soviet officials were involved in the Stalinist system of terror. Although the degree of the involvement varied, it was often necessary to denounce others or face possible denouncement oneself. At the very least, a certain public support for the bloodshed was required, as for example that shown by Khrushchev in 1938, "We thank you and greet you, great Stalin, your best pupil, Nikolay Ivanovich Yezhov [then head of the secret police], and all of you who by your Bolshevist actions have destroyed these vermin." These vermin being "bourgeois nationalists, . . . and other canaille."[148] Neither the Terror nor any of the other Stalinist crimes could have been accomplished without the direct participation of most of these leaders. As Roy Medvedev, Robert Conquest and others show, regardless of their motivations, the actions of these top people were vitally necessary for the fulfillment of Stalin's plans.[149] Stalin was very effective at binding others to him with bonds of mutual complicity, often requiring additional signatures on death lists as well as the fulfillment of "departmental quotas" of liquidated enemies.[150] In this sordid world it was the natural instincts of self-preservation as well as the opportunities for quick gain (someone had to replace the fallen) that made Stalin's tactics effective.

Although the defendants place the great majority of the blame on the investigative organs and top party leaders, the persecution and trial of the Crimean Tatars would not have been possible without the actions of countless "ordinary" Soviet citizens. Judging by the examples given by the defendants, a number of Soviet citizens truly did think of the Crimean Tatars as traitors, or at least as people to be suspected or feared. Reshat Bairamov describes an incident which took place when he was nine or ten years old:

> In our class one of my schoolmates told the teacher that he lost ten roubles (in the old money) [now worth 100 roubles]. Our teacher asked: "Who found or took this money?" Everyone was silent. In the class there were two Crimean Tatar boys. The teacher made us both turn out the pockets of our pants in the presence of all the students in the class, and of the principal and the vice-principal, who were invited to the class.[151]

The defendants also speak of persecution both at work and in local party organizations. Often those responsible even expressed their sympathy for the victims. Rollan Kadyev relates how he was refused permission for previously planned trips under various pretexts, and finally told by the dean and vice-dean that it was "beyond their power" to grant him a trip, and that he should "wait for a 'better time.'" Nevertheless, Kadyev persisted and somehow received permission. But when he tried to obtain his official notification the manager refused to give it to him, "referring to an explanation of several circumstances from the special section of the university."[152] So Kadyev went to the administration for an explanation:

> Thirty minutes after [the special section learned of the trip], the KGB worker Koziurin appeared in the dean's office and in my very presence summoned the vice-dean of science and went with him into the dean's office. The "chat" lasted about an hour. Coming out of the office after the "chat" the crimson-red Professor Rish, vice-dean of science, asked me to accompany him into his office, where he informed me, that the trip had been canceled for reasons entirely clear to me. . . . When I applied to the dean, he advised me "as a friend" to "submit" and promised me a trip if I would write a "repentant" statement or admit my "mistakes."[153]

Other defendants had similar experiences at work, often connected with local KGB and Party organizations.[154] Their efforts to resettle in the Crimea, even after they were officially cleared of the charge of mass treachery, met with only discrimination and rejection.[155] Support for the Crimean Tatars was almost always limited to expressions of sympathy and powerlessness. The few who made attempts to help the Crimean Tatars usually accomplished nothing. For example, a Party bureau voted on the expulsion from the Party of the Crimean Tatar activist (and soon to be defendant) Ridvan Safarov. After two-thirds of the bureau voted not to expel him the secretary of the bureau said, "Comrades! What are you doing? After all there is already a decision from the city committee on his expulsion." Two more rounds of voting were unsuccessful in expelling Safarov from the Party, so he was simply expelled without a vote.[156] Sometimes even workers in the KGB and police expressed sympathy. While expelling several Crimean Tatar representatives from Moscow, one lieutenant said, "Yes, you did not disturb the peace, but we are fulfilling the order of the authorities . . . I am not acquainted with the real reasons for your deportation, but any people, as I see it,

should always have the right to live in their homeland."[157] Similar expressions of support from a KGB soldier at the trial brought him nothing but trouble. In response to the question from local Uzbeks, "Who is being judged and for what?" he replied, "They are judging people for the truth." Then, according to Crimean Tatar witnesses, two informers told several officers of this incident and the soldier was "led away" by two KGB majors, and "never seen again" at the trial.[158]

In sharp contrast to the conduct of public defenders during Stalinist times, the public defender N. A. Monakhov provides the Crimean Tatars with a particularly strong and spirited defense. In his final speech the prosecutor attempts to convict Monakhov along with the defendants:

> Comrade judges, . . . Public defender Monakhov rudely violated the principles of the Soviet legal profession. Therefore I ask the court to submit a particular resolution on the public defender Monakhov's unbecoming behavior, I ask that the matter of his unbecoming behavior be brought to a judicial consultation meeting of the Presidium of the Moscow Collegium of lawyers. I consider that there is no longer a place for him in the ranks of Soviet lawyers for his unpartylike behavior, in particular, his actions at this court proceeding.[159]

Consequently the judge fulfilled the prosecutor's request and Monakhov was removed from his position.[160]

During the trial, one of Reshat Bairamov's friends from the army testifies against him. Vladimir Lomakin has nothing but praise for Bairamov, insisting that "he is a good specialist, has a lot of knowledge, [and] . . . always distinguished himself for bravery." Lomakin's "damning" testimony lies in the fact that Bairamov sent him documents which he turned over to the Party Organizer, who gave them to the KGB. Although Lomakin says that Bairamov sent him the documents "so that I would read and find out what his life is like," he nevertheless only "read the beginning" and then took the letter to the Party Organizer because he noticed "a lot of displeasure towards the government." After all, Lomakin reasoned, these letters "would have been detected all the same." When Bairamov asks Lomakin if he did not suggest that Bairamov "give up such activities, or things will end badly," Lomakin agrees, "I gave you friendly advice. Now you are sitting in the prisoners' dock, that is already bad." When Bairamov asks where in his document Lomakin sees the "slander against the Soviet system" to which he previously testified, it is hardly surprising that Lomakin says only, "You yourself understand very well."[161]

Lomakin is motivated not only by the desire to stay out of trouble, but also by the conviction that resistance on his part will not help anyone. Another witness for the prosecution, Valentin Ovechkin, expresses similar motives for bringing the documents he received to the KGB:

> It happened like this. . . .[When we received the letters] we were engaged in sorting the correspondence and archives of our father [a recently deceased "well-known" writer]. It was known to me that trials were taking place against citizens of Crimean Tatar nationality. Therefore I did not consider it necessary to keep these letters at home. Such a document could entail the seizure of my father's archives. Therefore I took this letter to the organs of the KGB.[162]

There seems to have been little reason for Ovechkin to have given the letters to the KGB. Ovechkin does not condemn the documents he received, the worst he can say is that, although he "did not read them all," he noticed that "in [the letters] there are several hysterical inaccuracies."

The witness for the prosecution Zorina Stepanovna, the wife of a police commander, offers an extreme example of many of the ideas which guaranteed the Crimean Tatars continued mistreatment and exile:

> I arrived in Chirchik in January 1968 and there for the first time heard that the Tatars are rebelling, that they want to go to the Crimea. . . . Before this I had heard that during the war the Tatars betrayed the Russians. . . . I said: "Since they sent you away, there was a basis for this, innocent people would not have been sent away, and that was rightly done." . . . [Bariev] said that they did not let them take anything, did not discriminate, but sent everyone away. I answered that it was war, and one could not have dealt with them differently. He said that they suffered. I answered: "If you suffered, well then we suffered, there was a war, and we, Russians, suffered most of all, we fought." I wanted to clarify—So living here is bad for you is it? He spoke about language, culture, etc. I explained that the Russian language is the richest and the most beautiful language and much better than Tatar, everyone speaks it, so what is [Tatar] to you—it is already not needed. . . .[Bariev] said that they were not allowed back to the Crimea. I answered that obviously this is necessary, . . . Russians and Ukrainians are already living there, and where can one fit you, and also if all of you were to be let back a bloody slaughter would

> begin. You would butcher all the Russians there. . . . One cannot trust you.[163]

In Stepanovna's view the Crimean Tatars are not merely petitioning the government for redress, they are directly opposed to and "rebelling" against the government. Of course, Stepanovna had come to expect such behavior from the Crimean Tatars, since they had "betrayed the Russians" during the war. For Stepanovna the treatment of the Crimean Tatars is justified because they have always been a threat to the Russians. Their stubborn refusal to accept Russian language and culture is yet another sign of their backwardness, further demonstrating that they cannot be trusted to stay out of trouble on their own. Stepanovna's claim that there is no longer any room in the Crimea for the Tatars is not accepted by the defendants. They point out that their present home of Uzbekistan is much more densely populated than the Crimea. They claim that the Crimea is actually in need of settlers and that the Soviet government actively encourages settlement in the Crimea, only not by Crimean Tatars.[164] This duplicity is aggravated by the fact that other deported nationalities had by this time been allowed to return and even been given nominal autonomy. Stepanovna's final explanation, "One cannot trust you," is more convincing in explaining why the Crimean Tatars were not allowed to return.

One must not forget the importance of strategic considerations in refusing the Crimean Tatars's demands for repatriation. Bariev was refused admission to a technical school in the Crimea because "Crimea borders Turkey through the sea, and there is no trust for the Crimean Tatars."[165] Maybe just as important were fears of what the results would be of setting a precedent by giving in to nationalist minority demands. Ethnic unrest was one of the most dangerous time-bombs threatening the foundations of Soviet power. Even in the era of glasnost and perestroika, the otherwise conciliatory Mikhail Gorbachev did not hesitate to send in the tanks when the Baltic states showed signs of budding nationalist separatism.

Whether they were motivated by traditional prejudices or fear, many of the participants in the Tashkent trial seemed to be almost eager to oblige the prosecution. Both Ovechkin and Lomakin could have just quietly discarded their letters if they feared getting into trouble. The Union of Writers, having received letters from Crimean Tatars, sent these documents directly to the KGB as "bearing no relation to the activities of the Union of Writers."[166] Their example was followed by organizations as diverse as the Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet

and the Crimean Regional Museum in Simferopol.[167] The judge also could have been less of a lackey to the prosecutor. After all, he had before him the example of the public defender Monakhov.

Yet all of these people felt it necessary to immediately accomplish what they knew the Soviet government expected of them. Under Stalin people had often been condemned for "non-denunciation."[168] Even if such a charge did not directly result in a death sentence, a few years in a Siberian camp could produce the same results. However, Stalin was dead and even Krushchev had been removed from power without being shot. It is, in theory, debatable whether such people as Lomakin and Ovechkin had much basis to fear charges of "non-denunciation." One must remember that only a few hundred Crimean Tatars were ever prosecuted, although hundreds of thousands had signed the very "criminal" documents which were used to condemn the defendants. Even the "criminal" Kadyev was at first only subjected to verbal abuse and loss of business trips.[169] In light of such considerations, one must conclude that Lomakin and Ovechkin probably would have incurred very little risk by not taking the letters they received to the KGB. The days of the witch hunts were over, and there were too many bigger fish to fry.

In spite of these facts, throughout the trial there was no shortage of people willing to aid the prosecution. Many different motives can be found for such behavior, although concerns for personal safety and comfort would probably rank high on any list. Undoubtedly, many found such behavior much easier when they could view it as just and patriotic.

The conditions which were responsible for the Crimean Tatars' dissent, trial, and conviction were not altogether new, but direct products of the past, and can be found in different forms in previous Russian and Soviet history. The history of the Crimean Tatars under Russian and then Soviet rule is a story of prejudice and attempted assimilation. As the losers in the long struggle between the Khanate and Russia, the Crimean Tatars were expected to assimilate and become good citizens of the Russian Empire. When they tried to retain a separate identity they were mistrusted and mistreated by the Russian government. The continuation of this mistrust over several centuries was in part due to the opportunism of those who saw ways to profit at the Tatars' expense, such as those who took the Tatars' land and the partisan leaders who found convenient scapegoats for their own failures. After Stalin's death it was no longer possible for the government to fully rehabilitate the Crimean Tatars. By this time the government had done too much to

admit that it had been wrong all along. Too many were deeply implicated in the mistreatment of others to allow the truth to be told.

The lip-service paid to democracy and equality by the Soviet government made possible the Crimean Tatars' protests. However, their arrest and trial was a consequence of the Stalinist subordination of everything and everyone to the security of the state. Only because the country was tired of the Stalinist butchery were the defendants able to show how ridiculous the charges against them were. And only because both the fear and the prejudices of earlier times survived were the defendants convicted in spite of their convincing arguments.

The Tatar defendants invoked the teachings of Ismail Bey, praising Soviet power and using its dogma for their own ends. Just as Ismail Bey chose liberalism over conservative Orthodoxy, so the defendants chose Leninism over Stalinism. Yet the central government had changed little in its relation to the Crimean Tatars. Just as before, historic distrust of the Tatars played an important part in shaping governmental actions and policies. With the possible exception of a short period right after the Revolution, the Soviet government remained as committed to de facto Russian centralized control as the former tsarist autocracy had been.

Communism promised freedom and equality to the oppressed peoples of the old tsarist regime. Yet Stalinism delivered suffering and oppression more effectively than the tsars had ever been able to. It also brought incredible lies and distortion to nearly every aspect of life. This is perhaps one of the most long-term damaging aspects of Stalinism, the habit of brutal oversimplification and twisting of the truth which pervaded all aspects of society. But, in the long run, lies are only effective if there is force backing them up. After the shock of Stalinism wore off, there proved to be insufficient force to maintain the mountain of lies which had been created. The example set by the Crimean Tatars was eventually followed by many Soviet nationalities, dooming the Soviet Empire to disintegration and collapse.

