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1. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

* Military's Involvement in Parliamentary Elections

A high-ranking officer in the Defense Ministry told an OBSHCHAYA GAZETA (1995, No.43) correspondent about the military's participation in the elections for the State Duma. The officer said that in accordance with resolution No.11, the Defense Ministry had applied to the Central Elections Commission for financial allocations for military candidates. However, instead of the requested 300 million rubles, not more than 80

million had been allotted. Therefore, military candidates are to be financed on an equal footing with civilian candidates.

However, many Generals have close connections with businessmen and criminals who are prepared to finance their electoral campaigns. Generals included in the list of Russia Our Home candidates will be supported by companies connected to the Prime Minister, while Boris Gromov is financed by prominent singer and businessman Iosif Kobzon.

The officer argued that there is no single command in the Defense Ministry in charge of the electoral campaign. There are a few bodies directed to manage electoral campaigning -- namely the department of military policy headed by Gennady Ivanov; the General Staff's working group headed by Vladimir Zhurbenko; the chief department of personnel morale headed by Sergei Zdorikov; and the chief personnel department headed by Yevgeny Vysotsky.

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said that there are 123 military candidates running for seats in the State Duma. However, in reality there are 350 army officers participating in the electoral campaign. Of this number, not more than 20 or 30 candidates could win seats in the lower chamber. However, by joining their ranks with the defense industry and the other power agencies' representatives, they could form an influential lobby in the parliament.

The officer further said that some electoral blocs are looking for ways to secure the support of the military in the elections. The "Serving Russia" representatives had approached high-ranking officers with a request to provide votes of army servicemen at the military bases prohibited to civilians. ("Ordered to Participate and Win", p.9).

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (27.10.1995): According to the opinion polls conducted by the Defense Ministry, over 90% of the elite Tula air borne division servicemen intend to vote for the Congress of Russian Communities in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. ("Moods in Air Borne Troops", p.1).

In his interview with the weekly VEK (1995, No.42), co- chairman of the Congress of Russian Communities Alexander Lebed said that he was pessimistic about the military's large- scale participation in the State Duma elections. Lebed stressed that the military does not have the necessary expertise for participating in law-making.

Lebed views the military's large-scale involvement in the electoral campaign as the other extreme that followed the 1993 prohibiting the military from running for seats in the parliament. Lebed cited the Volgograd elections for the City Duma as an example of an ill-considered massive campaign conducted by the military. ("Alexander Lebed's Prognosis"

60 Per Cent of Votes to Be Received by Communists, Agrarians, and the General Himself", p.3).

* Opinion Poll on Russians' Attitudes Toward State Duma

OGONYOK (1195, No.40, p.17): According to opinion polls conducted by the public opinion centre VTSIOM, Russians' attitudes toward the State Duma are as follows (%):

What is your assessment of the State Duma's performance?

Very high.....	0.4%
Rather high.....	1.6
Above satisfactory.....	3.4
Satisfactory.....	21.7
Below satisfactory.....	19.2
Rather low.....	15.9
Very low.....	20.3
Uncertain.....	17.3
No response.....	0.1

What laws adopted by the parliament affected your life? (More than one answer allowed).

No laws.....	40%
Laws on pensions.....	19
Laws on business activity.....	7
Laws on mass media.....	6
Laws on budget.....	12
Laws on minimum salary.....	22
Others.....	3
Hesitant.....	15

Why do you have no intention to participate in voting in December 1995 (% of those refusing to participate in elections)?

My voting would not change anything.....	47%
I do not trust politicians.....	32
I'm sick of politics.....	24
Politicians elected to the State Duma think more of themselves than of Russia.....	20
The election results will be forged anyway.....	19
I do not see worthy persons among politicians.....	15
There are no parties expressing my interests.....	10
Duma's ability to influence situation in Russia is limited....	9
Russia does not need Duma at all.....	7

* Cost of State Duma Seats

COMMERSANT-DAILY (27.10.1995): Experts believe that the average cost of an electoral campaign in a single-mandate district reaches US\$300,000. This amount is required primarily for paying for advertising in the mass media. The advertising cost is quite naturally the highest in Moscow and St.Petersburg.

