

Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

Sierra Club History Series

Edgar Wayburn

SIERRA CLUB STATESMAN
LEADER OF THE PARKS AND WILDERNESS MOVEMENT:
GAINING PROTECTION FOR ALASKA, THE REDWOODS,
AND GOLDEN GATE PARKLANDS

Introductions by
Paul Brooks
Harold Gilliam
John F. Seiberling

An Interview Conducted by
Ann Lage and Susan Schrepfer
1976-1981

Underwritten by
The National Endowment for the Humanities
and the Sierra Club

Copyright © 1985 by the Regents of the University of California
and the Sierra Club

All uses of this manuscript are covered by a legal agreement between the University of California and Edgar Wayburn dated March 11, 1985. The manuscript is thereby made available for research purposes. All literary rights in the manuscript, including the right to publish, are reserved to The Bancroft Library of the University of California Berkeley. No part of the manuscript may be quoted for publication without the written permission of the Director of The Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley.

Requests for permission to quote for publication should be addressed to the Regional Oral History Office, 486 Library, and should include identification of the specific passages to be quoted, anticipated use of the passages, and identification of the user. The legal agreement with Edgar Wayburn requires that he be notified of the request and allowed thirty days in which to respond.

It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows:

Edgar Wayburn, "Sierra Club Statesman Leader of the Parks and Wilderness Movement: Gaining Protection for Alaska, the Redwoods, and Golden Gate Parklands," an oral history conducted 1976-1981 by Ann Lage and Susan Schrepfer, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, 1985.

Copy No. _____

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Edgar Wayburn

PREFACE	i
INTRODUCTION by Paul Brooks	vi
INTRODUCTION by Harold Gilliam	vii
INTRODUCTION by Representative John Seiberling	ix
INTERVIEW HISTORY	xi
I FROM GEORGIA TO THE SIERRA NEVADA: BIRTH OF A CONSERVATIONIST	1
Early Interest in Nature	1
Personal Philosophy and Medical Education	2
Experiencing the Magnificence of the Sierra, 1927-1942	3
Sierra Club Contacts, 1939-1942	6
Impact of Postwar Changes in the Sierra	8
II MARIN COUNTY PARKS: THE BACKYARD WILDERNESS	12
Blocking the Subdivision of the Marin Wildlands	12
Differences with Newton Drury over Park Enlargement and Acquisition Policy	14
Enlarging Mount Tamalpais State Park, 1948-1972	17
Marin County's Conservation Ethic	19
III WILDERNESS, TIMBER, AND THE FOREST SERVICE	22
The Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs and the Three Sisters Wilderness	22
"Sanitation" Logging of the Jeffrey Pines	25
The Multiple Use and Wilderness Acts	27
Battling the Forest Service in the North Cascades	32
Sierra Club Reversal on Mineral King Ski Development	37
IV EVOLUTION OF THE SIERRA CLUB, 1930s-1960s	41
Club Leadership: "Establishment" Climbers, Hikers, and Skiers	41
Evolution of a Personal Philosophy	45
Three Momentous Decisions in 1952: "The Turn of the Hinge"	49
Going National: Formation of the Pacific Northwest Chapter	50
Debates on Dinosaur and Glen Canyon, 1950s	53
Opposing Power Plants at Nipomo Dunes and Bodega Bay	56
Nuclear Power--Pure Experimentation, with Unknown Side Effects	60

V	TOWARD A REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK, 1955-1968	63
	Initial Interest in the Redwoods	63
	Contacts with Stewart Udall and Laurance Rockefeller	66
	Legislative Trials of the Sierra Club's Redwood Bill, 1965-1968	68
	The 1968 Redwood National Park Act--A Pyrrhic Victory	71
	Efforts to Obtain Enforcement of the 1968 Act	73
	Opposition and Support in the Redwood Towns	75
	Stewart Udall's Turnabout, Spring 1965	77
	Role of the Lumber Companies in the Progress toward a Park	79
	The Legislative Orchestration on the 1968 Bill	82
	Mike McCloskey's Contribution	83
	Governor Reagan and His Secretary for Resources, Ike Livermore	85
	The Schism between the Sierra Club and the Save-the-Redwoods League	88
	Other Participants and Rivals	91
	Save-the-Redwoods League Position	95
VI	THE EFFORT FOR EXPANSION OF REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK, 1971-1978	98
	Legal Efforts to Protect Park Areas	98
	Working with Congressman Phil Burton on an Expansion Bill	99
	Vituperative Opposition from Labor	100
	Position of the Lumber Companies: Defending a Way of Life, or Greed?	102
	The 1978 Act: Protection for the Land and the Loggers	106
	Phil Burton: A Consummate and Environmental Politician	108
	Positions of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations	109
	Governor Jerry Brown's Ambiguous Position	110
	Transfer of State Parks to the Federal Government	112
	Healing the Breach with Save-the-Redwoods League	114
	The Club and Miller-Rellim: "Coincident Allies"	116
	Reasons for Success: the Aura of the Redwoods, Burton's Commitment, Sierra Club Lobbying	120
	Rehabilitation of Damaged Redwood Lands	123
VII	THE GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL RECREATION AREA	125
	Genesis of the "Battle for the Hills of Home"	125
	An "Outrageous" Plan Succeeds	128
	Positions of the NPS and the Local Ranchers	131
	The Case for a United Jurisdiction with Protection of the Natural Terrain	133
	Parks as a Haven for the Biosphere and a Recreational Resource	136
	Blocking the Spread of Subdivisions in Marin	141
	Park and Open Space Reserves: Social Dilemma or Social Opportunity?	144
	Establishing Point Reyes National Seashore; Completing GGNRA	146

VIII	FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON FOREST AND WILDERNESS ISSUES	152
	Tutored by the Forest Service: A Conflict in Aims and Philosophy	152
	Wilderness Protection and the Passage of the Wilderness Act	158
	Wilderness and Roads in the Sierra: USFS, Governor Reagan, and the Club	160
	Conservatism, Liberalism, and Conservation	163
	Opposing Highways in the Redwoods	164
	Differences on Wilderness Policies: Salmon-Trinity, Kern Plateau, Golden Trout	168
IX	A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE SIERRA CLUB	174
	Bay Chapter, Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs and the Conservation Committee, 1947-1961	174
	Election to the Club Board of Directors, 1957	179
	Club Presidency, 1961-1964: Defining a Role	182
	Initial Conflicts with Executive Director David Brower	185
	Challenges to the Club "Establishment," 1960s	188
X	GROWING INTERNAL DISSENSION: FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS, 1960-1968	190
	New Directions for the Publications Program	190
	Contributions of the Books: Membership Growth, Financial Strains	194
	Sharing the Leadership Role as Club President	195
	Roots of the Schism: Rapid Institutional Growth and the Freewheeling Personality of Dave Brower	199
	Board Efforts to Regain Financial Control	201
	Brower as Lobbyist, Editor, Persuader	206
	The Club Grassroots Leaders Mobilize	208
XI	THE EXTRAORDINARY SCHISM: 1967-1969	212
	Presidential Difficulties with Brower--Invaluable and Insubordinate	212
	Back into the Fray: Wayburn's Return as Club President, 1967	214
	Wayburn and Brower: Areas of Agreement and Difference	219
	A Separate Publishing Corporation--Answer to Overwhelming Financial Problems	222
	The Publications Reorganization Committee, 1967-1968	226
	Diablo Canyon: An Unfortunate Aberrancy, But Not the Most Important Issue in the Club's Schism	229

XII	A PRESIDENTIAL BALANCING ACT, 1968-1969	237
	Attempts to Accommodate Brower's Brilliance with the Survival of the Sierra Club	237
	Brower's Suspension, January 1969: The Earth National Park Ad Slate Politics and the 1969 Club Election	240 244
	Retrospective Thoughts on the Brower Controversy and Its Legacy	248
XIII	THE SIERRA CLUB IN THE SEVENTIES: RAPID GROWTH AND INTERNAL READJUSTMENTS	252
	New Leadership, Continuity of Goals	252
	The Grassroots Grow; New Chapters Bring Political Clout	255
	Organization on the Regional Level: RCCs and Regional Reps	257
	Financial Turmoil and Staff Morale in the Early Seventies	262
	Changes in the Delicate Balance Between Staff and Volunteer	267
	Building Up the Club's Washington Office	270
XIV	THE CLUB'S MISSION AND ITS MECHANISM, 1970s	273
	Implications of Limiting Directors' Terms: A Green Board	273
	Wayburn's Focus on Policies, Not Procedures	277
	A Broadening of the Conservation Agenda	279
	Choosing Priority Issues: Nuclear War and the MX Missile	280
	Views on Energy Issues and Nuclear Power	282
	Attention to Inner City and Labor Issues	285
XV	THE SIERRA CLUB FOUNDATION, 1960-1981	289
	Trustees for Conservation, 1950s: A Lobbying Arm for the Club	289
	The Foundation on Standby, 1960-1968	290
	IRS Ruling Activates the Foundation	293
	Beginnings of an On-going Conflict Between Club Directors and Foundation Trustees	294
	New Trustees and Concerns About Fiduciary Responsibility	298
	Working Toward a Joint Fund-raising Agreement	305
	Perspective on Friction Between Sibling Organizations	308
XVI	VOLUNTEER LOBBYIST IN WASHINGTON, 1961-1981	311
	A Close Working Relationship with Congress Phil Burton: Impact on GGNRA and the Redwoods	311
	Other Friends and Adversaries in Congress--Seiberling, Jackson, Aspinall, Mo Udall	316
	Contacts with Secretaries of the Interior Stewart Udall and Walter Hickel	323
	Friendship with Rogers Morton: Pay-Off on GGNRA and Alaska	326
	Assistant Secretary Nat Reed, a Supportive Ally	329

XVII	DISCOVERING ALASKA, 1968: FORMULATION OF A GRAND PLAN	332
	Muir and the Sierra Club in Alaska, 1879-1967	332
	The Wayburns' First Alaska Trip, 1967: Impressions of Mount McKinley	334
	Touring the Kenai Moose Range	340
	Roots of Commitment to Alaskan Preservation	343
	Juneau--Meetings with Conservationists, Officials, and Regional Forester Johnson	345
	Glacier Bay-Ketchikan-and Home	348
	Alaska: a Personal Project and a Sierra Club Priority	351
XVIII	FURTHER EXPLORATIONS IN ALASKA: THE 1968 TRIP	354
	The Alaska Conservation Society and the Sierra Club	354
	Crawl Through a Wolf Den at McKinley	357
	Introduction to West Chichagof Wilderness	360
	Timber Sales on Admiralty Island	364
	Katmai and the Wood River-Tikchik Lakes	367
	Bureau of Land Management Trip to the Wrangells and the Arctic	370
XIX	GATHERING SUPPORT FOR ALASKA PRESERVATION, 1969-1971	374
	Sierra Club Lawsuit to Protect Tongass National Forest, 1970	374
	Hiring an Alaskan Representative	383
	Developing Strategy on the Oil Pipeline: Differences with Local Conservationists	386
	Traveling with the BLM, 1970: a Mutual Goal of Protection for the Land	392
	Encouraging a Broader Vision of the Park Service Role in Alaska	396
	Further Exploration by Canoe, Car, and Plane, 1970	399
	The July 1971 Trip: Southeast, the Klondike, Brooks Range, Forty Mile River, Kodiak	401
	Park Service Survey Trip with Senator Bible	404
	Lobbying Henry Jackson for the Key Preservationist Amendment to ANCSA	407
XX	ALASKA ISSUES, 1971-1975	412
	The National Organizations and the Alaskan Conservationists: Developing the Preservationist Plan	412
	Working with Secretary of Interior Morton on Alaska Land Withdrawal, 1971-1973	416
	Lobbying Both Sides of the Aisle as a Registered Republican	421
	Working with Native Leaders on Boundaries and Hunting Issues	423
	Personal Visits to Native Villages--Chevak, 1973	430
	Club Efforts to Influence the Oil and Gas Pipelines	432
	Alaska National Interest Lands Bill, 1974-1975: Role of Morton and Jackson	435

XXI	ORGANIZATION FOR CONSERVATION VICTORY IN ALASKA	439
	The Alaska Task Force: a Lobbying Network of Volunteers	439
	Coalition Efforts to Draft an Alaska Bill, 1976	443
	Functioning of the Alaska Coalition	447
	H.R. 39, 1977--A Coalition Bill	452
	Nationwide Public Hearings on Alaska--the Seiberling Committee, 1977	456
	Interior, the Forest Service, and Alaskan Compromises	461
	Americans for Alaska	464
	A Megacampaign in Congress, 1977-1978	464
	Defeat in the Senate; Rescue by the Carter Proclamations, November, 1978	468
XXII	CULMINATION OF THE ALASKA CAMPAIGN, 1979-1980	472
	The Opposition Organizes for the Ninety-Sixth Congress	472
	Victory for the Conservationist Udall-Anderson Bill in the House	474
	Delay and Compromise in the Senate	477
	Reagan's Election and the Passage of a Compromise ANILCA	485
	Phase II: Interpretation and Implementation of the Alaska Act	488
	Club Growth and Changes, Post-Reagan	489
	Recent Visits and Current Issues in Alaska	491
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	495
	TAPE GUIDE	496
	INDEX	499

PREFACE

The Oral History Program of the Sierra Club

In fall 1969 and spring 1970 a self-appointed committee of Sierra Clubbers met several times to consider two vexing and related problems. The rapid membership growth of the club and its involvement in environmental issues on a national scale left neither time nor resources to document the club's internal and external history. Club records were stored in a number of locations and were inaccessible for research. Further, we were failing to take advantage of the relatively new techniques of oral history by which the reminiscences of club leaders and members of long standing could be preserved.

The ad hoc committee's recommendation that a standing History Committee be established was approved by the Sierra Club Board of Directors in May 1970. That September the board designated The Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley as the official depository of the club's archives. The large collection of records, photographs and other memorabilia known as the "Sierra Club Papers" is thus permanently protected, and the Bancroft is preparing a catalog of these holdings which will be invaluable to students of the conservation movement.

The History Committee then focused its energies on how to develop a significant oral history program. A six-page questionnaire was mailed to members who had joined the club prior to 1931. More than half responded, enabling the committee to identify numerous older members as likely prospects for oral interviews. (Some had hiked with John Muir!) Other interviewees were selected from the ranks of club leadership over the past six decades.

Those committee members who volunteered as interviewers were trained in this discipline by Willa Baum, head of the Bancroft's Regional Oral History Office and a nationally recognized authority in this field. Further interviews have been completed in cooperation with university oral history classes at California State University, Fullerton; Columbia University, New York; and the University of California, Berkeley. Extensive interviews with major club leaders are most often conducted on a professional basis through the Regional Oral History Office.

Copies of the Sierra Club oral interviews are placed at The Bancroft Library, at UCLA, and at the club's Colby Library, and may be purchased for the actual cost of photocopying, binding, and shipping by club regional offices, chapters, and groups, as well as by other libraries and institutions.

Our heartfelt gratitude for their help in making the Sierra Club Oral History Project a success goes to each interviewee and interviewer; to everyone who has written an introduction to an oral history; to the Sierra Club Board of Directors for its recognition of the long-term importance of this effort; to the Trustees of the Sierra Club Foundation for generously providing the necessary funding; to club and foundation staff, especially Michael McCloskey, Denny Wilcher, Colburn Wilbur, and Nicholas Clinch; to Willa Baum and Susan Schrepfer of the Regional Oral History Office; and last but far from least, to the members of the History Committee, and particularly to Ann Lage, who has coordinated the oral history effort since September 1974.

You are cordially invited to read and enjoy any or all of the oral histories in the Sierra Club series. By so doing you will learn much of the club's history which is available nowhere else, and of the fascinating careers and accomplishments of many outstanding club leaders and members.

Marshall H. Kuhn
Chairman, History Committee
1970 - 1978

San Francisco
May 1, 1977
(revised May 1979, A.L.)

PREFACE--1980s

Inspired by the vision of its founder and first chairman, Marshall Kuhn, the Sierra Club History Committee continued to expand its oral history program following his death in 1978. With the assistance of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, awarded in July 1980, the Sierra Club has contracted with the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library to conduct twelve to sixteen major interviews of Sierra Club activists and other environmental leaders of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the volunteer interview program has been assisted with funds for training interviewers and transcribing and editing volunteer-conducted interviews, also focusing on the past two decades.

With these efforts, the committee intends to document the programs, strategies, and ideals of the national Sierra Club, as well as the club grass-roots, in all its variety--from education to litigation to legislative lobbying, from energy policy to urban issues to wilderness preservation, from California to the Carolinas to New York.

Together with the written archives in The Bancroft Library, the oral history program of the 1980s will provide a valuable record of the Sierra Club during a period of vastly broadening environmental goals, radically changing strategies of environmental action, and major growth in size and influence on American politics and society.

Special thanks for the project's later phase are due to Susan Schrepfer, codirector of the Sierra Club Documentation Project; Ray Lage, cochair of the History Committee; the Sierra Club Board and staff; members of the project advisory board and the History Committee; and most importantly, the interviewees and interviewers for their unfailing cooperation.

Ann Lage
Cochair, History Committee
Codirector, Sierra Club
Documentation Project

Oakland, California
April 1981

SIERRA CLUB ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

March 1985

Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library

- David R. Brower, Environmental Activist, Publicist, and Prophet, 1980
- Brock Evans, Environmental Campaigner: From the Northwest Forests to the Halls of Congress, 1985
- J. William Futrell, "Love for the Land and Justice for Its People": Sierra Club National and Southern Leader, 1968-1982, 1984
- Patrick D. Goldworthy, Protecting the North Cascades, 1985
- Alexander Hildebrand, Sierra Club Leader and Critic: Perspective on Club Growth, Scope, and Tactics, 1950s-1970s, 1982
- Richard M. Leonard, Mountaineer, Lawyer, Environmentalist, 1976
- Martin Litton, Sierra Club Director and Uncompromising Preservationist, 1950s-1970s, 1982
- Norman B. Livermore, Jr., Man in the Middle: High Sierra Packer, Timberman, Conservationist, California Resources Secretary, 1983
- Michael McCloskey, Sierra Club Executive Director: The Evolving Club and the Environmental Movement, 1961-1981, 1983
- Raymond J. Sherwin, Conservationist, Judge, and Sierra Club President, 1960s-1970s, 1982
- William E. Siri, Reflections on The Sierra Club, the Environment, and Mountaineering, 1950s-1970s, 1979
- David Sive, Pioneering Environmental Lawyer, Atlantic Chapter Leader, 1961-1982, 1984
- Theodore A. Snyder, Jr., Southeast Conservation Leader and Sierra Club President, 1960s-1970s, 1982
- Wallace Stegner, The Artist as Environmental Advocate, 1983
- W. Lloyd Tupling, Sierra Club Washington Representative, 1967-1973, 1985
- Edgar Wayburn, Sierra Club Statesman and Leader of the Parks and Wilderness Movement: Gaining Protection for Alaska, the Redwoods, and Golden Gate Parklands, 1985
- In Process: Phillip S. Berry, Claire Detrick, Pauline Dyer, John Zierold

Sierra Club History Committee

- John Amodio, Lobbyist for Redwood National Park Expansion, 1984
- Elizabeth Marston Bade, Recollections of William F. Bade and the Early Sierra Club, 1976
- Philip S. Bernays, Founding the Southern California Chapter, 1975
- Harold C. Bradley, Furthering the Sierra Club Tradition, 1975
- Cicely M. Christy, Contributions to the Sierra Club and the San Francisco Bay Chapter, 1938-1970s, 1982
- Lewis Clark, Perdurable and Peripatetic Sierran: Club Officer and Outings Leader, 1928-1984, 1984
- Nathan C. Clark, Sierra Club Leader, Outdoorsman, and Engineer, 1977

- Harold E. Crowe, Sierra Club Physician, Baron, and President, 1975
 Glen Dawson, Pioneer Rock Climber and Ski Mountaineer, 1975
 Jules M. Eichorn, Mountaineering and Music: Ansel Adams, Norman Clyde, and Pioneering Sierra Club Climbing, 1985
 Nora Evans, Sixty Years with the Sierra Club, 1976
 Francis Farquhar, Sierra Club Mountaineer and Editor, 1974
 Marjory Bridge Farquhar, Pioneer Woman Rock Climber and Sierra Club Director, 1977
 Alfred Forsyth, The Sierra Club in New York and New Mexico, 1965-1978, 1981
 Wanda B. Goody, A Hiker's View of the Early Sierra Club, 1982
 C. Nelson Hackett, Lasting Impressions of the Early Sierra Club, 1975
 Joel Hildebrand, Sierra Club Leader and Ski Mountaineer, 1974
 Ethel Rose Taylor Horsfall, On the Trail with the Sierra Club, 1920s-1960s, 1982
 Kathleen Goddard Jones, Defender of California's Nipomo Dunes. Steadfast Sierra Club Volunteer, 1984
 Helen LeConte, Reminiscences of LeConte Family Outings, the Sierra Club, and Ansel Adams, 1977
 A. Starker Leopold, Wildlife Biologist, 1984
 Grant McConnell, Conservation and Politics in the North Cascades, 1983
 John and Ruth Mendenhall, Forty Years of Sierra Club Mountaineering Leadership, 1938-1978, 1979
 Susan Miller, Staff Support for Sierra Club Growth and Organization, 1964-1977, 1984
 Stewart M. Ogilvy, Sierra Club Expansion and Evolution: The Atlantic Chapter, 1957-1969, 1982
 Harriet T. Parsons, A Half-Century of Sierra Club Involvement, 1981
 Ruth E. Prager, Remembering the High Trips, 1976
 Bestor Robinson, Thoughts on Conservation and the Sierra Club, 1974
 Gordon Robinson, Forestry Consultant to the Sierra Club, 1979
 James E. Rother, The Sierra Club in the Early 1900s, 1974
 Tom Turner, A Perspective on David Brower and the Sierra Club, 1968-1969, 1982
 Anne Van Tyne, Sierra Club Stalwart: Conservationist, Hiker, Chapter and Council Leader, 1981

In Process: George Alderson, Ruth Bradley, Robert Braun, Clyde S. Brooks, Estelle Brown, Hasse Bunnelle, Frank Duveneck, Nina Eloesser, Joseph Fontaine, Robin Ives, Stewart Kimball, Joseph LeConte, Keith Lummis, George Marshall, James Moorman, Sigurd Olson

California State University, Fullerton--Southern Sierrans Project

- Thomas Amneus, New Directions for the Angeles Chapter, 1977
 Robert Bear, Desert Conservation and Exploration with the Sierra Club, 1946-1978, 1980
 Irene Charnock, Portrait of a Sierra Club Volunteer, 1977
 J. Gordon Chelew, Reflections of an Angeles Chapter Member, 1921-1975, 1976
 Arthur B. Johnson, Climbing and Conservation in the Sierra Club's Southern California Chapter, 1930-1960s, 1980

- Olivia R. Johnson, High Trip Reminiscences, 1904-1945, 1977
- E. Stanley Jones, Sierra Club Officer and Angeles Chapter Leader, 1931-1975, 1976
- Marion Jones, Reminiscences of the Southern California Sierra Club, 1927-1975, 1976
- Robert R. Marshall, Angeles Chapter Leader and Wilderness Spokesman, 1960s, 1977
- Dorothy Leavitt Pepper, High Trip High Jinks, 1976
- Roscoe and Wilma Poland, Desert Conservation: Voices from the Sierra Club's San Diego Chapter, 1980
- Richard Searle, Grassroots Sierra Club Leader, 1976

University of California, Berkeley--The Sierra Club and the Urban Environment

SAN FRANCISCO BAY CHAPTER INNER CITY OUTINGS:

- Patrick Colgan, "Just One of the Kids Myself," 1980
- Jordan Hall, Trial and Error: the Early Years, 1980
- Duff LaBoyteaux, Towards a National Sierra Club Program, 1980
- Marlene Sarnat, Laying the Foundations for ICO, 1980
- George Zuni, From the Inner City Out, 1980

SIERRA CLUB OUTREACH TO WOMEN:

- Helen Burke, Women's Issues in the Environmental Movement, 1980
- LABOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA, 1960s-1970s:
- David Jenkins, Environmental Controversies and the Labor Movement in the Bay Area, 1981
- Amy Meyer, Preserving Bay Area Parklands, 1981
- Anthony L. Ramos, A Labor Leader Concerned with the Environment, 1981
- Dwight C. Steele, Environmentalist and Labor Ally, 1981

INTRODUCTION -- Paul Brooks

For me, "Wayburn" and "Sierra Club" are virtually synonymous. During most of Ed's adult life, the club has been his passionate concern. (How he manages to combine this with a distinguished medical practice is a continuing source of wonder.) Looking back over his still-active career, I am impressed not only by the wide range and variety of the conservation battles in which he has been engaged, but even more so by the detailed, professional knowledge that he brings to bear on every individual campaign. Ed is a master of both strategy and tactics. Soft spoken, his style is more that of Omar Bradley than of George Patton. At meetings of the board of directors he is quietly persuasive. There is a touch of the schoolmaster. With an occasional hint of exasperation, he patiently leads his often-vociferous colleagues to accept sweet reason and get on with the job.

These same qualities have made him an unusually effective lobbyist. He is justly proud of his innumerable trips to Washington on the overnight plane from San Francisco--the so-called "red-eye special"--to instruct his pupils in the highest levels of government. For years Ed and his wife, Peggy, strove to establish an adequate Redwood National Park. Now they have become leading advocates for the Alaska wilderness, convincing the club management to make this a top priority. Nearer home, Ed was instrumental in establishing the Golden Gate National Recreation Area: a major achievement for which local residents and visitors like myself are eternally grateful.