---

1. Rachel Denber, ed., *The Soviet Nationality Reader* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 354. See also Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, *The Hidden Nations* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1990), 29.

2. Gwyneth Hughes and Simon Welfare, *Red Empire: The Forbidden History of the USSR* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1990), 105. It is stated that the average population of the Soviet penal camp system under Stalin was approximately eight million, or (assuming a total population of approximately 170 million) nearly one out of every twenty Soviet citizens was interred.

3. See, for example, Chakovskiy, "O svobodakh mnimykh i svobodakh deystvitel'nykh" (On sham freedoms and real freedoms) *Pravda*, 28 March 1969, quoted in "Zapis' sudebnogo protsessa v Tashkente nad desyat'yu uchastnikami natsional'nogo dvizheniya krymskotatarskogo naroda"

(Record of the court proceeding in Tashkent against the ten participants in the national movement of the Crimean Tatar people) (hereafter Trial) Part 3 of [Ayshe Seytmuratova, comp.], *Tashkentskiy protsess: sbornik dokumentov* (The Tashkent trial: a collection of documents) (hereafter *Tash*) (Amsterdam: The Alexander Herzen Foundation, 1976), 610. Unless otherwise noted, this and all other translations from the Russian are mine.

4. E. Bagramov, *The CPSU's Nationalities Policy: Truth and Lies* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), 5.
5. Diuk and Karatnycky, 66-71.
6. For examples of Soviet discrimination against non-Russians see Diuk and Karatnycky, 47-71.
7. J. V. Stalin, *On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.* (Moscow: Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers of the U.S.S.R., 1936), 30. See also V. Karpinskiy, *Osnovnyye prava i obyazannosti grazhdan SSSR* (The fundamental rights and obligations of citizens of the USSR) (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1946), 29.
8. V. D. Men'shagin and P. S. Romashkin, eds., *Nauchno-prakticheskiy kommentariy k zakonu ob ugolovnoy otvetstvennosti za gosudarstvennyye prestupleniya* (Scientific-practical commentary to the law on criminal responsibility for state crimes) (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1960), 27, 70.
9. *Ibid.*, 27-8.
10. "Obrashcheniye krymskotatarskogo naroda k XXIII s" ezdu KPSS" (Address of the Crimean Tatar people to the 23d session of the CPSU) (hereafter Address) Doc. 1 in Part 1 of *Tash*, 30. Also see "Soobshcheniye pervogo zamestitel'ya ministra okhrany obshchestvennogo poryadka UzSSR M. Beglova predsedatel'yu KGB pri SM UzSSR S. I. Kiselevu o sud'be krymskotatarskikh spetsposelentsev v Uzbekistane" (Communication from the first vice-minister of the defense of public order of the UzSSR M. Beglov to the chairman of the KGB under the SM of UzSSR on the fate of the Crimean Tatar special settlers in Uzbekistan). Doc. 32 in Part 2 of *Tash*, 200-1. Also see "Soobshcheniye zamestitel'ya nachal'nika 1-go spetsotdela MOOP UzSSR v sledstvennyy otdel KGB pri SM UzSSR o sud'be krymskotatarskikh spetsposelentsev v Uzbekistane" (Communication from the deputy head of the 1st special department of the MOOP of the UzSSR to the investigative department of the KGB under the SM of UzSSR on the fate of the Crimean Tatar special settlers in Uzbekistan) Doc. 33 in Part 2 of *Tash*, 202. It appears that the Crimean Tatar data is probably more accurate, especially as the KGB data does not take into account mortalities on the month long journey to Uzbekistan, and minimizes deaths by excluding late arrivees (demobilized soldiers and others) from the "arrived" totals while including them in the "survived" totals.
11. "Vsenarodnyy protest" (Nationwide protest) (hereafter Protest) Doc. 2 in Part 1 of *Tash*, 54.
12. Protest, 102-7. Trial, 422-5. "Traurnaya informatsiya No. 69" (Funereal message No. 69) (hereafter Funereal Message), Doc. 8 in Part 5 of *Tash*, 747-50.
13. Address, 10. Protest, 55, 81.
14. "Postanovleniye o poryadke primeneniya stat'i 2 ukaza ot 28 aprel'ya 1956 goda" (Resolution on the manner of application of article 2 of the decree of 28 April, 1956) Doc. 4 in Part 5 of *Tash*, 723.
15. Protest, 56-116.
16. "Obvinitel'noye zaklyucheniye" (Indictment) (hereafter Indictment) Doc. 35 in Part 2 of *Tash*, 255.
17. Indictment, 272.
18. "Obrashcheniye krymskikh tatar po povodu sobytiy v gorode Tashkente 4 i 5 avgusta 1969 goda" (Address of the Crimean Tatars regarding the events in the city of Tashkent of the 4th and 5th of August 1969) in Part 4 of *Tash*, 709.
19. Indictment, 271-6.
20. Trial, 333.
21. Trial, 396.
22. Trial, 339, 396, 408, 429, 436.

23. Address, 31-2.
24. Trial, 604.
25. Trial, 604. Also see Trial, 440.
26. Trial, 418. For an example of such historical reinterpretation see V. Al'tman, "Sessiya po istorii Kryma" (Sessions on the history of the Crimea), *Voprossi istorii*, 12 (December 1948): 184.
27. Hughes and Welfare, 164.
28. B. A. Vvedenskiy, ed., *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia) (hereafter Encyclopedia II), 2d ed. Vol. 23 (Moscow: Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1953), 552, 559.
29. Trial, 604.
30. Alan Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1978), 30.
31. There are fundamental aspects of social and political structure which preclude the characterization of most Islamic societies as feudal. Hereditary ties did not on the whole play as large a role in Islamic society as in medieval Europe. Occasionally the use of "iqta" land grants is offered as an indication that Islamic society was feudal. However, the recipients of such grants did not directly own the land but merely acquired the right to its revenue. Such rights might or might not include various degrees of heritability. The exact form such grants were given depended more on the needs and power of the participants than on any ideal "rights." Under such a system grants could sometimes be transferred relatively often, and sometimes merely sold to the highest bidder. For a thorough discussion of these issues see Marshal G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, Vol. 2 *The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 64-5, 99-104, 342-357.
32. Hodgson, Vol. 3 *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times*, 112.
33. Of the pre-Russian conquest Crimean peasantry Fisher writes, "Their relationship with the lords of the land was not feudal in character. Most of the peasants were Muslims . . . .Since the peasants were free to leave if they wished, those who collected and assigned taxes were careful not to abuse their rights for fear of losing the producers on their land." (pp. 23-4).
34. Fisher, 27-8.
35. O. U. Shmidt, ed., *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia) (hereafter Encyclopedia I), Vol. 35 (Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1937), 318-21.
36. Encyclopedia II, 562.
37. Encyclopedia II, 552.
38. N. Nadinskiy, *Suvorov v Krymu* (Suvorov in the Crimea), 3d ed., rev. and enl. (Simferopol: Krymizdat, 1950), 20.
39. Nadinskiy, 23.
40. Encyclopedia II, 652.
41. Encyclopedia I, 307.
42. Trial, 509.
43. Quoted in Fisher, 69.
44. James Trager, ed., *The People's Chronology: A Year-by-Year Record of Human Events from Prehistory to the Present* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 192.
45. Address, 13.
46. Encyclopedia II, 552.
47. Encyclopedia I, 307.
48. Fisher, 93.
49. The populations cited in various sources are often contradictory, and are made more confusing by frequent changes in Russian territorial administrative areas and their varying inclusion of the Crimean peninsula proper. Fisher makes use of Western travellers' reports and arrives at a post-annexation population of 150,000 Crimean Tatars (Fisher, 79). When added to the first Russian governor's estimate of an additional 150,000 who left between the Russian invasion

and occupation, one arrives at a pre-invasion total of about 300,000 Tatars (Fisher, 75). This is significantly lower than both that of the Crimean Tatars ("several million" elsewhere indicated as four million) and that of the first edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (approximately 630,000 assuming a birth/death ratio of one from annexation up to 1863). For the Crimean Tatars' estimates see "Letter to UN Secretary General Mr. Waldheim," *A Chronicle of Current Events*, 31 (17 May, 1974): 154.

50. Fisher, 70.
51. Encyclopedia I, 309.
52. Alexandr Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples* trans. George Saunders (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978), 107.
53. Fisher, 102.
54. The Emancipation of the serfs, the establishment of a Russian parliament (Duma), and the Judicial Reforms of 1864, were all widely perceived as liberal reforms, while in fact they were directed primarily at consolidating the tsar's autocratic rule. After emancipation the serfs remained as tied to their land and as exploited as they ever had been. The Duma had no say in actual governmental decisions, and was soon dissolved by the tsar. Insofar as the Judicial Reforms were effective in eliminating inconsistencies and abuses in the law they merely increased the tsar's autocratic power.
55. "Ismail Bey Gasprinski. 1851-1914." *Shura*, nos. 21-4 (1 Nov., 15 Nov., 1 Dec., 15 Dec., 1914) translated by Alan Fisher in Edward Allworth, ed., *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 78, 86, 56.
56. *Terjuman*, no. 1 (10 April 1883), translated by Alan Fisher, quoted in, "Ismail Gaspirali, Model Leader for Asia," Chap. 2 of Allworth, ed., pp. 16-7.
57. Address, 17.
58. *Ibid.*
59. Quoted in Allworth, ed., 18-9.
60. Nicholas Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 359.
61. Address, 13.
62. Trial, 371, 389.
63. "Zayavleniye A. Bariyeva General'nomu Prokuru SSSR" (Statement from A. Bariev to the Prosecutor General of the USSR) (hereafter Bariev's statement), Doc. 20 in Part 2 of *Tash*, 168-9.
64. Victor Sherstobitov, *Solving the National Question in the USSR* trans. Galina Semyonovna (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), p. 6, "attempts to endow the nation with 'its own content' are totally erroneous. The nation is only a form of social development, whereas its content is determined by the given mode of production."
65. Sherstobitov, 124.
66. Bagramov, 83.
67. Address, 16.
68. Trial, 614.
69. Trial, 628.
70. Diuk and Karatnycky, 30-33, 56-60, 66-69.
71. V.I. Lenin, "Concerning the National Question of Autonomisation" (hereafter Autonomisation), in "Documents circulated as an addendum to N.S. Krushchev's Secret Speech," Part 3 of Nikita Sergeyevich Krushchev, *The 'Secret Speech'*. trans. Tamara Deutsher (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1976), 104-5.
72. Trial, 628-9. Autonomisation, 102.
73. Autonomisation, 100.
74. Encyclopedia I, 294.
75. Autonomisation, 104.

76. Harrison Evans Salisbury, *Russia in Revolution, 1900-1930* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), 262-3.
77. "Lenin's Testament" in part 3 of Krushchev, pp. 90-2. Also see Robert Conquest, *Stalin: Breaker of Nations* (New York: Viking, 1991), 100-4, 110-1.
78. Salisbury, 167.
79. Boris Levytsky, *The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police 1917-1970*, trans. H.A. Piehler (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1972), 16.
80. Trial, 355.
81. N.U. Shvedovoy, *S.I. Ozhegov Slovar' russkogo yazyka* (Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian Language), 23rd ed. rev. (Moscow: Russkiy yazyk, 1990), 656.
82. Shvedovoy, 896.
83. Hughes and Welfare, 69.
84. For a comparison of the measures of War Communism with the first Five-Year Plan see Riasanovsky, 551.
85. Conquest, *Stalin*, 11.
86. Vasiliy Grossman, *Vse techet . . .* (Always Flowing) (Frankfurt: Posev, 1970), 118. Also see Conquest, *Stalin*, 158.
87. Among these deported peoples are the so-called kulaks, peoples of territories acquired on the eve of World War II (The Baltic States, Western Byelorussia and Ukraine), as well as some or all of the following Soviet minorities: the Chinese, Koreans, Kalmyks, Chechens, Volga Germans, Greeks, Kurds, Kemshins, and others. See Nekrich, 98-105, 133; as well as *"Punished Peoples" of the Soviet Union: The Continuing Legacy of Stalin's Deportations* (New York: Human Rights Watch (Helsinki Watch), 199.
88. Address, 27.
89. Nekrich, 59.
90. Address, 29.
91. Nekrich, 120.
92. *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Block of Rights and Trotskyites"* (hereafter Show Trial) (Moscow: People's Commisariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1938), 793.
93. Show Trial, 223.
94. Show Trial, 796, 798.
95. Grossman, 128.
96. Alexander Werth, *Russia at War: 1941-1945* (New York: Carrol & Graf, 1964), 246-249.
97. For example, see Levytsky, 185.
98. "Zayavleniye R. Kadyeva General'nomu Prokuru SSSR" (Statement from R. Kadyev to the General Prosecutor of the USSR) (herafter Kadyev's Statement), Doc 17 in Part 2 of *Tach*, 148.
99. Trial, 539-40.
100. Compare Trial, 556 with Trial, 680-1.
101. Trial, 610.
102. Trial, 549.
103. Hughes and Welfare, 158. See also Conquest, *Stalin*, 276-7, and Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequeces of Stalinism*, trans. Colleen Taylor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 523.
104. *The Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Translation of 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1979), vol. 22, p. 431. It should be noted that the Russian scientists to whom such inventions are attributed often did accomplish valuable work and provide important contributions in their fields. However, they were only a few of the many scientists from various countries who did so, and typically no mention is made whatsoever of the non-Russians. If one scientist is to be labelled as the inventor, there are usually other candidates who are more qualified. For example, see *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1973 ed., s.v. "Lighting," "Radio" and "Aviation."