Although some political leaders doubted the correctness of these estimates, there is every reason to believe that they are reliable. The cost of being included in the list of candidates for a leading bloc is about \$200,000, and it is \$100,000 for a bloc having lower chances for success. ("We Want It Nice!", pp.3, 4).

2. LEGISLATION AND LEGAL ISSUES

* Law on Federation Council Not Adopted Yet

MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA (27.10.1995): The Federation Council has turned down the draft law outlining how its members are to be chosen. The law had been previously passed by the State Duma. The State Duma-adopted draft envisaged the election of the heads of regional administrations and legislatures as upper chamber members.

The draft met a rather cool reception in the Federation Council. The State Duma faction Yabloko's steps on discrediting the draft was the last straw. Faction member Victor Sheinis, a prominent expert in legal issues, published an article expressing the hope that the upper chamber would reject the draft. Published on the day of voting in the Federation Council, the article discouraged many upper chamber members from voting for the draft.

The upper chamber is not likely to elaborate a new draft within the two weeks remaining before the deadline. Therefore, a presidential decree on the Federation Council's formation, or extension of its term, seems the most likely solution. Both of these run contrary to the acting Basic Law, which means that Russia is obviously approaching another constitutional crisis. ("All Playing with Senate's Fate" by Oleg Zhirnov, p.1).

3. POLITICAL PARTIES

* Parties Having Collected 200,000 Signatures

COMMERSANT-DAILY (24.10.1995): According to the Central Elections Commission, as of October 22, 43 parties and electoral blocs had submitted collected signatures in support of their participation in the elections for the State Duma. Of the 43 parties and coalitions, 8 have had their signatures checked and recognized as being valid by the Central Elections Commission. These organizations are:

Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Congress of Russian Communities
Liberal-Democratic Party
Russian Women
Russia Our Home
Ivan Rybkin's Bloc
Agrarian Party
Union of Labor

("Last Day the Most Difficult One" by Natalya Arkhangelskaya, p.3).

IZVESTIYA (24.10.1995): Among those having failed to submit the collected signatures are the following parties and electoral blocs:

Movement Democratic Russia
Union of Russian Muslims
Association of Russian Lawyers
Zemsky Sobor - Union of Zemstva, Cossacks and Orthodox and
Patriotic Organizations of Russia
Our Future
Federal Democratic Movement
Mother Land - Association of Disabled
Serving Russia

In general, out of the 69 parties that had stated their intention to run for State Duma seats, 20 did not appear in the Central Elections Commission to submit collected signatures at all. On the whole, 26 blocs and parties have quit, while of the remaining 43, many are certain to be disqualified after the signatures are checked. The commission is to make public its decision after November 2. ("26 Blocs and Coalitions Quit Struggling for Mandates" by Anatoly Stepovoi, p.2).

* Head of Central Elections Commission Accused of Being Biased

MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA (25.10.1995): Leaders of the movement Democratic Russia accused the Central Elections Commission of purposefully preventing the movement from submitting its collected signatures in due time. In this connection, the daily says that Democratic Russia appeared in the Central Elections Commission office just a few minutes before the deadline, and it had nobody to blame for this. At the same time, it agrees with the movement leaders' assertion that the commission intends to cut the number of organizations running for seats in the State Duma.

The daily quoted the commission head Nikolai Ryabov as saying to the representatives of the European Council Parliamentary Assembly that the number of those allowed to continue in the race will be much less than the 43 organizations having submitted signatures. At the same time, their number would be more than the 13 that had run in the elections in 1993, assured Ryabov.

These limits were set by the Central Elections Commission's head on October 23, when the commission had just started its work and nothing was known of the results of verifying the signatures. Therefore, one cannot help taking these words as proof of the commission head's biased stand on the desired number of parties and coalitions allowed to run for seats in the lower chamber.

The daily also notes that the Central Elections Commission had rejected the requests by independent observer associations to follow the elections. At the same time, it vested the public chamber under the President with a rather broad authority in this field. ("Kings Can Do Everything" by Oleg Zhirnov, p.1).