In many of these activities, Ed and Peggy act as a team. Both are articulate, as readers of Sierra and the volumes published by Sierra Club Books know well. (Peggy herself is a professional writer of distinction.) Ed has always been interested in the club's publication program. When I was chairman of the publications committee, we had the task of shifting emphasis from the expensive "exhibit format" books--which had made publishing history but were now being imitated throughout the book trade--to a wide range of titles of all types and prices: the largely self-sustaining operation that we have today. Ed was a good man to work with. He understood the value of publications to the club and to the causes we were working for. He notably did not agree with some club leaders who would have thrown out the book program altogether.

Members of the Sierra Club Board of Directors come and go, but Ed Wayburn is never gone for long. Under the present limitation of terms--with which he does not wholly agree--he could be found presiding over the Sierra Club Foundation, but soon he would be back on the board, and back as president. He has seen the club through its internal schisms and through its tumultuous evolution from a Californian to a national organization, with all the growing pains that entailed. His reminiscences, I imagine, will be virtually a history of the club in our time.

Paul Brooks
 Writer and publisher, Houghton Mifflin Co.
 Sierra Club director, 1966-73
 Sierra Club Foundation Trustee, 1974-1981

INTRODUCTION -- Harold Gilliam

Every generation tends to take its heritage for granted. The average Egyptian for centuries has probably assumed that the great pyramids have always stood there in the desert as part of the natural order of things and has given little thought to the incredible human efforts that created them. Ordinary Athenians since the Golden Age of Greece doubtless have assumed without thinking that the Parthenon was a gift of the gods and have had little understanding of the genius, the labor, and the dedication that built it.

That great American gift to civilization, the concept of the national park, has too often met with similar indifference, perhaps to an even greater degree than the treasures of classical times, because national parks seem to have been freely provided by nature. The average park visitor has little knowledge of the long years of toil, tears, and sweat that brought those parks into being. The casual vacationer may have vaguely heard of John Muir but is unaware of the successors of Muir who in the years since have carried on the naturalist's tradition, too often unknown, unhonored, and unsung.

For generations to come, visitors to the Golden Gate Recreation Area (already the most visited unit in the National Park System), Redwood National Park, and the 106 million acres of protected wild lands in Alaska will be in the everlasting debt of Dr. Edgar Wayburn of San Francisco, who envisioned the need to protect these priceless treasures and over a period of decades, beginning in the 1940s, went about building foundations under those visions. His success stems from four principal sources: his ability to foresee the future and its needs; his intimate, on-the-ground knowledge of the areas involved (few Alaskans, for example, know their state as Wayburn does or have run as many of its rivers); his sagacious know-how in the corridors of political power; and his legendary patience and persistence, which radiate from the quiet serenity of the man himself and infuse his co-workers with hope when all seems lost. He is undismayed by setbacks because his eyes are on the far horizon. He knows that in conservation there are no quick victories. He thinks not merely in terms of years but decades and in some cases centuries. Even as the redwoods he was trying to save were falling before the omnivorous chainsaws, he persisted in efforts to preserve those still standing and to secure the logged-over land around them, knowing that with patience the forest could be restored and that tall trees would one day grow there again.

From city halls to Capitol Hill, from the neighborhood grassroots meeting to the White House, Dr. Wayburn, with his quiet voice, his deft sense of humor, and his serene manner, is a familiar and revered figure--the accomplished strategist, the tower of strength in times of adversity. He would be the first to insist that he did not do it all alone, and he gives the credit to his co-workers in the environmental vineyards.

A few years ago I was interviewing Representative Phillip Burton, the leading conservationist in Congress and something of a political genius in his own right. We talked in his Washington office for hours, and repeatedly when I queried him about a controversial wild area or a potential park, he would respond thoughtfully: "I'll have to see what Ed thinks about that."

I suspect that for many years ahead, political figures, environmental leaders, and grassroots activists will be asking what Ed thinks, relying on him for advice and encouragement, and depending on his leadership to help preserve a natural heritage that will be a source of enjoyment and renewal for our descendants for centuries to come.

Harold Gilliam
Environmental Writer

April 1985
San Francisco, California

Edgar Wayburn was one of the witnesses in the Alaska hearings, but he was much more than that. He was an informed consultant, prodder, and inspirer to key members of the congressional committees, as well as members of the Carter administration. He personally lobbied dozens of congressmen and senators to support a strong Alaska bill.

Since the enactment of ANILCA, Edgar Wayburn and the Sierra Club have closely monitored the Reagan administration as to its compliance (or non-compliance) with the intent of the act. In so doing, they have helped my Subcommittee on Public Lands do a more effective job of overseeing the administration's conduct.

All these events and many more are portrayed in intriguing detail and with unique insight by Dr. Wayburn's remarkable memoirs. Countless Americans, in the present and in future generations, will enjoy not only the fruits of Edgar Wayburn's labors and those of the Sierra Club, but his "inside story" of the unending struggle to preserve America's most magnificent lands.

John F. Seiberling
Chairman, Subcommittee on Public Lands
Committee on Interior & Insular Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

Akron, Ohio
January 1985

INTRODUCTION - John F. Seiberling

No meaningful history of the Sierra Club and its preeminent contributions to the cause of conservation could be written without devoting much space to the role of one man--my friend, Dr. Edgar Wayburn of San Francisco. Happily, and most appropriately, he has done something that only he could do--given us his own fascinating account of that history.

In the 1960s, I was drawn to the Sierra Club by the superb style of its periodical, the Sierra Club Bulletin, the scope of its environmental and recreational activities, and the obvious brilliance of its leadership. Not surprisingly, Edgar Wayburn was then its president.

At the time, I was enjoying life as a private citizen in Ohio and working with others hoping to save the beautiful valley of the Cuyahoga River between Akron and Cleveland. Some years later, after I had entered Congress, the effort was crowned with success, and 32,000 acres of the valley were placed in a National Recreation Area. Instrumental to that success was the rapid growth of the Sierra Club of Northeastern Ohio and, not just coincidentally, personal visits to the valley by the indefatigable Edgar Wayburn. Similar accounts could be given about Sierra Club involvement in just about every conservation effort in the 1960s and 1970s, and much of it is covered in Dr. Wayburn's memoirs.

The memoirs also cover the very special case of Alaska. Ed and his wife, Peggy, made their first of many trips to Alaska in 1967. One need only read his account to see that they were "bowled over" by the experience, just as I was in my first visit eight years later. Out of his visit came a new resolve and the Sierra Club's role in the decade-long campaign that culminated in the signing of the Alaska Lands Act (ANILCA) by President Carter in the closing days of his presidency.

Edgar Wayburn and the Sierra Club were in the thick of the Alaska campaign at every stage, from the enactment of the "D-2" legislation in 1971 and the withdrawals of 82 million acres of Alaska lands by secretary of Interior Rogers Morton in 1973, through the formation of the Alaska Coalition and the four-year battle to get Congress to adopt the Udall bill (HR 39).

During the nationwide hearings in 1977 on HR 39 by the House Subcommittee on Alaska Lands, which I chaired, dozens of Sierra Club members from every region of the country testified. Following the hearings, the House in 1978, and again in 1979, passed the Udall bill by sizable margins, despite ferocious opposition.

As oral histories often do, both the content and conduct of this memoir reflect the interviewee's personal style and outstanding qualities. Readily apparent here is Dr. Wayburn's comprehensive grasp of the issues, with a view of the broad meaning and close attention to a myriad of details. His systematic approach to problems was reflected in the chronological relation of events with which he felt most comfortable. Most outstandingly evident from his recounting of the three major campaigns and the numerous lesser ones of his conservation career is his long-term commitment to the dedication of the American land and to the Sierra Club and his indefatigable, patient persistence in pursuit of his goals.

In addition to being a prodigious record of major campaigns for parks and wilderness from the 1950s to the 1980s, this oral history gives an important perspective on the internal affairs and organizational complexities of the Sierra Club in these years. We now have in the Sierra Club oral history series the record of the three main participants in the internal upheaval within the club during the 1960s--Wayburn, Dick Leonard, and David Brower. Wayburn's memoir is unique in that he has remained active in the directorate of the Sierra Club and is one of only two directors from the sixties who has served continuously through the present time (except for the occasional one-year hiatus required by the by-laws). Wayburn's presidency of the Sierra Club Foundation in the seventies gives him still another perspective from which to comment on the club and its internal affairs.

With an interview of this length, the editing and review process is immense. After light editing in this office, the transcript was sent section-by-section to Dr. Wayburn, who fit into his already-filled schedule this lengthy task. He thoroughly reviewed the manuscript in its entirety with careful attention to accuracy, even providing the spelling of obscure Alaskan place names. A short section on finances of the Sierra Club Foundation was sent to foundation administrator Steve Stevick to check and provide accurate figures. Dr. Wayburn stayed within the guidelines of being true to the conversational style of the oral history process, however, editing only for clarity and accuracy. Because the interviewing process took place over a number of years, a few repetitions were inevitable. Some of these were deleted; some have been retained because they have meaning within the context of the subjects under discussion. The tapes of the interviews are available in The Bancroft Library, along with extensive written documentation of the subjects covered in this interview.

Ann Lage
Interviewer-Editor
Co-Director, Sierra Club
Documentation Project

Berkeley, California
February 1985

INTERVIEW HISTORY

This monumental oral history with Edgar Wayburn was initiated nearly nine years ago, when Susan Schrepfer, professor of history at Rutgers University, interviewed Dr. Wayburn in six marathon sessions during the summers of 1976 and 1978. These sessions covered Dr. Wayburn's youth and introduction to the Sierra and the Sierra Club and his work on conservation issues in the San Francisco Bay Area, particularly the establishment of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. Also discussed in depth were two areas of special concern to the interviewee as involved participant as well as to the interviewer as researcher and author: the campaigns to establish and to enlarge the Redwood National Park and a variety of national park and national forest campaigns in California and the Pacific Northwest. It should be pointed out that the interviewing on the redwoods took place during an interregnum between the 1968 bill which established Redwood National Park and the 1978 enlargement bill. Thus, there is a sense of immediacy to Wayburn's discussion in 1976 of efforts to protect and enlarge the park. The final interview on the redwoods was recorded in June 1978 shortly after the Redwood National Park Enlargement Act was passed.

In October 1980 I had the pleasure of taking over as Dr. Wayburn's interviewer, and a schedule of regular one- to three-hour interview sessions was established for the following year. Interviewing was completed on December 11, 1981, after thirteen additional interview sessions and a total of thirty-nine hours tape-recorded. Our sessions covered Dr. Wayburn's role in and perceptions of the internal workings of the Sierra Club in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and his part in the preeminent environmental issue of these years--the campaign for Alaskan preservation.

Dr. Wayburn's memoirs are a valuable addition to the Sierra Club oral history series, not only because of his key role in club affairs and conservation issues since the 1950s, but also because of his detailed recollection of events and careful recording of his thoughts. He has extensive files on club affairs, most of which have been given to The Bancroft Library's Sierra Club collection. In addition, he has throughout the years kept a log or diary where he records important meetings, conversations, and phone calls and notes in brief his impressions. He referred to this log in preparation for interviewing and, at times when precision was called for, paraphrased from it for the tape.

His journals again were useful in recreating impressions from a series of trips to Alaska, where he explored the Alaskan wilderness by plane, boat, and on foot. Each time he also met with government officials at every level as well as with local conservationists to begin the gigantic task of preserving Alaskan wilderness.

I FROM GEORGIA TO THE SIERRA NEVADA: BIRTH OF A CONSERVATIONIST
[Interview 1: July 30, 1976]##

Early Interest in Nature

Schrepfer: I think one of the first things we might ask is how you became interested in nature and wilderness. Were there any books, perhaps, that you read at an early age, things that you did in college, childhood experiences, maybe religious experiences that contributed to this?

Wayburn: I haven't given concentrated thought to this. It undoubtedly started early. I was an omniverous reader. My reading included nature books. I did not, at an early age, do very much obvious looking into nature. On the one hand, as a small boy, I started going to summer camps by the age of nine, and went to camp in the summertime on an average of about two months each summer for perhaps nine years. This was a developing personal interest because my family was not particularly interested.

I was born in Macon, Georgia. My mother came from San Francisco, and I came back to her home with her. (She was widowed when I was less than two years old.) I came back with her to San Francisco six times, I think, in my first eight or nine years, before I started going to camp in the summertime.

My first of what might be called conservation recollections was traveling through the red hills of Georgia--which were almost choking dusty during the summer when it was dry, and red

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 496.

Wayburn: mud into which you sank after the rains--and thinking this ought not to be. It was the result of the one-crop cotton philosophy, which was true of the South (and particularly Georgia) up to the 1930s, when the reclamation of the land began, and where the Forest Service did some of its best work in replanting that conifer country with pines.

Schrepfer: This would have been about 1920?

Wayburn: Yes, in the twenties. I think that the acquisitions of the Forest Service began in the thirties. Then some farsighted people began to realize that you couldn't just plant cotton year after year and not deplete the soil. They began to replant the land in grass, and to raise cattle, and this has been another factor in the long reclamation of the southern landscape.

But I can remember as a boy having certain areas that I was later to look back on and think of as "my wilderness," and how those were replaced with housing developments.

Personal Philosophy and Medical Education

Wayburn: Another side of my philosophy: I grew up perhaps a born do-gooder. I can remember where you put down your philosophy in the yearbook as a high school or college senior. I remember (with a certain amount of embarrassment) that I had in mine, "Only in the pursuit of truth and beauty will I find happiness." When I went into medicine, it was from that aspect. I had no idea what I wanted to do. If I'd been a little bit stronger or smarter, I might have gotten a Rhodes scholarship. I applied for one when I was finishing my sophomore year at the University of Georgia and failed because I was then a small boy without any athletic qualifications. (You needed athletic as well as scholastic qualifications.) If I'd done that, I might have ended up as a professor of English literature. But, as it was, I didn't know what I wanted to do.

I had what was considered a thorough southern liberal arts training, which meant no science whatsoever up until my junior year in college, at which time I had to take science. I took physics and psychology. Just about this time--towards the end of my junior year--I began to think of going into medicine. It was that time that I read Sinclair Lewis's Arrowsmith, which is the story of a bacteriologist. I was romantically interested in being

Wayburn: a bacteriologist. To do that, I had to study medicine. And there were, further, some physicians in my family, and it was something to think about.

At the beginning of my senior year, I went to investigate--should I go into medicine or not? I went to the professor of chemistry because in order to meet the requirements I had a long way to go; I had no chemistry, no biology. I went to the professor of chemistry, expecting him to say, "Why don't you take biology?" and he said, "Why don't you take both of them?" I didn't want to do that. So I went to the professor of zoology, and he said, "Take both." In desperation, I went to the dean, and he said, "Take both."

Here I was, stuck, in my senior year (which I wanted to enjoy) with long premedical courses in both chemistry and zoology. From the time I started, I realized that that's what I liked. But I was still half-way through my senior year, thinking about where I'd go to medical school. I ended up by submitting just one application--to Harvard Medical School--not expecting to be accepted because I still didn't have organic chemistry, which I had to have. However, I was accepted and was allowed to take this in Harvard summer school--after which no one asked if I'd ever taken the course.

This is just preamble on philosophy, I guess, because for the next several years I was very fully occupied in the study of premedical and medical courses and, unfortunately, did not get out into the New England countryside the way I might have. To look back on it, I realize that I should have. I did not read Thoreau or Emerson. I didn't even realize that Thoreau lived so close by Boston and Concord, and I did not make any pilgrimages. As a matter of fact, I was totally ignorant of nature philosophy at the time; I just knew that I liked to get out in the outdoors; I liked to camp. This was a matter of personal enjoyment.

Experiencing the Magnificence of the Sierra, 1927-1942

Wayburn: It was not until I returned to California, first in 1927, after my first year of medical school and was shown Yosemite that I suddenly realized that there was more, much more, magnificence in the natural scene, and at that time made up my mind, more or less, to come back to California when I was able to.

Schrepfer: This was--when?--in the late twenties, it must have been?

Wayburn: Yes, 1927.

Schrepfer: None of the science you had in college or medical school bore any relationship to your attitude toward nature?

Wayburn: It wasn't significant. I was going down one line of endeavor. I was very young, in several ways; I was young chronologically (I entered medical school at nineteen) and graduated when I was twenty-three) and perhaps I didn't have much time to think about it. I was fully occupied with medicine and all it involved. In my attitudes, I didn't have much chance to consider the natural world much more than a sometime surcease from intensive working.

Schrepfer: But it did have a role in drawing you out to California.

Wayburn: It did, very definitely. This is where I wanted to live; I knew that. But I had no idea of "conservation." I just realized to this time that certain things I had enjoyed--certain areas--were disappearing. I went back to my local wilderness around home in Georgia, and it was taken up by housing; it wasn't there any more. I visited some of the places where I had gone and camped, and they weren't there any more. At first, this didn't make too much of an impression on me because I could go on to someplace else.

It was only after I came back to California (and I came back for good in 1933) that I began to realize that there were differences. The magnificence of the Sierra Nevada I encountered first at Yosemite. I'll never forget my first view of Yosemite valley, the incomparable valley, in 1927.

This work ethic had me under its wing when I first came back. I enjoyed day outings in the Bay Area all the way from Mount Tamalpais down to Los Gatos, and I had relatives who lived in Larkspur and Los Gatos, had summer homes. So I had the opportunity to go out and begin to explore. But it was 1935--when I first was willing to take a vacation for two weeks out in the Sierra--that I began to learn more.

I went there with another doctor who was a fisherman, so I bought a fishing rod to experience the thrill of catching the first mountain trout in my life. We were spot-camped into Upper Waterwheel Falls on the Tuolumne River below Tuolumne Meadows so that we were able to go backpacking from there. I can still remember my experiences backpacking that first summer in the Sierra.

Wayburn: I was still someone who regarded the natural scene as naturally belonging to me, and taking what did belong to me in a personal way, enjoying it thoroughly, realizing that the Sierra was different from anything I'd seen in the South or East or in Europe. I'd had, in 1930 and '31, as part of my medical education, six months in Germany; at that time, it was still part of the rounding out of an American physician, and I did get to see some of the outdoors at the same time.

But 1935 was my first full experience. From '35 to '39, I went out with one to three other men. Thoroughly enjoying ourselves--fishing, hiking, climbing (to a small extent) and either backpacking or taking horses or mules for our trips.

In 1939, I heard about the Sierra Club. A friend, Jerry Cramer, asked if I would like to join. He was a man I really didn't know very well, but he was a member of the Sierra Club. I joined. He got me another sponsor, and I don't even remember the name of my second sponsor; you needed two. I joined in order to go on a burro trip. In the summer of 1939, I went on a burro trip in the northern Yosemite area, again out of Tuolumne Meadows, retracing some of the 1935 areas that I'd been in.

I also began to enjoy winter sports and began skiing in Yosemite at Badger Pass in 1939. I didn't do very much; didn't have time for more than one or two days at a time. You don't learn to ski very well when you have only four or five ski days during the winter. But in 1939 and 1940, I first went to Clair Tappaan Lodge [Sierra Club ski lodge near Donner Summit in the Sierra]. And in the years '39 to '42, I began to increase my skiing skills considerably.

Schrepfer: Then you were in the Air Force medical corps in the war?

Wayburn: In 1942, I joined the Air Force. I did that in order to do research in aviation medicine. Earlier, when I started in medicine, I was going to do research, but my family turned poor, and I had to earn a living to support my mother, who had remarried, and my stepfather.

Schrepfer: Had they not been poor before?

Wayburn: No. The family was fairly wealthy when I was small. When my father died he left a considerable fortune. That had dissipated during the years. So, I didn't get to carry out my original intention of research in bacteriology, except during medical school when I did some. I continued to do a little part-time research until the war, and was going to do research in aviation medicine during the war.

Wayburn: Instead, three weeks after I had been taken in, and twenty-four hours after I'd been guaranteed six months on my first research project, I found myself traveling on an emergency assignment to become the chief of the medical service for a new Air Force training base at La Junta, Colorado. This gave me a little experience in Colorado. Later I transferred to Douglas, Arizona, where I spent a year and a half on the Mexican border, learning about the desert but not really appreciating the desert as much as I was to later.

Sierra Club Contacts, 1939-1942

Wayburn: I went out with the Sierra Club only once before the war on a summer trip, and that was this 1939 burro trip, which I thoroughly enjoyed. The Sierra Club was then a middle class outing group of about three thousand people. It had been, as you know, in the Yosemite, Hetch Hetchy, and Kings Canyon campaigns, but was essentially a small group of Californians. I was interested mostly in the outing activities.

But I'd become saturated with what I'd found in the Sierra and in the Bay Area. The four-year gap, 1942 to 1946, made, I think, a very considerable change in my attitude, particularly when I came back. I was not alone, but I was one of a group of people who found the Sierra quite different in 1946 from the way they'd left it in 1942.

When I returned from the war in May, 1946, I arranged to go on a trip--just two of us--with a man named John Thacher, who shortly before had been appointed manager of the gas division of Standard Oil of California, and who was a tennis-playing friend and hiking companion from before the war. In June, President Truman had made certain changes (and I forget what they were); at any rate, Standard Oil said he couldn't go on vacation because it was necessary for him to stay and work. So I was left without a mountain companion and just went into the Sierra Club office to pay my respects and to find out what trips they might have.

They welcomed me because they were without a doctor for the high trip. The high trip! I had no intention of going on the high trip. Two hundred people? A crowd like that! In 1940, I had been on a trip in the Kings Canyon area with three friends. We were walking, packing three mules (and this is a long story, which interrupts suddenly, but I think it may be significant).

Wayburn: It was a very heavy snow year. We'd come in from Horse Corral and were three days out, camping in Cloud Canyon, debating what we would do because snow was blocking Colby Pass for six hundred feet down. The Forest Service told us no one had been through that year, and they didn't think anyone could get through; certainly animals couldn't get through. As we sat there, the three of us, debating, a man came through with a troop of Boy Scouts from Fresno--a black-haired, black-bearded fellow we nicknamed Black Bart. We told him about this, and he said, "Oh, I'll go through," and took his troop and went on. We looked at one another. We were young folks in very good shape, and I was in very good shape at that time. We said, "If that fellow and the Boy Scouts are going through, we'll take it."

One other man, named George Gray, and I decided we would backpack through. The other two people, John Lee and Jan Tibse, would take the animals and meet us at Charlotte Creek, which was a branch of Bubbs Creek, four days later. I was the only one who had a decent pack; I had a Bergen pack, which we loaded with cans and other non-backpacking materials that we had on our trip. George had a huge dunnage bag with shoulder straps, so he took the bulky things and I took the heavy things, and off we went. We passed Black Bart and his Boy Scouts at the foot of the snow line--I understand they never did get over--and we made our way over Colby Pass and down into the Kern-Kaweah basin. We crossed the Kern River in waist-high water (the only way to get across) and then climbed up over Forrester Pass where the snow line was 1,000 feet down from the ridge.

##

Wayburn: As we came down into Center Basin, having gone over Forrester Pass, we passed a Sierra Club burro trip led by Milton Hildebrand, who had led us the year before on our burro trip. Milton and Roger, sons of Joel Hildebrand, professor of chemistry at the University of California, were very active young leaders in Sierra Club outings at that time. They had pioneered the burro trips; they had a burro trip in Kings Canyon that year. We greeted each other in passing and I thought nothing more of the meeting.

We completed our four-day adventure and joined our companions at Charlotte Creek and were set for our last three days of enjoyment of this fishing and camping trip. The next morning at eight o'clock, we were sleeping off our journey when a red-eyed man shook me and woke me up and said, "Are you Dr. Wayburn?" Shocked out of sleep, I said, "Yes. Why?" He told me that the day before, he was in a party of two men and their wives who had been spot-camped into East Lake, and his friend had developed a heart attack. They had met Milton Hildebrand, who told him where I was, and he'd gone searching for me.

Wayburn: So, inwardly thinking a little harshly about Milton, I gave my car keys to my friends, put my pack on my back again, and hiked back up to East Lake (which I think was eighteen hundred or two thousand feet above where we were) to see this man. In that day there weren't many people, comparatively, in the Sierra, and you did what you could to help out.

I found Milton Hildebrand up there caring for him. The man did not have a heart attack; he had a ruptured stomach ulcer. We made plans, then, to get him out because this was the thing we had to do first. We sent runners to Cedar Grove to alert people there to get further transportation. Milton and I started trying to carry this man out with a crudely made pack frame. We got him a short way when the CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps] boys, who had been alerted, came up, and we were able to rig up a stretcher with four people carrying. In thirty-six hours, we got him from East Lake down to Cedar Grove by man-carry and horse-carry, and in another few hours of traveling--five hours by ambulance from Cedar Grove to Fresno, and an hour and a half or two by airplane to San Francisco. I mention this because it was my next contact with the Sierra Club.

Impact of Postwar Changes in the Sierra

Schrepfer: Did the war have any impact on you?

Wayburn: The war had a tremendous impact on me. I saw how the countryside of England, particularly, and Germany and France, secondarily, had been affected. I visited Sweden. (I had another side alley that I'd followed.) I'd gone abroad, after my two years in the Flying Training Command, to spend almost two years in England. From being a physician to Air Force personnel, I was made the chief of a unit; "Officer in Charge of the Mass Chest X-Ray Service of the United States Army Air Forces in Europe" was my title. [amused] This was because I knew nothing about mass chest radiography. (That's another story.)

I traveled around looking for mass chest X-ray equipment; we couldn't get any from the United States. I did this first in England, and then in Germany after V-E day, and then in Sweden, and then back in England.

Wayburn: I came back from the war considerably older and I think a little wiser--and reluctantly went out with the high trip as the doctor in 1946. I was offered the job for six weeks and have been sorry ever since that I took it for only two weeks. I became acquainted at that time with people who were the new young leaders of the Sierra Club--Dick Leonard, Dave Brower. Dick Leonard was the trip leader; he was the chairman of the outing committee, and he was the leader of our trip. Dave Brower was the leader of the next two-weeks trip, to which I just said "hello" and left.