105. Trial, 599.
106. Address, 44. Protest 86, 106. Trial, 382.
107. "Ob utverzhdenii Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR" (On the ratification of the Decrees of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR), *Izvestiia*, 26 June, 1946: p. 2.
108. Nekrich, 93.
109. Encyclopedia I, 294.
110. A.V. Basov, *Krym v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945* (The Crimea during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945) (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 279. Also see Nekrich, 112.
111. Hughes and Welfare, 151.
112. Address, 24.
113. Address, 18.
114. Bariev's Statement, 170. Trial, 605-6.
115. Nekrich, 33.
116. "Ukaz o grazhdanakh tatarskoy natsional'nosti prozhivavshikh v Krymu" (Decree on citizens of Tatar nationality formerly living in the Crimea), Doc. 3 in Part 5 of *Tash*, 721.
117. Trial, 363.
118. Nekrich, 9. Hughes and Welfare, 149.
119. Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia: 1941-1945* (New York: Octagon Books, 1980), 65-7, 142-3, 166-7.
120. Krushchev, 58.
121. Il'ia Vergasov, *V gorakh Tavrii* (In the Tavri mountains) (Kiev: Dnipro, 1969), 38.
122. Trial, 595.
123. Trial, 417.
124. Nekrich, 29.
125. Nekrich, 25-32.
126. Nekrich, 25.
127. Werth, 573.
128. Address, 9.
129. Trial, 335-340.
130. Trial, 624.
131. Trial, 417, 620.
132. Trial, 576, 616, 649, 660.
133. Trial, 642.
134. Eugenia Semyonovna Ginzburg, *Journey into the Whirlwind* (originaly published in Russian as: *Krutoy Marshrut*) (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 214, 283.
135. Trial, 642.
136. "Pis'mo-zayavleniye predstavitel'ey krymskotatarskogo naroda" (Letter-statement of the representatives of the Crimean Tatar people), Doc. 7 in Part 5 of *Tash*, 738-9.
137. Trial, 621.
138. "Reshat Bairamov: Genotsid v politike pravitel'stva Sovetskogo gosudarstva" (Reshat Bairamov: Genocide in the politics of the government of the Soviet state) (hereafter Genocide), Doc. 6 in Part 5 of *Tash*, 732.
139. Trial, 611.
140. Trial, 611-2.
141. Trial, 613-614.
142. Trial, 615.
143. Genocide, 732-3. Trial, 574.
144. Kadyev's Statement, 147.
145. Kadyev's Statement, 148-9.

146. G.K. Bol'shakova and V.A. Terekhina, eds., *Sovetskaya prokuratura* (The Soviet public prosecutor's department) (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1982), 215.
147. Kadyev's Statement, 148.
148. Levytsky, 124.
149. Roy A. Medvedev, *Oni okruzhali stalina* (They surrounded Stalin) (Benson, Vt.: Chaldize Publications, 1984). Conquest, *Stalin*, 171-221.
150. Medvedev, *Oni okruzhali Stalina*, 148-51.
151. Genocide, 730.
152. Kadyev's Statement, 154.
153. Ibid., 155.
154. Bariev's Statement, 172. Also see "kharakteristika I. Khairova s mesta raboty" (Report on I. Khairov from his place of employment), Doc. 31 in Part 2 of *Tash*, 199. Compare with Trial, 362, 567.
155. Protest, 101-107. Bariev's Statement, 172. Trial, 384.
156. Trial, 567.
157. Funeral Message, 750.
158. "Iz informatsii No. 2" (From report No. 2), in Part 4 of *Tash*, 695-6.
159. Trial, 557.
160. "A Record of the Trial of Il'ya Gabay and Mustafa Jemilev in the city of Tashkent, 12-19 January 1970" in Edward Allworth, ed., p. 103.
161. Trial, 614-6.
162. Trial, 465.
163. Trial, 509-10, 513.
164. Address, 46.
165. Bariev's Statement, 173.
166. "Pis'mo K. V. Voronkova v KGB" (Letter from K.V. Voronkov to the KGB), Doc. 2 in Part 2 of *Tash*, 122.
167. "Pis'mo kontr-admirala Tikhonova v KGB" (Letter from the first admiral Tikhonov to the KGB), Doc. 1 in Part 2 of *Tash*, 121. "Pis'mo direktora Krymskogo krayevedcheskogo muzeya" (Letter from the director of the Crimean regional museum", Doc. 22 in Part 2 of *Tash*, 178. Also see indictment, 215-8.
168. Ginzburg, 110.
169. Kadyev's Statement, 152-3.

We Have Saved Our Words: Voices of Resistance in Catalan Poetry (1939-1951)

Jim Carpenter

The persecution of the Catalan language and culture were the inexorable complement to one of the essential objectives of the government . . . the disappearance of Catalonia . . . with the destruction of its linguistic and cultural personality, and the reduction of its language to the condition of patois.[1]

—Joseph Benet

In the early 1970s, as the Franco regime limped towards its long awaited demise, Joseph Benet and other Catalans like him began an attempt to come to terms with the dictatorship that had nearly destroyed their centuries old culture. From the moment the armies of General Francisco Franco set foot on Catalan soil until his death on the twentieth of November, 1975, the people of Catalonia found themselves subjected to oppression that approached draconian levels. Says Albert Balcells, in his Contemporary History of Catalonia: "beginning in 1939, Catalan identity [*la catalanidad*] in its most elemental manifestations would suffer its worst repression since the time of Felipe V."[2]

Setting the Stage

To fully understand the ramifications of this hostile and often shocking repression, one must first understand the Catalan situation before the franquist invasion. Catalan nationalism, like many similar European movements, began to take shape during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In all fields, from literature to architecture to politics, a particular national identity coalesced and began to challenge the authority of the central government in Madrid. This nationalist movement reached its apogee between 1931 and 1936 as Catalan autonomy became an important element of the political agenda of a young republican government. Having germinated for decades, the movement finally bore fruit with the flight of the dictator Primo de

Rivera and the king who had protected him, Alfonso XIII, early in 1931. Seizing the opportunity, Fransesc Maciá, soon to be named head of the Generalitat (the autonomous legislative body of Catalonia), proclaimed into existence "the Catalan Republic, as an integral state in the Iberian Federation"[3] on April fourteenth, 1931. This Catalan Republic only existed for a matter of days, but it set a precedent that the new government in Madrid could not ignore. Although the new leaders of the Spanish state opted for a centralized government, based in Madrid, they appeased the demands of Catalans by granting them a long desired Statute of Autonomy.

The Statute of Autonomy, also referred to as the Nuria Statute in recognition of the town where it was written, established many of the rights Catalans had yearned for since their defeat and subsequent subjugation to rule from Madrid in the War of Succession in the early eighteenth century. The first lines of the document, "Catalonia constitutes an autonomous region within the Spanish state, in accordance with the constitution of the Republic and this present Statute. Her organ of representation shall be the Generalitat and she is made up of the provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona,"[4] are replete with elements that satisfy many of the demands of Catalan autonomy. The simple recognition of autonomy, after two centuries of rule from Madrid, must have filled Catalans with considerable pride. The establishment of the Generalitat as the "organ of representation" resonated favorably in their hearts and minds, as it had been the body that enforced Europe's first legal code, the Fueros of the eleventh century, and ruled over the Catalan empire at its moment of greatest power in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[5] Indeed, the Generalitat had served over the years as a sort of rallying cry for the preservation of Catalonia's autonomous legal system. The suppression of the Generalitat in 1713, after defeat in the War of Succession, served as a metaphor for the widespread repression that would plague Catalonia during the following century. A final important element of the Statute was the list of provinces that make up the autonomous region which, although not completely identical to it, call to mind the Paisos Catalans (Catalan nations), the medieval empire composed of countries which identified Catalan as their primary language. Although at its largest expanse the Paisós Catalans covered, in addition to the regions listed, part of southern France, the Spanish province of Aragon, and parts of Italy, the provinces in this list composed its nucleus. As well as these informal resonances, the Statute issued a large degree of governmental responsibility to Catalonia. The

Generalitat was given legislative power over much of the region's economy—including mining, forestry, fish, agriculture, civil and social legislation, and the creation of a new justice system.[6]

One must consider each of these elements a great success for the Catalan nationalist movement, but their importance pales in comparison to these historic words: "The Catalan language is, like the Castilian (i.e. Spanish), an official language of Catalonia . . . All official disposition or resolution within Catalonia must be published in both languages."[7] These words, perhaps more than any others, proclaimed the triumph of Catalan nationalism. Catalan artists and politicians had fought for recognition of their language on a par with Europe's major tongues ever since Bonaventura Carles Aribau published his classic poem "La Patria" in 1833. Although writers had taken steps towards this recognition, as we shall see later, its enactment in legal form fulfilled one of the important goals of the nationalist movement. Official recognition led to a veritable explosion in the literary production of Catalonia during this five year period. Although statistics are hard to come by, given the hiatus in publication that would follow the civil war, the "most faithful calculations give an estimate of some 1200 periodical publications edited in the Catalan language in 1936."[8] One must also note the remarkable 750 books published annually within the region. Among these titles can be found two important works by the legendary Catalan linguist Pompeu Fabra, his *Diccionario General de la Llengua Catalana* and his *Diccionario Ortografic* (Orthographic dictionary), both of which served to give a formal grammatical authority to the language.

The Statute of Autonomy that came into effect in 1932 did not meet all the demands of Catalan nationalists. Its educational provisions, for example, did not provide finances for the establishment of Catalan language schools, leaving that responsibility to the newly created, penniless Generalitat. Although the Statute guaranteed the co-officiality of the languages, article 50 of the new constitution established the obligatory use of Castilian in primary and secondary education. The lack of finances from the central government, and the mandatory instruction of Castilian, were intended to moderate the effects of the co-officiality of the languages. They resulted, however, in the creation of serious obstacles to the effective teaching of Catalan at the primary and secondary levels. Despite these obstacles, the Generalitat did manage to secure the teaching of the Catalan tongue, although instruction was not always conducted in Catalan, at these essential levels. The statute served as a legislative base for a flowering of the language between 1931-36.

Given the importance of the Statute, both in the specific rights it legislated into being, and the psychological importance its mere presence lent to the people by recognizing their existence as a community, it is appropriate to begin a discussion of the oppression wreaked on Catalonia by examining the franquist regime's attitude towards that nation.

After occupying Lleida, the first Catalan province conquered, Franco proclaimed "the Statute of Catalonia, conceded in bad judgement [*mala hora*] by the Republic, no longer has validity, in the Spanish juridic order . . ."[9] This declaration was only the first in a series of measures he would take during the first decade of his regime, measures aimed at a destruction of Catalan language and culture. He did not stop with abolishing the autonomy of the nation; rather he tried to eliminate the nation itself. Another of his initial acts upon conquering Catalonia was "to prohibit the use of Catalan in public and announce that its use would only be permitted within family and private life."[10] In his study of the oppression of Catalonia under the franquist regime, Benet comes to the conclusion that "[t]he persecution of the language and culture of Catalonia was an authentic cultural genocide."[11] The repression extended beyond language and legal documents, as Franco did not hesitate to extend his policies of cultural genocide to human beings. The historian Josep M. Solé i Sabaté estimates the regime executed four thousand Catalans for political crimes between the years 1938-53, the years of strictest repression.[12] Among those executed was the president of the Generalitat, Lluis Companys, who ironically was condemned for being an "author by association in the expressed crime of military rebellion."[13] Companys defended the elected government of Spain, but the council of war seemingly chose to overlook the fact that they were the ones who had initially rebelled. Although the four thousand unnecessary deaths perhaps have the strongest emotional effect, one must also remember the thousands jailed, the government officials unceremoniously dismissed from their posts in favor of replacements from Madrid, and the countless Catalans who fled to exile. In 1946, seven years after the end of the war, the regime still held in captivity ten thousand political prisoners in Barcelona alone.[14] Benet, to give an example of the scale of the exile, provides a list, a list he says is not exhaustive, of the professors who fled the country upon losing their posts. His list includes some 134 names, among them some of the most influential Catalan intellectuals of the time, including Pompeu Fabra—the linguist who gave Catalan systematic authority with his dictionaries, and Carles Riba—one of the most important Catalan poets of the time.

Franco did not arbitrarily decide to pursue this policy of repression, repression that in differing degrees affected all of Spain, but conceived of it as the natural extension of the philosophies with which he would govern for over three decades. Franco, whose power rested primarily on the church, the army, and the intensely patriotic "Falange y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (J.O.N.S.)" party, had no use for nationalist movements like the Catalan or the Basque. His goal was to create a single, unified, almost mystical Spain sanctified by its historic destiny and the church. This idea of a mystical Spain resonated strongly in the rhetoric of the two pre-war parties that would unite to form Franco's most militant power bloc. The prewar head of the Falange, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, proclaimed "The world must once more be directed [governed] by three or four racial entities. Spain can be one of these three or four."[15] In the same vein Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, the leader of the J.O.N.S., said "Ours is the honor, we have no reason to hide it—to be among the first to systematically set before Spain the route of empire."[16] The rhetoric of these two men became the ambition of the Franco regime. Spain, as conceived by Franco, had the obligation to move towards its destiny of empire. Signs appeared in factories with the slogan "Spain, whether or not she desires it, by her nature, is the key to the destiny of the West."[17] While he never pursued an active imperial policy, Franco used rhetoric such as this to more closely bind the dissident nationalities to the central Spanish government. He mixed this millenarian rhetoric with references to the church, implying a conception of Spain as the proverbial chosen land. One of the common cries at regime meetings was "For the Empire, towards God."[18] This mixture of religious rhetoric and allusions to the destiny of the country led to the creation, in the propaganda of the regime, of a mystic Spain. Chosen by God, propelled by history towards greatness, the very conception of the country became a tool of the government.