* Five Electoral Coalitions Apply to Court

NEZAVISMAYA GAZETA (27.10.1995): The electoral bloc Democratic

Russia-Free Labour Unions, as well as four other organizations running for

State Duma seats, applied to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in connection with the Central Elections Commission's refusal to accept signatures collected by their blocs. The appeal alleges that the commission misinterpreted the law on elections.

The law stipulates that all papers shall be simultaneously submitted to the Central Elections Commission no later than 55 days before the elections. However, the commission rejected the movement's papers on the ground that the protracted procedure of accepting them lasted until after 12:00 a.m. on October 22. The movement representatives said the commission

dragged out the time by issuing some certificates before allowing them to hand in their papers. ("Five Electoral Coalitions Apply to Court" by Konstantin Katanyan, p.1).

* Russian National Unity Will Not Run for State Duma Seats

VEK (1995, No.41): Russian National Unity's leader Alexander Barkashov told his party congress that he had no intention of becoming involved in electoral campaigning. The union's primary goal is to come to political power in Russia. This would be possible only provided that Russians become organized. Therefore, organizational activity and propaganda are the main objectives pursued by Russian National Unity.

Russian National Unity has submitted an application for its registration as a federal party to the Justice Ministry. Barkashov's organization is indeed gathering momentum now. The union has a network of training centers and subsidiaries in 40 places in the Moscow region.

The congress participants told of their connections with the law-protecting bodies and of the support received from the defense industry enterprises. The core of the union activists consists of 5,000 persons. In addition to this, there are other "supporters" and "followers". ("Barkashovtsy Claim Federal Status" by Vladimir Kucherenko, p.3).

* Congress of Russian Communities has Good Prospects

VEK (1995, No.42): Contrary to many other electoral coalitions, including the Prime Minister's Russia Our Home, the Congress of Russian Communities represents the result of a logical evolution of Russia's political system. The congress has comprised all those who are in opposition to the government, though are not looking for a radical overhaul of the political system.

By voicing his support for the Congress of Russian Communities and opposition to the Communist Party, the President contributed to the polarization of forces running for seats in the State Duma. This statement

has put the Communists in a deadlock. While during the initial stage they had proclaimed the slogan of "struggle against liberals", later they had to concentrate their criticism on Russia Our Home. Now, however, the Communist Party is faced with the Congress of Russian Communities as its main rival in the future State Duma.

The main problems are likely to arise after the elections. If the Congress of Russian Communities wins a majority of seats, the President

could appoint Yuri Skokov as Prime Minister on quite legal grounds. If victory is attained by the Communists, the same could be done in order to prevent the radical opposition coming to power.

In the new State Duma, the Communist Party faction will be faced with the choice of either supporting the Congress of Russian Communities as an alternative to the present regime, or opposing it. In the former case, the Communists would have to share responsibility with the cabinet, while in the latter case, Skokov would be accused of political extremism and splitting the opposition.

Skokov has attained the goal pursued by Ivan Rybkin, which was to split the left-wing opposition. The large number of prominent figures in the ranks of the Congress of Russian Communities would help it survive when the time for an unpopular decision comes. At the same time, the congress' heterogeneity is a time bomb that could go off some day. The Congress of Russian Communities has neither ideology nor tradition to cement it. Therefore, its key problems are still, ahead as some day Skokov

will have to pass from words to deeds. ("President's Ideas Alive and Victorious..." by Boris Kagarlitsky, p.3).

4. POLITICAL FIGURES

* Federation Council Approves Prosecutor General

SEGODNIA (25.10.1995): The Federation Council has approved Yuri Skuratov as Russia's Prosecutor General. Skuratov was introduced to the upper chamber members by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin. In his address to the Federation Council, Skuratov accused his predecessor of concealing crimes, and promised to improve the psychological climate in his agency. He also expressed his intention to set up a proper balance of the prosecutor offices' functions as prosecuting bodies, and as those protecting people against bureaucracy and crime.