One memorable experience that stands out in my mind is traveling across five miles of some of the hottest, most unpleasant sand desert I've ever encountered--which was Guyot Flat. This is in the southern Sierra, south of Mount Whitney. I said to Dick Leonard, "This is really terrible country," in between Rock Creek and Timberline Lake on the approach to Mount Whitney, and Leonard saying, "Have you never read John Muir's account of the beautiful flowers of Guyot Meadow?" I said no. He said, "You should do that sometime." I later did.

The story, as you know, was of Muir going into the High Sierra as a shepherd and participating actively in all the devastation because he was a shepherd, and the sheep eating the fragile mountain flora until the roots could not survive, and the very thin topsoil then being blown away and washed away, so that some seventy-five and ninety years later it was still a desert. I saw this repeated at Rattlesnake Creek, on the other side of the Kern, and in other places in subsequent Sierra Club trips. I gradually, during the late forties, became a very firmly convinced conservationist. This was, I guess, my rebirth, from going into the mountains just because I very thoroughly enjoyed the experience, being a user, to being someone who went in primarily to look, evaluate, and to see what could be done.

Schrepfer: You mentioned that there was a difference before the war and after the war.

Wayburn: The Sierra had changed. I had not been in the Kern River country much before the war, but I had been in the Kings River country and most of the Sierra to the north, to northern Yosemite. I noticed the change most remarkably, I guess, in 1947, where the high trip (I was by then an advocate of the high trip) went in from Rock Creek on the eastern side and went through the Four Recesses. I'd been in the Recesses in 1937. The Fourth Recess furnished a startling contrast from the comparatively long grass of the meadows that I'd found in 1937 to the short-cropped grass that I saw in 1947. In those ten years, there'd been considerable

Wayburn: use of the Sierra, even with the time period of four years of war, when it wasn't used so much. But there'd been so much use that it was quite obvious to me, and I began to think about the fact that I had to help do something about it. The way to do something about it was to join in the conservation efforts of Sierra Club.

Schrepfer: There weren't actually that many more people in '47 than there had been?

Wayburn: Well, that many more people had used the area than had used the area in the years before 1937; this was my impression. It was due primarily to pack stock; I wasn't fully aware of that at the time, as I became convinced later, but the short-cropped grass was due to the fact that pack stock had been in to a much greater extent--larger parties, more parties. Some of the area had been obviously used. There were more fireplace scars; there were more trees cut; there was less vegetation and less dead vegetation, including trees, on the ground. People in the thirties and forties did not pay attention to how much they used; there was a limitless amount there, to the early users.

Separate, but related, is the fact that in 1947 friends, particularly Bob Schallenberger and Jack Dearth, insisted that I run for the executive committee of the Sierra Club's San Francisco Bay Chapter--something I had no desire to do, because I'd never been an organization man; I was much more of a loner. But, according to these people, the Bay Chapter executive committee was in very bad straits. They needed new blood; they had tired old people on the committee. So I went in and was elected to the executive committee and became vice-chairman of the committee that year after having my arm twisted, and then the next year became chairman of the Bay Chapter executive committee. I guess I was hooked, because I began to see that individuals couldn't do very much; you needed organization.

##

Schrepfer: How would you describe the character of the Sierra Club in the 1940s?

Wayburn: In 1939, when I joined, it was a California-based group of three thousand people. As far as I knew, it was chiefly an outing club and a skiing club; it was outdoor-oriented. The leaders of the outings were the people who ran the club. I know that the Kings Canyon campaign took the efforts and energies of such people as Francis Farquhar for a long time in the thirties. But these were isolated incidents, despite the fact that the Sierra Club was

Wayburn: founded as a conservation organization, and had always been one, and was differentiated from other outdoor recreation clubs by that character.

Still, in 1947, it probably had no more than four or five thousand members. In 1949 it had one conservation committee, which had been activated only temporarily before the war, inactivated during the war, reactivated just about 1947 by the late Arthur Blake, and had no chapter conservation committees.

I formed the first chapter conservation committee about 1949 in the San Francisco Bay Chapter. Earlier I had resisted the formation of a conservation committee for the chapter because I was already on the club conservation committee, and most of what we did was around the Bay Area and northern California. It took me a while to realize that a local group could do more. Then I had a personal reason for not wanting to form the Bay chapter committee while I was very active in the executive committee because I was beginning to look ahead, and I could see that if the chapter conservation committee were formed, I would be it. I was the first chairman. Organizationally, I stayed on the Bay Chapter executive committee for either four or six years and was chairman of the chapter conservation committee for either six or four years.

##

II MARIN COUNTY PARKS: THE BACKYARD WILDERNESS

Blocking the Subdivision of the Marin Wildlands

Wayburn: About the time that I became involved in the Bay Chapter, I began to see that not only the Sierra, but land elsewhere needed protection. In this regard, I guess I'm classed among the traditional conservationists who have worked for protection of the land as the first resource. I coined the phrase years ago with regard to wilderness, "Wilderness begins in your own backyard" and extends all the way to the wilderness core because, in order to protect the far-away wilderness, people have to have places that they can go to nearby. Otherwise, there'd be no difference between one's backyard and the place one is trying to classify as wilderness. As a matter of fact, what we have classified as Wilderness (with a large W) has often become so overused because everyone wants to go to the dedicated wilderness or parks.

My first conservation project, growing out of my Bay Chapter experience, was in Marin County. I had, as I mentioned before, enjoyed Marin County as a boy and to an extent as a young man, personally. When I began to see what was happening to it, I became its defender. Just as the Sierra had changed before and after the war years, so Marin County was changing even more.

You, as a Californian, know that Marin County was once the bedroom for San Francisco--it still is to some extent. Except for the small community of San Rafael, all of the small towns and places in Marin County were summer homes for San Franciscans. That's how I became acquainted with it--by going over there to visit an aunt and uncle who had a home in Larkspur that they went to only in the summertime.

Wayburn: As I hiked more and more on the slopes of Mount Tamalpais, I became aware of the fact that there was very little dedicated public land. We were hiking on ranches, on water company property. There was at that time, in 1947 and '48, only 495 acres of federal land--the Muir Woods National Monument--and 870 acres of state land--Mount Tamalpais State Park.

I remember the figure of 870 acres when I personally started working on enlarging Mount Tamalpais State Park. We worked for additions of a few acres. Dad O'Rourke's Bench, which is on the western crest, was one of the first areas we worked for. I did this partly through the executive committee of the Sierra Club and partly through the Tamalpais Conservation Club, which I had joined, but mostly through the Sierra Club. Three hundred acres was a big addition at that time.

The big change came when I began to think in much bigger terms, looking at some way to keep the area as it was, because subdivisions were beginning to develop, and the ranchers were beginning to have hard times. I remember talking to friends in 1948 or '49 about enlarging the state park. It wasn't big enough; it was just a very small area extending in a claw around Muir Woods and ending at the Panoramic Highway where the Marin Municipal Water District took up. It may be that it went up to include the mountain theater; I think that it did. But it was shaped like the claw of a crab.

I started talking about enlarging it, and people would argue with me and say, "Don't you like ranches? They have a picturesque western quality." I said, "Yes, I do," and for a few weeks I didn't really get too excited about this. Then a very significant event happened: I learned that the Dias Ranch, which was one of the largest ranches on the southern slope, had been sold by the owner to speculators. That really put me into high gear as far as trying to do something was concerned.

The only thing we knew to do was to get the state to buy the land. The state was not thinking in terms of buying any park land except with matching funds. We didn't have the money, and we didn't have access to money to furnish the matching funds. The matching fund provision was in the State Park Bond Act of 1928, I think; the state still had some money from that.

After finding out who the speculators were, I enlisted the late Bill Losh, William J. Losh, a public relations man. His firm was Lee and Losh. He was an old-time conservationist, one

Wayburn: of the very liberal sort who believed in living and letting live among the business community and the preservationists. He found out from me that this property had been bought as a speculation by a lawyer named Stanley Weigel and the western representative of the Parker Pen Company whose name was Carl Priest. He agreed to go with me to Weigel and Priest. (Weigel has since become a federal judge. Priest remained here for years, but I don't know what's happened to him at this time; he may still be around.)

We went to see them at the Parker Pen Company office down on Post Street and told them our predicament, what my hopes were. To my surprise, really, they agreed. We made a bargain--a deal, if you will--that we would consent to the division of the property at Panoramic Highway, which was almost the crest of the hill. There were some seven hundred acres of the Dias Ranch, and I think it was 540 acres which were to the west of the Panoramic Highway in the bowl of Frank's Valley, which I'd conceived of as being the nucleus of an enlarged Mount Tamalpais State Park. That was to be bought by the state when we could get the state to pass a bond act to purchase it, and we would make no effort to get the 160 acres on the east side of the ridge, which they would develop for real estate. I felt that their property on the west side of the highway was the key.

Differences with Newton Drury over Park Enlargement and Acquisition Policy

Wayburn: We next went to the state. Newton Drury was then the new chief of the Division of Beaches and Parks. He had just come back to California after eleven years as director of the National Park Service. Because of his reputation we had great hopes for what he would do as chief of the state parks.

I remember one Sunday afternoon--it must have been in 1948--taking Drury and Arthur Johnson, who was then the chairman of the riding and hiking trail committee advisory to the State Park Commission, over to Marin County to look at this proposed enlargement that I had in mind. It was to a meeting of the TCC [Tamalpais Conservation Club]. Unfortunately, the day turned out to be one of those when the fog layer was down, and they couldn't see very much. They didn't realize what I was talking about. All they saw was the manzanita-covered slopes above the Panoramic Highway. I know Drury wasn't at all impressed, and Johnson said, "We've got lots of areas like this in southern

Wayburn: California." I was bemoaning the fire trails that went up the mountain and he said, "We have much worse fire trails than this." In other words, they weren't particularly sympathetic.

Schrepfer: Drury hadn't been there before?

Wayburn: Drury didn't seem to know the area. He certainly didn't know what I was talking about. Yet, he believed in the integrity of park land. I mention this because we had our choice, if you will; we thought that we could get some money out of the legislature (we set the sum of \$700,000) to purchase land enlarging Mount Tamalpais State Park. (We did get that through the legislature in 1955.) Drury wanted to acquire the Brazil Ranch, which was immediately adjacent to the Muir Woods National Monument and in the center of the area that I'd envisioned for the enlarged park. I didn't want to do that because I felt we had to block the subdivision progress, which would come over the mountain. In order to develop western and southern Marin, it was my feeling, they needed water; they needed power; they needed sewage. They didn't have any of this for big development; it would have to be imported from eastern Marin, in the Mill Valley area. But once they put the sewage, water, and power lines through for a subdivision at Panoramic Highway, then it would be all too easy to override the rest, and we never would get the logical boundaries that we had envisioned, which were roughly from ridge crest to ridge crest.

While Drury agreed that we should have that, he said, "That can be delayed." I didn't think it could, and I think that history proves that I was right on that. I had to fight Drury, which was a tough job in those days, before the State Park Commission, with him as the chief executive officer. But we did, and we prevailed. The Park Commission agreed to make the Dias Ranch the first purchase, and that was what the bond act funds went for.

Incidentally, the legislation, as passed the first time about 1955, was faulty and I believe it was 1958 before the appropriation became available.

##

Wayburn: In a related development, William Kent, Jr.--son of the man who gave Muir Woods (the only redwoods in the national park system up to that time) to the federal government--wanted to sell the Steep Ravine property of two hundred acres to the state. This had been used by the public for many years, but it was still private property--part of the Kent estate which once occupied so much of southern Marin and was gradually being sold off.

Wayburn: An interesting sidelight here. William Kent, Jr., told me that in the thirties, I believe, his family had offered their Sea Drift property--sand dunes--to the state, free, as a state park, and the state had turned it down. In the early fifties, after Drury had become chief, Kent had offered it for fifty thousand dollars, and Drury had turned it down, saying it wasn't needed; it wasn't essential to the state park. That property today, in the 1970s, is worth hundreds of millions, and the state wished that it had it as part of Stinson Beach State Park. But this is hindsight.

I asked Drury about this once, but I don't remember getting an answer. Except--let me amend that. I talked to Newton about acquisition. I've been very acquisition-minded since the late forties. Newton's feeling was that you could only take so much at a time. If you look at the Save-the-Redwoods League policy (about which I'll go into later) that was very true of redwood acquisition too.

All this ties into my feelings about the acquisitions across the way in Marin County. I early had been inculcated with the philosophy that private property was best, that private owners took better care of their land than public owners, and so forth. But I learned in the forties that this wasn't true; the private owner, in most cases, if it came to a choice of keeping his land or getting money, would take the money. So much land began to change hands in the late forties and early fifties that I became firmly convinced that the only way to achieve protection of the land was by public acquisition.

Schrepfer: You mean it was bought by speculators.

Wayburn: It was bought by speculators and then would be turned into subdivisions. The rancher's plea, "I take better care of my land" wasn't true at all. Not by that time.

Schrepfer: So you think Drury had then a different attitude toward property and change in the area? In other words, did he feel that there was enough time, and you didn't feel there was time?

Wayburn: That may have been some part of it. Some of it was the fact that he was the responsible state decision-maker, and I was what you might call a wild-eyed advocate of large public acquisition while there was still time, because I saw time as a tremendous factor here. The prices of land were rising so fast, and the taxes on land were rising so much as it came close to metropolitan development, that I thought the more land which could be put into public hands fastest would be the best investment the state could possibly make. I think that's been true.

Enlarging Mount Tamalpais State Park, 1948-1972

Wayburn: At any rate, I was out to enlarge Mount Tamalpais State Park to include everything from the crest of the mountain to the crest of the next distant ridge to the south, including everything from Panoramic Highway to the sea. In the course of the years from 1948 to 1972, before it was completed, we enlarged Mount Tamalpais State Park from 870 acres to around 6200 acres.

We'd got everything that we'd envisioned, with the exception of small bits and pieces of property along the edge of the Panoramic Highway which had gone up in value so much that they were valuable to people to buy as lots. There are a few lots which stick into the bowl of Frank's Valley along the Panoramic Highway. But on the whole, we got what we were after.

One critical item came up about 1953, I think it was, in a meeting before the State Park Commission when we were arguing for the acquisition of everything. Three young men had bought from the Brazils thirty acres immediately adjacent to the Pan Toll headquarters of the state park in the Lone Tree area (known locally as the Lone Tree area). The Lone Tree Spring is the path of the Dipsea Trail. These three young men had selected the finest place for them to have homes; they were going to put up three houses on this thirty acres.

I appeared before the State Park Commission to argue against it. I still remember a man named Charles Kasch; he was the publisher of the Ukiah, California, paper, and Joseph Knowland, publisher of the Oakland Tribune, had been on the State Park Commission for many years. Knowland by this time was a very elderly gentleman who would sleep through much of the proceedings, or seemed to, and his colleague ran the State Park Commission at the time.

These three people argued that the State Park Commission should not interfere with their acquisition; they'd already bought the land. I pointed out the fact that they would have homes in the center of what was going to be, but wasn't yet, one of our finest state parks, and that this should not be allowed.

We prevailed, and Commissioner Kasch told them that the state would condemn their property. They gave up the property, the Brazils returned their deposit, and the State Park Commission took some sort of a hold on it at that time. But it was years later that the park commission got enough money to buy this property.

Wayburn: This was my personal big project through the 1950s.

Schrepfer: What about these southern areas that were going, like the Santa Clara Valley?

Wayburn: I saw what was happening there and was contrasting that to what happened in Marin. But I have to go on with this Mount Tamalpais Park acquisition because it was not until 1972 that we realized the full acquisition. In 1955, and finally in 1958, the state passed bond acts (which by this time had risen from \$700,000 to \$1,100,000) to purchase the Dias property and the Steep Ravine property of Kent.

In 1963 I was president of the Sierra Club when I became involved with the proposed state park bond act of 1964. We still didn't have enough money to buy what we needed to buy in Marin County because prices had gone up so. The Brazil ranch, which could have been acquired for \$700,000, in 1955, had risen to \$2 million by 1964. I agreed to put the Sierra Club full force behind this bond act. Naturally we were for it, but I suggested that we had to have a guarantee that Mount Tamalpais State Park, as we had envisioned it, would be acquired in full. It was agreed that \$4 million should go to Mount Tamalpais; the total bond act was for \$75 million.

I mention this particularly because this is part of the reason it took so long to get the money to buy Mount Tamalpais, and partly because our activity in the 1964 California state bond act was one of the three items cited by the Internal Revenue Service as an example of "substantial" legislative activity. They did this despite the fact that we took every precaution to refrain from legislative activity. We accepted funds, deductible funds, for nonlegislative, educational purposes. The State Park Commission was responsible for the legislative campaign, specifically Harold Zellerbach, who was the treasurer of the committee which took nondeductible funds, particularly contributions from industry, and used it for direct vote proselytizing activity. That didn't make any difference later to the Internal Revenue Service, however.

That bond act brought in a great deal of other land for the state park system, as well as Mount Tamalpais.

Marin County's Conservation Ethic

Wayburn: I didn't comment on the fact that in Marin County, miracles kept happening. We kept just ahead of the development. Maybe I can do that when we discuss the Golden Gate National Recreation Area because it has happened. It's happened up right until now.

Schrepfer: But you're somewhat skeptical about the miracles happening in the southern part of the Bay Area--Santa Clara Valley?

Wayburn: Yes.

Schrepfer: I gather that some of the things in the Santa Clara Valley--some of these things that happened there in the fifties--were an added influence on your thinking about preservation.

Wayburn: Yes. We saw a chance to accomplish in Marin County what we could not in the San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties.

Schrepfer: What did Marin have that Santa Clara didn't?

Wayburn: It had a conservation community, a developing one. This was under the leadership of people like Caroline Livermore and Sabrina Evers. They were all willing, I think, at that time, to save the land.

Schrepfer: In connection with what you just said now about Marin being different from San Mateo and Santa Clara County, and what we were talking about at lunch, with Los Angeles being different from San Francisco, are there any patterns that you can see in why such monuments develop in some areas and not in other areas?

Wayburn: One can draw conclusions. The San Francisco Bay Area is by nature endowed better than any other urban metropolitan area that I know. I've traveled fairly widely over the world. I've not been to Rio, but I don't know of any metropolitan area with the natural geographic advantages of the San Francisco Bay Area.

##

Wayburn: It's simply magnificent. I have told people, when being accused of wanting to add too much to the GGNRA [Golden Gate National Recreation Area]-Point Reyes complex, I've said, "If San Francisco hadn't been settled first, we'd have put that into the national park because, from a scenic standpoint, and from the point of view of the preservation of some of the finest sand dunes, San Francisco would have been a splendid national park." That usually ends the conversation there. [laughter]

Schrepfer: Do you think that the fact that Marin County might have been a wealthier community than the Santa Clara Valley helped?

Wayburn: That could be true. One has to remember, I think though, that the East Bay counties--Alameda and Contra Costa--formed their own regional park district. That area, particularly the outlying areas, the hinterland beyond the hills, is much the same sort of community complex as the Santa Clara Valley, except that it's part of the San Francisco urban complex, whereas San Jose grew up as a separate center and if you will, as a small-town rival.

San Francisco itself was limited by geographic considerations. There's no question that the two bridges changed what was essentially an isolated community with limited expansion facilities down the peninsula. But--I ask the question--what was so different about San Rafael and San Jose? It may be that wealth and large estates had something to do with it. But there's great wealth down the peninsula, and some very large estates still existing. Some of those, with the demise of their present owners, are going into public hands, which may set up the nucleus for public ownership in a way similar to that in Marin. Others are being subdivided.

The conservation conscience, if you will, proceeded earlier in Marin. It was not just because it was a wealthier community. There were families like the Kents, for example. In the late thirties and then in the forties, the Kents, who had been a wealthy family, were gradually selling off their land in order to get dollars. On the other hand, there were wealthy families like the Livermores and the Evers. But I doubt if they were there in much larger number.

Now, you might say, what about the mass of people? Are they wealthier? Perhaps they are, but are they significantly wealthier? I choose to believe, perhaps, that it's the conservation ethic which has grown up in Marin County, as it has in the San Francisco Bay Area. It's also grown up in Berkeley, Alameda, Oakland, just as it has in San Francisco, and now to some extent in the peninsula; quite a bit in the peninsula now. But it hasn't spread far enough--

Schrepfer: To reach San Jose. [laughter]

Wayburn: Only yesterday afternoon, I met a Mrs. Hayes. I didn't know Mrs. Hayes. She's a member of the Sierra Club and apparently a lady of some wealth who was congratulating me on the GGNRA and

Wayburn: saying, "You know, my daughter-in-law is the mayor of San Jose." I said, "That's hopeful." I know Mrs. Janet Hayes is the mayor. I think she's a conservation-minded person. What this means I don't know. I think it was only incidental.

Schrepfer: I do tend to associate with Marin County, summer homes, as you mentioned; and San Jose, prune ranches.

Wayburn: That's absolutely right. No, those two communities came up differently. As far as park land in Santa Clara County as such, it may be influential. I don't know whether you're aware that through the Save-the-Redwoods League a ten-thousand-acre ranch, Coe Ranch, has just been added to the California state park system.

Schrepfer: Yes, and also J.D. Grant's land.

Wayburn: J.D. Grant's ranch. And is that ten thousand acres too?

Schrepfer: I don't know what the acreage is; it's extremely large.

Wayburn: This gives a sizeable body of parks to add to the Mount Madonna and other areas that they've got.

Schrepfer: But it's bitterly resented by a good portion of the community.

Wayburn: Right.

III WILDERNESS, TIMBER, AND THE FOREST SERVICE

The Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs and the Three Sisters Wilderness##

Wayburn: In the early fifties I was, figuratively, farmed out by the Sierra Club to the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs [FWOC]. I first looked in at a convention of the federation in 1950 when it was meeting at Clair Tappaan Lodge. I'd been up at Lake Tahoe over Labor Day with my family to go swimming in Lake Tahoe and enjoy the outdoors, and I just stuck my head in, not intending to leave it there. But the federation got my interest, and the next year the Sierra Club asked me to be the delegate of the Sierra Club to the convention. I went. I think that was 1951. And in 1952 I was elected vice-president and was asked to look in on their most pressing problem--which was something that I knew nothing about. I was elected president in 1953.

My first year as a delegate to the convention was '51. The delegates were quarreling--violently, I remember--about a place I knew nothing about, the Three Sisters Primitive Area in Oregon. The old hands who were connected with the Forest Service, led by Ding Cannon, who was then president of the Standard Insurance Company and I think was the current president of the federation, and L.A. Nelson, who was an old-time forester who worked with the Forest Service, were agreeing with the Forest Service that the boundary of the future wilderness for the Three Sisters should be at Separation Creek.

There was one wild-eyed woman named Ruth Hobson, a biologist at Oregon State or Oregon University, who was arguing that it should be at Horse Creek. This was asking for too much area, according to the other people. So they, for some reason, turned

Wayburn: to me as an impartial observer and said, "Will you make a decision for us?" I said, "I know nothing about this. I've never been there!" "Well, come back next year and let us know."

The next year, Peggy and I made arrangements to go into the Three Sisters Primitive Area. We wrote to Britt Ashe, the district ranger. He took us in for five days. Along with us, as the fourth member of the party (the Forest Service always had to be even-handed, you know), they had a lumberman from Springfield, Oregon, who later became the secretary of the Oregon Lumbermen's Association. For five days, we traveled by day and argued by night over the campfire.

That's a long story. To cut it short, by then I was a believer in watershed protection for any dedicated or protected area.

Schrepfer: By then?

Wayburn: By then. I went up to the federation at the end of that meeting. They clustered around me and said, "What have you decided?"-- Nelson and Cannon particularly. I said, "You don't want me to make this decision." "Oh yes." I said, "Well, there's only one logical boundary, and this is the Ollalie Ridge," which was west of the Horse Creek boundary Ruth Hobson was arguing for; Separation Creek was east of it.

They stuck to their word, and this became the federation's boundary line proposal. We never got it. I think they settled for Horse Creek. I haven't been back there recently, but I know that some of the areas that we decided on at that time have been logged, clearcut, since; and in other places in that same general area, Oregon conservationists and national conservationists are still fighting for remnants.

Schrepfer: What was your reaction to the Forest Service in this incident?

Wayburn: I was brought up in conservation, if you will, partly by the Forest Service. I was interested in the history of the Forest Service, knowing that they had first advocated establishing primitive areas and wilderness areas. At the time, I didn't know too much of the reasons for this, but I found out later that such men as [Aldo] Leopold and [Robert] Marshall and [Ferdinand] Silcox had been instrumental in doing this. The Forest Service was, as the BLM [Bureau of Land Management] was for a longer time, a custodial agency. But they became much more

Wayburn: timber-oriented as the private timber supply became exhausted more and the private operators turned to the national forest. And the Forest Service educated a body of men whose first orientation was logging.

Schrepfer: And this, you feel, occurred about the late forties? early fifties?

Wayburn: The change in attitude began probably in the late thirties and culminated in the fifties. I was cultivated as the California vice-president of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs by Forest Service personnel, as I look back. They were awfully nice to me.

Schrepfer: Did they take you on trips?

Wayburn: They took me on "show me" trips a number of times.

Schrepfer: Did they show you only what they wanted you to see?

Wayburn: They showed me what they wanted me to see. They would show me other things and explain them. They were very good men, individually, although the result collectively was pernicious. But I did like, and I do like, individual foresters. I can understand their point of view, even though I disagree with it wholeheartedly.

Schrepfer: So you don't think there were any efforts made to mislead you?

Wayburn: There was an effort made to show me their point of view. So, I'm not a believer in the conspiracy theory. I don't think the Forest Service conspired knowingly. But I know that they had a very definite viewpoint. I can remember being invited to lunch (I'm not certain of the year, but I think it was 1953) by Clair Hendee, who was then the regional forester for the California region. (I think he succeeded Pat Taylor, who became a member of my chapter conservation committee after his retirement.)