Franco's mystical conception did not leave room for the existence, within Spain, of cultural identities other than the Spanish. Said Franco, "we want it [the national identity] absolute, with one single language, the Castilian, and one single personality, the Spanish."[19] Propaganda posters of the time portrayed crowds carrying signs, referring to Catalan, that said "war on blasphemy," "we want a pure language," and "blasphemy does no honor to the country." The caption of the posters read simply "Speak well (or right)."[20] These policies would gravely affect the Catalan language, a language that Franco said would only be permitted to exist "reduced to a dialect, a folkloric, familial, and sentimental

dialect."[21] Franco's philosophy and his policies strongly manifested themselves in Catalan life, as they created a hostile environment for Catalan culture.

As a result of Franco's policies, actions that before the establishment of the regime would have been considered normal, had they been considered at all, took on a new significance as acts of resistance. When Franco tried to reduce the Catalan language to the status of a museum piece, any effort to keep it alive became resistance. Its use in official life, or its appearance in print directly contradicted the desires and aims of the new regime. Though the legal situation evolved over the course of the 1940s and gradually provided for limited publication, that publication can still be defined as resistance because it served to aid the survival of a culture that was not the Spanish. Indeed, by this definition, any act taken that could be identified as a "Catalan" act must be identified as resistance. This type of resistance is the object of this study, specifically as it manifested itself in Catalan poetry during the period of heaviest oppression: 1939-1951. This poetry, because of Franco's stance, and because of its place in a long standing tradition of Catalan poetry, served as a lonely voice of resistance on the quiet Catalan streets of this period.

Previous studies of Catalan resistance during this period, with one notable exception, are plagued with a shortcoming that hinders interpretation. Tunon de Lara's study of Spain under Franco emphasizes political resistance, such as the guerilla warfare that flared up in pockets of the Pyrenees until the late 1940s, and attempts by political parties and labor syndicates to maintain clandestine havens of organization. He only mentions in passing cultural resistance to the regime, citing such Castilian authors as Camilo Jose de Cela and Carmen Laforet, and even then does not include so much as a single Catalan author. Catalonia, along with Madrid and the Basque country, would prove to be one of the centers of resistance to Franco during the latter years of the regime. This failure to include a single Catalan author does a disservice to the people who built the foundation for that political resistance.

Perhaps a greater disservice, however, is done by the fact that Tunon de Lara has separated, in the way he has structured his book, the political from the cultural sphere. One must consider cultural resistance as vitally linked to the politics, to such an extent that one cannot accurately trace the process of resistance if they are separated. To arrive at an understanding of the strikes and demonstrations of the 1960s, one must examine the literature, music, and drama of the 1940s and 1950s. By separating these spheres, Tunon de Lara has robbed the reader of the tools necessary

to accurately interpret the era. Balcells, in his study of contemporary Catalonia, includes a substantial section devoted to an examination of cultural resistance but, like Tunon de Lara, examines the cultural and the political spheres separately. He traces the development of cultural resistance from poets like Carles Riba and the younger Salvador Espriu to the singer Raimon, but does not take the final step and examine its effect on political resistance. Only Hank Johnston, in his study of the development of resistance, gives full credit to cultural groups, such as choral and excursion groups, and activities for the development of political resistance. He recognizes that "[t]he existence of these groups implicitly challenged the new order under Franco by providing a link with pre-war Catalan life."[22] By recognizing this role of cultural groups, he gives himself the freedom to examine them as causal factors in the development of political resistance.

These studies give a fair representation of the type of scholarship produced to this point on Catalan resistance during this time period. They provide valuable information about political and cultural activity, but for the most part fail to make the connection. They also emphasize the activities of cultural groups and almost completely ignore the cultural artifacts produced during the period. At most one might see a passing mention of the most important titles of the period. This emphasis on the activities of groups must be understood within the context of the atmosphere of Catalonia during the 1940s. The attempts to destroy the nation reached such draconian levels that one tends to be attracted to any sign of community. The mere presence of cultural groups takes on such heroic overtones that the actual production of cultural works is overshadowed. This does not mean, however, that these artifacts have any less significance. A study such as this one is necessary to establish a greater understanding of the ideology of resistance that permeated Catalan society under Franco. Because of the danger, only a small part of the nation took part in the various groups mentioned by Johnston and Balcells. A book, however, could find its way into any home, and in the books of poetry seen here we see a more pervasive, if quieter resistance.

Before examining the poetry itself, however, it is necessary to examine both the Catalan nationalist tradition from which it arose, and its place in the canon of modern Catalan verse.

Poetry and Catalan Nationalism

In his pioneering study of nationalism Benedict Anderson notes that "[since] World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in

nationalist terms."[23] Before the breakup of the former Soviet Union along national lines, many people had condemned nationalism to the trash bin of history. This condemnation, however, proved drastically premature, as the map of Europe continues changing under the weight of nationalist movements. One would be hard pressed to identify another single force that has had as much impact on twentieth century history as nationalism.

Having said this, it must also be noted that nationalism is not a clear concept. Hugh Seton Watson's resigned conclusion that "no scientific definition of nationalism can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists"[24] more than adequately demonstrates the difficulties in arriving at a definition. Anderson, despite Seton Watson's assertion, sets out to define the nation clearly, as "an imagined political community— imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[25] Anderson's persuasive argument bases itself on the simultaneous onset of print capitalism and the development, in renaissance Europe, of the primacy of the vernacular. The saturation of the Latin market a mere one hundred and fifty years after the invention of the printing press, combined with a shortage of money in Europe, provided the impetus for printers to publish "cheap versions in the vernacular."[26] The widespread publication of these versions served to clearly demarcate the boundaries between nations. As printers could only sell large numbers of French books within French speaking regions, the notion of France became increasingly well-defined. As people began to understand their identity as pertaining to a certain nation defined by linguistic boundaries, history and culture began to take on specific national characteristics. Cultural symbols that had originally pertained only to a small region were appropriated for use by the nation as a whole. History began to be studied in terms of the nation, although that nation may not have existed at the time the events studied took place. Though language was the initial force in the development of the nation, it soon was considered on equal terms with history and culture in the individual's conception of the nation.[27]

The intersection of those elements will be the aim of this study, as we focus on poetry as a form of Catalan nationalism that, both in its mere presence and its content, served as a form of resistance against the Franco dictatorship. The historical, linguistic, and cultural lines along which we have defined the nation each find themselves manifested in poetry. It is, as a form, one of the primary cultural expressions of a people, taking a place alongside music, drama, and dance. It also, because of its dependence on mythological, sensorial, and historical

imagery, resonates most strongly within a particular community. Poetry depends on an implicit understanding of these images, and only a reader indigenous to that community will have the tools to understand them thoroughly. As people increasingly defined their communities in national terms, poetry became more and more particular to the nation. Poetry also, for obvious reasons, holds an important place in the linguistic tradition of a nation. The fact that it is written in the language of the nation cannot be underestimated, as it gives the people an even more complete ownership of the poetry. The difficulty inherent in translating poetry perhaps most strongly illustrates that ownership. Poetry depends so heavily on cadence, meter, and sound that no translation, no matter how closely it approximates the meaning of the words, can perfectly imitate the original work. As nations defined themselves along linguistic lines, a particular poetry became peculiar to the nation.

In Catalonia, the national importance inherent in poetry finds itself amplified by the role Catalan poetry has played in the formation of this nation's particular brand of nationalism. Although one cannot select a singular event that initiates the formation of any nationalism, Catalan historians often highlight Carles Bonaventura Aribau's poem "La patria [the nation]" as the most important element in the first phase. Although other works, written both in Castilian and Catalan, preceded it, it was the first work to express "an identification of the language with the country."[28] The poem contains striking images of the physical landscape of Catalonia—"the winding beach of Llobregat," the "high palace" of Montseny, and the "ship of Mallorca" in the "immense sea"—combined with an emotional elegy of the author's native tongue. He describes it as "sweeter to my tongue than honey," and says that his soul "does not understand any other language."[29] This juxtaposition of the language and the physical landscape of the country leads to an association of the language with a nationalist sentiment. Aribau wrote the poem in 1833, as Catalonia began to emerge from the oppressive shadow cast by the Bourbon regime. The monarchy had phased the Catalan tongue out of public life during the eighteenth century and had pushed it to the edge of oblivion. Aribau's poem then, along with other works both in Spanish and in Catalan, began a reawakening of the Catalan tongue.

This reawakening took several important institutional forms, including the University of Barcelona, the Academy of Letters (literally of good letters), and most importantly the Floral Games (*els Jocs Florals*). While the first two dedicated themselves to instruction of Catalan and

the collection of Catalan works which would form their substantial libraries, the Floral Games served as a forum to inspire younger Catalans to write poetry. The Floral Games had been, in the Middle Ages, a poetry competition that flourished in Catalonia. Begun at a time when poetry primarily existed as an oral form, the Floral Games originally gathered the best of Catalan poets and gave them a chance to compete against each other in front of a demanding audience. When a new generation of poets began to develop in the mid-nineteenth century, they revived this tradition in memory of the most glorious period of their nation's history. It did more than call to mind memories of a long distant past, however, as it also provided a vital link between the poet and his audience.[30] The mere presence of an oral poetry competition made the act of reading and writing poetry a community activity. Says Balcells, "given this [the development of the Games], it matters little that the poetic production was mediocre until the end of 1877, which was the year in which the highest prize was awarded to Jacint Verdaguer's 'L'Atlantida.'"[31]

Verdaguer's "L'Atlantida," widely seen as the first modern Catalan masterpiece, inspired writers who would form the nucleus of a movement that would unite many different phases of Catalan art: modernism. The modernist movement in Catalonia includes figures as diverse as the architect Antoni Gaudi, the painter and author Santiago Russinyol, and the poet Joan Maragall.[32] This movement, unlike the initial rebirth (or *Renaixenca*) that preceded it, fit easily into the patrons of modern European art. The "European literary sense,"[33] that Maragall expressed in his work, was the next necessary step towards recognition of Catalan as a valid literary tradition. Indeed, many of the writers who followed Maragall, would at some point in their careers all but reject popular Catalan traditions in favor of the European vanguards. Their desire for recognition as part of the European literary tradition can be seen through the Postwar poetry we will examine.

Modernism as a poetic movement in Catalonia extended more or less from the late 1880s to approximately 1920. The movement that substituted it took the name of *noucentisme*, which literally means twentieth century-ism. The dominant writers of noucentisme looked in two directions with their poetry. They reached to the past and "attempted to recoup Catalan literature's lost centuries of development and to reestablish contact with Renaissance humanism"[34] in an effort to give their poetry historical respectability. At the same time they looked ahead as they tried to "place a final polish of culture and formal flexibility on Catalan as a literary tongue."[35] Noucentista authors such as Carles Riba,

Josep Carner, and Guerau de Liost "developed a poetry of aesthetic distance, irony, and a new kind of attention to form."[36] They gave Catalan poetry a new level of sophistication, a sophistication they hoped would earn their tongue recognition outside of Catalonia.

As we move away from *noucentisme* to postwar poetry, it is important to recognize that the strands highlighted in each of these movements did not fade away with the movement; on the contrary, they continue through the postwar and even to the present day. Catalan poetry, because of the Floral Games, still plays an important role in the Catalan community, and as such must be seen as an important factor in the formation of Catalan nationalism. The desire for recognition as part of a greater European poetic tradition has not faded either; indeed, it may have strengthened, and the attempt to place a historical respectability and a polish of culture on Catalan verse is as strong as ever. Each of these elements serves as a driving force both in the formation of nationalism and in the identity of the nation, and they were each present in the "psychic and political landscape characterized by desolation and hopeless longing"[37] in which postwar poetry was written.

Postwar Poetry as Resistance

One can divide the poets we will examine into two major groups: those whose roots lay in the prewar noucentista movement and had achieved credibility before the war, and those whose poetic roots lay in the war and the repression of the immediate postwar period. In the first group one can easily identify Carles Riba and Jose Maria Sagarra, two prominent noucentista authors, and, although with reservations, can also single out J.V. Foix. Foix did participate in the noucentista movement, but perhaps reached his greatest level of recognition after the war. Salvador Espriu, Pere Quart (the pen name of Joan Oliver), and Agusti Bartra make up the nucleus of the second group. As we shall see, overt resistance frequently arises as a theme in these poets, much more so than in the first group. The lack of resistance as a theme, however, does not mean we should refrain from considering the works of these first poets as resistance.

An examination of the publication data from this period provides a rough sketch of the way these poets resisted the regime. Although the covert nature of many of these publications makes it impossible to compile comprehensive statistics, we can sketch a rough picture of the situation poets found themselves in between 1939 and 1951. In its study of cultural resistance during the postwar, the Barcelona newspaper *El Periodico* identifies two periodicals dedicated to poetry during that period: *Ariel* and *Poesia*. Both were published in secrecy, and both were

published by the same person, Joan Palau i Fabra. The two magazines can actually be considered one continuous work, as Palau i Fabra stopped publication of *Poesia* in 1945 (it began in 1944), and began to publish *Ariel* in 1946. *Ariel* issued its last edition in 1951. At its peak, *Ariel* released 800 copies of one issue, far greater than *Poesia's* peak of 100.[38] Although one could not sincerely say these magazines reached a large proportion of the population of Catalonia given these numbers, their mere presence was significant.