The President's representative Alexander Yakovlev did not dismiss Skuratov's allegations of the violations of law committed in the law-protecting bodies. Neither did he preclude the possibility of some Prosecutor's Office officials being prosecuted for committed crimes.

Federation Council member Alexander Beliaev told a daily correspondent that Skuratov's appointment had been an early sign of Boris Yeltsin's beginning electoral campaign. By nominating Skuratov, the President had tried to prove to the broad public that the personal loyalty factor is not decisive for him any longer when making choices on choosing government officials. ("Russia Has Legitimate Prosecutor General" by Darya Korsunskaya, p.1).

* Opinion Poll on Popularity of Leading Politicians

SEGODNIA (19.10.1995) published a list of Russian the leading politicians' popularity rates from April 1993 to September 1995.

	Apr. 1993	Nov. 1993	May 1994	Nov. 1994	Mar. 1995	Spt. 1995	
1. Victor Chernomyrdin		11	8	5	5	5	14
2. Alexander Lebed		-	-	-	2	2	13
3. Grigory Yavlinsky		4	16	9	11	14	12
4. Gennady Zyuganov		-	3	5	5	7	11
5. Svyatoslav Fedorov		2	3	2	3	6	10
6. Yegor Gaidar		6	17	8	7	7	8
7. Alexander Rutskoi		19	6	7	8	6	7
8. Boris Fedorov		-	1	-	1	4	6
9. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy		2	4	6	5	8	5
10. Boris Yeltsin		19	17	8	9	4	5
11. Nikolai Ryzhkov		-	-	-	-	-	5
12. Stanislav Govorukhin		-	-	-	-	-	5
13. Ella Pamfilova		-	2	1	1	2	4
14. Boris Nemtsov		1	1	-	-	-	3
15. Yekaterina Lakhova		-	-	-	-	2	3
16. Mikhail Lapshin		-	-	-	-	0.3	3
17. Ivan Rybkin		-	-	-	1	2	3
18. Yuri Luzhkov		-	1	-	1	3	3
19. Sergei Shakhrai		10	15	6	5	6	2
20. Aman Tuleev		3	3	1	2	2	2
Other		22	18	17	16	32	20
Do not trust any politician		17	25	29	22	31	25
Undecided		39	34	34	39	26	25

("One Fourth of Russian Voters Do Not Trust Any Politicians" by Oleg Saveliev, p.3).

* Alexander Lebed Protecting Army's Interests

COMMERSANT-DAILY (19.10.1995): Alexander Lebed told a press conference held in the aftermath of the founding congress of the movement "Honor and Motherland" that it would only take him a few months to create a small and efficient army. Observers draw attention to the fact that the movement had been set up within the framework of the electoral coalition Congress of Russian Communities.

Lebed's popularity within the army is unchallenged. The Congress of Russian Communities has skilled experts providing information on political

moods in the army. In addition to his, many officers in the Defense Ministry and military districts render assistance to the congress.

Alexander Lebed is gradually turning into the voice of the frustrated and disorganized part of the military. The ideas Lebed offers to the military can help him rally army support. ("Lebed Striving to Protect Oppressed Army" by Ilya Bulavinov, p.3).

5. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

* Yeltsin: Russia Will Participate in Peacekeeping Operation in Bosnia

SEGODNIA (25.10.1995): On completing their 4-hour talks in Franklin Roosevelt's family mansion, Boris Yeltsin and US President Bill Clinton announced Russia's decision to join ranks with the international peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. However, the exact dimensions of Russia's participation in peacekeeping operations remain to be decided upon.

As one can foresee, the Russian troops would stay where they are -- that is in the French sector of the international forces. The US believes that Russia's proposal to send a division to Bosnia goes beyond reasonable

limits. In addition to this, Russia's estimate of its anticipated expenditures of US\$3 billion far exceeds the \$1.5 billion spent by the US.

("Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton Reach Agreement on Joint Actions" by Vladimir Abarinov, p.1).