Clair Hendee sat down with me over a lunch table--he was then being transferred to Washington to be assistant chief forester--and told me that it was absolutely essential that the Forest Service get enough money for roads because roading of the national forest was necessary to get their long-term timber management plans underway. Without it, things would be haphazard. It could be done in an orderly fashion once they got the roads through.

Wayburn: Of course, it's true, but it also meant the destruction of much de facto wilderness. This, I think, was evidence that even in 1953 the Forest Service had made up its mind pretty well on what it wanted as wilderness, and it was far less than we citizen conservationists wanted.

"Sanitation" Logging of the Jeffrey Pines##

Schrepfer: There was a series of crises in the fifties involving Forest Service administration in various Sierra areas, and they were at least significant in affecting some of the people in the club. I wondered if any of these crises or issues like sanitary logging issues, primary wilderness and recreation areas such as the Jeffrey pine in the Mammoth area, or Inyo National Forest, or any of the ones that came in between those two, affected you.

Wayburn: I was in the middle of it. From 1953 to '55, I was president of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, and from 1955 to 1961, I was chairman of the conservation committee of the national club. During those years, we came into frequent contact with the Forest Service. In, I think, 1955, Peggy and I took a "show me" trip to the Mammoth area to visit the proposed Deadman Summit sanitary cut. It was called recreational logging that time. The Forest Service flew several of us in a plane into Long Meadow. We then got in cars, and they showed us all through the Deadman area. I'm trying to remember the details; it's been a long time and I haven't thought about it. So I may recall it imperfectly.

I can remember driving over Forest Service roads, first into the small earlier developed area of Deadman Creek, and then up into the more distant roads, and seeing the marked trees "for the recreational development for the benefit of the public" and seeing tree after tree marked. The farther back you went, instead of a fewer number of trees you'd see more trees marked for cutting. There were more trees left along the road than there were back in the depths of the forest. I can remember asking questions. "Why? Why haven't you feathered it the other way?" They said, "We want to keep the natural character of the area next to the roads." This was one of the things that firmed up in my mind that condoning the apparent protection of a forest along the road should always be avoided. It is the conservation's job to expose the public to the worst right away. I found that of great benefit later in the redwood campaign, when Arcata gave me a chance.

Wayburn: As we traveled over these roads, we came to some areas which were not such good sites, and there weren't so many marked trees. And yet, the story was, in addition to making the area suitable for recreation, that they were doing sanitation logging, which meant that they were removing the trees which were going to die soon, trees which had finished their productive period, and saving the others. I saw a great many fine trees (this was a forest of Jeffrey pine, one of the last of its kind in a virgin state in the eastern Sierra).

Finally, on a sandy hillside, we came to an area where there was only one tree standing, more or less by itself. It was a huge tree. It must have been many hundreds of years old. It had lost its top; it had no crown; it was bare-topped. It had some bare branches; some of it had obviously died. I remember saying to the Forest Service supervisor, "Why haven't you marked this tree? It's obviously ready to go." He said, "It's the only one of its kind, and we have to leave this for the natural effect." I said, "Is this, then, the Eisenhower tree?" (This was in the late years of Ike's presidency, when he'd had a heart attack, and he'd had ileitis.) The comparison was, as they knew, that this was like sending our young men to war and leaving our old ones, who were in a bad way, to survive.

What that forest has done in recent years, I don't know. I went back once and was saddened to look at it. I think the Forest Service had good motives, according to its lights. But the forest shouldn't have been logged. I think it would have been of more value staying in its natural condition.

Schrepfer: Why did they log it? What was your understanding of why they logged it?

Wayburn: Their official reason was they needed to promote recreation; they needed places for people to go. This was about the time they began to stop giving permits for summer homes along the lakes that they'd freely given earlier. They planned part of this area for summer home development. This was another thing that I couldn't see; it seemed to me that that sort of an area, where they had to cut down the forest as much as they did, was not going to be a proper area for summer home development. I don't know what they've done. I haven't had time to go back.

One tragedy, I guess, and one personal sense of loss is that I don't get to go back to the Sierra, as much as I like it.

Schrepfer: Were there any other incidents?

Wayburn: Yes, there was another Jeffrey pine area on Mount Alamo in the Mount Pinos Recreation Area in southern California. This is a recreational area in Los Padres Forest, at the lower end of the Grapevine route over the Tehachapi Mountains, used for skiing and in the summertime too. It was in the mid-fifties that our people from the Los Padres Chapter in Santa Barbara got me interested. I went down and looked at that. This was a lush Jeffrey pine forest growing over the top of a mountain. They were planning to do sanitary recreational logging, similar to the Deadman Summit area.*

We argued with them for a couple of years and they held off. Then they went in to log it and did. I went back there once, and it was horrible to look at. This was shortly after the logging.

The Multiple Use and Wilderness Acts

Schrepfer: Did this lead you to draw any conclusions about the Forest Service's recreation policies or wilderness policies?

Wayburn: Oh yes. As I said earlier, the Forest Service, as it changed from a custodial to an active operating agency, gave increasing attention to logging. This was due to various reasons, part of which was the fact that the Forest Service, like the Park Service, has been expected to justify its existence by taking in receipts, by getting large numbers of people to participate in their areas. This philosophy I find most unfortunate and not in keeping with what's best for the area, for the landscape. The Forest Service, under its Organic Act, had to allow mining. Forest Service officials had repeatedly bemoaned the fact and tried to get conservationists to change the mining law of 1872. We had tried, but the American Mining Congress has an extremely strong lobby in Congress.

What they never tried to do was to get us to change their logging practices. It is only during these last several years that we have been able to make any effect on their policies from a legal standpoint.

*See Sierra Club Bulletin, June 1960, p. 15, for fuller account of the Mount Alamo controversy.

Wayburn: Previously, we had repeatedly protested Forest Service intentions, policy, and actions, on individual areas as well as the forest at large. The Forest Service would always fall back on its mandate, as expressed in the Organic Act and in a few laws passed after that. We kept at it through the 1950s, and the Forest Service, in our opinion, kept dodging the issue, and the supporters of the Forest Service kept changing their attitudes.

There was finally a compromise in 1960 when the Multiple Use Act for the national forests was developed. In that, I think the Forest Service and the conservationists worked together to get recognition of the fact that timber was not the only use of the Forest Service, as demanded by the Organic Act.

Schrepfer: But you were in favor of the Multiple Use Act?

Wayburn: We were not wholly in favor of it. We recognized it as a compromise, but we recognized it as a compromise on which we could get a handle. At least I did. I know some people in the Sierra Club were adamantly opposed to it. But it has been extremely useful because for the first time we can say to the Forest Service, "You have other mandates besides the cutting of trees. You have the mandate to preserve the watershed, to preserve the quality of the water, to allow for recreation, and to allow for wilderness." Up until this time, Forest Service officials always claimed that they did this at their own peril. The Multiple Use Act put it into law, and we found that extremely useful.

But the Forest Service, and our opponents, promoted the Multiple Use Act in a way to avoid what we were trying to put through--which was the Wilderness Act. We started working on the wilderness bill about 1956. The original idea was expounded in a Sierra Club wilderness conference, I think in 1951, by the late Howard Zahniser, who was then executive secretary of the Wilderness Society. The Sierra Club took it up with great gusto. The Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society were the two organizations most responsible for the passage of that act. I think it took eight years from the time the bill was first introduced by Hubert Humphrey in 1956. Then Humphrey lost his interest or was persuaded to divert his interest elsewhere. He never sponsored it again.

Schrepfer: Humphrey's position has been changing.

Wayburn: Humphrey's position has changed radically. He's one of my disappointments in conservation; I've had quite a few of them. Different from other conservationists, perhaps. But Humphrey's

Wayburn: one; we had high hopes for him when he first consented to be the principal sponsor of the first wilderness bill. But then he dropped it--and us, and he has changed his position until, in the present forestry legislation, he was the author of legislation that we consider pernicious, in contrast to the Randolph Bill, which our people were largely responsible for writing.

Back to the Forest Service--without, I think, openly opposing the wilderness bill, the Forest Service behind the scenes opposed it. Friendly foresters would let us know about what was going on and, of course, we found out in other ways too. In that day the Chief Forester was Richard McArdle [until 1962] who, like other foresters, claimed to be a proponent of wilderness but who was really not. The Forest Service policy on wilderness became one of reclassifying its primitive areas and not allowing any new wilderness, although there was a great deal of wilderness still in the forests. We termed that de facto wilderness. There's still a lot of de facto wilderness in the forests, and we're still trying to reclassify some of those areas to really protect their status.

The present Church-Udall Bill recognizes a number of those areas in the Endangered Forest Wilderness Bill, which is in Congress now [1976].

But back to the wilderness bill, our efforts on that. As the chairman of the conservation committee and the president of the Sierra Club during that period, I was involved in it pretty heavily. We tried through four successive congresses before we achieved our purpose, which was the passage of the Wilderness Act. And yet, from 1956 on, I personally didn't worry about those particular areas, which were primitive areas and Forest Service areas which had been reclassified as wilderness by the Forest Service. I felt as long as the issue was active in Congress, the Forest Service was not going to cut or road any of those primitive areas, until they had had a study by the service itself and then in Congress.

That, of course, was carried out and well amplified later by the decision in Colorado on the Gore Range-Eagle Nest Wilderness Area and the adjacent land [the East Meadow Creek drainage]. The case was won by Tony Ruckel, who later became a member of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund staff. It was a landmark case, and the significance was that we sued the government because the Forest Service was about to road this area. It was directly adjacent to the Gore Range-Eagle Nest Primitive Area, which was later reclassified to a wilderness. Our point was that this area,

Wayburn: being immediately adjacent, and being just as worthy of wilderness status as was the primitive area, should not be logged, should not be roaded.

The court awarded us that decision, and later it was included in the wilderness. This has been one of the landmark cases the club's legal arm has won [1972].*

Schrepfer: Then, do you think that the multiple-use policy is a good policy? Do you think the Forest Service practices multiple uses, as mandated in the act?

Wayburn: I think Forest Service practices, on the one hand, improved as a result of that law, and on the other hand, it gave them a certain amount of legal excuse for doing what they were doing. But on the whole, I think it's been a good law because it recognizes the fact that there are other uses, and that wilderness is one of the proper uses of the national forest.

Schrepfer: Wasn't wilderness just snuck into the bill by the conservationists at sort of the last minute?

Wayburn: Well, there may have been a little of that. [laughter]

Schrepfer: Ed Crafts said that was very sneaky and underhanded.

Wayburn: Yes, in the same way that it was very sneaky and underhanded for the National Wildlife Federation to have gotten the national forests into the three-system protected area of the national interest lands of Alaska in Section 17(D)2 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. We had in our draft only the National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge System, and the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System--those were the three national conservation systems. There was really no excuse for the Forest Service getting in there. But they did, and it means a lot more struggle as a result.

I have no question in my mind that Ed Crafts might regard it as sneaky. This is in the nature of American politics.

You see, the Forest Service called wilderness "non-use." Well, what do you mean by "use"? This was a question we frequently asked. We would say that "non-use" is one of the best uses of the national forest. Watershed protection is non-use, if you will.

*See Sierra Club Bulletin, April 1972, pp. 16-17.

Schrepfer: Didn't you know that they could improve the watershed, over nature?
[ironically]

Wayburn: Yes, I know. But not too much in wilderness. We lost certain little battles in that regard. In the Sierra, for example, check dams of a certain size are permitted and are found in the wilderness area south of Yosemite on the San Joaquin River watershed. There were some there preexisting, and the club had gone along with those. Later we advocated including those in the wilderness. We've advocated including in wilderness certain other areas where there are dams--water impoundments, as they're officially called.

There are a set of three lakes on the eastern slope--Waugh, Gem and Agnew Lakes--which go up from the June Lake-Silver Lake area, right up to the John Muir Trail. These are all water impoundments and it's very valuable to have those inside the wilderness. If they were not inside, there'd be more development of them than there is now.

Schrepfer: Would you say, then, that the Wilderness Act was a kind of culmination of a growing distrust of the Forest Service?

Wayburn: Yes, it was very definitely a distrust of Forest Service actions and Forest Service policy.

##

Wayburn: You know the history of Forest Service policy on what we call wilderness now. Due to the influence of Aldo Leopold, in large part--and I think his chief forester at the time [William B. Greeley], who allowed him leeway--the system of primitive areas was established, the L Regulations.

During the thirties, under the influence of Robert Marshall and his chief forester, Silcox, it was recognized that primitive area regulations weren't strict enough, and the U Regulations were set up for the establishment of wilderness, wild, and scenic areas.

We found out these regulations were fine as long as they were implemented and kept up. But we also began, in the fifties, to find out that the Forest Service, even as it could classify, could declassify; even as it gave protection, it might feel that that protection should be changed to another status. This was the reason that we supported the idea that wilderness should be protected by law; that wilderness should have the highest degree

Wayburn: of protection possible, not by regulation but by law. This meant that it had the sanction of Congress and would have to be undone by Congress.

As the conservation movement gained strength, it felt that it could employ the democratic process better than to trust the Forest Service because we had instances where the Forest Service had changed its policy. The policy was not the same in all parts of the United States, either. In Region Five, the California region, for example, there were these three classifications I've spoken of--wilderness, wild, and scenic. In Washington and Oregon, Region Six, they had a different policy. I don't know if they had any primitive areas at all, but they had limited areas, so-called. To us, the limited area was the same as the primitive area, as we looked at it first. But to the Forest Service, it didn't have the same status. They began to reclassify the limited areas without including what we thought should be in wilderness. In effect, they would declassify; what had been limited area would become just part of a general forest area.

After this first presentation in 1951 by Zahnie [Howard Zahniser], we seized upon the idea of law as the only way to really be sure that we would preserve wilderness in perpetuity. This was one of our biggest general projects through the late fifties and early sixties.

Battling the Forest Service in the North Cascades

Schrepfer: I presume you're talking in part about the Cascades?

Wayburn: I am. The Three Sisters in Oregon was a primitive area and had to be reclassified to wilderness. This was our battle on the Three Sisters area. But in Washington, I don't think there were any primitive areas at all. The North Cascades included the Glacier Peak limited area. We became aware of the fact that there was to be a reclassification.

Schrepfer: This was under J. Herbert Stone?

Wayburn: Under J. Herbert Stone, exactly. Regional Forester, Region Six. Stone denied it later, and I think denied it at that time, but he didn't really like wilderness.

Wayburn: My efforts in this regard started along with the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, during that time. I first went in 1952 to Oregon, and by this time I was a confirmed, thoroughly hooked conservationist and devoting more time than I had available to the idea and was in the Sierra Club orbit very heavily.

In 1952, I went to the Three Sisters. Then in 1955 I first went up into Mt. Rainier National Park. I was marveling--all over again--as I have each time I come to an extraordinary new series of landscapes in a different country, really. On this trip, which was led by the late Oliver Kehrlein, who was one of the premier Sierra Club outing leaders of his time (I guess the man who was responsible for the base camp trips more than anyone else; he founded them and he led them)--I was on a Sierra Club special outing, run by Oliver Kehrlein with Al Schmitz as his assistant.

Schrepfer: I don't know Schmitz.

Wayburn: Schmitz is a very widely-known outing leader, both in and outside the club. He's with Mountain Travel. This was, I think, his first occasion to lead an outing; he was the assistant.

This was on Mt. Rainier. We had a base camp at Sunrise and went around exploring the glaciers. (Another whole story is behind this, but....) During that time, Leo Gallagher, who was the grand old man of the Mountaineers, came up to visit us. He and I were standing in a vast field of flowers at sunrise. I was marveling at it. Leo said to me, "Do you think this is wonderful?" I said, "Yes. It's absolutely magnificent. As a transplanted Georgian who fell in love with the marvels of the Sierra and California, I'm in love all over again with this scene." He said, "If you think this is something, you should see Glacier Peak."

In 1955, I had just heard of Glacier Peak; it came up at the federation convention as an area which was to be studied. Leo intrigued my interest so much that I went to Oliver and Al and said, "Where are you planning next year's out-of-state outing?" They said, "Lake O'Hara in Canada." I said, "Well, you've got to take a look at Glacier Peak and let me know what you find there. Then you can go on to Lake O'Hara and look at that." (They were scouting it out.)

A few weeks later they came back. They'd climbed up from Holden on Lake Chelan, over Cloudy Pass, and looked at Glacier Peak, and they said, "It's something! We'll have to put an outing in there next year." So I said, "All right. I'll be going along because this is going to be a big fight that we have." I was aware

Wayburn: of the reclassification attempts of the Forest Service, and the fact that they had planned a very small Glacier Peak wilderness area, confined more or less to Glacier Peak itself.

This was in the years that I'd made up my mind to see every western mountain range that I could, with the idea of evaluating it for protective status.

In 1956, the club made its first trip into Glacier Peak wilderness. I went in from Lake Chelan. Stehekin is on Lake Chelan; so was Holden, which was the site of the Howe Sound Mining Company's mine there a few years before, which had played out. From the first moment that we started up this long trail and found this magnificent country, we knew that here was another battleground we had.

We were met by Jane and Grant McConnell, who had a cabin in Stehekin, and another couple named Abbie and Stuart Avery from Massachusetts, who also had a cabin in Stehekin. The Averys met us at the top of Suiattle Pass. It was the first time I had seen a Gerry tent; I later bought a couple of them. Grant McConnell had written to the Sierra Club, asking for help with the Glacier Peak wilderness. Grant was a professor of political science at the University of Chicago at the time; he later went to University of California, Santa Cruz, as professor and provost. He's still at Santa Cruz, I think. The McConnells and the Averys were two couples who had cabins at Stehekin and who wished to save this area. Another man was Ray Courtney, who was our packer. They were almost the only local people with that desire. Other people in the area thought that Stehekin should be developed, and they saw good possibilities for developing their property.

Grant wrote to Dave Brower soon after we had scheduled this trip. Dave became so enamored of the country by mail that he scheduled another trip into the Sauk River country. (Dave was then executive director of the club, and he had a very strong influence on the outing committee.) So that year, 1956, we actually had two outings, one which was scheduled all year and the other one which was developed fairly late in the game. Although Dave's trip was bitterly attacked by rain the whole time, they enjoyed themselves thoroughly. We had a good time--half the time rain, one-third the time mist, and the rest of it sunshine.

Wayburn: Both Dave and I became convinced that we had to wage a fight. I kept the battle within the confines of the Forest Service for a large Glacier Peak Wilderness Area as long as possible. Dave, Grant, and others gave up on the Forest Service before I did and started agitation for a national park.

Schrepfer: Grant once favored the Forest Service for a while.

Wayburn: Oh yes. We all did--the Forest Service has good people, they have earnest people, they have convincing people; and they were going to take good care of the wilderness. On the other hand, the National Park Service had developed an increasing reputation for protection of the national parks. The Forest Service worked on us too: "You don't want a national park here." When I would mention national park, as I would at times with my Forest Service friends, trying to get leverage, they would say, to me, "But you don't want a national park! They'll put a road right through--there'll be a road going right up to Image Lake" (which is one of the most beautiful places of the universe). And of course I didn't want roads going through that area. So this is the reason that, from 1956 to 1959, or 1960, we fought by Forest Service rules, trying to get them to classify Glacier Peak as a large wilderness area. But as Mr. Stone envisioned it, the Forest Service plan for a Glacier Peak wilderness was nowhere near what we thought we should have.

We realized we would have to go to Congress, and in the early sixties we made the jump and had bills for a national park introduced. I think it was about 1963 or '64 that we had the first bill introduced for the national park. That, by the way, was significant in a number of ways in some of the precedents it set. The Sierra Club was always behind the scenes as the principal large organization fighting for the park's establishment. But there was another organization called the North Cascades Conservation Council, which has always been headed by Pat [Patrick] Goldsworthy, who became a Sierra Club director (a former chemist here at the University of California and for the past twenty years, I guess, at the University of Washington Medical School). That became the front organization which bore the brunt of the fight for the park.

The act established the North Cascades National Park and Recreation Area. The Recreation Area was established in order to accommodate the hunters in part of the area that we had wanted to include. It established a precedent which we were able to use in other areas to keep the total park area larger. I think it

Wayburn: has been a good precedent; we've got to allow for something of this sort in Alaska, where the hunting fraternity is very strong.

But back to my own personal involvement, I went to the North Cascades in '56, '58, and '59--three years--exploring that area, working with the Forest Service, and then finally becoming convinced that Forest Service protection was not going to be enough. I think we've got that protection in the Cascades National Park. There are other areas in the Cascades, besides the Glacier Peak-Stehekin River area, which the Forest Service has classified and hasn't done as well as we'd like. So we have no doubt that the establishment of the Cascades National Park was the right way to go.

Schrepfer: Do you think that agitation for the Wilderness Bill alienated the Forest Service?

Wayburn: There's no question of it. The Wilderness Bill takes away some of the supremacy of the Forest Service (supremacy isn't quite the right word); the ability of the Forest Service to manage its domain in just the way it wants to. The Forest Service has been a very independent agency. It's the only land management agency not in the Department of the Interior; and, as a part of the Department of Agriculture, it's had its way pretty much most of the time. Sometimes an assistant secretary or a secretary would bring it to heel. But on the whole, it's been remarkably successful. I admire the Forest Service for its abilities. I deplore its monolithic character, particularly when oriented towards timber utilization as much as it has been, and its failure to understand that its own sustained yield policy is violated by it over and over again with its policies on allowable cut. But I admire its effectiveness.

I know that the Wilderness Act was bitterly resented. On the other hand, it showed the Forest Service for the first time that conservationists had clout. (This is another story that I should perhaps develop, a little independent of the attitudes of the Forest Service.)

Schrepfer: Are there any other areas that come to mind in your relationship with the Forest Service? Maybe the Kern Plateau?

Wayburn: In those days, I was just sort of a fireman who would answer calls to fires that had to be put out. Alamo Mountain was one from the Los Padres chapter. The Oregon Cascades and Washington Cascades were others. I began to look about to try to anticipate

Wayburn: other areas. These were mostly Forest Service areas that we were concerned with. The national parks had been classified, had that measure of protection (although later I'll go into some of the ways in which I think the Park Service has not protected the park system).

From 1952 to 1967, I systematically explored the western mountains, and particularly the Forest Service areas. The Kern Plateau was one which I'd been interested in since about 1954 or '55 and my days with the federation. I had visited Ardis Walker and his wife; Ardis is a poet and his wife is an artist. They were interested in preserving the Kern Plateau wilderness, and I became an advocate of a million-acre wilderness on the Kern Plateau. We went down there several times to visit the Walkers and to look about, with the Forest Service one time and then again with the Forest Service in the late sixties when Jack Dienema had become the regional forester.

This is another subject in which I was concerned off and on, helped get the Sierra Club started on, then couldn't personally carry on with it. Martin Litton took the cudgel up later and exploited it as far as he could. But each time the club got into it, I was pretty much in the thick of it.

We watched our million-acre wilderness gradually become decimated. The only areas that the Forest Service would grant should be wilderness were a fifty-thousand-acre Dome Wilderness, which had comparatively few trees and lots of rocks, and a possible Golden Trout wilderness--which is not yet established. Meanwhile, we have given up on the Forest Service's intentions; and, because of a combination of Golden Trout on the east and Mineral King on the west, we would like to incorporate the Golden Trout area into an expanded Kings Canyon-Sequoia National Park.

Sierra Club Reversal on Mineral King Ski Development

Schrepfer: We could talk about Mineral King. It would be logical at this point. The early vote on Mineral King came really before you were active.

Wayburn: That's right. In 1947, Mineral King was one of the areas where the Sierra Club directors agreed with the Forest Service's plan of some commercial development for downhill skiing. By 1955, when I came on

Wayburn: the scene to discover Mineral King as a personal project, I'd been in Mineral King in 1949 and 1951, I think, on high trips, and was convinced that this small mountain valley should not be yielded to a commercial ski development. But we had the precedent of the Sierra Club directors voting for it in the thirties and as late as 1947.

Schrepfer: And again in 1949.

Wayburn: Working through the conservation committee, I changed the attitude first in the conservation committee; then we recommended to the board that Mineral King not be developed. It was somewhere after this time that the Forest Service gave two developers the go-ahead. One was Disney; one was a man named [Robert] Brandt. I remember this in connection with their politics. It must have been in the early sixties because there was a Democratic regime.

Schrepfer: 1964.

Wayburn: All right. Brandt was a good Democrat and had helped Democratic politicians. His wife was a famous movie star. Disney was a Republican. We thought that Brandt would get the contract.

Will Siri and I worked with Brandt to try to show him how he should have a limited development, because we were working with established Sierra Club policy.

Schrepfer: I wondered why in 1965 you made a motion recommending that the club not oppose the development but that instead the club recommend a minimum impact development.

Wauburn: That's right. This was because we were working within established club policy. In the fifties, I think, when I first got interested in Mineral King I don't believe I was on the board. I couldn't change the policy. (I would have to go back and look at that.) I personally thought that Mineral King should not be developed and started working within the club to get the club's attitude changed. At the time the Forest Service put out its proposal [in 1965], the club's official attitude was still in favor of ski development. But in 1937, and even in 1947, it wasn't suspected that roads would be like roads became. It was thought in the thirties that these little roads which crawled up the mountainside were good; they did what John Muir wanted--they brought people to enjoy the Sierra. It was not realized that they would bring their own development because they were there, and that they were the greatest hazard to the life of the wilderness that could be imagined.

##

Wayburn: When the club leaders endorsed skiing at Mineral King, their concept of the ski area was what a ski area was in the 1930s--a comparatively small area with rope tows and in some cases, a poma lift and a small chair lift. Poma lift--this was a cross between the chair lift and the rope tow--it put a sort of shield against your back and let you slide up the hill, as a rope tow did, but it was much less arduous than the rope tow. Chair lifts were just coming into being in the late thirties. Sugar Bowl had one which was greatly in demand, and that's the only one that I knew of.

Schrepfer: Did you ski?