In the realm of book publication, each of the authors mentioned above managed to publish at least one book during this period, and Espriu and Riba each produced two. They found different ways to evade the censorship that, at the beginning of the decade, theoretically forbade all publication in Catalan. Riba published *Elegies de Bierville* in exile; in 1943, and it would arrive in Catalonia in publication with his return later that year. Many authors chose to publish in exile, indeed, the great part of not only Catalan, but Spanish literature of this period, first appeared on the printed page in foreign countries. However, as the decade progressed, and most dramatically after the Allied victory in World War II, the censorship began to loosen and "slowly, books in Catalan were permitted to appear."[39] While in 1946 only twelve books were published inside Catalonia in the native tongue, in 1946 the number had increased to sixty, and by 1954 it reached ninety-six.[40] Despite the gradual increase in tolerance and the fact that poets managed to slip themes of resistance past censors who did not know Catalan, many authors still found themselves forced to disguise or encode their work. Salvador Espriu's *Cementeri de Sinera* (Sinera Cemetery) constitutes the most notable example of this type of encoding, as Sinera is merely an anagram for Arenys del Mar. Arenys del Mar is a small coastal city in northern Catalonia that Espriu uses as a symbol for the traditional Catalan culture the Franco regime is destroying. The total production of books and periodicals fell drastically from the boom period that ended in 1936, but with covert publication, the loosening of censorship, and the encoding of some of the themes, poets managed to make their work available to the public. The simple presence of the poems undoubtedly holds great importance, but equally important was their content. In the imagery, themes, and structures they employ, each of these poets, although to differing degrees, expresses a sentiment of resistance.

Imagery

The imagery used by these authors serves as a thread that runs through the work of each of them and ties them together into a common

tradition. While they each have their own particular style, and the themes they return to vary from author to author, a remarkable consistency can be found in their imagery. One can divide the primary images into three major groups: images of the nation, images of oppression, and images of hope. Each of these categories fits easily into the tradition of resistance we have already identified. The nationalist imagery flies in the face of franquist ideology, the oppression imagery decries it by describing the situation, and the images of hope openly defy the regime in their insinuation that it will someday fall.

Aribau's poem "La Patria," mentioned above as an important element in the development of Catalan nationalism, was the source of one type of nationalist imagery. In that poem, as we have seen, Aribau used images of the physical landscape of Catalonia to evoke a sense of national identity. In *Tales of Nationalism,* Hank Johnston's study of quotidian forms of Catalan resistance under Franco's dictatorship, excursionist clubs are identified as one of the primary refuges of Catalan culture. These clubs, through expeditions to the mountains, to the beach, or to historical landmarks, promoted a strong identification with the physical identity of Catalonia.[41] Both the popularity of these clubs during the time of greatest oppression and Aribau's use of physical imagery demonstrate a widespread pre-occupation with maintaining this identification and passing it on to further generations. An identification of this sort tends to create in the mind of the individual a concrete, lasting image of the identity of the nation. It is no wonder then that in this decade of severe oppression poets would frequently employ this type of imagery. With the very existence of the nation in doubt, the use of solid, lasting images of its physical landscape must have given a sense of comfort both to the poets and their readers.

Riba, in a poem written in 1943, praises the rolling hills of the Catalan landscape.

> Hills, oh sweet
> between north and the mid-day!,
> the love that runs through you
> of a higher desire, returns
> by the narrow path.[42]

This poem, in the mind of a Catalan, would automatically call to mind images of the sharp crags and imposing peaks of the Pyrenees mountains. Located on the north-eastern border of Catalonia, these mountains form the backbone of the nation. The "narrow path" in the

last line of the poem is reminiscent of countless trails that traverse this rugged mountain range, connecting the towns nestled in its valleys. While the Moorish invasion swept over the Iberian peninsula early in the eighth century, these mountains were never conquered. The long re-conquest of the peninsula began in these mountains and slowly spread south. For a Catalan they signify resilience and durability, both because of their role in Catalan history, and becuase of the simple fact that they will outlast any oppression. Franco could try to eliminate the nation, but these mountains that were so much a part of it would outlast him and all his followers. Riba's elegy to the mountains would resonate in the mind of a Catalan, and provide a measure of comfort against the uncertainty brought on by oppression.

Riba was not the only author to use Aribau's technique to this effect, as Espriu, in his poem "Memory," uses the imagery of the mountains to illustrate the eternal nature of the country.

> I always listen to
> your eternal silence
> in the mountains.
> Other days, other hours
> make the memory difficult[43]

The poet seems plagued by conflicting impressions of reality here, as he recognizes the fact that the country may be facing its death ("eternal silence"), but he also gives the impression of Catalonia as lasting even in death. His statement that he "always listen[s]" to the silence, and his use of the image of the mountains gives a certain indestructibility to the nation. He does not deny the travails facing the nation, as seen in these "other days, other hours" that "make the memory difficult," but in the midst of them he provides a glimmer of hope in the indestructibility of the physical landscape of the country, represented by the mountains.

Espriu and Riba, in the tradition of Aribau, use images of natural landmarks to represent stability. Sagarra, in his "Poem of Montserrat," uses a manmade landmark that would resonate in the mind of a Catalan reader as strongly as the Pyrenees. Montserrat is an eleventh century monastery located in the hills about twenty miles inland from Barcelona. It sits on an imposing 'mountain' that rises significantly above the surrounding hills. The mountain, with its gnarled rock outcroppings and sheer sides, provides a fortress that protects the monastery. This monastery, because it contains a shrine to the Virgin of Montserrat, one of the patron saints of Catalonia, has considerable importance in the

Catalan nation identity. The poem is an elegy to this mountain, and to the monastery that is inexorably linked to it, but it is built on a series of images of other concrete places. The section of the poem entitled "The children of Saint Boi" begins with a long list of places familiar to the native Catalan, expressed in terms of human anatomy: "the ribs of the Pyrenees," "the foot of Catllar where one water speaks to another," "the bones of Gerona," and the "lips" of Fluviá.[44] This use of human anatomical terms to describe these places creates an image of the nation as a person, giving it a certain emotional appeal that a conglomerate of inanimate objects would not have. Not only does Sagarra emphasize the permanence of the nation by using images of physical landmarks, he personifies it as well. He moves on from this personification of the nation to list many of the important monasteries of Catalonia: Sant Cugat, Ripoll, Sant Pau del Camp, and finally Montserrat.[45] These monasteries, during the tenth and eleventh centuries, provided the backbone for the protection of Catalonia against the moorish threat to the south. Because of their role in protecting and settling the country, monasteries have long been seen as an important part of the foundation of the nation. Although the use of these monasteries as images undoubtedly differs to some extent from the use of the physical landscape, they held, after nearly a thousand years of existence, almost the same amount of power as images of stability. By writing a poem in praise of one of these monasteries, and then using personalized imagery of the country, as well as imagery of other monasteries in the poem itself, Sagarra has taken this technique of Aribau's to a new level. He has piled image upon image, and then fused them with a historical sensibility such that the Catalan reader is left with a vibrant representation of his or her nation.

In his poem "My Nation is a Rock," J.V. Foix also manages to take these concrete images of the nation and add his own twist to them. Although he does not employ any specific place names, such as the rivers and mountains identified in Sagarra's poem, the image of a rock adequately substitutes them in its expression of stability. This image takes on greater significance when the subject of the poem, "Catalonia's rough mountain folk,"[46] is taken into account. The poem describes not only physical places, but elements of an ancient and vital way of life. The "autumn of oxen," "furtive garden," "slingshot," and "freely held land (*alous*)"[47] each symbolize a different aspect of a centuries-old way of life. Indeed, Foix dedicated the poem to "the stock (or line-*estirp*) of the Foix and Torrents,"[48] his family members who for centuries lived this life. In his use of this type of imagery, imagery that calls to mind a certain

way of life, Foix expresses stability in a new way. If the physical aspects of the country represent stability because of their immutability, the way of life of the people, despite hundreds of years worth of changes, illustrates that same stability in the way it has managed to retain its essence. The picture of a group of people living in more or less the same way over centuries calls to mind a permanence that will withstand even Franco's oppression.

While Foix expresses stability in his portrait of the harsh way of life of the mountain dwellers of Catalonia, Espriu does the same with his portrait of those who live by the sea. As mentioned above, his book *Cementeri de Sinera* laments the loss of a way of life in the coastal town of Arenys del Mar due to the repressive policies of the regime. Arenys del Mar held no political significance in itself, but it was perhaps for its lack thereof that he chose it. How could he better illustrate a simple way of life than by writing about an anonymous, traditional town? All through the book he utilizes imagery of the dying way of life of a people. Images of this seagoing way of life, such as "smells of the sea watched by clear summers" and "rowing old rowboats on the tides of Sinera,"[49] dominate one poem. In the face of the loss expressed by the opening line, "My eyes do not know more than to contemplate lost days and suns,"[50] these images once again present the hope of permanence.

Images of the sea appear frequently in the work of each of these poets, although most do not develop them as much as Espriu. This frequency should come as no surprise to anyone who has glanced at a map of Catalonia. The boundaries of the small nation rarely extend more than a few hundred miles from the shore, and only in the heights of the Pyrenees can one truly escape the culture of the coastline. As a result of these geographic factors, Catalonia, in its moments of greatest expanse, built its empire on the sea. Catalan merchants, as well as those from various Italian city-states, held sway over the Mediterranean during the Middle Ages. The Catalonia of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was one of the most powerful kingdoms in Europe, its prominence won on the sea and its goods trafficked over it. As a result of the cultural and historical prominence of the sea in Catalan life, we should expect to find a large number of images associated with it. Riba speaks of the "faraway sea" when he writes from exile, and in the same book refers to himself as "shipwrecked,"[52] cast out of the sea that is his nation onto unfamiliar foreign land. Bartra, in his poem "Joan Junyer," speaks of "our sea"[53] in his list of that which he and his fellow exiles have lost. Quart uses the "free sea"[54] in his poem "Dirge of Spring" to describe the hope that the

exiles are guarding. Each of these authors uses this image of the sea to represent either the nation itself, or some element of the nation.

The last in our list of nationalist images comes as perhaps more of a surprise than these previous images, but it would hold no less resonance to a Catalan. Every April twenty-third, a curious tradition plays itself out in cities and towns throughout Catalonia. The visitor to these cities will, upon leaving his or her hotel room, stumble upon streets filled with stands of street vendors selling books and roses. Women browse at the book shops searching for the right gift for their husband or boyfriend, while men search for the perfect rose for their wife or girlfriend. In the meantime, outside the Generalitat of Barcelona, a line forms as people take advantage of the only day of the year it is open to the public. This strange amalgam of traditions is the festival of Saint George, the other patron saint of Catalonia (the Black Madonna of Montserrat was the first). The myth of Saint George says that, after he slew the dragon, its blood fell to the ground and a rose sprouted. It is the fusion of this myth and the fact that Cervantes died on this day that probably gave root to this tradition. In the tradition itself one can see a remarkable fusion of literature with the cultural and political traditions of the nation. This strange combination of books, a national symbol such as the rose, and a symbol of the nation's political autonomy (the Generalitat), strongly reinforces the importance of literature in Catalan identity. Besides its independent importance, the tradition makes for a striking image, one that would be accessible to a Catalan reader who came across the image of the rose.

This image of the rose manifests itself perhaps most strongly in the forty-ninth poem of Riba's *Of the Game and of the Fire* (or *Of Play and of Fire- Del joc i del foc.)*. As we will discuss below, Riba wrote the poems in this book using the form of the Japanese tankka: a strict, five line structure that lends a sparse feeling to the poems. This sparseness works with a particular effectiveness in this poem as it sharply contrasts the hope embodied in the rose with the melancholy that overwhelms the author. The first lines of the poem form a question laden with loneliness:

> Who will accompany me
> sad before this
> my first pain.[55]

The author, having brought us to his sadness, than lets us see the hero who comes to accompany him in his loneliness:

But from the right
comes the ancient rose.

This poem, striking in its simplicity (the entire poem is reproduced above), provides an excellent example of the use of the rose in the poetry of these authors. It serves almost without exception as a national symbol, and as such nearly always appears in a positive light.

Riba, of course, does not stand alone in his use of this powerful and highly accessible image. Indeed, the author who does not use it at some point stands out at as an exception. Espriu, in a poem we have already examined, laments "the rose that I used to collect, lost in my words (*dits*)."[56] Bartra, in his somewhat surrealistic "Confession," says he did not dare "tell her the roses of her cheeks had been assassinated."[57] In one interpretation of this poem, the roses are a personalization of Catalonia herself, and their death a symbol of her destruction. Quart goes even further than the others in his "Explicit Song," in which he places the images of the rose and the book together in his opening line: "[t]he book as well as the rose."[58] These images appear as part of a series of objects that will "disturb you, and will be of little consolation."[59] Quart intends the reader to make the connection between these images and the situation of the nation, and to understand that this memory of the nation, because of the situation, should be disturbing.

Before moving on to images that reflect the situation of the nation at the time, one image remains that does not clearly fall into either of our categories: the bird. The image of the bird appears over and over in the work of these poets. Bartra, in his homesick "Ode to Catalonia from the Tropics," uses the bird as a symbol of some element of the nation.

I only live for the luminous entrance of your birds
in the granaries of the future
for the exact resurrection of your voice among the foam

The "you" in this poem is Catalonia, with Bartra expectantly awaiting its rebirth. Espriu also uses this image in his ominous "The Well of the Night," where he talks of "[b]irds, that do not circle high weathercocks of light."[60] Riba, not one to be outdone, writes of the "dawn of birds that return,"[61] and the "invisible birds of hope."[62] The image appears relatively frequently, but what does it signify? Obviously in Bartra's poem the birds have some sort of nationalistic appeal, as he relates them with the rebirth of the nation. One could say that, because of the images' adjectival connection with dawn and hope, Riba uses

them in the same way; however, limiting the interpretation to that level would not do Riba justice. Professor Jordi Coca has pointed out Riba's connection with Italian symbolism, a movement that heavily emphasized the use of images such as birds to symbolize the mysterious elements of life (death, freedom, love, etc.).[63] We have mentioned the desire of Catalan writers to be respected within the European intellectual community, and Riba's use of these images can be seen within the context of that desire. One can also examine Espriu in that light, as the Italian hermetics, a group that evolved from symbolism, had a great effect on his writing. It is also essential to note that Joan Miró, one of the most important Catalan painters of the twentieth century, used birds time and again in his work. The most celebrated example is the immense "Woman and Bird" that stands behind Plaza de Espana in Barcelona. This frequency of birds in all forms of art may be connected to a simple longing for freedom from the day to day oppression of the period. The bird is a mysterious image that runs through these works, one that cannot be explained entirely in terms of the nationalist imagery we have seen, or the frequent imagery of oppression that accompanies it.