COMMERSANT-DAILY (24.10.1995): The US has remained firm in its intention to preserve the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia as a NATO operation. Meanwhile, Yeltsin has no arguments to oppose the US stand. The

only thing Moscow could do is to promise unilateral participation in military operations within the conflict zone. Bearing in mind Russia's sympathy towards the Serbs, this course could develop into a confrontation

with NATO, says the daily. ("Diplomacy Though Nothing to Be Put at Stake" by Natalya Kalashnikova, Vadim Dymarsky, pp.1, 3).

MOYA GAZETA (1995, No.40): It is becoming increasingly clear even to those having scarce knowledge of international politics that the changes taking place now could be of critical importance for shifting the balance of forces in the international arena. Russia's Western partners are virtually trying to create a kind of new Yalta system aimed at consolidating their victory in the cold war. NATO's expansion to the East and its transformation into the sole instrument of international and European security not envisaging Russia's participation must be viewed as consistent steps in this direction.

Under these circumstances, Yeltsin made a statement on replacing the Foreign Minister and revising Russia's foreign policy to demonstrate to the West Russia's frustration with its current role in international politics.

Russia's agreement to NATO's command over the international peacekeeping forces in Bosnia would be equal to recognizing NATO's role as the sole instrument of international security. In the event that Russia seeks to retain its role in international politics, it must resolutely block the West's plans in Bosnia. If the West refuses to meet Russia's demands, the latter must veto giving NATO a UN mandate for operations in Bosnia via the UN Security Council.

Such a step should not be taken as Russia's unfriendly stand toward

its Western partners, as it would be quite consonant to its general course on preventing the expansion of NATO's zone of influence.

Russia must pass from words to deeds, as the West does not believe what Moscow says. ("Russia Can and Must Say "No" to NATO's Domination in Balkans" by Andranik Migranyan, p.1).

* Foreign Ministry Officials on Foreign Minister

MOSCOW NEWS (1996, No.73): Many people within the Russian Foreign Ministry dislike Andrei Kozyrev and hope for his resignation. However, Foreign Ministry officials are unanimous that President Yeltsin's statement on his intention to replace Kozyrev had dealt a blow to Russia's foreign policy image, and thus disapprove of it.

Retired ambassador Vladimir Stupishin says that zigzags in such cases are inadmissible. On voicing his frustration with Kozyrev's performance, Yeltsin should have taken the final decision on him, Stupishin argues.

Sources in the Foreign Ministry say, however, that Kozyrev is used to treating his subordinates in the same manner. He more than once circulated rumours on a particular ambassador's imminent resignation, but made him wait for months until the final decision was taken.

Foreign Ministry officials argue that Yeltsin's criticism had missed the target, as Kozyrev just does not have sufficient leverage for coordinating foreign policy decision-making. Many heads of government agencies have direct access to Yeltsin, and in some instances the Foreign Minister learned about Russia's initiatives from newspapers. A Foreign Ministry high-ranking official said that in order to coordinate all agencies concerned, one must have the powers of the Prime Minister.

Although disliking Kozyrev, the Foreign Ministry officials are pessimistic about his possible successor. They would prefer to have professional diplomats such as Yuli Vorontsov or Anatoly Adamishin appointed Foreign Minister. Another high-ranking diplomat Igor Ivanov is disliked for his closeness to Kozyrev.

Low and middle-ranking diplomats would welcome the appointment of Vladimir Lukin, head of the State Duma committee for international affairs. Lukin is believed to be able to restore the Foreign Ministry's image, as well as influencing and opening opportunities for young diplomats' careers. However, older diplomats fear Lukin's advent would threaten their positions. ("Passions Around Andrei", pp.1, 18).

6. DOSSIER:

RUSSIAN EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The Russian External Intelligence Service is headed by its director, who has seven deputies.

Yevgeny M. Primakov, External Intelligence Service director, was born

in Kiev in 1929 to a family of Jewish doctors. Later, his family moved to Tbilisi (Georgia). He speaks Arabic, Georgian, and possibly Armenian.

In 1952, Primakov graduated from the Arabic department of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies (Moscow M.Lomonosov University). During his study he allegedly gained a reputation as a poor student with a humble knowledge of Arabic. After graduation, he worked for some time as a junior

research fellow in the Institute of Oriental Studies (the USSR Academy of Science). In the early 1960s, he was sent for field studies to Egypt. In 1966, he was sent as a daily Pravda correspondent to the Middle East.