Wayburn: Yes. I learned to ski in 1935--an interesting experience. One of the reasons that I joined the Sierra Club was to ski at Clair Tappaan Lodge, where we had one of the best rope tow hills which ever existed--one of the best rope tow hills still existing. But, they [the club directors] conceived of Mineral King as a distant place that few people would go to over a long twenty-five mile road that took close to two hours to get from Three Rivers up to Mineral King Valley.

##

Wayburn: There were club people who made that decision in the thirties and forties still on the board in 1965, and they did not want to go back on their word. The Sierra Club had given its word, and the Forest Service kept reminding it of that. It was some time before we could get the Sierra Club directory to turn 180 degrees in its policy. During that time, as the president of the club from '61 to '64, I was obligated to do what I could to preserve the values of Mineral King. I remember Will Siri and I particularly working with Brandt--and maybe Dave Brower came in on that. We had lunch a couple of times with Brandt up on the seventeenth floor of the Medical-Dental Building, where my office is. We worked out all the so-called mitigating measures we could, and we got Brandt to limit his development.

As ski developments go, if that plan had been carried out, it would have been optimum for the time, although it would have still been bad. But then Disney came out with his much greater development. I think Brandt's maximum was somewhere around five thousand, and Disney's was for thirty thousand people at one time.

Schrepfer: Why did the Forest Service go Disney?

Wayburn: I don't know the answer to that. The public explanation was that they thought that Disney was better able to carry out the contract. Whether that's the whole story or whether there were other political factors, I don't know. As I mentioned, we thought that from a political standpoint, Brandt had the better claim.

Wayburn: Disney's plans took most people by surprise because of the extent of it. Disney proposed to put as many as 30,000 people into Mineral King Valley at one time and to have more accommodations, as well as more total people, than Yosemite Valley. And considering the fact that it's only about one sixth the flatland area of Yosemite, this would have been horrendous.

At any rate, the award of the Disney contracts was so outrageous in the minds of the majority, possibly all of the directors of the Sierra Club, that we were then able to change policy completely. We came out for no development and began the agitation for a transfer of Mineral King to the Sequoia National Park, mindful of the fact that it was originally part of Sequoia National Park but had been excluded for erroneous reasons (because it was supposed to have been highly mineralized). Everyone had the opportunity to go in and get the minerals out, and there were no minerals of commercial value there.

IV EVOLUTION OF THE SIERRA CLUB, 1930s-1960s

Club Leadership: "Establishment" Climbers, Hikers, and Skiers

Schrepfer: Some of the critics of the club have pointed out, or some of the people who have discussed Mineral King have made this point: that the Sierra Club was willing to say the development of Mineral King was all right as long as San Gorgonio [a national forest wild area in southern California with potential for ski resort development] was threatened; as soon as they felt San Gorgonio was safe, then they turned against Mineral King.

Wayburn: Yes, I know that argument; it's been brought out. To some extent it was (I say advisedly was) a valid argument. The reason I say "was" is that the Sierra Club has evolved over the years. In the thirties, the Sierra Club was a small outfit with directors who were reelected every year; people of wealth and position, for the large part; people who were part of the establishment. I remember so well when we engaged our attorney to fight the IRS suit in 1968. We engaged Gary Torre, who himself is very much a part of the establishment, is one of the three senior lawyers of one of the biggest law firms in California, the Lillick firm [Lillick, McHose and Charles]. He learned the history of the Sierra Club at that time better than anyone else because we were his client. I said, "How is it you never happened to join the Sierra Club, Gary?" He said, "Oh, I've been anti-establishment, and the Sierra Club was too much establishment for me." There was some truth in that.

Through the late forties, a bunch of young people came back from the war with different attitudes, and the Sierra Club became much more militant than it had been.

Schrepfer: Like Dick Leonard as a radical? [laughter]

Wayburn: No. Dick Leonard was a fine leftover. Dick Leonard started in the Sierra Club in 1933, I think, and he was primarily a rock-climber. Dick always came along reluctantly on anything radical. He would turn around and make good speeches after we established the policy, sometimes without him. (My relations with the other Sierra Club directors I'll come to in another interview, perhaps.)

But this is true. Dick was a director starting in 1938, or maybe '36. He was a very young one then. By the 1960s Dick was, shall I say, one of the more sobering influences on Sierra Club directors. But the composition of the board had changed [after World War II] and kept changing. There were more Young Turks.

Schrepfer: Who originated that phrase?

Wayburn: That was originated by a group of doctors to describe the American Society of Clinical Investigation which met in Atlantic City, which was an offshoot of the American Association of Physicians. They were professors of medicine of American medical schools. A group of young people who were later to be professors, in large part, started meeting just after them and were called the Young Turks. I used the expression because I was part of that movement, in the thirties, in still a third organization, which was the American Federation for Clinical Research; that's another part of my life.

So, from famous outing leaders and mountain climbers and winter sports people, the composition of the board gradually changed. In 1955, when I first ran, no one who'd been chairman of the conservation committee could be elected to the board of the Sierra Club, except for Harold Bradley. He was chairman for a couple of years. But Arthur Blake, who was appointed to the board, could not be elected by the electorate.

Schrepfer: What do you mean, could not?

Wayburn: He didn't get enough votes.

Schrepfer: I see. You didn't have enough charisma unless you met everybody in the mountains and got popular support.

Wayburn: That's right--exactly. Either in the summer or the winter. Or you were a famous climber. (This, incidentally, is how Will Siri got on the board in 1956. He had just come back from the Himalayas; he was the deputy leader of the first American expedition to Mount Everest.) This is the way Dave Brower and Dick Leonard got on--they were outing leaders, as well as Oliver Kehrlein and Cliff

Wayburn: Youngquist and the Hildebrands and Bestor Robinson and Lewis and Nate [Nathan] Clark. All these people were prominent in the activities of the club. Conservation was at fairly low ebb as far as running the club was concerned.

Dave set out to change that when he became executive director, and I guess I was the first one that he campaigned for actively. But he did it in a gentlemanly way in those days [laughter]; shall I say, a subdued way. As the composition of the board changed, and as we were able to document what we were talking about more in such matters as Forest Service issues, we were able to turn the board around. The board did turn around and vote to oppose commercial ski development at Mineral King, much to the dismay of some of the older, distinguished people in the club. I would have to look back, but I don't think it was a unanimous vote at that time at all. Bestor Robinson could not have voted for that. I don't remember if it was a recorded vote.

Schrepfer: Yes, it was.

Wayburn: Well, you can tell me better than--[laughter] What was the vote on it?

Schrepfer: You're right, Bestor was not for it. Dick Leonard kind of abstained for the moment. That is, he said, "We should talk to the Forest Service more." He was against development but, "Let's talk to them more." Then there was--was Clark there?

Wayburn: Both Clarks were there.

Schrepfer: Yes. I'm trying to think--Harold Crowe? He was against it. Very adamantly.

Wayburn: Yes. Harold Crowe was one of our distinguished citizens who was very active in the affairs of the Angeles Chapter and who was the best storyteller in the club.

Schrepfer: When you say the earlier directors were more members of the establishment, would that then be someone like Will [William E.] Colby?

Wayburn: Will Colby? Yes. You reminded me of Will Colby when you said Aubrey Drury had left things in the cigar box. One of Dick Leonard's favorite stories is that when he first came into the officialdom of the club, he had to straighten out Colby's records, which had been kept in a cigar box.

Schrepfer: [laughter] Colby was a mining engineer?

Wayburn: No, Colby was a mining lawyer.

Schrepfer: In what way would he have been more establishment than some of the people, some of the directors, say, in the sixties?

Wayburn: When I use the term "establishment" there are people who would still say that some of the directors of the club are establishment. I might even be put into that category, I don't know; simply because I've been around as long as I have. One looks at people from one's own perspective. The times were different. The times when John Muir could gather around him the founding members of the Sierra Club--the leading professors of the two universities, Stanford and California, including the president of Stanford--practically all the founding members were prominent members of the community. The Sierra Club has always attracted the more literate and the more so-called middle and upper classes. But now it is a very broad-based organization. It was based around a small group of people in the San Francisco Bay Area.

It kept this fairly limited character for many years, even in the thirties and the forties. Then, perhaps because of the greater mobility of the American public and the fact that, in addition to having easterners come to California, Californians began to move east in their work, we began to become national.

With a limited membership of people who were able to go out and enjoy--again, it took someone with considerable funds and desire to go up into a place like the High Sierra. You had to give up a month, and be able to take a vacation of a month, in order to make one of these early high trips, which would travel by train from Oakland or San Francisco to El Portal, and then take stagecoaches up to Yosemite Valley and then start walking.

Schrepfer: A paid vacation wasn't a normal thing in the twenties and thirties; it doesn't really become very widespread until the forties.

Wayburn: All the more reason that the people who did that had to be people of means--in other words, belong to the establishment.

Schrepfer: I met a man in Berkeley who had joined the club early enough that he had all over his walls pictures of John Muir and his wife. This man's still alive, lives alone. His fortunes, evidently, dipped very dramatically in the thirties, and he never went to another Sierra Club function again. But he's the oldest member, and nobody's heard of him. Named James E. Rother. R-O-T-H-E-R.

Wayburn: No, I don't know him. I did know some of the founding members including one of the Hutchinsons--I think it was Lincoln, it may have been James Hutchinson--because in the fifties, you may remember, the Hutchinson Lodge, which was the property of the Sierra Ski Club, was given to the Sierra Club. There were only a few members of the ski club alive at that time. It included Joel Hildebrand (who is still alive) and Harold Bradley and I think it was Lincoln Hutchinson. I think the three of them were the ones who made the actual presentation.

Schrepfer: So you think that change in the character of the club, then, affected the policies like Mineral King.

Wayburn: There's no question of that. The club took more people on as the nation's resources were becoming more obviously limited. The directors--the active people in the club--realized that they had to do more. This is all part of what I ran into as a young man returning from the war in 1946. My first contact was with the high trip--which was at the same time contact with various leaders of the Sierra Club of the time. I didn't have the advantage or disadvantage of being closely associated in the thirties. I didn't join until 1939, and even then it was as an active skier, sometime climber, hiker, and burro tripper. All of which gave me a perspective unfettered by tradition. Looking back, I might endow myself with more qualities than I had at that time. There were certain things that had to be done, such as in Marin County (which was home), and as in the High Sierra (which was heaven). I gradually spread my idea of heaven to include all the mountain areas of the west.

Evolution of a Personal Philosophy##

Schrepfer: Would you say that you underwent a change in attitude similar to what the club experienced after the war?

Wayburn: Before the war I joined the Sierra Club as a user of the mountains. I joined in 1939 to go on a burro trip. I enjoyed the burro trip--the outdoor experience. I joined to go skiing--in 1935 I first learned to ski, and skied just a little bit. As a young doctor who didn't have much money, I was looking for places that I could ski inexpensively, and the Sierra Club offered me that. I was one of those who used to drive up on a Friday night, ski Saturday and Sunday morning and early afternoon and drive back on Sunday night. I skied at the Sierra Club lodge on the rope tow and occasionally

Wayburn: went over to the new Sugar Bowl. I was not a good skier. I became a much better skier in the sixties when I had the opportunity to go to Aspen and spend a week to ten days at a time, but learning to ski on one or two days, every three or four weeks, doesn't turn you into a good skier as a rule.

I had an awareness of what there was, and I think I told you that awareness came early in my life as I saw what was happening in my native Georgia, where the land was very badly treated. But it was partly because I got into the organization of the Sierra Club and partly because I began to observe things for myself--beginning in 1946 on the high trip where I was contrasting what I saw with what I had heard and read. I realized that it was all different and gradually developed the idea that I had to do something about it. That came at the same time that I was asked to become part of a local Sierra Club hierarchy as member of the executive committee of the Bay Chapter. It was perhaps no accident, although I've thought of it as being an accident, that it happened. It was certainly no accident that I stayed in because from the time that these things began to come up, I increasingly realized that this was where I was going to put a good part of my energies and that this was where I could make a contribution.

This was a contribution which might be more valuable than the contribution that I would make in medicine. I had previously done research in medicine all the way through in my career--starting working in bacteriology, my second year in medical school and coming close to doing something which would have a lasting effect, but never quite making it. Years later, I recognized that if I had gone just a little farther in certain ways, I would have made a more permanent contribution. I turned out my first papers in the early thirties and published some twenty papers in the thirties. Then when I went into the service I made the decision that I would take a lower rank than I could have had otherwise if I were allowed to do research. In the way of the army, that didn't happen at first. I was assigned to be chief of a medical service, and I went abroad. Later I was offered a job as chief of the Mass Chest X-ray Service of the United States Army Air Forces in Europe, which was a very small outfit. But because I was the head of it I was able to do things that I wanted and again turned out several research papers.

I started to do some when I came back, but then began to be diverted into the Sierra Club--into conservation activities. Then I began to drop different parts of my medical career. The first thing that dropped off was research because I realized I wasn't

Wayburn: doing enough to matter enough and I could do more by making a contribution to conservation. Then I dropped some of my teaching activities, more and more of those.

Schrepfer: Where had you been teaching?

Wayburn: I had been teaching at Stanford Medical School and principally at the San Francisco County Hospital. I dropped off the staff of the County Hospital in the early fifties and concentrated at the old Stanford Hospital in San Francisco. When the Medical School went to Palo Alto in 1958, I became the chief of the endocrine clinic here and stayed in that capacity for twelve years and was active in medical organizational work--becoming the president of the San Francisco society. And for over twenty years now I've been a delegate of the San Francisco Society of the California Medical Association, and active in trying to promote environmental health in that organization--with some success.

I realized there were many people who were interested in doing medical research and medical teaching along with medical practice, but there were very few people who were seriously interested in the preservation of the American land, and so I chose that as where I would make a contribution.

This was not a decision made on high--it was something that I gradually came to, and came to as I went up the ladder in the Sierra Club and saw that this organization was doing more than any other in that field. I saw what its problems were and my debates with Bestor Robinson simply epitomized my feeling and my attitude towards what I felt needed doing and what the conventional attitude of the club had been.

Bestor represented the conservative attitude in the club and all that he thought the club should fight for. If the board of directors had adopted his viewpoints, the extent of the national parks and the national forests and the wildlife refuges would have been far less. The principles that the different administrative services adopted would have been far more liberal in their interpretation. I think we've been able to make a very profound impression on what has happened in the federal and, to an extent, in the state's public lands.

We went from a small California organization to a large national organization to accomplish our purpose nationally, but in so doing the side effect was that each of the individual cells,

Wayburn: or chapters, of the club, in different places, began to see that it had a local mission as well as a national mission in helping out the national Sierra Club. There began to be a difference in the recognition of national Sierra Club versus local chapters.

So far, this has been extremely helpful. We haven't suffered as the National Wildlife Federation has in being a group of warring tribes. But there have been times when local sentiment has predominated to influence what the local chapter would do for the national effort. Well, I get carried away in talking about my own philosophy there--which I think you know by now--although I may well go out on it again.

I think that I have been able to and will make further contributions on the dedication of the American land, which I think is the first thing that we need to do. The club has gotten interested in a great many other things and rightly so; in pollution control and energy saving and energy plants, in clean air and clean water. And I'm all for these things, but my particular contribution, in what I know best and can speak most authoritatively on, is land dedication. We've got to have some areas of land which are recognized as being sacrosanct; as being dedicated to the future as much as for the present. I advisedly include the present, because in order to get them for the future we have to allow them to be used, to some extent, for the present.

Schrepfer: Are you suggesting perhaps that we might have some areas where people would not be allowed to enter at all?

Wayburn: Perhaps. It's doubtful how much we can reserve in that way at present. This is one of the charges being leveled at us in the Alaska campaign.

There's no question that I, as leader in this campaign, would like to see some areas where there is as little imprint of man as possible. I think that a few humans can go, in the same way that a few animals can go, and not destroy the vegetation or interfere with the wildlife, but as those numbers increase, even with light use, there is going to be an increasing difference, subtle as it is.

Man has been in the north, speaking specifically of Alaska and the Yukon, for millenia. And has adapted himself to the natural conditions successfully and has not been responsible for too much abrupt evolutionary change, but modern man doesn't know how to do this. Aboriginal man was a part of the whole process, not a man who wanted to change the process abruptly.

Wayburn: So, when you ask that question--keep people out--no, not necessarily keep all people out, all the time, but restrict people to those who are willing to abide by the natural laws--to study them, to enjoy them, and enjoy the country. But even so you can't have too many people, particularly modern people, enjoying it. That's where restriction comes in.

##

Three Momentous Decisions in 1952: "The Turn of the Hinge"

Schrepfer: What about the arguments or debates that began about '53, '54, over whether the club should grow? Creating out-of-state chapters was a major turning point.

Wayburn: Right. From my perspective, 1952 was the turn of the hinge. You will remember that in 1952 we were engaged in the Dinosaur campaign and the Upper Colorado River project. I was a member of the conservation committee which was making the decisions which we recommended to the board.

In 1952, the board of directors did three significant things. One, it was fighting the Upper Colorado River project. Two, it engaged a full-time professional on five-sevenths salary (the first time it had ever paid anyone, except for clerical-secretarial work). And three, it decided to go national. These were all closely interrelated, and these took place about 1952. Which was cause and which was effect in some instances may be a little difficult to say without the written record, and maybe even with the written record.

I was a member of the conservation committee who was by then attending all the meetings of the board of directors and was working behind the scenes in large part, presenting information to some degree. I remember meeting at Harold Bradley's house one day in 1952--evening. Our conservation committee meetings at that time took place at Harold Bradley's. Harold had taken Art Blake's place as the chairman of the committee. We used to have thirty or forty people at the meetings. We argued all night on whether or not we should put everything we had into a campaign--something that very few of us knew anything about. This was the Upper Colorado River Project. All we knew was, really, that two dams were proposed to invade Dinosaur National Monument. We regarded the national parks as sacred areas which must not be violated--even though Dinosaur was "only a monument and not a park," and even though

Wayburn: Bestor Robinson would argue, "Let's compromise and agree to Split Mountain dam and save Echo Park. Split Mountain is not as valuable as Echo Park."

None of us had ever been in Dinosaur National Monument. Maybe Harold Bradley had, but essentially none of us had. We were fighting on principle. We were a little club of seven thousand members. The conservation committee argued all night and the next day eight of us assembled to make a decision. It was delegated to eight of us to make this decision--would we or would we not throw everything we had, all of our resources, into the Dinosaur campaign? We decided we would. Those people, as I remember, included Harold Bradley, Dave Brower, Dick Leonard, Charlotte Mauk, Lewis Clark, myself; Art Blake must have been one, and one other.

We presented our decision to the board of directors, and they accepted it. Even before that, we had talked about going national. But we realized in this campaign--it was a national campaign--we had to become national if we were going to succeed in this and other things that we saw ahead of us. So those two things went together.

At the same time (I think it was for the Dinosaur campaign) we realized that no one had the time to go visit Dinosaur, go to Congress, do all the other things that were going to be necessary. So, we looked about for someone who could be paid to do the work, and he was in our midst. That was Dave Brower.

Going National: Formation of the Pacific Northwest Chapter

Wayburn: I'm pretty sure--you can look back in the records--that we had decided in 1952, we'd recommended to the directors and the directors agreed, that the club should become a national organization. Now, the Pacific Northwest story is a little bit different, and I was very much in the middle of that in 1953.

Schrepfer: Oh yes--with the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs.

Wayburn: In 1953 I became president of the federation.

Schrepfer: There were people who were arguing that there was some problem or conflict.

Wayburn: That's correct. Even before 1951 when I first went to the federation there was conflict, for different reasons perhaps. There were then some thirty-one to thirty-five clubs in the federation. The Sierra Club, with seven thousand members, was by far the largest. The Mountaineers had one thousand at the time, and the Mazamas had seven hundred (something like this). They were the next two largest clubs. These small clubs, particularly, and the middle-sized clubs argued that the Sierra Club should have just one vote (we never claimed more than one vote) and should not influence the federation more than its one-vote status. They were bitterly opposed--the northwestern clubs--to the Sierra Club coming into the Northwest. That was a parochial issue. As president of the federation, I leaned over backwards to support the federation viewpoint.

##

Wayburn: I argued before the directors of the Sierra Club that the Sierra Club should not establish the Pacific Northwest Chapter but should work through the federation clubs in the Northwest to accomplish its objectives. By that time, people like Pat Goldsworthy and Polly [Pauline] Dyer had moved up to Seattle. Al Schmitz had moved to Portland. Polly Dyer had insinuated herself very well into the Mountaineers and become chairman of the Mountaineers' conservation committee; she was there for many years. But Pat did not accommodate to the Mountaineer policies. He wanted to, and some of the other people wanted to, establish a Sierra Club chapter in the Pacific Northwest.

I remember with interest, too, there was a man named Verlis Fischer in Portland who had been, I think, president of the Mazamas, who argued strenuously for the establishment of a Sierra Club chapter in the Pacific Northwest. Fischer later became one of our most virulent critics because "we went too far."

However, during that year [1953] I was successful in preventing the establishment of a special chapter in Oregon-Washington. The next year I was not successful, and I've always been glad of that. I was not opposing chapter status because I didn't want a chapter there, but because I had an official job to do.

Have you checked to see whether the Atlantic Chapter or the Pacific Northwest Chapter is the older? My impression is the Atlantic Chapter is.

Schrepfer: We can certainly look that up.

Wayburn: I'll check. Hold on one second. [tape recorder turned off]

Schrepfer: Okay. If the Atlantic Chapter preceded the Northwest, then the issue of the Northwest is somewhat eased. In other words, the question of the Northwest Chapter was a local question, not a national.

Wayburn: It was a local or parochial question, and not a question of whether or not the club should go national. That issue had been decided, I thought in 1952, and we've just seen the Atlantic Chapter was actually formed in 1950.

Schrepfer: But they still debated it after the fact whether it had been a good thing, after they created it.

Wayburn: That's correct. We have our liberal and our conservative wings; we have had right along. (I guess at the moment, less.) But there was very definitely a conservative and liberal or radical aspect of the directors through the fifties and sixties, with the liberal always winning out in the long run.

Schrepfer: So you thought that out-of-state chapters and growth was good.

Wayburn: Yes. They were not necessarily good--they were essential.

Schrepfer: Essential to fight national campaigns.

Wayburn: That's correct. We had decided by that time that what affects the Sierra Nevada affects the Cascades, affects the Sawtooth, affects wilderness everywhere. And what affects parks in one area affects parks everywhere.

Schrepfer: As long as you were fighting national bureaus you had to be national.

Wayburn: That's correct. We realized that in order to provide for enough land--and we were traditionally, in that respect, bound to the land--we had to have national strength. As we got into the other environmental issues, and they were to be decided on a national as well as a state basis, we had to be national for that.

Above all, the big issues that were being fought in the Congress were national issues, and we had to have the clout to fight. Seven thousand people was not enough.

Schrepfer: You thought it was very possible that what was happening to Dinosaur could be a precedent.

Wayburn: In my mind, there was no question of it.

Debates on Dinosaur and Glen Canyon, 1950s

Schrepfer: You mentioned the all-night debate [on initiating a major campaign to save Dinosaur National Monument]. I'm quite sure the debate was not recorded because debates rarely are in the minutes. What were the objections to the Dinosaur campaign from those who did object to it, and who were they? It was the first out-of-California issue.

Wayburn: Right. I was not a member of the board at the time, but I was on the conservation committee. We debated the issues beforehand. The pro argument was the integrity of the national parks system; that was the prime pro argument. We, as an idealistic organization devoted to upholding the principles of the national park system, felt that we had to fight for it. This was the first time since Hetch Hetchy that there had been proposed dams inside a national park. Even though we really didn't know much about Dinosaur, and some people decried it, we felt that we had to meet this issue on principle.

I don't recall the whole of the debate at that time. The minutes of the conservation committee of 1951-52 probably would give some clue. And I don't recall the vigorous opponents. I know that the reasons con were, "It's not our issue," "It's too far away," "It's a second-rate national park," "It won't be a precedent." All of these things came up in the course of the debate.

The one thing that stands out in my mind, because he was my opponent in so many debates with the board of directors later, was that Bestor Robinson had proposed a compromise. He agreed that we should fight, but he proposed that we--the Sierra Club--propose as a compromise that Split Canyon dam be allowed and that Echo Park be opposed. But Bestor did not prevail in the board. I don't think he was part of the debate within the conservation committee; I don't know whether he was a member of the conservation committee, although all board members would of course be invited.

In that day, the conservation committee was a comparatively small group of people who were particularly interested; and the board was a broader group composed, as I mentioned earlier, of people more established than perhaps the conservation committee people were. And yet, some members of the board always used to come to the conservation committee, people like Charlotte Mauk, often Lewis Clark, often Dick Leonard, always Dave Brower, always Harold Bradley after he was elected, and so on down the line.

Wayburn: I would have to read back to refresh my memory on that.

Schrepfer: No, that's fine. Your answer's fine. What about the campaign itself? Brower was largely responsible, I guess, for shaping it. How would you describe this campaign, evaluate it?

Wayburn: It was a most effective campaign. It was Dave's first big one, and he made the most of it. I didn't go back to Washington. I was a citizen supporter of this campaign. I didn't have leadership in it; I had a policy-making role in that I was one of the eight people who made the final decision. But at the time, I was the chairman of the Bay Chapter Conservation Committee, and I had the local issues around the Bay Area as my prime interest (I've mentioned the fight to expand Mount Tamalpais State Park), and I was interested in the Sierra Nevada, which I was exploring as far as I could. On principle I was very strong for fighting Dinosaur. I wrote letters about it, but I did not take a lead part in that campaign.

I remember Dave going back to Washington and coming back jubilant at confounding the Bureau of Reclamation with his "ninth-grade arithmetic" and finding their statistics were false. There were some of the other people in the club who played a role. I'm certain--I think Nathan Clark, who was an engineer with the Lockheed Company, did calculations which were very helpful to us. Of course, Wallace Stegner's book on Dinosaur (published by A.A. Knopf) was the first of our national issue books, and this played a big role too.