This imagery of oppression, unlike the imagery we have already examined, requires little, if any, cultural literacy to be understood. While the non-Catalan reader might not understand the significance of Saint George's rose, he or she will find the images of rain, fog, night, ashes, and blood to be obvious reflections of (and perhaps on) the situation of the nation in this period. These images, in their vividness and accessibility, stand out as some of the most striking of the poems.

We have frequently mentioned Espriu's striking book *Cemetery of Sinera* as one of the most prominent works to emerge from this period. The book, consummately concerned with loss and the postwar situation, provides an abundance of images that serve to illustrate the desperation that came from the strident oppression of the regime. In the third poem of this collection, he employs for the first time the image of rain, an image that will reoccur frequently throughout the work. The poem consists of twelve lines, the first four of which consist of a lament for that which is trapped "underneath sandy dust/ hardened by rain."[64] It later becomes evident that the rain-hardened dust traps the remains of the country, a country that, in the poet's words, "has died with me."[65] The use of rain as an oppressive element is far from unusual in this book, or in any of Espriu's work of the period. In the eighth poem of *Cementeri de Sinera,* he begins with the simple statement "[i]t will rain [*plourá*]"[66] and in the following poem he speaks of "memories of rain that sharply

beg," and "the rained out sky."[67] In the book that preceded *Sinera, Ariadna's Songs,* he frequently uses this same image in descriptions that at times shock the reader with their brutality. He often uses biblical examples and imagery in this book to further illustrate the oppressive situation, which is what we find in the disturbing poem "Rizpah."[68] The poem presents us with Rizpah guarding her sons' bodies as the rain pours down upon her ("Look how it rains, watch over me whilst it rains"). Once again, the rain is an important element in the description of an absolutely desperate situation. This use of rain as an image of desperation is not isolated in Espriu's work, but occurs in many of the important works of the period.

In Riba's poem "Inscription," for example, he presents us with "the proud star of the tempest,"[70] and in his "Branch Riding the Torrent" we see "such flight of water!"[71] These two lines give a frightening, almost violent connotation to the image of water. Although such specific imagery does not occur in Quart's work, we do see the "false and miserable spring, where only mud . . . prospers," and, in the same poem, "the sweet bitter weeping wilts the tender leaf."[72] This imagery of rain serves in the work of each of these poets to establish a certain atmosphere, to give a particular backdrop to the work. It also serves as a sort of point-counterpoint to the positive connotation of the sea as a nationalist imagery. Water once again is an important element, but here it is associated with sadness, destruction (Riba's "Branch Riding the Torrent"), and fear. This ominous atmosphere is further emphasized by the use of night and darkness to set the tone.

Espriu uses this image in his poem "Mishna" by placing the reader "[i]nside the darkness" of the "mouths of authority."[73] The fact that he links darkness with authority not only sets the scene, but attributes it to the regime. Later in the same poem he writes of

> voices of princes that impose
> eternal precepts of the past, of parties,
> of women, of the dance, of the mass and the sacrifice.[74]

These traditional elements of the past provide some hope, but they are placed "beyond the time of night."[75] This particular use of the image obviously associates the darkness with the postwar oppression. When the darkness fell, the eternal precepts such as justice disappeared, and the previously joyful parties and dance came to an abrupt end. Riba uses the images of darkness and night to illustrate not only the loss of a previous, better time, but the hopelessness and desperation of the period

in which he is writing. A fine example of this desperation is the haunting image of "the shadow that does not sleep"[76] from *Of the Game and the Fire,* an image that disturbs the reader with its daunting restlessness. To assure himself that the reader will notice the image, he also uses the "marine night,"[77] the "night inside time,"[78] and finally the "nocturnal flower."[79] Quart, in his previously mentioned "Dirge of Spring," describes "the terrible night that has made the light its slave"[80] in his description of the "false and miserable spring"[81] of the postwar. Bartra as well, in his "Solitary," overloads us with images of night, with the "purity of fallen shadows, in that darkness watched by stars," and pierced by "the wind of the low night."[82] This particular imagery, far from uncommon, works together with that of rain to give the reader a sense of the desperation that informed the immediate postwar period.

Two other images, because of the frequency with which they occur, beg to be mentioned in any list of images of oppression. The first of these, that of blood, does not illustrate the atmosphere in the same way as darkness and rain, but equally expresses the pain and hopelessness that dominated the era. Bartra uses blood not only as a noun, but as part of an adjectival clause in his poem "Far Away," where he talks of the "blood of the sunset over the wall."[83] While one cannot describe the image of a bloody sunset as unique, his selection of that particular adjective in the midst of a poem that also contains a "tomb of water, wax, and memory" and "slow tears"[84] is not coincidental. It describes the sunset, but it also amplifies the violence and brutality already present in the poem. Quart, in his poem entitled simply "Catalonia," uses blood in an almost penitential manner, as he says that the country "will one day see itself washed of its sins, by so much blood."[85] Espriu, as always rich in images, uses blood in both *Ariadna's Song,* the first book he wrote during this period, and *The Hours,* which was the last. In the latter, he says

> I know now that the blood
> has destroyed my world[86]

and in the former he longs "to be able to clean off the blood and finally save myself."[87] In both of these examples, we see blood as part of the destruction of a world, as a sign of the desperation that he faces.

In addition to blood, one other image of the destruction of the nation, that of ashes, frequently occurs throughout these poems. This image is used almost without fail to describe the charred remains of the nation, the "image that has been burned,"[88] in the words of Salvador

Espriu. In the poem entitled simply "III," Espriu talks about the remains of his nation:

> O that the sea breeze would scatter
> the ashes on the boats
> and the picturesque furrows
> and the light of Sinera.[89]

In this poem, the country has already died and been cremated, and Espriu can only concern himself with the remains. The image of the ashes of the nation being scattered over the furrows and the boats lends a quiet melancholy to this poem. Quart also uses this image, as he talks of the "begging ashes of the infinite death,"[90] an image that once again describes the bleakness of the postwar period. Even Riba, who usually stays away from the such straightforward imagery, talks of the "ashes of a name"[91] in his poem dedicated to the important Catalan linguist Pompeu Fabra. Riba's use of the image holds particular importance in his association of ashes with words, especially in connection with Fabra. He recognizes, as a Catalan and a poet, that Franco is trying to essentially turn the language to ashes, an action which holds a particular personal significance for Riba.

We have examined images that resonate as nationalistic, that describe the destruction of the country, and that do some of both, but before moving on there is one final image that deserves recognition—that of roads and trails. This image does not fit easily into any of the groups previously identified, but instead stands as a monument to hope. Riba, upon returning to Catalonia, praised the "narrow trail" that guided him to "the love that carries you to the highest desire."[92] He also uses the image in a less literal sense in his poem "Catalan Choir," where he talks of the "hope that reaches [*aspira*] over the trails."[93] Espriu, in his mysterious "Rare Echoes for the Tomb Dwellers," longs for the day when

> roads will open for me
> beyond the foam
> of this ancient sea.[94]

Espriu, like Riba, uses roads to illustrate his desire to escape to some paradisiacal place, but while Riba longs to return to his homeland, Espriu longs to escape the oppression that reigns over it. It is an important reflection on the Franco regime that not only did it force many people to flee, but took something from those who fled so that, like Riba, they could not be content in safety. The regime physically

oppressed Catalans within Catalonia by denying them their language and their culture, and oppressed those outside by denying them their country. If the resistance spread to all corners of the world, so did the oppression.

This discussion of images has hopefully served to illustrate the way in which Catalans viewed the postwar world, and to establish a thread of continuity through all of these writers. The fact that each image appears in the works of many, if not all, of these authors creates a certain link between them. Although the remainder of this study will focus on individual authors, one must keep this continuity in mind. Each of these authors lived under this oppression, and experienced it in much the same way. The fact that a specific poem is used to express a theme does not mean that theme is particular to that author, but that he best expresses it.

Themes

The significant poems examined in this study can be divided into two distinct thematic groups: those that have to do with the loss of some facet of national identity, and those that we will call overt anthems of protest. Of those in the first group, some deal with the loss of community or stability, while others simply explore loss in itself.

Agustí Batra's "In Many Places in this World" falls into the last category, as a poem that simply leaves the reader with an overwhelming sense of loss. Bartra wrote the poem during his imprisonment in a French concentration camp just after the civil war, a fact that aids greatly in its interpretation.[95] The poem consists of verses of two lines, each beginning with the phrase "In many places of this world."[96] In some ways, the stanzas seem optimistic, calling to mind as they do truly beautiful images.

> In many places of this world there are great stretches of ripe wheat
> with skies where songs sustain a sure and joyous flight
>
> In many places of this world the leaves are ardent lips
> that kiss each cloud and speak to all the winds.
>
> In many places of this world the day falls like an apple
> —that the tree of night has ripened—of light and fragrance[97]

The poem continues like this until the final line where the poet, after examining his list of images asks "o weary heart, what more do you ask?"[98] This ending, the poet looking for comfort for his weary heart in many places, endows the poem with an unmistakable sense of loss. The loss is evident in the contrast between this list of beautiful images and the physically and psychically shattered landscape of his homeland.

What more does the heart ask? It asks for a nation in which he can find the images he listed, or that they be returned to his homeland.

While Barta's poem exudes a general sense of loss, we see a specific longing for community in the first poems of Espriu's book *Ariadna's Song*. In each of these poems, community activities—festivals, fairs, the circus, and marriages—serve as either the setting or the theme of the work. The second poem, "A New Beginning [*Represa*]," is addressed to the generic "[s]irs [*senyors*],"[99] and talks of the extreme danger that for the people is merely the yearly town holiday (*festa mayor*). What we see is a poet who braves the dangers of speaking out for his people (represented by the common ritual of the *festa mayor*) so that he may guide them to the "fresh water" and "revolts"[100] that end the poem. This theme of community gatherings extends through the subsequent poems, as we see a generic "spectacle,"[101] the circus, two fairs,[103] and a wedding.[104] The mere presence of each of these gatherings demonstrates a consciousness not only of community, but also of the rituals that bind it together. Perhaps the most thematically important of these poems is one that portrays a fair, "Illuminated Fair." This simple poem only consists of two short (four line) stanzas. In the first we see "[c]rowds. Lights," and "laughter," all images of a cheerful town fair. The second stanza, however, leaves us with the image of the "sad lights," "little by little turning off."[105] The light-hearted fair that dominated the first stanza has sadly faded away into darkness. In the same way, we see a longing throughout these poems for those community rituals that, at one time, helped bind the nation together. Bartra mourns generic loss, but Espriu mourns the loss of those specific communal events. We also see loss in Foix and Riba, but they add the element of the disorientation, especially for the poet, that plagued postwar Catalonia.

The first poem of Riba's, "Tankkas of the Return," shows us the insecurity that plagued the poet as he returned to his home.

> A different cry
> from that of the forest, purifies
> the sleepless shadow.
> I go behind. Do you follow?
> I will not turn back.
> Do you love me?[106]

The new or different cry is that of Riba's work, purifying the shadow of the forest of oppression that hangs over Catalonia. He follows the cry, giving the sense that the poetry has a life of its own, that the poet

has no choice but to follow. To this point we see the confident rebel, the man who follows his words through the darkness in order to save his people. In the two questions that end the poem, however, we see the insecurity of the poet. He has decided he will not turn back, but he still searches for the company and love of those he fights for. Trapped in the night of oppression, with the very tools of his trade, words, stripped away from him, he is bombarded with uncertainty and fear. This should come as no surprise, as poets were deprived of the contact with the community they had previously enjoyed, and faced with the constant fear that they would be punished for using their tools. Trapped inside the lonely darkness, he asks fearfully "[d]o you love me?," hoping beyond hope that the answer will be yes.

Foix, in his "I Arrived in that Town," explores these same themes of disorientation, although in a more explicit way. The poem opens with images and questions—"What's the name of that town?," "I go around half-naked," "What's my name?"[107]—that, in critic David Rosenthal's words, "help create a mood of childlike bewilderment."[108] This bewilderment is then augmented by the poet's fruitless search for an audience, as the crowd leaves laughing, the musicians stop playing, the doors close, and the poet wonders if he has a role left to play.[109] The sense of desperation continues mounting as his picture floats by on a scrap of newspaper, and on the radio they say only "I'm cold, I'm scared, I'm hungry."[110] In the final, disturbing lines of the poem, he sees the Devil waiting for him at the corner. This poem presents us with the fear and disorientation of a poet stripped of his cultural framework, and robbed of his audience. The seemingly incoherent pile of images in the end gives the reader a sense of the desperation that the poet suffered. At the end, we do not see the hope prevalent in other works, but the condemnation of the Devil awaiting him at the corner. He has lost his place in the world, and he cannot be sure if he will regain it, or be condemned to insignificance.

While many poets of this time chose loss and fear as their primary themes, others took a more stridently rebellious approach and wrote poetry that openly praised the nation, poetry that could serve as patriotic anthems. Riba's "Catalan Choir," an elegy of Catalan art, fits nicely into this group. The poet begins by commenting on the purity of the sound produced by the choir: "How pure you seem/composed of so many voices."[111] The simple fact that he writes about a specifically Catalan cultural group lends importance to the poem, given the prohibited status of such groups at the time. Riba, however, is not satisfied with this

implied nationalism and he goes on to extend the image of the choir to the nation as a whole. The third and fourth lines of the poem, "nation, of such/ hope,"[112] make explicit his extension to the entire nation. The fact that he finds this hope in the voices of the country has singular importance as voices can serve as a metaphor for the language itself. In this poem, Riba has created an image of the entire nation as a chorus of voices that sing out in hope. This poem is an affirmation of the linguistic identity of the nation, and in its hopefulness, a call to fight on.