Primakov's career started to develop especially after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Since the early 1970s, he became a permanent member of all Soviet academic delegations taking part in conferences and discussions on Middle East problems. In 1978, he became the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies.

Since the beginning of perestroika, Primakov succeeded in becoming a confidant of the KGB's Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, and this greatly contributed to his career. During the time of Gorbachev's rule, he witnessed a fantastic political career. He became the director of the Institute of World Economy and International Politics, as well as alternate member of the Communist Party's supreme body -- the Politbureau -- and the chairman of one of the USSR Supreme Soviet's chambers. At that time, he played the role of Gorbachev's adviser in talks with the US on military and strategic issues and in foreign policy decision-making at large.

Despite such an ascendancy to the top Soviet political institutions, Primakov carefully avoided making public statements on controversial issues, and preferred to keep a relatively low political profile, which obviously helped him survive Gorbachev's downfall.

On September 30, 1993, he was appointed director of the External Intelligence Service. Initially, he was considered a compromising figure for Yeltsin and Gorbachev. However, as they saying goes, he managed to survive due to his ability to submit the right information at the right moment.

The First Deputy director of the External Intelligence Service is Vyacheslav Trubnikov (age 51), who is also an expert in Oriental studies.

A. Shcherbakov is another deputy director. In July 1995, he was appointed a member of the inter-departmental commission on ecological security and of the coordinating inter-departmental council on military and technical policy.

Vadim Kirpichenko, former deputy head of the KGB's 1st department (external intelligence) is the head of the External Intelligence Service's group of consultants.

The service's director has another four deputies, though information on them is not made public.

On July 5, 1995, President Yeltsin appointed former Interior Minister

Victor Yerin the 7th deputy director of the External Intelligence Service.

In his new capacity, Yerin is likely to be in charge of the prevention of international crime. Before that, this activity had been conducted by the

counter-intelligence service and had not been considered to be of much importance.

In spite of Yerin's appointment, no special analytical center is expected to be established for his department. This means that Yerin is to remain a person of little significance in the intelligence service. Primakov, however, abstained from voicing his frustration with Yerin's appointment. He obviously preferred not to spoil his relations with the President. In addition to that, Primakov obviously intends to use Yerin for further developing contacts with Yeltsin.

From 1991 to early 1993 the External Intelligence Service passed through its first serious crisis, as it faced a 40% cut and a number of its officers deserted abroad. The Russian mass media leveled unrestricted criticism against the service.

Liberal politicians argue that Primakov has conducted the cutting of his service at the expense of the most skilled professionals, thus putting his bets on the old officers recruited during Kryuchkov's time. Most of the middle-rank officers of the 37-45 age group have quit during the cuts, while the older officers have stayed.

However, in 1994 the situation improved. The number of critical articles decreased. During his visit to the External Intelligence Service on April 26, 1994, President Yeltsin demonstrated his respect and support for Primakov.

At the present time, Primakov is putting an emphasis on providing analytical materials for top-ranking government officials. These materials are elaborated with the active participation of researchers from Russia's leading analytical centers.

Primakov has managed to avoid confrontation with the other power agencies. The Foreign Ministry is the only exception in this respect for two reasons. First, contrary to the Foreign Ministry, the External Intelligence Service views NATO's expansion as a threat to Russia, and is skeptical about the prospects of Russia's cooperation with it. In his turn, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has more than once made critical remarks of the intelligence service's recommendations on NATO. Second, speculations existed that Primakov was to replace Kozyrev as Foreign Minister.

Primakov possesses a rather independent stand on the key issues of foreign and domestic policy. This was demonstrated by his negative vote on the Chechnya operation during the Security Council session. Primakov is reportedly on good terms with presidential security aide Yuri Baturin. Primakov does not try to solve the most important issues by bypassing Baturin, which helps them keep good relations. Primakov is among the few top government officials having direct access to the President.

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