Schrepfer: There was some question about Glen Canyon--whether Glen Canyon and Dinosaur could both have been saved.

Wayburn: If the conservation movement had been advanced to the point that it was much later, we might have saved Glen Canyon. Looking at it in perspective, I don't think that we could have had both Glen Canyon and Dinosaur at that time. As it was, we were fortunate, and we had this national park principle. Glen Canyon had no reserved status; it was unreserved public land. We realized later we had compromised a very fine area. But again, we didn't know. It's one of the things that made me decide I was going to personally find out about as much as I could on all of these issues beforehand. If I had known in 1952 what I knew in 1968 about Glen Canyon, I would have fought awfully hard for Glen Canyon. As it was, some of our people tried to include Glen Canyon at the time. But most of the agitation came later, after the rules had been laid down for the decisions.

Wayburn: We eked out in the Dinosaur campaign. We won, but we didn't win by too much. If we had had Glen Canyon in there too, we might have lost. As it was, Mr. Aspinall, who was just then reaching his greatest power, had opposed us bitterly. I think that he would have prevailed, as he did on other projects that were outside of national parks. The Arkansas Frying Pan Project was an example of that, where they tunneled through the Rockies to bring water to eastern Colorado from the Frying Pan River; the Frying Pan feeds into the Roaring Fork of the Colorado.

Being realistic, and looking back twenty-odd years, I have serious doubts if we could have sustained both victories.

Schrepfer: And I gather you felt the same way at the time?

Wayburn: Yes, but I didn't know enough about Glen Canyon. It was "another place down there on the desert." [laughter]

Schrepfer: One of the reasons for advocating Mineral King ski development was to save San Gorgonio. In this case, the argument was to accept Glen Canyon to save Dinosaur. It came up again with the Nipomo Dunes and Diablo Canyon. Is there a pattern there?

Wayburn: There's always an either-or pattern in conservation, and I've never believed in it. Well, I was not party to the "either San Gorgonio or Mineral King struggle." As I studied Mineral King at the beginning of 1949, I was firmly convinced that Mineral King on its merits should not be developed for a commercial ski development. During that time, it's quite true the Forest Service had come along on San Gorgonio. I was not part of that. This was, in a way, the fight of southern California conservationists. The Sierra Club was in it, all right, but the choosing sides part was not one I had anything to do with. In my opinion, we should have both: San Gorgonio as a wilderness and Mineral King as a protected area. We couldn't get it protected in the Forest Service, so we wanted it back in the park. We're still at this, as you know. The bill has not yet gone through. It has a good chance now with both California senators and the local congressmen joined in a large array of other congressmen. But it remains to be seen whether that will be put through this year; it's still doubtful.*

It's so much easier to oppose something than it is to get something positive done. That opposition to "blind progress" (which was coined some years ago) has been one of our fortes. But

*In October 1978 Congress passed the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (omnibus parks bill), which incorporated Mineral King into Sequoia National Park.

Wayburn: I thought we had to accentuate the positive; in talking before the club and before other organizations in the general community, I've always tried to accentuate that and emphasize it.

Opposing Power Plants at Nipomo Dunes and Bodega Bay

Wayburn: Back to the either/or--preventing the development of Nipomo Dunes [on the California coast] was one of my causes in 1961-63. We thought we came out all right on that. We found out in about '64 that the state was not going about the acquisition of Nipomo Dunes for a state park as we had thought they were. About that time, PG&E [Pacific Gas and Electric Company], which had plans for a nuclear power plant at Nipomo Dunes and had just about offered to yield on Nipomo (Oceanic Dunes), found another site at Diablo Canyon. By then I was no longer president of the club. It was in 1965 that that matter came up, and I had turned this whole problem over to Will Siri, who succeeded me as president.

Will personally investigated Nipomo Dunes and agreed that we should fight for them; he also did the investigation of Diablo Canyon. I had never seen Diablo Canyon until afterwards, and I simply took Siri's word for it in the debate. I knew what I wanted on the Nipomo Dunes; I knew their value. I was accepting someone else's word on Diablo Canyon.

Later--and this was a matter of comparison--I went down to Diablo Canyon and saw it and was of the opinion if we had to have nuclear development of any kind on the seashore, that this was perhaps as good a place as they could find. Still later I found out I had been deceived on what PG&E was doing. Like the Forest Service, PG&E, in accomplishment of its purposes, didn't tell us the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The actual structures on the beach are not as bad as the poles and lines which go out from there and spread all over the landscape, over the hills from Diablo Canyon into the Los Osos Valley and beyond. They didn't tell us the whole story.

If I'd been voting on that ten years later, I would have voted to oppose Diablo Canyon too. It might well have been a quixotic gesture because I've learned through the years that we, the American people, have to lose something in order to realize what we've lost and to gain something more. We've learned that the hard way in places. I'm not at all sure, given the time, that we could have saved Diablo Canyon as well. They were different types

Wayburn: of areas, and it was simple to say either/or, or both; but that was only part of the issue. The issue was, how much must you lose before you can realize what you've lost? Then what can you say? There are many people who say that both of them should be developed as sites for atomic energy plants. And, as you know, the decision at this time, fifteen years later, is "go slow" but not yet "no nuclear energy plants in California."

Schrepfer: There were some people in the club who were bitter over this. I guess Martin Litton accused Doris Leonard--

Wayburn: That I think is an exaggeration of what their respective roles were. Doris Leonard, Dorothy Varian, and George Collins had formed the organization known as Conservation Associates, which was never anything but three people, with Dorothy's money allowing George and Doris to work. They attempted to be a go-between, conciliating conservationists and industry. They failed, as so many other peacemakers fail. They, in my opinion, were not too soundly based. They considered themselves as the conservationists who could make the decisions for other conservationists. This wasn't true.

On the other hand, I don't think that Doris was a sell-out either during that time or later when she became a director at PG&E. I think her intentions were the best, and I think that she was trying to do what she thought was right. This, of course, was a subject of bitter debate and much hard feelings. I didn't participate in that because I thought that each side was doing what it thought was right. I was in the middle for a great deal of the club's troubles.

Schrepfer: Do you think that that kind of cooperation, as practiced by Conservation Associates, is good in principle?

Wayburn: I think that it can be, but it can't have people who are essentially third parties doing the deciding. Neither Doris nor George nor Dorothy were insiders in the club. Even though Doris was Dick's wife, Dick always claimed to keep clear (and I accept his word for this) from what they were doing. (My wife is writing a book on the governor of Alaska; I'm not responsible for that, even though I'm deeply involved). But I thought that their efforts were not fruitful. I don't think they succeeded.

Schrepfer: Didn't they succeed in saving Nipomo?

Wayburn: No. We, the Sierra Club, were responsible for Nipomo.

Schrepfer: And they did not help, contribute--?

Wayburn: Oh yes, I think they contributed. Sure.

Schrepfer: But you could have done it without them?

Wayburn: Yes. We had the assurance of Nipomo Dunes in 1964. I don't remember just when the Conservation Associates was formed, and I don't remember their go-between role. But I do know that it's not weakness but strength on the part of conservationists which wins battles. We made PG&E withdraw from Bodega, and there was no compromise. If we'd had enough strength, we could have made them withdraw from Diablo Canyon.

Schrepfer: I always have the feeling that the club was not quite as responsible for Bodega Bay as was David Pesonen.

Wayburn: All right. Do you want me to tell you that story now? Because I know it well. In 1957, Bodega Bay came on the scene. I would have to check my notes, but I think the first information came in a letter to me from Rose Gaffney, a woman who had lived on Bodega Head for many years. Then, over Labor Day 1957--I know it was a summer weekend; I think it was Labor Day; it could have been July Fourth--I went with my family, all six of us, up to Bodega Bay to visit Rose Gaffney, to camp on the beach at Sonoma Beach State Park, and then to go over for the organizational meeting of the brand new Redwood Chapter, which was formed that year.

PG&E had proposed a plant. It was not listed as an atomic energy plant at that time. It's possible that the original communication came to Harold Bradley as the president of the club; I'm not certain. I was chairman of the conservation committee; Bodega Bay was close enough, and I wanted to investigate it personally.

We looked at Bodega and we said, "There should not be a PG&E plant here. We will oppose this." We went from Bodega Bay over to Santa Rosa to Kenwood, where the new chapter was holding its organization meeting. As chairman of the conservation committee, I gave the new chapter a first task: to oppose the Bodega Bay development. So, we were on record right from the start there in opposition.

PG&E then came to us with compromise gestures. They went particularly to Bradley. I was at these meetings. I was not on the executive committee (and remember, I had to oppose this at the executive committee). We opposed it for some time. Then in 1959 or 1960, we got a new young man in--David Pesonen. He was first engaged as an assistant to the editor of the Sierra Club Bulletin,

Wayburn: and then in some other job. In '61 or '62, I asked him to be assistant to the president because the job of president was demanding too many things.

David had been a senior forestry student and graduated in forestry before he went into the law. He got totally absorbed in Bodega about the time the club decided that it didn't have the resources to fight--was still opposed, but didn't have the resources to fight PG&E too hard. I don't remember all the details of that, but on the record we were always opposed to that development.

David Pesonen and another young law student named Phillip Berry, combined to work out the safety factors of what was then the atomic plant proposal (it had become obvious). In other words, the plan of PG&E had been allowed to subside with our first opposition and had come up again in the early 1960s as an atomic plant. The grounds were then safety, and the directors, after a stormy meeting about it, decided that safety would not be too much of a factor in the opposition. While we would oppose, we would not devote all our resources to that. That's where David Pesonen's intelligence and perseverance paid off. He did this--continued it--as a personal project. He had the support of some of us, but we were doing other things, and this was his. So, just to put the record straight: yes, it was the club; no, it wasn't the club.

Schrepfer: I had thought that there were some people in the club who felt that he was too radical.

Wayburn: There were. No question.

Schrepfer: And the club might have extended more help to him had there been more unanimity among the leadership.

Wayburn: I think that's correct. This is later in the game. But the club's opposition played a very significant role throughout, and at first it was the thing which held up PG&E in '57 and '58.

The Redwood Chapter, incidentally, was not able to carry the load; they were new people and some of them were influenced locally by PG&E--PG&E and the Forest Service had similar tactics. PG&E would find out that the club leadership would be opposed to something and go to local club members to get their support. That happened in Sonoma County. Later, the Redwood Chapter became quite militant. In the meantime, there was this weakness with a new chapter.

Nuclear Power--Pure Experimentation, with Unknown Side Effects

Schrepfer: What is your feeling about nuclear power? Has it changed?

Wayburn: Yes, it's changed definitely. Like many other people in the fifties, nuclear power was presented to me as the bright hope for clean energy of the future. The side effects were not presented, were not known. From that time, I've had peripheral contact with it, and recently I've had more experience, outside of the Sierra Club, through my connection with the environmental health committee of the California Medical Association, which was in support of Proposition 15.*

I'm scared to death of the side effects of nuclear power. This is another part of my philosophy that has developed, what I might call the doctrine of side effects. Science goes into some new issue, and the issue is big and it's all good and beneficial. It's particularly true in medicine. It's true also in environmental conservation. You find out that along with the effects that you are trying to get, you get side effects which are extremely dangerous, even lethal, that you didn't count on. Many scientists, many people are reluctant to admit that those exist because of the good that they see in one way or another, or the vested interest they acquire in the course of time.

Nuclear energy, I think, is the outstanding example of this. I'm not personally afraid--I'm too far along--but I'm afraid for my children's children, for what the eventual fate of the biosphere is. I don't know of anything which is more potentially dangerous. When there were only one or two nuclear plants in California, I could support this experimentation. But this is pure experimentation, even now. It's experimentation on a wholesale scale; the people doing it don't know what they're getting into. And all the people who say this has been the most thoroughly investigated thing in the world--they don't know what they're talking about.

I have had distinguished chemists who would tell me by the hour how safe atomic energy was. "You can pick up plutonium and hold it in your hand." And others say, "If he did that, it would burn right through his hand." I don't know the answer to this; I'm a layman. But enough have I read that I have never been so afraid.

*The Nuclear Power Plants Initiative, on California's June 1976 ballot, was a measure to limit development and operation of nuclear power plants unless specified safety and liability insurance conditions were met.

Wayburn: As time has gone on, we've found that nuclear power is much more expensive; it's not nearly as economic as we had heard. For all these reasons, I'm very firmly opposed to any expansion of atomic power at this time, until we know a lot more. I think the present plan for expansion of fission energy plants from somewhere around fifty in the United States to eight hundred to a thousand by the year 2000 is absolute nonsense! It doesn't make any sense at all, even if we felt that we had to have that much more energy, and I don't agree with that.

The argument is made that it's much more dangerous to breathe in the effects of coal. Perhaps it is, in the short haul. It will kill people tomorrow and the day after. But burning coal, as far as we know, is not going to affect future generations the way nuclear energy can.

I've always believed in experimentation, growing up in scientific medicine. But in medicine one does controlled experiments--small scale experiments. Here with a mere thirty-five years experience, we're setting a stage for possible holocaust and wholesale death in the future.

Schrepfer: Did the atomic bomb have any effect on your thinking?

Wayburn: When the atomic bomb was set off, I was still with the U.S. Air Force. My first reaction was that it ended the war a lot sooner than it would have ended otherwise. It meant that a lot of work that I'd been doing was unnecessary because my work during the preceding year as officer in charge of the Mass Chest X-ray Service of the U.S. air forces in Europe had to do with getting chest X-ray films on eighty thousand air force personnel who were to go from the European theater to the Asian theater. As a result of the dropping of the atomic bomb not one went, although we had X-rayed eighty thousand.

I suppose there was a feeling of relief and pride and, "Well, that's a great accomplishment." I didn't go much beyond that. I'm afraid that I didn't think of all the poor Japanese who were being destroyed or maimed. Again, war is war, and it's nasty business. Before I got this last job I was in air sea rescue--going out into the North Sea in a little motor boat to pick up American and English air force personnel who were in bombers which had been shot and were limping home. Some of these people had to ditch in the North Sea; we would pick them up and take them to shore as quickly as possible, and many of them to hospitals.

Wayburn: So I didn't have any of the feelings that came out in, I think, people who knew much more about the moral issues. No, I wasn't concerned at that point.

Schrepfer: Just wondering how the bomb represented man's ability to destroy the environment.

Wayburn: At that moment, I was someone who enjoyed the environment and didn't realize the extent of the damage to the environment--or to the entire future of life--posed by the bomb. I think we found that out afterwards.

V TOWARD A REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK, 1955-1968

[Interview 2: July 31, 1976]##

Initial Interest in the Redwoods

Schrepfer: Let's begin by discussing your early interest in a redwood national park, up to the early 1960s.

Wayburn: We had been interested in the redwoods in a desultory fashion, up to 1955, but it was the Bull Creek disaster which gave me a sense of almost personal guilt--I had been too busy with other things to do anything about the redwoods.

Schrepfer: This is 1954-55?

Wayburn: 1955. Peggy and I had gotten interested in the redwoods at that time, and she was commissioned to do an article for the Sierra Club Bulletin, called the "Tragedy of Bull Creek." We went up to the redwoods occasionally, but it was in 1960 that we became deeply concerned. At the 1961 Wilderness Conference, of which Peggy was the general secretary, it was arranged that she sit next to the new secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, and at that time, she broached to him the fact that there was no redwood national park, and that there should be one. Udall was extremely interested. We tried to get him to come out and look at the redwoods with us. He didn't, but he sent John Carver, who was then assistant secretary for Parks, Fish and Wildlife, and we made a trip up there. The area that we looked at particularly was the Klamath River, which was once one of the great redwood areas. We drove up the Klamath to Blue Creek--at that time Blue Creek was still not logged and parts of the Klamath weren't logged.

Schrepfer: Most of the Klamath was logged.

Wayburn: Most of the Klamath had been logged by that time. Blue Creek had not been, and parts of the Klamath watershed had not been. We suggested the Klamath. We got back from Udall word that this was too much--that there was too much of a fight involved. He thought that compared to this the battle for Canyonlands National Park was a picnic. But at the same time Udall did get interested. I think it was he who got the National Geographic interested in their studies. At the same time he had the Park Service send a pair of professional planners up into the redwoods to spend several months, and they came out with a conclusion.

Schrepfer: Do you recall their names?

Wayburn: Yes. They were Chet Brown and Paul Fritz. Their conclusion was that the only area left with the possibilities for a national park--where there were enough redwoods in a watershed protected from ridge to ridge--was Redwood Creek.

We were in communication with Fritz, particularly, as early as 1963, when they first went in. Because they were investigating, they wanted to know who knew about redwoods and they found out about us. They asked for our opinion, and we told them what we knew, and we compared notes. We all became convinced that Redwood Creek was the choice place. That was the beginning of the Sierra Club's ninety-thousand-acre park proposal.

The National Park Service published a report called "The Redwoods"--they had in there four alternatives, but only three plans. I went to them and said, "You left something out." They said, "Oh, no, we've got everything in there." I said, "No, you've left out what your optimum plan is. It's perfectly obvious as you identify the resource, that there had to be a plan that is bigger than any of the three which you offer." And after a while they admitted to me that that was true. The ninety thousand-acre plan that we offered had been in their private report, but they were told that they could not offer it publicly.

Schrepfer: Was that a coincidence that their recommendation coincided with yours, or was there an influence going back and forth?

Wayburn: There was influence going back and forth. We were looking for the optimum redwood forest to preserve. We wanted not just to find groves, as the Save-the-Redwoods League and the state of California wanted; we were looking for a redwood forest which could be preserved in perpetuity. We were looking for a forest to preserve from ridge to ridge; from the coast to the inland limits of the redwoods. We knew of the early work of the Save-the-Redwoods

Wayburn: League--Madison Grant's proposals [in 1918] of the Humboldt state redwoods, Redwood Creek, the Klamath and the Smith River. I think those were the four areas which were in the original Save-the-Redwoods League national park proposals as places which would be worthy of national park status. By 1963 Humboldt State Redwoods Park had just had a freeway put through it. The Klamath had been cut over--

Schrepfer: I was just going to ask you that--why did Chet Brown and Fritz eliminate the Klamath?

Wayburn: They came along later.

Schrepfer: I see, there was that much cutting that went on in that two or three-year period.

Wayburn: That's right. They thought about Blue Creek, but they thought it had been cut too much. On the other hand there was a twenty-two mile "lawn" of virgin redwoods on the northeast bank of Redwood Creek which had not been logged. That was the section from Lost Man Creek around Little Lost Man and up Redwood Creek to about Copper Creek--possibly Coyote. I'm not sure in 1963, whether there had been logging between Copper and Coyote Creek or not.

On the other side of Redwood Creek, then owned by Georgia Pacific, the logging had been comparatively light. The entire Bridge Creek Mountain was preserved, and the whole of the Devil's Creek watershed was preserved.

Schrepfer: This is the north side?

Wayburn: No, this is on the southwest side. Redwood Creek runs from southeast to northwest, and this was on the southwest side of Redwood Creek.

The Hammond Lumber Company, which had logged that area, had logged it comparatively lightly. The lower part of the drainages of Elam Creek and MacArthur Creek were intact at that time. Bridge Creek was intact. At the time that the Park Service went through there in 1963 and '64, this was a superb watershed. They were in there before we were. They showed it to us, and we became convinced.

We had been looking--you see Redwood Creek was off the beaten path.

Schrepfer: This is Brown and Fritz who showed you Redwood Creek?

Wayburn: Brown and Fritz.

We adopted their plan, but we went beyond what they had proposed. I think that they would have proposed it if it hadn't been for the political influence, but their superiors felt they were asking for too much.

Schrepfer: And then when they talked to you, they suggested this ninety-thousand-acre proposal?

Wayburn: No, they didn't do that. They just showed it to us. They put out their report on the redwoods, and I challenged them on what they had put out because I felt that they hadn't told the whole truth. What they told was the truth but they had left out something. And what they had left out was a larger plan, which they had mentioned to their superiors but had been told that it was too much to ask for.

The largest plan, then, that they offered, was, I think, around sixty-eight thousand acres--all in the Redwood Creek basin. Incidentally, all these various plans included Prairie Creek Redwood State Park, which is, of course, in the watershed of Redwood Creek.

##

Contacts with Stewart Udall and Laurance Rockefeller

[The following section was recorded on February 18, 1984, to replace comments lost because of a malfunctioning recorder in a previous interview.]

Lage: You were going to tell about your meeting with Rockefeller and your relationship with Udall in the early years.

Wayburn: From 1961 to 1965, we worked very closely with Stewart Udall. I went back to Washington for various purposes three to five times a year during that period, and I would usually go in to see Stewart. The topic was most often the redwoods and what should be in the redwood national park.

I would take along our latest proposals. He would have maps showing the areas that the Park Service had identified. We would spread these maps down on the floor of his office and go over them in some detail.

Wayburn: We were able to get Laurance Rockefeller interested in our ideas for the redwood national park. I had been corresponding with him in 1962. He was the chairman of John F. Kennedy's White House Conference on the Environment in June 1964. I made arrangements to see him before the conference. He was extremely busy as the chairman and said that he could give me only a half hour.

I went into the room where the conference was being planned and spread out my maps on the redwoods. Rockefeller seemed most interested. Instead of a half hour, we had well over an hour and would have had longer if Fred Smith, one of his assistants who was concerned particularly with the management of the conference, hadn't been pulling him away to attend to the business of the conference. Another one of his assistants, Connie Wirth, the immediate past director of the National Park Service, was egging me on. At the end of my exposition, I turned to Mr. Rockefeller, and said, "What do you think, Mr. Rockefeller?"

He said, "How much would it cost?" I answered, "A hundred and fifty million dollars," thinking that would throw him back. He said, "That shouldn't be difficult. We could put in fifty million. We'd get the Ford Foundation to put in fifty million, and the Old Dominion Foundation to add another fifty million."

By this time my heart was floating on the ceiling, along with all the rest of me, in fantasy. I then said, "Mr. Rockefeller, anything I can do, I'm ready to. What do we do next?"

Rockefeller answered, "I have taken no public position. When I do, I will be guided by my longstanding advisors, Newton Drury and Horace Albright." At that point, something dropped on the floor. It was my heart.

I didn't hear much from Rockefeller for some time, but still had hopes that he would come out to look at the redwoods and see the values involved.

##

Wayburn: Well, on the weekend of July 4, 1965, he did make a visit to the redwoods. Peggy and I were also in the area. We stayed at Hagood's Motel in Orick. Jean Hagood said, "Oh--you just missed Laurance Rockefeller. Are you following him around?" I said that I didn't know that I was, but-- She said, "Laurance and Newton Drury were here last night, and today went on north to Crescent City. They were looking at Redwood Creek and looking further at all the redwood parks." By this time, I was quite convinced that Laurance was not

Wayburn: our man, and I knew that Newton was not our man. As I learned later in the summer--although I'd suspected very strongly before--Stewart Udall was no longer our man.

I had had a brief telephone conversation with Udall from Kemmerer, Wyoming. It was the only time I was able to talk to him. It was late in July or early August of '65, although we had been on very close terms earlier. The administration kept offering one excuse after another for not introducing a bill according to the recommendations of its own National Park Service.

Legislative Trials of the Sierra Club's Redwood Bill, 1965-1968

Wayburn: We were aware of the fact that Wayne Aspinall, chairman of the House Interior Committee, had a habit of taking up bills in chronological order. When he wanted to postpone something, he would say that its time hadn't come. Therefore, we thought it essential to get in a regular bill as soon as possible, and we asked our friendly congressman, Jeffrey Cohelan--and I think Phil Burton was the co-author of the bill--to introduce our bill in October, 1965. The expectation was not that it would be considered, but that by getting it in in this session of Congress, the next session would have hearings on it.

The next three years were very hectic. Actually, the Senate took up the bill before the House did. Chairman Henry Jackson of the Senate Interior Committee, and Senator Kuchel, who was California's senior senator at the time and the senior minority member of the Senate Interior Committee, were both supporting the bill. We had worked long and hard on Kuchel, and we finally convinced him it was in the best interest of California and of the people of the whole country to have a redwood national park. He had been very skeptical earlier, but he became in this regard particularly--and others too--a confirmed conservationist. It was his efforts and those of Jackson which made the redwood bill as good as it was.

The Senate committee came out to investigate, to have field hearings in Crescent City. I accompanied the helicopters. I was with Jackson's helicopter, and he unfortunately did not get to see much of Redwood Creek. But he said that he would support a good-sized redwood bill. Through his and Kuchel's efforts, the Senate passed a bill which had 64,000 acres all in Redwood Creek and was roughly comparable to plan three, I think, of the National Park

Wayburn: Service--not plan four, which was our bill. It was not ideal, but it was good. This was the situation, I believe, in 1967 at the end of that first session.

It was the next session of Congress before Aspinall would hold hearings and before he would allow the bill out of his committee. When he finally did, it was his own manufacture, and it was for 28,000 acres, mostly scattered in a thin line along the coast, including three state redwood parks, and with none of what we termed a conservation opportunity.

I don't know all of the motivation of Mr. Aspinall; that's another story. I know he was the miners' advocate; he was not in favor of preservation. In spite of this all, we had a fairly good mutual relationship, on fiercely opposite sides, but on friendly terms.

During the course of the hearings, many things happened. I don't recall all of them at this time. One interesting sidelight is that we arranged to have the Sierra Club outing in the redwoods in June, 1967. It was a very popular outing--over fifty people went. It was a sort of base camp; traveling around to different areas by automobile, and then walking in.

At that time, we were able to get permission from Arcata and Georgia Pacific to visit their lands. It was the only time Arcata, particularly, gave permission. Arcata's chief forester, Eugene Hofstetter, insisted on going with us on our trip and trying to proselyte us--of course, without much success.

We had a very good trip, and most of the people on that trip became very firm supporters of the redwood park efforts.