In the same vein as this hopeful work of Riba's is Espriu's nationalist anthem "My People and I." Espriu dedicates the poem to Pompeu Fabra, the famous linguist and "[i]nstructor of all who speak and write in Catalan."[113] With this dedication, Espriu shows from the outset that he wrote this poem for the language, and the people, of his nation. The poem consists of ten three line stanzas, the last line of which is always "my people and I."[114] The first stanza overflows with the bitter history of the nation:

> We drink in gulps
> bitter wines of mocking
> my people and I.

He follows this theme of the longtime oppression and belittlement of the nation through many of the following stanzas, but always mixes in hope and determination. Though they have "descended to the bottom of a well,"[115] they keep looking up. Despite constant oppression, he declares, in the middle of the poem, that "we have saved our words."[116] The final stanza sums up the hope and determination of the poet as he says

> We lift ourselves up
> in burning waiting
> my people and I.[117]

This poem, perhaps more than any other, illustrates the spirit of resistance that resonated strongly throughout the work of the poets of this time. Espriu articulates a particular sense of community, and expresses a hope and a determination to save his nation.

Structure

We have examined both the images and themes that played a large role in this poetry of resistance, but it would be amiss to move on without at least a cursory glance at the structural elements of the poems. The majority of the poets do not conform to any strict structural

patterns in their work, but let each individual poem determine its structure. While the poets undoubtedly employ the structure they feel is most appropriate for each poem (a good example is the songlike structure of Espriu's anthem "My People and I"), one should not extract conclusions about resistance from the structure of the majority of the poems. With few exceptions, structure appears intimately linked to the individual poems, and one cannot find consistent structural patterns throughout entire books, much less the work of a poet over the course of the decade. This does not mean that structure does not hold importance, but that it works in harmony with the other elements of the individual poems. As we have shown, these other elements act to form an atmosphere of resistance, and structure by extension falls into that pattern. In one book, however, the uniqueness and consistency of the structure merit a more in-depth examination.

Earlier it was noted that, in Riba's *Of the Game and the Fire*, the use of the Japanese tankka creates an atmosphere of sparcity throughout the work. The tankka is a highly defined form in which each poem consists of one five line stanza. The first and third lines contain five syllables, while the others have seven syllables each. When examining this book, one must remember that, before the war, Riba had pursued what he called pure poetry, a poetry that was not limited by rigid structures of rhyme patterns. The poems in his first book, *Rooms,* follow no discernible patterns of structure or rhyme scheme, but freely employ lines and stanzas of different lengths as the poem dictates. His almost fanatical pursuit of this pure poetry before the war makes his use of the tankka even more mysterious.

Riba says that the tankka is used "to contain a sensation, a representation, a reflection, an event of love or sadness within a sober and close-fitting outline of words."[118] This explanation, though helpful, does not provide a satisfactory answer as to why he made such a dramatic shift. Would he not, after all, have expressed these certain feelings or events in his prewar poetry? Professor Jordi Coca provided the seeds of an answer to this question when he noted that after the war "Riba became conscious of the fact that poetry had to address the political situation."[119] Before the war, Riba's poetry, in its pursuit of purity, was consciously isolated from real world events. He followed in the footsteps of some of the great turn of the century Spanish writers in his pursuit of a perfect, lasting poetry. With the tragedy of the war and the postwar oppression, however, he felt an obligation to address new, real-world themes in his poetry. The emotions that he tried to express in this book

must have been absolutely overwhelming, as he dealt with returning to a nation devastated by Franco's cultural oppression. His earlier forms simply would not suffice, and he needed a rigid structure which would force him to express these feelings in limited terms. He used the tankka as a way to grasp hold of the myriad of emotions that run through the poems. At the same time, one can see the tankka as an expression of the sensations he felt as a Catalan writer in Catalonia. He placed restrictive boundaries on his poems, in the same way that he had to create in a heavily restrictive environment. If the atmosphere of the nation was constrained, that of the poems is no less so. Riba used this structure both as necessary tool for handling new ideas, and to heighten the oppressive atmosphere of the poem.

We have seen the ways in which the imagery, structure, and themes of these poems manifest the spirit of resistance that ran through them. It is easy to consider the poems as entities in themselves, as cultural documents that have some kind of life of their own. One must remember, however, that the poets who wrote these words were real people who watched the destruction of their country. They did not live in a vacuum, but within a community of Catalans who worked together to protect their language and their culture. These communities in turn strove for connections with and recognition by the international artistic communities of the time.

The Artistic Community

As Franco's army rapidly approached Barcelona from the south in January of 1939, an undoubtedly larger contingent of men, women, and children fled that same city in an attempt to arrive at the French border to the north. Among this group were many of Catalonia's pre-eminent intellectuals, including nearly all of the poets studied here. Although they had all made their way back to their homeland by the middle of the next decade, during these first postwar years they found themselves stranded outside their nation as Franco systematically tried to annihilate its culture. In exile, many of these intellectuals banded together, either by living together or through correspondence, in a conscious effort to preserve their culture. Riba was among this group of exiles, and as a prodigious letter writer he has left an interesting picture of this life in exile.

Perhaps earlier than anyone could have expected, Riba realized the responsibility he and his fellow exiles had to their country. In a letter dated February 13, 1939, a mere two and a half weeks after the fall of Barcelona, he speaks of this responsibility: "we do not refrain, the

emigrated intellectuals, from maintaining the figure and the actions of our cultural and literary institutions with the purpose of saving the spirit of Catalonia."[120] His realization of this responsibility is almost prophetic, as at this point no one could be sure of what policies Franco would pursue. This letter, written to Joan Gili (a Catalan editor and translator who had lived in London since 1934), demonstrates a high consciousness of the necessity to form and maintain some sort of unity even in exile. He talks of the urgency "of having companions in times of anguish,"[121] and makes it a point to note that "[t]he members of the Institution of Catalan Letters . . . have formed a group."[122] He also lists four people he has written to ask their support, the beginnings of a epistolary network he established to support the various groups of exiles.

Riba wrote the previous letter in Avignon, and in it he demonstrated an uncertainty as to where he and his family would go next. They made their way to Paris, where they stayed a few weeks before installing themselves in the small town of Bierville, not far from Paris. A catholic pacifist offered Catalan intellectuals and their families a mill he owned in Bierville. The community at Bierville became one of the centers of the resistance, as many exiles lived there at one time or another. The original community consisted of four families of prominent Catalan writers: Josep Pijoan, Carles Soldevila, Miquel Josep i Mallol, and Riba, and would later include the family of another writer, Pau Romeva, and the painter Joaquim Sunyer.[123] Although the conditions were far from luxurious—Riba describes "chambers of a monastical monotony and austerity—"[124] they did provide a gathering place for the exiles. It was in Bierville that Riba wrote the first of his elegies to Bierville, and partially as a result of this book it became a symbol of the intellectual community in exile. By late summer, 1939, Riba had moved on from Bierville to another, similar, community on the Isle of Adam, not far from Paris. Though located in a different place, this community was very similar to Bierville. We see references, throughout Riba's letters, to other groups of intellectuals, including one in London[125] and a group of six who fled to Chile.[126] These groups managed to stay in contact with acquaintances in Barcelona by way of a clandestine mail service that smuggled letters over the border.[127] The existence of these communities, and the mail service, demonstrate a conscious effort to preserve the culture, and help us understand the world in which many of the poems we have examined were written. While these groups of exiles provided shelter and security for individuals, perhaps more important from the

long term standpoint were the various publishing groups that helped preserve the culture.

First in exile, and after 1943 in Barcelona, Riba served as the director of the Bernard Metge Foundation, a publishing and translating group that predated the war. Although his actions in exile were largely symbolic, by 1947 he managed to publish, inside Barcelona, translations of other languages into Catalan. While the Foundation focused its energies on translations, the publishers *Els Nostres Classics [Our Classics]*, and Editorial Selecta published works by Catalan authors. These groups were joined in their efforts to preserve the language by the Institute of Catalan Studies, which sponsored Catalan culture and language classes in homes, private poetry readings, and other similar activities. These organizations often worked clandestinely, and even when legalized could only reach a small part of the population, but they demonstrate an active desire to preserve the culture and maintain its vibrancy in the eyes of the community. The accomplishments of the various authors were presented to the general public on the Night of Saint Lucia (the patron saint of literature). The celebrations that took place on this night, with the awarding of three major literary prizes (the *Little Bear* for poetry, the *Victor Catala* for narrative, and the *Aedos* for biography) and many smaller ones became "a public act of Catalan cultural resistance."[128] In the festivities of this night, Catalans re-established the link between artists and the general public that the Floral Games had once formed. These multiple organizations and activities created the cultural framework in which the poets we have examined produced their works.

While this framework managed to connect the authors to their nation, those who stayed inside Catalonia found themselves cut off from the European intellectual community. In any nation this would create severe consequences for intellectuals, but in a nation with a young literary tradition it was nearly devastating. The most influential pre-war Catalan poets, the *noucentistes*, had attempted to connect their tradition with those of the rest of Europe. As we have seen, Riba was greatly influenced by the symbolists, and Espriu by the Italian vanguards. Catalan artists felt they were at the point of receiving recognition as a major European literary tradition before the civil war, at which point the development of their culture was dramatically stunted. This sudden isolation produced a deep insecurity in Catalan writers that sparked two primary reactions: they tried to gain access to cutting edge European works, and they tried to write works that, as well as being Catalan, were European.

As the efforts to find experimental European works were individual and informal, we do not have many records of their searches. We do know, however, about a few small groups who gathered at each other's houses to read these works. The most prominent example is that of the painters Joan Ponc and Antoni Tapies, and the poet Joan Brossa, who gathered at the house of the arts promoter Joan Prats to read back issues of experimental magazines. Prats, in turn, introduced them to the Catalan painter Miró, the result of which would be the production of two avant-garde magazines, *Argol* and *Dau al Set*.[129] The magazines reflected their exposure to cutting-edge European art, and to some extent spread that art to the public. Groups such as these kept Catalan artists abreast of major European artistic developments.

While these artists were concerned with informing themselves with the latest in European trends, others were more interested in placing Catalan works squarely inside the European canon. The clandestine magazine *Ariel* published, as well as poetry, articles best described as Catalan literary and artistic criticism. In an article about the painter Josep Amat, Josep Llorens i Artigas praises his work as "moderated painting, that, without going to extremes continues the vital tendencies of modern European painting."[130] We also see praises of following European traditions in the literary field, for example in Joan Triadú's critique of Narcis Oller: "[i]n the tradition of the great Russians, he does not hesitate to introduce dialogues in other languages, principally Spanish and French."[131] Here the critic not only comments favorably on the following of other traditions, but also on the use of other languages including, incredibly, the Spanish language that is replacing his own. In Jaume Bofill i Ferro's critique of Riba's *Elegies to Bierville,* he also invokes the larger European tradition. Indeed, in a mere seven line segment of this article he compares different aspects of Riba's work to Goethe, Faust, Homer, Rousseau, Shakespeare, Mallarmé, Valéry, and Rimbaud. It is as if the critics believe that the works have limited value in themselves, but when compared to the great European writers they take on a new importance. Riba himself, in his relationship with the French symbolists, consciously tried to establish a European identity. These comments and attitudes can only be adequately understood within the context of a desperate desire to belong to a greater European tradition.

This yearning for acceptance within the European sphere extended to even the most radical publications. As *Ariel* was a clandestine magazine, one might expect examples it to contain works with explicit messages of anger and resistance. It was not concerned with censors,

and its novelty nearly assured the sale of as many issues as could be published. Why then does overtly angry, anti-regime poetry simply not appear? The poetry fits into the patterns we have examined, in its imagery and major themes, but nothing even along the lines of Espriu's "My People and I" is to be found. What one does see is academic criticism that time and again compares Catalan artists to those from other European traditions. One cannot help but be struck by the erudite style and polished affectation that fills its pages. It does not read like an angry, rebellious magazine, but like a snobbish, academic publication. Given this evidence one can easily come to the conclusion that the publishers of *Ariel* wanted desperately to have their culture considered as part of the dominant European culture. They may have feared that, had they written works with a more overtly angry tone, they would not be taken seriously. They wrote intellectual poetry because they wanted a place in the European intellectual world. Like the little brother who imitates his older sibling's every move, Catalan writers had such a strong desire to be considered European that they went out of their way to appear consummately part of the continent's tradition.

Effects of the poetry

The poets we have examined played an important role in the preservation of Catalan culture, both in its political and artistic spheres. While the line between the two is far from clear, as one must remember that "for a Catalan, the act of dedicating oneself to a cultural work is a form of political demonstration,"[132] these poets did have a lasting influence on both spheres.

We have focused on describing the cultural repression during the immediate postwar, but the political persecution was perhaps even worse, and undoubtedly longer lasting. While Catalan poets began to find outlets for their works by the mid to late 1940s, political organizers would feel very little lessening of the pressure that plagued them until a decade later. In this atmosphere, artists had the responsibility to maintain a national consciousness until the politicians would have room to work again. The historian Manuel Tunon de Lara noted that artists "could express an inconformity that would later crystallize into ideas and actions of larger scope."[133] Even though many of the poets did not explicitly express political ideas, they did maintain this unconformity that political organizers would take advantage of in the 1960s as they resisted overtly.