During the course of the redwood battle, we became very well acquainted with the local congressman, Don Clausen, who had succeeded the recently deceased Clem Miller just before the redwood controversy. Miller's death was a great blow to us because we had thought that Clem Miller would introduce the bill, and if the local congressman does introduce the bill, it has, as you know, a better chance of success. If the local congressman opposes the bill, the Congress has a habit of not going along, although occasionally it will.

In the case of the redwoods, Clausen had been elected by industrial interests, particularly the lumbermen; he knew he had been financed this way. He was a former insurance man in Crescent City. He never came out in open opposition to the bill. I had interesting conversations with him in a very friendly, casual sort

Wayburn: of way, a superficial sort of way. He would say to me, "Ed, you know, if I oppose this bill, you couldn't get it through." I said, "Yes, Don, I think it would be very difficult if you were in full opposition." (He was a member of the Interior Committee too.) I said, "And, by the way, you know, we've got two thousand members in your district, and they all want the bill."

Clausen introduced his own redwood bill for a skinny coastal park of possibly 35,000 acres. But it wasn't near as bad as Aspinall's bill. In the conference the Senate prevailed, largely through the efforts again of Jackson and Kuchel. The trouble with conferences is that even when one side prevails, it's always a compromise. In this case, the total acreage went up from Aspinall's 28,000 acres much closer to Jackson and Kuchel's 64,000 acres; it ended up at 58,000. But it took the form of the House bill by including all three state parks on the seacoast. Practically the only new, virgin timber was in the Redwood Creek drainage--some eleven or twelve thousand acres--instead of the 33,000 acres that we had tried to include. It did not include--this is very critical--it did not include watershed protection for the upper seven miles of Redwood Creek.

The treatment of this area, the so-called "worm," proved that our Congress had not learned any lessons from the last hundred years. It left unprotected a superb stretch of virgin redwoods along the bank of Redwood Creek, a quarter of a mile wide on each side, extending up above the Tall Trees. The Tall Trees had been the rallying point for a large part at Redwood Creek because of attention focused on them by the National Geographic article in July 1964.

There are interesting bits of byplay that I heard about later which may have affected the course of this legislation. When the House [Interior] committee made its field hearings--that was Aspinall who was in charge, the House did not have any way to take its members past the Tall Trees. We drove to the Tall Trees grove in buses over Georgia Pacific's line, with their permission, and Mr. Aspinall took the committee there. I had investigated ahead of time and had arranged for a helicopter to be there when the committee was there; since the U.S. government couldn't afford to pay for a helicopter flight, the Sierra Club did. But it was a small helicopter and could take not more than two other people besides the pilot. So we were able to get only five congressmen into the upper area that we call the Emerald Mile, a particularly beautiful stretch which was in the Senate bill but outside the House bill.

Wayburn: After we finished taking these five congressmen up [Congressmen Ryan, Udall, McClure, Haley, and Tunney]--and they all walked back--they were convinced of the worth of this area. I was told by someone else that Aspinall was furious at me because I didn't ask him first. I thought that he wasn't interested in going in. Learning of my mistake, I offered him the opportunity later at the Tall Trees but he declined. I really doubt if this would have made a great difference. Aspinall was in many ways, including stature, a very small man.

This trip had an impact on Bill [William F.] Ryan, who was an Irishman and a very liberal Democratic congressman from New York City and had never been in such an area as the redwoods before. He was so convinced by this experience that he insisted, before, he would let the measure out of the Interior Committee, on getting the so-called Emerald Mile into the House bill. Then this isolated strip was in the House bill and not in the Senate bill. In order to compromise with the House, the "worm" was extended up for a full seven miles, but without providing watershed protection.

The 1968 Redwood National Park Act--A Pyrrhic Victory

Wayburn: At the time, we welcomed this because we thought it would give us an opportunity to come back the next year. But, on looking back, it was a Pyrrhic victory. The man who had first introduced our bill and carried it in the House, Jeffrey Cohelan, was afraid that the next year was too soon; since the Congress had made a decision, it would demand that the executive branch carry out what it could. So he waited a year, and then he was defeated for reelection a year after that. So he wasn't there to introduce it.

In the rest of Congress, the feeling was there that Congress had done its share; it had appropriated more money than had ever before been appropriated--\$92 million. Also, it included the Redwood Purchase Unit of the national forest. (I'm running ahead pretty fast here on what happened as I remember, and I'll remember more things later.) But we knew that this was dangerous. President Johnson had hardly signed the bill--I think it was that same weekend we were back there. I went to Stewart Udall and said, "You know as well as I know that this bill is a bad compromise. Everyone says we have a victory, but we don't regard it as a real victory. There

Wayburn: are, however, three provisions in the bill which will allow salvage of a great deal of the redwoods in Redwood Creek if you do something about carrying out these provisions.*

Udall thought it over and then said, "I can't do it. I'll be out of office in another few weeks." He told us this immediately after the election. He said, "Ed [Edward C.] Crafts will take care of it. He knows all about it, and I'm going to leave him responsibility for arranging with the lumber companies for the transfer of the land. I know he'll do his best." Crafts was then the director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. I didn't have the same confidence in Crafts that Udall did. Crafts I've always considered an extremely bright man and a very good forester, and one who took the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation job when he was passed over in favor of Ed [Edward P.] Cliff for chief forester.

Crafts had attended the field hearings; Crafts was right on top of the redwood situation. But Crafts was not only a compromiser, he also was a logger. He was a man who would, if he could, put something over on you, too.

I remember at the Senate hearings, he said to me, "You know you're not going to get what you want. So you should settle for--" and he outlined his position, for much less. I thanked him and said, "We'll still go ahead." I don't know if you ever read the write-up that he did of his view of the redwood situation, how it all happened.** Like many of us, Crafts was a very good man in his way, but he didn't see things our way. He didn't see that we needed to preserve an entire forest in order to perpetuate the redwoods.

*Interestingly, Congressman Aspinall had mentioned that there were three provisions in the bill, which could have saved more redwoods. One was a scenic corridor, which could have saved a good deal of Skunk Cabbage Creek if it had been implemented. One was the fact that with the 58,000 acres, not all of it was identified. Some 56,200 were identified. There were another 1,800 acres of virgin redwoods that could have been acquired under this provision of the act. The third was that the secretary had the right--all these were privileges of the secretary--to acquire more land within, or adjacent to, the boundaries, if he thought that this was essential to the protection of the Redwood National Park. [E.W., from Interview III, June 6, 1978, tape 7, side A]

**See American Forestry, June and July, 1970.

Wayburn: And he did not take any actions which would lead to carrying out these provisions that the House had inserted into the bill when they took the crucial acreage out of the Senate bill.

Efforts to Obtain Enforcement of the 1968 Act

Wayburn: As I said, we tried to get Udall to do it, and then as soon as the new administration came in, we wrote to undersecretary [Russell] Train. We wrote to Train particularly because he was a fellow conservationist, having been president of the Conservation Foundation, and we knew he would have a certain sympathy. But Train did nothing. Then we tried [Walter] Hickel, who did nothing. We tried [Rogers B.] Morton, who did nothing. We have even tried Kleppe, and he has done nothing.

You undoubtedly have papers too on the long lawsuits that we had and we won, and we finally no longer won because the Department of the Interior did many things to satisfy the judge's [Judge William T. Sweigert] demands. He finally ended up a month ago stating that he thought the Department of Interior had done everything within its power; it was now up to Congress to save what was left of the Redwood National Park.

We had gone to each secretary, trying to get him to do something. In 1971, with the new Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the first thing that the new executive director, Jim Moorman, had to offer us was that we make a formal legal demand on the secretary to carry out the provisions of the act, and even before that, under the Freedom of Information Act, to let us know what they had been doing about the redwoods, because as far as we could find out, nothing was done and the Department of the Interior would give the Sierra Club no information.

Moorman and I went in to see the secretary, who was not there, and Assistant Secretary [Nathaniel] Reed, who was not there. We gave our demand to Deputy Assistant Secretary Curtis Bohlen, who had just started work a few days before, and who was very much taken aback by being confronted by this formal legal document. But this was the first thing that produced any results. We found out later that, as a result of our putting this [written demand] in, the department had the National Park Service do a study which resulted in their recommending an additional ten thousand acres around the worm to protect that area. And yet, no public notice of that ever came out.

Wayburn: After we found this out, we had proof that the department itself recognized that they were not performing their duties as they should. The Park Service report stated that the redwoods in the existing park were in danger. We then extended our suit to include a demand that the department do something. The next thing that happened was the department started a three-year study and kept delaying until the study was over. We'd done the studies beforehand, and we knew what the facts were, and we wanted action.

After the three-year study was completed, the study agreed scientifically with what we'd said back in 1968. Then, we extended our suit once more to make the department do something. Finally the department did recommend two things: first, that the Department of Justice take legal action against the redwood companies; secondly, that the administration make a plea to Congress to increase the authorization beyond 58,000 acres and to increase the amount of money appropriated.

At this particular moment [July 1976], the department hasn't yet filed suit. They're still negotiating with the companies, and I don't know whether they'll file suit next week or not; they may. The Office of Management and Budget, working inside the Department of the Interior, has denied the department's request to go to Congress on a larger redwood national park, even though no funds are involved; it simply puts the issue back to Congress. In turn, we will go to our friendly congressmen before the next session. We have had, in all of this session, the Burton bill, which the Interior Committee has not yet heard; until there are hearings, nothing will happen.

We haven't pressed it this year or even this Congress because we are aware of the realities of this situation, of getting more funds. This is the largest amount which was ever authorized. The money comes from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. The Land and Water Conservation Fund has had a backlog of projects for several years. President Nixon and President Ford have not allowed a full funding to be appropriated. And yet, even if full funding--\$300 million a year--were allowed, this still wouldn't be enough for all the projects which need to come out of that fund.

We've been pushing hard. One of my personal projects of this session of Congress is to get the increase in the Land and Water Fund budget. The Senate, led by Senator [Henry] Jackson, passed a bill, I think, in the first session authorizing an increase in the Land and Water Conservation Fund to one billion dollars a year, starting immediately, making certain changes in the formula. The house had a companion bill by Congressman Taylor, chairman of the

Wayburn: subcommittee on national parks, which was less bold. It called for a gradual increase over a several year period, from \$300 million to \$800 million. That bill has now been passed. So, the two bills are in conference committee at the present time. What comes out of that will determine in part how we move next. President Ford may veto the bills, but there are forces within the administration which have urged that he sign the bill for the Land and Water Fund. I have seen a memorandum (which is still confidential and its history won't come out for a while, but it'll be public property) from Assistant Secretary Reed urging the president to advocate actively the House bill, because he thought it had several features which were preferable to the Senate Bill.

##

Opposition and Support in the Redwood Towns##

Wayburn: I want to acknowledge the local support we received for the redwood park idea. In the years between 1963 and 1968, when we were fighting the battle of the first redwood national park, we met a number of dedicated people in northwestern California who played significant roles in the establishment of the park. Notable among these were Jean Webster Hagood and her family, Lucille and Bill Vinyard, David Van de Mark, Kay and Keith Chafee, and Ru Flo Harper Lee.

I remember that we would occasionally meet at Ru Flo Harper Lee's house. We would park our car one to two blocks away and walk on because we did not want to take a chance of endangering her life. She was at the time well along in years, a typical "little old lady in tennis shoes," who had had the courage to appear before the Board of Supervisors of Humboldt County and other bodies which were hostile to her for several years. Although she had been repeatedly threatened, she continued to stand up in this regard until her death.

There were also a number of students, particularly from the University of California at Davis. Notable among these were Jim Rose, who furnished all of the pictures for the second redwood book, and Bob Snyder. There were others also, some of whom are up there working still.

##

Wayburn: But we also encountered considerable local opposition. During our Sierra Club outing in the redwoods in 1967, we had along with us on our first day the editor of the Eureka paper, a young man who said, "I want you to know I disagree with your ideas, but I will report what you say fairly on the reportorial pages even while I'm editorializing against you." I said, "That's fair enough." And he did. We were attacked editorially all the time. But the reportorial work of that newspaper was, I thought, essentially fair.

We ran into a terrific amount of local opposition, which was completely understandable although erroneous. If the Congress had passed the redwood bill we advocated, with all the side benefits that could have been contained, the people of the redwood region would be much better off than they are now. They have for a hundred years depended upon a single-industry economy. Their land has been destroyed, and they've been kept more or less pauperized. A few people have made great fortunes--the people who control the lumber companies. A few more people have made very comfortable livings--some of the merchants and some of the loggers. Many of the people who work in the logging camps work at a very low economic level.

The net result has been that the towns were essentially company towns. Although the only admitted company town was Scotia, Eureka and Crescent City amounted to company towns. They had no place to go except to use up their one resource. The sad part is, as John Muir expressed it so long ago, that as timber the redwood is too good to live.

We had in our plans a viable tourist economy which would utilize the small towns around the Redwood National Park as places where tourists would go and leave money. But the park, as passed in its final form, was not a rational or a viable park.

Schrepfer: All you have to do is to look at the map for a moment to see that.

Wayburn: Yes. I've often been asked, "Well, shouldn't you go to the state of California and get them to transfer their parks?" Someday I hope that we may. But I can't in any way, in conscience, go to the state at this time and ask them to transfer all the valuable property that they have.

Schrepfer: They wouldn't do it anyway.

Wayburn: They wouldn't do it anyway, but I can't blame them, because the federal government has added all too little when they got a chance to add a lot. If the Sierra Club plan of 90,000 acres had

Wayburn: been accepted in the early stages of this fight, the entire area could have been acquired for \$150 million. The people of the redwood region, as well as the people of the United States, would be much better off.

Stewart Udall's Turnabout, Spring 1965

Schrepfer: I have some questions about some of the things I can't find in the written record. I wonder if you were under the impression at the time of what kind of pressure Udall was under to have changed his position in 1965. We talked about Laurance Rockefeller, obviously. You mentioned that he had listened to you. He turned to the league and assumed their position. Obviously he's got unofficial capacity with the federal government. He was the adviser to Johnson on the Redwood National Park and this type of thing. But exactly what was Udall under? Rockefeller changed the president's position? Do you think Udall was afraid of losing his job, or what? Why did he change?

Wayburn: I could make this simplistic (and might have at one time) and say he wasn't a man of conviction. That wouldn't be entirely fair to Stewart Udall. I've always been bothered in his change because we worked together so closely early in the game, and he was such an enthusiastic man who convinced one of his finest intentions. But I've said on more than one occasion that Stewart Udall was the bitterest disappointment of my conservation career because he knew the score so well. I held that against him more than I would against some of the other secretaries or other people in power who didn't know the score in the way Stewart did.

The pressures on him must have been very considerable, and I have no doubt that Rockefeller influenced him greatly. But unless Rockefeller was a much better dissembler than I had, or have, given him credit for, he was greatly impressed by the presentation we gave him in May 1965. Already in April of 1965, we had learned that the league had quietly dropped its support of our bill and was opposing it. That was coincident with my inability to reach Udall when previously we had worked so closely together. So something happened before that, in March or April of 1965.

Schrepfer: Even before Rockefeller was involved?

Wayburn: Before I knew Rockefeller was involved.

Schrepfer: When was it Rockefeller visited the redwoods?

Wayburn: In July, 1965.

Schrepfer: Do you think that the lumber companies had a role at this time?

Wayburn: I believe they did. I think they were lobbying all the time. I know they were working through Don Clausen.

Schrepfer: Don Clausen sponsored the administration's bill.

Wayburn: Did he actually go with the administration bill?

Schrepfer: He was the first one; when the first Kuchel bill was introduced, Clausen introduced the same bill in 1966.

Wayburn: That shows my memory is bad. Well now, the administration bill was for how much?

Schrepfer: Mill Creek?

Wayburn: Just Mill Creek. Right. Well, it was between '66 and '68 that we changed Kuchel's mind--'66 and '67. You recalled to me going in to see Kuchel on several occasions. The first time we went in to see him, he was almost hostile. He was very brusque. But as we explained our position, he became increasingly friendly toward us, and it was he and Jackson who carried it for us. Was it Jackson, then, who introduced our bill when it was first introduced in the Senate? Who did--Metcalf?

Schrepfer: I didn't think that Kuchel and Jackson got involved until they sponsored first that cooperative measure that included both something of Mill Creek and something of Redwood Creek in the fall of '67. That's my recollection.

Wayburn: That's possible, yes. Metcalf has been a very friendly senator who has introduced for us the full measure of what we've asked. Metcalf has not felt able to follow through as strongly as others. He hasn't been a well man during part of this time. A man of very fine intentions. Without looking it up, my memory goes back to the big push, which was in 1967.

Schrepfer: In the period of time in which Udall was evidently wavering, during the summer and early fall of '65, there--

Wayburn: No, he wavered in the spring of '65.

Schrepfer: Well, he's beginning to, yes, but it doesn't become public until November.

Wayburn: It was very obvious to me in April, 1965, just about the time I learned that the Save-the-Redwoods League had withdrawn its support. It's difficult for me to not associate those two events. Why would Udall do it under this provocation? I suppose because the Redwood League was associated with redwoods, and Udall perhaps wanted to support a winning horse. He felt that if the club didn't have the support of the league, then the bill would have a hard time going through. That's the kindest explanation I can give.

As to other pressures early in the game, I don't know. It may have come through Clausen; it may have come direct from the lumber companies. It may have come from the National Park Service, which is an agency which notoriously has been a step behind the citizen conservationists in advocating large ideal national parks.

Role of the Lumber Companies in the Progress toward a Park

Schrepfer: The role of the lumber companies is interesting in this affair. Because of the division between the league and the Sierra Club, the companies always faced the problem of sticking together. Now, it has been said by a number of people that the Sierra Club cooperated with Miller-Rellim. Is there any truth in this?

Wayburn: I can explain that one to you very easily. The Sierra Club felt that the league's position was wrong, even as the league felt that the Sierra Club's position was wrong. The Sierra Club was trying to expand greatly the redwood acquisition in Redwood Creek. We had no concern about Mill Creek expansion. There was already an industrial plant in the heart of Mill Creek, and that we felt was set for a long time. So, we didn't actively oppose logging Mill Creek, just as the league didn't oppose the logging in Redwood Creek. To that extent, one could say, if you were so inclined to, that we cooperated with Miller-Rellim. We had common objectives.

Miller-Rellim likewise split off from the other companies. The companies were not united during the course of this debate. Miller-Rellim raised no objection to the Sierra Club bill for the acquisition of much larger areas of Redwood Creek than were proposed for Mill Creek.

##

Wayburn: Likewise Georgia Pacific and Arcata were perfectly willing to have the national government acquire Miller-Rellim lands in Mill Creek.

Schrepfer: Their competitor.

Wayburn: Their competitor. On the whole, the lumber companies opposed any real acquisition of redwoods for park land because they felt that this would put pressure on them to log other lands earlier, and they wanted to follow the old principle in the redwoods of cutting out all the old growth timber and then getting out (only they never would admit it).

Schrepfer: Did you ever talk to Miller about this?

Wayburn: Oh yes. I talked to Miller a little and to his general manager, Schroeder, who testified at the hearings. We were on friendly terms because we weren't trying to get anything that belonged to them; they had no lands in the Redwood Creek drainage. We felt that we couldn't be advocating preservation of all redwoods since our avowed purpose was one large redwood forest. The lumber companies which were affected were the ones which reacted.

Schrepfer: In a 1967 Saturday Review, Mike McCloskey wrote an article. Talking about the fact that the progress toward a national park had been slowing down, he made the statement that it was hard to tell who was responsible for slowing this down--whether it was the lumber companies, or the financial institutions behind them, or foundations willing to make grants to them, or certain members of Congress. To whom might he have been referring when he talked about financial institutions and foundations?

Wayburn: When he talked about foundations, he was probably talking about the three that I mentioned earlier--the Rockefeller, Ford, and Old Dominion (Mellon) Foundations--and he was probably referring to our earlier efforts to get money from them. We had no real promises, but we had a certain amount of assurance that they would help out in this acquisition. The outstanding example of it, of course, was Mr. Rockefeller's pseudo-offer in 1964.

Schrepfer: Do you think the Rockefellers have any business interests that might be involved in this?

Wayburn: That question has often come up. I don't personally know of any but I've heard this. I simply can't comment on this; whether the Rockefellers had business interests which were affected, or whether Laurance (Laurance was the Rockefeller most closely involved) had become convinced this was not right, I don't know.

Wayburn: I can comment on several other aspects related to this. In '66 or '67, Richard Pough, who had been a very active conservationist for years, voluntarily came to us and said he knew a family related to the Weyerhaeusers. One of the Weyerhaeusers' daughters married into this family. Pough had gone to them with a plea that they, the Weyerhaeuser family, donate their lands to the federal government for the redwood national park. I had learned a little about this interrelationship before; but at this time, it all became much more clear to me.

You may recall in your reading that the Weyerhaeuser Company had always denied vigorously that it had any interest in redwoods, and as far as we're able to find out, the Weyerhaeuser Lumber Company doesn't own any redwood lands, or didn't at that time. However, the Arcata Lumber Company was in large part owned by members of the Weyerhaeuser family. This all came out at the hearings when the chairman of the board of Arcata turned out to be Mr. Weyerhaeuser. Mr. Howard Libbey, Arcata's president, had a certain financial interest in it too. But the great majority interest was in the Weyerhaeusers. Pough had learned that, and he had gone to the younger members of the family. According to the information I got (which was supposed to have come through Pough), he had gotten assent from at least two of the four members of that generation. But the previous generation, the chairman of the board-- I don't remember whether his name was Frederick or George or just what--had said firmly, "We will not give any of this."

An interesting sidelight on this is that at the congressional hearings--I'm not sure whether it was the Senate or House in Washington--Mr. Weyerhaeuser testified. He said that "these people" (meaning the Sierra Club) claim to have great public support." He said, "Well, I've read their ads in the paper, and I want you gentlemen in Congress to know that less than one-third of one percent of the people believe them." My wife, who was sitting in the audience with me, did some fast calculating. She and I went up to Mr. Weyerhaeuser later. I said, "Mr. Weyerhaeuser, you could perform a great public service and be long remembered as a great American if you would consent to donate your land to the federal government. From what I understand, you can do this without too much hardship." He turned red and said, "Thank you, Dr. Wayburn, but I'll make my own decisions."

Then my wife said to him, "Mr. Weyerhaeuser, is it true that the Arcata Lumber Company received thirty thousand letters protesting Arcata's policies in the redwoods?" I thought this gentleman was going to have an apoplectic fit; he turned purple. She had calculated fairly accurately what he was talking about. We

Wayburn: had put these ads in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the San Francisco Chronicle, with a total readership of maybe a million readers--and one-third of one percent of a million, I guess, would come to thirty thousand.

We know the Department of the Interior received many, many thousands of letters advocating our position. These ads were extremely effective. Many of the people who sent in coupons didn't do more, but many also sent in letters asking for saving the redwoods. Otherwise, if this hadn't been true, nothing would have come of all that proposed legislation because the Congress had never before appropriated--they had rarely before appropriated any money, but never before anything like \$92 million plus another \$40 million equivalent in the redwood purchase unit. This was an authorization; it was not an appropriation at that time, it was authorization.

The Legislative Orchestration on the 1968 Bill

Schrepfer: There is one thing that I'm sure strikes anybody when they deal with the club and the redwood national park, and that is the fantastic orchestration of legislation. Is there any way you can tell us how this was done? The club got fifty-some congressmen to introduce their bills in a very short matter of months. Who was the person who directed and arranged this? How was something like that done? Did it happen spontaneously, or were there some congressmen who helped you in getting other congressional support?

Wayburn: I'd have to go back to my notes. I can tell you that we planned it and designed it that way. But it would be our Washington lobbyists and our then beginning, spreading network of chapters that caused this to happen. The redwoods did have, and still do have, a great appeal to the American people. Periodically, we find letters, editorials coming from all over the country, from people who thought the redwoods were saved--and if they weren't they should be, and do something about it! Certainly that sex appeal that the redwoods have has something to do with it. Most people--and particularly people not familiar with the redwoods--when they first come into a redwood forest are simply amazed and awed. They feel, like those of us who go back and go back and go back, that they're in nature's church or cathedral. I think that has something to do with it.

The presence of so many congressmen introducing the same bill was one technique we learned. It isn't always successful. There are over fifty cosponsors of the bill that Phil Burton introduced

Wayburn: a year and a half ago, and it hasn't moved. So, that technique doesn't always succeed. But here it has a great deal to do with the success.

I think a lot of it was that a congressman in the East, who has no connection with redwoods personally and nothing to lose personally, will be approached by a group of his constituents, and he will introduce a bill, particularly if it is already safely in the Congress, introduced by someone else. I guess I don't think of that as quite so remarkable a phenomenon as you're suggesting.

Mike McCloskey's Contribution

Schrepfer: Mike [McCloskey] was the one who arranged the first four bills in '65. Was he back in Washington in '66?

Wayburn: Mike--just very briefly--was employed by us, the Sierra Club, and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs jointly in 1961, I think. He was our first northwest representative. Then the Sierra Club took on full responsibility for his salary. I was carrying the redwood bill, and I needed staff help very badly. So we brought Mike down, first on a part-time basis, and later he came down full time to work on redwoods. He did the staff work in a superb fashion. We didn't need Dave in on this at all; we had a staff man who was doing real staff work in a way that Dave hadn't done since the Dinosaur campaign. Mike and I worked together very closely, with me directing the policy and him doing the staff work. He took an increasing part in the policy determination. After he became conservation director of the club, particularly, he spent more and more time in Washington. Without recalling more at this time, I would say it had to be Mike's work that was responsible for this.

What I remember most vividly was that Mike had become close to Senator Jackson and to the Senate Interior Committee staff. During the conference, which went on for a number of weeks, Mike was in Washington all the time, in and out of the conference room. (At that time lobbyists were not allowed in the conference, as far as we were concerned; I think industries had them inside.) This was the first time that we knew that conservationists had sat down and worked with the staff. I think you could say that the good design of the Senate bill--the best that was in it--and the favorable results that came out of the conference were due to Mike more than anyone else.