These poets left an artistic, as well as political, legacy in the poets who found their voices in the 1950s and 1960s. Joan Brossa, Miquel

Martí i Pol, Joan Vinyoli, Gabriel Ferrater, and Vincent Andrés Estellés all learned their trade from the poets we have examined. Some learned simply through reading the poetry, others through the small groups that gathered in houses, and still others through the clandestine Catalan culture classes sponsored by the Institute of Catalan studies. The poets studied here were the last generation educated in normal linguistic conditions, and it was partially through their efforts that the language was preserved in those who followed them. Not only poets, however, but singers were the heirs of this generation of poets. In the late 1950s a folk singing movement sprung up in Catalonia headed by the group The Seven Judges, and the individual artist Raimon. Their music, based in the long standing traditions of Catalan poetry, reached more people than the poetry had even at its apex. Raimon paid tribute to his predecessors by recording Espriu's poem "A Song Recital in the Temple," a poem that ends with the line "I love, with a desperate pain, this, my people."[134]

The legacy of these poets lived on in the political unrest and rebellious artistic movements of the 1960s. They played a large role in the preservation of a literary tradition, and indeed an entire culture, faced with extinction under an oppressive dictatorship. Moreover, in their resistance to that dictatorship, they maintained an atmosphere of unconformity that would later flower into political resistance. Catalonia, as a nation and culture, thrives today as an autonomous region in the Spanish state. In late July, 1992, the head of the central Spanish government in Madrid, King Juan Carlos, opened Barcelona's Olympic Games. He stood before a television audience of millions and uttered one simple Catalan word: "benvinguts [welcome]." Espriu and his fellow countrymen and women can truly say "we have saved the words of our language."[135]

---

1. Joseph Benet *Catalunya Sota el Regim Franquista* (Barcelona Editorial Blume, 1979)10
2. Albert Balcells, *Historia Contemporanea de Catalunya* (Barcelona: Edhasa, 1980,1983) 330.
3. "La Autonomia Republicana," *El Periodico.* 15 July, 1992: 310.
4. *El Periodico.* 310
5. Salvador Claramunt, From a lecture given 7 May, 1992. The Generalitat began not as a legislative body, but as a sort of ruling committee, with members from the clergy, the merchants, and the nobility, that governed between the infrequent meetings of the entire government (which included these elements).
6. Balcells 250.
7. *El Periodico* 310.
8. Benet 29.
9. *El Periodico.* 338.
10. Benet 14.

11. Benet 14. While one must take into account the emotional ties Benet has to his subject, due to his status as a Catalan, the strength of this statement reflects the gravity of the situation.
12. *El Periodico*. 339.
13. *El Periodico*. 339. This quote is taken from the report issued by the council of war.
14. Balcells 353.
15. Benet 67.
16. Benet 66.
17. *El Periodico*. 342.
18. Benet 68.
19. Benet 71.
20. *El Periodico* 344.
21. Benet 73.
22. Hank Johnson, *Tales of Nationalism* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 1991) 43
23. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983) 2.
24. Anderson 3.
25. Anderson 5.
26. Anderson 38.
27. Anderson. This definition is particularly indebted to chapters three and five of Anderson. Anderson's definition is much more complex than indicated by this brief summary, but I have not contradicted any of his assertions.
28. Balcells 42.
29. Bonaventura Carles Aribau, "La Patria" (Barcelona: Biblioteca Breve de Bolsillo, 1983) 294-297.
30. Balcells 44.
31. Balcells 44.
32. David Rosenthal, *Postwar Catalan Poetry* (Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 1991) 18.
33. Rosenthal 18.
34. Rosenthal 19.
35. Rosenthal 20.
36. Rosenthal 19.
37. Rosenthal 24, 25.
38. *El Periodico* 348.
39. *El Periodico* 348.
40. Balcells 357.
41. Johnston 45.
42. Carles Riba *Del ioc i del foc*. "LVII." (Barcelona: Edicions del Mall, 1987) 92.
43. Salvador Espriu, *Obres Completes: Anys d'Aprenatage. Vol. 1, Poesia, 1*. "Memoria:" (Barcelona: Ediciones 62, 1985) 221.
44. Jose Maria de Sagarra, *Antologia de la Obra Poètica de J. Ma. de Sagarra*. "El poema de Montserrat." (Barcelona: Ediciones Poligrafa S.A., 1973) 191.
45. Sagarra 193, 195.
46. Rosenthal, "El meu pais és un roc." 35.
47. Rosenthal 35.
48. J.V. Foix, *Obres Completes*, Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1974) 253.
49. Espriu, "IV." 176.
50. Espriu 176.
51. Riba, *Del joc, "XLVIII."* 86.
52. Riba, *Del joc, "LIV."* 90

53. Agustí Bartra, *Obra Poètica Completa. vol. I 1938-78,* "Joan Junyer." (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1971) 82.
54. Pere Quart, *Poemes Escollites,* "Complanta de la primavera." (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1983) 48.
55. Carles Riba, *Obres Completes,* "XLXI." (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1965) 199.
56. Espriu, "IV." 176.
57. Bartra, "Confessió. 39.
58. Quart, "Cancó Explicita." 46.
59. Quart 46.
60. Espriu, "El pous de la nit." 156.
61. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "XLII." 197.
62. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "XLV." 198.
63. Jordi Coca, Personal interview, 29 October 1992.
64. Espriu, "III." 175.
65. Espriu 175.
66. Espriu, "VIII." 180.
67. Espriu 181.
68. "Rizpah" was one of the wives of Saul whose sons were killed to atone for the injustices he had done to the Gibeonites. Upon their death, she guarded the bodies. "From the beginning of the harvest till the rain poured down from the heavens on the bodies, she did not let the birds of the air touch them by day or the wild animals by night." 2 Samuel 21:10 (New International Version). The story can be found in 2 Samuel 21:1-14.
69. Espriu, "Resfá." 30.
70. Riba, Obres Completes. "Inscripció." 200.
71. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "Branca sobre el torrente." 203.
72. Quart, "Complanta de la primavera." 48.
73. Espriu, "Mishná." 32.
74. Espriu 32.
75. Espriu 32.
76. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "XLII." 197.
77. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "XLV." 198.
78. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "LXIX." 204.
79. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "LXX." 205.
80. Quart, "Complanta de la primavera." 48.
81. Quart 48.
82. Bartra, "Oda a Cataluny des dels trópics." 74
83. Bartra, "Llunyana." 62.
84. Bartra 62.
85. Quart, "Catalunya." 49.
86. Espriu, "Viatge d' Hivern." 227.
87. Espriu, "Salm." 29.
88. Espriu, "Vell misteri de la soledat de Sinera." 113.
89. Espriu, "III." 175.
90. Quart, "L'Angel." 52.
91. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "IX." 232.
92. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "LVII." 202.
93. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "Orfeo Catalá." 203.
94. Espriu, "Rars ecos pels tombants." 25.
95. Rosenthal, "A molts llocs d' aquest món." 23.

96. Rosenthal 24.
97. Rosenthal 24.
98 Rosenthal 24.
99. Espriu, "Represa." 14.
100. Espriu 14.
101. Espriu, "Perque miris despres aquests saltimbanquis." 15.
102. Espriu, "Fira en cesa." 16.
103. Espriu, "Fira, hores abans de Naxos." 17, 18.
104. Espriu, "Boda de Laia." 20.
105. Espriu 17.
106. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "XLII." 197.
107. Rosenthal, "Vaig arribar en aquell poble." 38.
108. Rosenthal 39.
109. Rosenthal 38.
110. Rosenthal 39.
111. Riba, *Obres Completes.* "Orfeo Catalá." 203.
112. Riba, *Obres Completes* 203.
113. Espriu, "El meu poble i jo." 147.
114. Espriu 147.
115. Espriu 148.
116. Espriu 147.
117. Espriu 148.
118. Riba, *Del joc* 9.
119. Jordi Coca, personal interview, 29 Oct. 1992.
120. (ed.) Carles-Jordi Guardiola, *Cartes de Carles Riba II: 1939-1952* (Barcelona; La Magrana, 1991) 24.
121. Guardiola 24.
122. Guardiola 24.
123. Guardiola 34, 35.
124. Riba, *Obres Completes* 214.
125. Guardiola 84.
126. Guardiola 102.
127. Guardiola 104.
128. *El Periodico* 348.
129. Rosenthal 58.
130. "Josep Amat," Ariel July-August 1946: 49.
131. *Ariel* 42.
132. Jose Maria de Sagarra, *Memorias* (Barcelona: Editorial Noguer, 1957) Translator's Note.
133. Manuel Tunon de Lara, *Espana bajo la dictadura franquista* (Madrid: Editorial Labor, 1980) 446, 447.
134. Rosenthal 130.
135. Espriu, "El meu poble i jo." 147

Contributors

Naomi Leite is a Senior majoring in Art History with a minor in Religious Studies. She intends to continue work in these fields through graduate study in Symbolic Anthropology.

Justin Horner is a History major whose scholarly interest lies primarily in the social history of industrialization and the development of American capitalism. He hopes to pursue graduate study and ultimately find a place teaching young adults American history. His paper on Cambodia was the final semester project of a political science class on revolutionary change, of which he is very fond.

Alexy Kochowiec graduated in December of 1992 with a degree in History. He plans on attending medical school this fall or, alternatively, doing graduate work in history or joining the Peace Corps. In addition to two previous trips to Russia, he plans on living and working there this summer.

Jim Carpenter will graduate in May with a degree in History. He spent his junior year studying at the University of Barcelona. He plans to return to Barcelona to teach or pursue graduate work.

The editors regret an error made in two authors' biographies in the Journal of Fall, 1992. Sherry K. Holbrook's and Katherine McGregor's biographies were switched.

Back Issues

☐ Fall 1992 Vol 6 No 1

Reactionary Conservatism and the Hollywood Western Boom, (1946-1952)
Organizational Controls and Expressions of Resistance: Seasonal Work in Alaskan Seafood Processing Plants
Evil, Suffering, and God-Concepts in Christianity and Hinduism
The Monster Within: Form and Meaning in the Ritual of Horror
Women in Development: Rhetoric and Reality

☐ Spring 1992 Vol 5 No 2

Divine Hatred: Meir Kahane and American Jewry
Which Witch is Witch? Changing Images of Witches in Twentieth-Century Children's Literature
Spanish Minority Nationalism: The Emergence of the Periphery as a Political Force
Resolving the Present: The Western Landscapes of Bierstadt, Jackson, and Moran
The New Utility of Nature, 1880-1925

☐ Fall 1991 Vol 5 No 1

Boomerangs of Color
Reflections of Style: Willis Jefferson Polk and the Hallidie Building
New Age Capitalism
Hispano Creativity of Tradition: Nuevo Mexicano Poesia y su paso
Politics and Photomontage: A Comparison of the Works of John Heartfield and Gustav Klutsis

Each issue is $3.95

For all nine back issues shown, please send $20.00 (postage and handling included). Make checks payable to:

The Regents of the University of California

Mail completed form to:

The Berkeley Undergraduate Journal
Back Issues
200 California Hall
University of California
Berkeley CA 94720

☐ Spring 1991 Vol 4 No 2

Gender and Genre: Patriarchal Ideology and the Nude in Avant-Garde Painting
The Saga and the Hare: Nature and the Rise of the State in Early China Silent Conformity or Alternate Reality
The Preservation of Power: Reconstruction in Georgia, 1865-75
Retelling the Tale of La Malinche in Ana Castillo's "Ghost Talk"
Hetch Hetchy: A Mere Depression Between Hills

☐ Fall 1990 Vol 4 No 1

What's in a Name?
Italian Fascism Memory and Forgetting: The Modern Disease Imagining the Inner World of the Other
The Development and Potential of Reservation Bingo
In Defense of Molly Bloom
Voices Behind the Front

☐ Spring 1990 Vol 3 No 2

The Takeover Binge of the 1980s: Hollow Fulfillment of Frenzied Desires
Silence to Self-Expression: A Development of Voice in Chicana Literature
Homecoming in the Odyssey and the Aeneid
Reflecting on the Chinese Democracy Movement
La Oración es la Expresión de un Juicio: A Profile of a Poet in Exile

☐ Fall 1989 Vol 3 No 1

'Our' Collective Intentionalty "The War Spared No One." : The Individual and the Spanish Civil War
Race and Ethnic Experience in the US and Japan: Development of My Identity
'Almond Branches in Blossom' and the Van Gogh Literature.
'That Man Doesn't Khow How to Finish a Story': Molly's Final Word on Ulysses

☐ Spring 1989 Vol 2 No 2

Creating Americans: Early Eighteen-Century Schoolbooks
The Rhetoric of Nineteenth-Century American Landscape Painting
The Road to Freedom: One Man's Story
The Grotesque in Chicano Fiction: Two Novels
The Causes of the Bullionest Policies of Henry IV
BART—Doomed from the Start?
'The Making Good Again': The Human Consequences of German War Reparations to Jewish Survivors

☐ Spring 1988 Vol 1 No 1

United States Foreign Policy in Guatemala: 1954, The Contradiction of American Ideals
Twenty Questions, Two Answers on the University Art Museum
Mary and the Modern Woman: Cuban Women in the Republic and the Revolution
The California State Lottery: Winners and Losers
Israeli Arms Exports: A No Win Situation

The Berkeley Undergraduate Journal

Subscription Form

	One Year 2 issues Fall/Spring	Five Years 10 issues
Individual	$7	$28
Institution	$14	$56

Please circle subscription rate and complete this form.
Refer to the following for ordering back issues.

Name _____

Institution _____

Affiliation _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____

Telephone _____ Zip _____

Please make checks payable to:
The Regents of University of California

Mail completed subscription form to:
The Berkeley Undergraduate Journal
Subscriptions
200 California Hall
University of California
Berkeley CA 94720

$3.95