Schrepfer: So that the club did have some input into the final bill?

Wayburn: Oh yes. We had a great deal of input in the final bill. If you compare the bills to the act, you will see that there is no land acquisition on the north. There are borderline boundary adjustments to the existing state parks and a connection between the existing state parks, so that there is a contiguous area. But that eleven thousand acres of conservation opportunity, of private land comprised of primeval redwoods, that's all in the drainage of Redwood Creek. Little Lost Man Creek, Lost Man Creek, and Redwood Creek itself are the three drainages.

Schrepfer: That's very interesting. I didn't know that.

Wayburn: We were asked to make many compromises during the course of that time. As the closing days of the Congress came, and we knew we were going to have to either compromise or start all over again on another at least two-year battle and possibly four-year battle, we were very aware of what our options were. We knew that President Johnson, as the outgoing president, would like to have some sort of a redwood bill as part of his accomplishments. So we knew the bill wouldn't be vetoed if it came to Johnson. We were aware of Aspinall's bitter opposition, and of the opposition of the Save-the-Redwoods League and the Rockefellers, and of the administration's opposition (including the secretary of Interior) to what we wanted.

As the time grew close, Mike and I were constantly trying to make our decisions on the options we had. We had agreed, for example, that we would use the Senate bill, and we got the conference to use the Senate bill. Also, because the final bill that came out, we felt, had to be affected by the House bill so much, we were trying to get as much protective language into the House bill as possible. Mike had a hand in actually writing that language, which supposedly came out of the House. In those final days, Mike's role was critical.

Schrepfer: In developing your legislative support, did the club, either you or Mike, have any contact with labor unions?

Wayburn: Now, on the one hand, we must have (I'd have to look back in our record there) because Jeffrey Cohelan was a very strong labor man, and I think that without some support from labor, he would not have been our principal sponsor in the House. On the other hand, I'm sure that the woodworkers union opposed us; that all of the union support we had would be outside the redwood region, and that inside the redwood region labor opposed us.

Schrepfer: When you look at the sponsors, they tend to be in the labor wing of the Democratic party. And you said you were a Republican.
[laughter]

Wayburn: I also said that my strongest supporters in conservation legislation, my firmest friends, are usually Democrats. It was bipartisan; we had Kuchel and Jackson and Metcalf working for us vigorously in the Senate.

Governor Reagan and His Secretary for Resources, Ike Livermore

Wayburn: Some of our help came from very curious sources, speaking of Republicans. You recall the famous statement of soon-to-be-governor Ronald Reagan. An anecdote which goes along with this: Shortly after Reagan had been inaugurated, his resources secretary, Norman B. (Ike) Livermore, Jr., wanted us to meet him. Ike Livermore had once been a director of the Sierra Club as well as treasurer of the Pacific Lumber Company later. He resigned that to become resources secretary for Reagan. As a half a dozen of us were waiting in Reagan's office for him to come in (and we were being offered jelly beans, which he had in this huge jar on his desk), the governor walks in with a great big smile on his face, sticks out his hand to me and says, "I want you to know I never said it." [laughter] I smiled and said thank you.

A few months later, I was in Los Angeles being interviewed by a TV interviewer. After the interview, or during that time, I told him this story. This man grew red in the face and he practically snarled, "He's a goddamn liar, and I've got the tape to prove it!" [laughter] Since then, I don't know any more of that.

But among the sources of help we had was Ike Livermore, whom we took on a "show me" trip--a float trip down Redwood Creek. Ike was extremely impressed by Redwood Creek, and particularly the Emerald Mile. He wrote advocating the Emerald Mile. This is one of the reasons we got that part of Redwood Creek into the bill and got it into the act.

Schrepfer: Had you known Livermore before?

Wayburn: Yes, I've known Ike since 1948.

Schrepfer: What was your feeling of him as head of the natural resources department?

Wayburn: I felt, and I still feel, we were extraordinarily lucky to have a man like Ike Livermore as Governor Reagan's resources secretary. Reagan, despite his statements to the contrary at times, has never been a conservationist; I'm not sure he knew what it was all about. On the other hand, Ike was and is. His particular interests had been limited. As a young man, he became enamored of the Sierra Nevada (as a boy too), and he got interested in packing. He went to business school at Stanford, and he did his M.A. thesis on packing as an industry. He was the behind-the-scenes owner of two different pack stations, and he left the management, as far as possible, to these two co-owners. One, Bruce Morgan (and later Morgan's son-in-law, Tommy Jefferson); and the other I think was Johnson in the McGee Creek region (I'm not certain of that).

Ike never made money off this; he lost it. He fortunately was independently wealthy and made more money afterwards. He tried for years to unload his pack stations, and he offered them to the Sierra Club, I believe for free, if we would take the full responsibility afterwards. It was an offer we turned down. The board felt it did not need a packing business, and there were times and places where we thought that packing should be eliminated because pack stock should not be allowed in fragile areas.

Schrepfer: Were you aware at all at the time that Reagan, when he did finally give his support for the Redwood National Park--although the one in Mill Creek and not really the final bill--that one of the prices that Johnson paid was Udall's permission for the road through Sequoia National Park to Mineral King?

Wayburn: No.

Schrepfer: Kuchel sponsored the bill that incorporated it.

Wayburn: That is very interesting. You mean, to allow the development of Mineral King? No, I didn't know. These are always interesting items, these deals. I've been part of too radical a movement to be privy to that type of thing. The only time I, and we, would find out about such is when someone would leak it to us or when we knew that something had to have happened and, as brought out earlier here, we brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act to find out.

No, that was one of the things we couldn't understand about Udall--again, my disappointment in Udall--because Udall knew the significance of Mineral King as a part of the national park, and Udall had told us earlier that he was adamantly opposed to the ski development. Then for him to come out and give his permission was again, to us, a betrayal.

Schrepfer: That's why he did it.

Wayburn: You found this in the Redwood League?

Schrepfer: No, no. The Department of the Interior ultimately gave me the one letter that proved it conclusively. But the legislative history really includes the deal. It's written there, especially when you realize what you're reading. Why would Kuchel sponsor a bill for the Disney development with the redwood national park? Why the two of them in one piece of legislation? Udall implied to the press at the time--his phrase was that he had been pressed by the highest sources in the Bureau of the Budget, which meant the president. Then, within the legislative history on that bill is a letter from the Bureau of the Budget telling Kuchel and Jackson that Udall will give in. And then what Interior supplied me with was the Bureau of the Budget's letter to Udall.

Wayburn: You know, the Bureau of the Budget--presently the Office of Management and Budget--has been one of the more outrageous levers which have impaired conservation, all done under the name of financial stability; it isn't true at all. At the present time it's this same Office of Management and Budget which is keeping the Department of the Interior from finally doing its duty toward the Redwood National Park. It's doing this in the face of an effort to preserve the investment--the financial investment as well as the moral and physical investment--which the country has made in the redwoods.

One of the people who recognized the value of land as a bank was officially Richard Nixon. If you'll remember when Richard Nixon ran for governor of California and was defeated by Edmund Brown, Sr., the Sierra Club offered both of them space in the Sierra Club Bulletin to express their views on conservation. Both of them endorsed what we were doing in land acquisition. I forget just how it was, but Richard Nixon--paradoxical as it may seem now--said that he ordinarily didn't believe in bond issues (this was in connection with the California State Bond Act of 1964) but that he felt that investment in land was good investment just as investment in the bank was. So he came out in support, in strong support, of this bond act.

There was an instance where we were able to get everyone's support. It was a case where enough was promised to enough different interests so that we could do it. When we get to the GGNRA, I'll tell you further stories on that--how one has to learn to promise enough to enough different interests while pursuing one's main objective.

Wayburn: On the California State Bond Act, I was the Sierra Club representative (as its president) on this ten-man committee. It was at that time I got very well acquainted with Harold Zellerbach who on the State Park Commission had been a frequent opponent, but who recognized the debt that the state and particularly the State Park Commission owed the Sierra Club, particularly after the club put up certain of its monies. After we lost our tax deductibility he actually gave money through the Zellerbach family fund to the club and to the Sierra Club Foundation, even though we were bitter opponents through most forest legislation, and still are.

The Schism between the Sierra Club and the Save-the-Redwoods League

Schrepfer: I was wondering if you could go over just briefly--you mentioned that you talked to Newton Drury before 1960 [on a portion of the tape that failed to record clearly]. I was wondering if you could convey your feeling on the Save-the-Redwood League's position--how they reacted to your overtures. I think it's an excellent point. You mentioned you had met with Drury very early.

Wayburn: Drury, with his long career in redwood preservation and as secretary of the Save-the-Redwoods League after he was no longer chief of the Division of Beaches and Parks (I think that was 1958, and he was succeeded by Charles de Turk), was the natural counsel to seek. He was the senior statesman of the conservation movement in the redwoods. He had enormous prestige. He was the wise man; he'd been through it all. As I became personally involved and worried about what was happening in the redwood region, I naturally went to Drury and consulted with him.

Schrepfer: About 1960?

Wayburn: I don't remember whether it was '59 or '60, but in this general time frame and before I ever went to Stewart Udall and talked about my idea of a redwood national park. Drury was discouraging and, as I remember it now, he felt that the Redwood League had done everything that was necessary for redwood preservation. True, it had made a few mistakes but had learned about those mistakes and wasn't going to make them again (such as the Bull Creek disaster). The California state park system took very good care of the redwoods. The finest of the redwoods remaining had been preserved or were under some commitment by industry to sell to the league. As I remember, he told me that in 1946 he had to make a decision about a

Wayburn: redwood national park--possibly it was the Helen Gahagan Douglas bill--and that he had decided against it. So my feeling was that we could not count on Drury or the league for strong support for a large redwood national park, and we would have to go it alone getting whatever other support we could.

However, we did keep in touch. I don't think the club ever excluded the league, and we couldn't have excluded the league from our deliberations because Dick Leonard was at that time a director [of the Sierra Club] as well as a member of the council of the league, and he was privy to everything that went on in the club, past the initial phases of vision and thought. So the possible accusation you may be talking about--that the club never kept the league informed--is not true.

Schrepfer: I've heard that said.

Wayburn: Yes. We tried to get their support and didn't succeed on the occasions that we tried. We knew that in Dick Leonard we had a director of the league who could communicate in both directions as he chose, and I assumed was doing it. So even though I was the prime mover for the redwood national park, I felt that the league was aware of everything we were doing. At times, when I would find out their opposition because they didn't know, I would be amazed! I can remember talking to Leonard and saying, "But you knew everything we were doing." I don't remember his response at this time.

Schrepfer: I do remember reading about the meeting at the Palace Hotel that you talked about.

Wayburn: Yes. That was in 1964 after we had jointly decided to support each other's position.

Schrepfer: And you did so--I have seen position statements--and then I noticed that somewhere in '65 you drop Mill Creek in your position statements.

Wayburn: Yes.

Schrepfer: You were doing this because it was your understanding that the league had dropped its advocacy of Redwood Creek?

Wayburn: We knew that; it wasn't just our understanding at that time. We knew it.

Schrepfer: In what ways did you know this?

Wayburn: [laughter] Some twelve years later, I don't remember exactly how we knew it. In that respect, perhaps your statement is more accurate until I can check my notes or give you better proof. But we had one advantage over the league, one tremendous advantage, in that we were actively lobbying. The league, keeping Simon-pure, could not openly lobby; but it was lobbying furiously behind the scenes, with powerful forces.

Schrepfer: Did you ever think that the league was allied with the lumber companies?

Wayburn: We didn't think it although we wondered. We knew there was a relationship; there had to be.

Schrepfer: You imply that in your open letter to President Johnson, as I recall.

Wayburn: I'll have to check back.

Schrepfer: I believe your statement was that the president and those who supported the Mill Creek plan had been very influenced by lumber companies. You don't imply it's an unholy alliance, however.

Wayburn: Well, there's no question that the league had to be influenced one way or another by the lumber companies with which it was dealing. Now, one of those companies was Miller-Rellim, and they were firm foes at that time, because the league had proposed taking Miller-Rellim's property. I don't think the league has bought any more redwoods from Miller-Rellim; this may be wrong, but their relations haven't been as cordial as they were before.

##

Schrepfer: Do you recall the debates on the redwoods issue at Sierra Club Board of Directors meetings?

Wayburn: The debates throughout 1964 on the redwoods must have been not so much on the amount of land we were in favor of, or where, but on whether it was wise for the Sierra Club--as a comparatively small citizen conservation organization--to advance this proposal, or whether we should support the professional work of the National Park Service, which we assumed would automatically get administration support. We decided, I think, that we should let the National Park Service come out with its proposals first, support those, and then come out with our advocacy. I believe--although I'm not certain--that at that time we pointed out that our proposal for ninety thousand acres was actually in the alternatives section of the Park Service report, although it was not in the plans section. (If you remember that report, there were two sections. One was

Wayburn: the four possible alternatives, describing what was desirable and what was available; and the other was the actual plans, and there were three plans.)

Now, I'd have to go back and find out what the later debates were.

Schrepfer: March '66.

Wayburn: March of '66. It was probably the old conservation versus liberal conservation attitude.

Schrepfer: Was there anyone besides Leonard that was in favor of the league's position? What about [Francis] Farquhar? He was a director of the league.

Wayburn: He was a director of the league; he was no longer a director of the club. Farquhar had retired as a director in the early fifties.

Schrepfer: Then Leonard was the only one?

Wayburn: I don't remember.

Other Participants and Rivals

Schrepfer: What was your reaction to the position of Conservation Associates?

Wayburn: Conservation Associates was around at that time? I really didn't know they had a position. What was it? I've forgotten; if you told me, I might recall.

Schrepfer: It was for a park that would go from the southern redwoods out to the coast.

Wayburn: Oh! Oh yes, I do remember now. This was, in my opinion, a cockeyed proposal. Let me give you some of the background. In, I believe the year was 1960, I was one of a number of people who was invited to look at the King Range, that area of the coast that happens to be a checkerboard pattern of private and public ownership, and public ownership is under the Bureau of Land Management. Doris Leonard and George Collins were the movers of this "show me" trip. I forget under whose auspices it was, who was paying the bill. A number of conservationists, including myself and I believe some government officials, went along on a trip which went to Eureka, went by car over to Ferndale and Petrolia, then around the eastern side

Wayburn: of the King Range to Shelter Cove; and then flew the area on the coastal side. I've still got the report that Doris Leonard made for conservationists. I didn't recall that this was part of Conservation Associates at the time, though; I didn't realize that Conservation Associates was that old.

I supported their proposal for protection of the King Range as the last primitive beach and an unusual mountain formation. That proposal would have tried to put into public hands the King Range from the crest down to the ocean. I think that it is still not a settled matter, although Shelter Cove has been desecrated by development since then. So the southern terminus of the area is out.

A related area that I was interested in, where you probably would not find many things, was Bear Harbor, just south of Shelter Cove, which I worked for off and on for eight to ten years to try to get into the state park system. Finally, last year, of all people, Senator Collier, the father of the freeway system in California, put a bill in and got it into the state park system.

I do remember that Conservation Associates was around in 1964 to '66 and made this proposal that the redwood national park go, I believe, from Humboldt redwoods to the sea. Now, I say it was a cockeyed proposal because it added no new redwoods. It simply took the existing redwood park [Humboldt Redwoods State Park] that belonged to the state and transferred it to the federal government, and would cause the purchase of a lot of private land, which was not redwood land but was land with hardwood forest on it, and some unusual mountain country extending over to the sea. It would have been a fairly large block of contiguous land, without really adding any more redwoods.

Schrepfer: Do you think there was any conflict or rivalry between the money to go to the redwoods and future money to go to Point Reyes?

Wayburn: Rivalry in what I term the "either-or" sense, which is not of our choosing but which is rivalry offered by our opponents. When they see us getting to a certain stage in the preservation of land, not infrequently they will offer a compromise and say, "Where should all this money be spent? Either in the redwoods or in Point Reyes." I had a lot to do with Point Reyes, which isn't on here [the outline] except under the heading of Marin. That reminds me of one of the things that happened in the effort to pass the Point Reyes National Seashore Bill.

Wayburn: A Mr. Douglas Hertz, who was the manager and I guess part-owner of the Bolima Club, which was a sports club having property is what is now the Point Reyes National Seashore, was somewhat reluctantly showing a group of us from the Point Reyes Foundation his property. He was trying in a very pleasant way to dissuade us. He said, "You know that the federal government has never put up a penny for national parks, and it's never going to." That was within two years of the time that act creating the Point Reyes National Seashore was passed. But it was thought in those days that there wasn't money for acquisition of private land for public purposes--for national parks, at least. Point Reyes was a precedent. As far as I remember, that was the first time that any funds had been authorized, and that was the result of a great big lobby by the San Francisco Bay conservationists.

I think that our opponents drummed up this competition in authorization and appropriation. After all, both of the authorizations were made in the Congress over the bodies of such people as Aspinall, and the precedent was set that the preservation of unique areas of our country should be bought back, if that were the only way they could be had. We fought hard for that. I, for one, was never to be dissuaded from trying to get more appropriations for already authorized funds. That charge has been made over and over again--"they compete." All right. The way to get rid of that competition is to have more money in the Land and Water Conservation Fund, and this is why I fought so hard for that.

Schrepfer: I gather that in the Redwood National Park affair you did not have much cooperation from the National Park Service. When Conrad Wirth was director when the first report was made, he obviously supported your position. Then later he had an element of perhaps being two-faced in talking to you and encouraging you, even after he was out of office, and going along with Rockefeller perhaps, ultimately. But what about [George] Hartzog?

Wayburn: Hartzog was new in the job at the time, and I don't believe I can at this moment give you any real opinion as to what Hartzog's personal attitude was. As far as the Park Service was concerned, it was in the Department of the Interior. We--I--was dealing directly with Secretary Udall, with the boss. So whatever the boss said, his subordinates would follow through with. I don't think we can hold Hartzog responsible for the failure of the National Park Service to support what its own professionals advocated. He was a new director and in the subordinate role to Udall.

Wayburn: Later, as time went on, I dealt more and more with Hartzog. He had his very good points as well as his bad points, which some other time we can go into. Again, he was a personal friend whom I used to go in to see and give help to at frequent intervals. But I was never one of the people who openly, outwardly, criticized Hartzog. Those people didn't get anywhere with Hartzog; he was a very tough hombre. That toughness, incidentally, eventually cost him his job when he and the assistant secretary of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks clashed inwardly, and Hartzog was the subordinate. Hartzog had to go. If [Nathaniel] Reed had known when he fired Hartzog what he was going to get as his replacement, he would never have done it. I think highly enough of Reed to feel certain of that. You know what he got. He got [Ronald] Walker, who was Nixon's advance man, who knew absolutely nothing about parks, who was a disaster.

Schrepfer: I think that that comprises the bulk of my questions about the redwoods--at least my major ones.

Save-the-Redwoods League Position

Wayburn: You obviously have been through the league's records, and you can ask questions, therefore, that I couldn't answer because they were the league's viewpoint. I know of this schism and I've regretted it. I've thought that if we had stayed together, we would have prevailed in a much more realistic fashion towards the Redwood National Park. I always regretted bitterly the league's, let me call it, "withdrawal" from a united position without notifying us. I have never been satisfied as to why the league did it, even though I've discussed some of the possible reasons. I further feel that the league may well have a guilty conscience, the people in the league, because they're aware of what they did; they know that they dropped their support of the combined proposal long before we dropped Mill Creek from our bill. Some day, I may find out more. And if you find out, I'd like to know.

I think that the league is probably winding down its good work. They don't have much more to do because there isn't much more for it to do. It talks about new acquisitions around Prairie Creek and Skunk Cabbage Creek and borderline acquisitions to round out some of the present redwood state parks. It never mentions Redwood Creek officially. Although he, John Dewitt, the league's new executive director, has never committed himself openly, I have an idea that he knows that we were right, and if he had a say in the matter and the opportunity came up--if there were redwoods still around Redwood

Wayburn: Creek--at the end of the program they've set themselves they would try to acquire more land there. I don't think that opportunity will be present while there are primeval redwoods left in the basin of Redwood Creek. But I would offer a prediction that at some future day, the league--if the federal government hasn't earlier--will purchase cutover land in Redwood Creek for the protection of the Redwood National Park that it never wanted.

Schrepfer: Some poetic justice there?

Wayburn: Maybe poetic justice, but I would say the redwoods have been my greatest Pyrrhic victory. I feel very sad about it.

Schrepfer: I think that when we were talking earlier you suggested the idea that the league really didn't have--I don't want to put words in your mouth; correct me if I am--it really wasn't in a very strong position to work against the lumber companies. It owed its ability to function to getting along with them.

Wayburn: That's right. In a way, you can say that the league owes its existence to its ability to make compromises with the lumber companies. If the lumber companies firmly don't want the league to acquire any lands in a given region, they can stop them; the league recognizes this and accommodates itself to them and always has.

Schrepfer: You mentioned that you thought the league had drawn up its program along the Redwood Highway. Perhaps you might like to repeat that.

Wayburn: Yes. The research that we've done (and I guess it's well-documented) shows that by 1900 practically all of the redwoods had passed into private hands, and those in private hands had passed into larger and larger hands until a comparatively few large lumber companies owned most of the redwood land. Because of the type of equipment and because of the economic factors, it became profitable for larger companies and not so profitable for smaller companies to log redwoods.

The coming of the league was coincident with the coming of the Redwood Highway. Both of these things were coincident with increased access to new areas to log. It wasn't profitable to do logging in areas which were far removed from highways in those days, or far removed from the sea; there had to be either road or water access. The early people in the league could best find areas along the highway. When they would find a beautiful, superb redwood flat, that would be the area that they would identify for purchase.

Wayburn: There were many of those in 1918, and they had limited funds. Although their founders, such as Grant and Merriam and Osburn, had a vision of a redwood national park at the start, they very quickly lost it. Grant identified these three areas which he felt in 1918 worthy of redwood national park status, and those included Redwood Creek as well as the Humboldt redwoods region.

But the league quickly got down to business and had a hard row to hoe early in the game. So I can only conclude that they were not explorers who prospected through the entire redwood region by foot, since in the early stages they found along the road all the flats of primeval redwoods that they could get money to acquire. Humboldt state redwoods is a prime example, where they went along the road and acquired successive groves--and each grove was fine enough so that they shouldn't pass it up--and when a grove was next to a small community, it was all the more reason to buy that before it was leveled in favor of more houses. It therefore purchased a large number of these small or middle-sized groves. It may well be that early in the game, even as it was later, that they were given a certain amount, either in land and trees or matching funds, if they would purchase a given tract.

The point I'm making is that in 1918 there was still an opportunity that we didn't have in 1960. The land was worth that much less. The reason, I guess, that we didn't get a redwood national park then was that nobody understood, nobody appreciated, the long-term significance of the redwoods as a full forest. In 1918 the Humboldt state redwoods area, with a small road leading up to it but not going through it, would have been the most magnificent investment our country could have made, for a few million dollars to buy back what had been given away. Of course, to have kept the redwoods before they had been given away would have been the right thing. As you know, was it secretary of the Interior Schurz in 1870 who proposed--

Schrepfer: Carl Schurz? Yes.

Wayburn: --that there be a--

Schrepfer: Two townships.

Wayburn: God! Well, that's what we should have had, and that's all gone. We realize, as much as anyone, that we're fighting for small remnants now. We're fighting partly on principle and partly because we want to secure up the hydrographic boundaries, and we will do that sooner or later. I just hope we can do it sooner while there are still enough redwoods in critical areas.

Wayburn: Incidentally, that concept has now been accepted by the Department of the Interior, after their own exhaustive studies, that certain areas are more critical than other areas. The department, as well as the Park Service, is trying its best to keep the lumber companies from cutting in some of these critical areas. They're trying as yet without success. They will be without success unless the Department of Justice gets in there soon and gets an injunction, specifically, against Arcata Redwood Company on putting a road in that the California State Forester has approved and the California State Board of Forestry has confirmed by a split vote of three to three, with the chairman casting the deciding vote for confirmation.

There's another area we haven't talked about--the role of the state at the present time in helping us. We had great hopes when Brown, Jr., was elected governor, particularly when the then vice-president of the club, Claire Dedrick, was made resources secretary. We have been greatly disappointed. Now, it's my understanding that recently Claire has reconsidered the state's position and may make new approaches to us. But it's just an understanding at this moment, and we have had no meeting.

The last time we met with Claire was almost a year ago--August 1975--when we entreated her to use the power of the state under the new State Forest Practices Act to stop logging in the basin of Redwood Creek. She said she couldn't do it, and she kept reiterating that she realized that some positions she had taken earlier as an advocate she could no longer take, that she was now responsible to all the people of California, including the lumber companies--which I thought was very sad. I'm hoping still that something can be salvaged out of this.

VI THE EFFORT FOR EXPANSION OF REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK, 1971-1978
 [Interview 3: June 6, 1978]##

Legal Efforts to Protect Park Areas

Schrepfer: Let's resume with a discussion of events leading to the passage of the 1978 redwoods bill.

Wayburn: As we discussed in our last interview two years ago, we were desperately trying with each secretary, in a polite, supplicating way to obtain enforcement of the 1968 act. In 1971 we made a formal, legal request, under the Freedom of Information Act, that the Department of the Interior make available to us all the information that they had on the Redwood National Park, and what they had done to carry out the trust theory of the parks.

That information became known to us after Judge William Sweigert had stated that we had the right to the information. Jim Moorman was the first attorney on this suit and later he turned it over to Mike Sherwood, who worked for several years on it, and took it through three lawsuits, each one expanding on the other. All the lawsuits were tried before Judge Sweigert, and we won three lawsuits. At the time of the last one, the judge said, "The Department of the Interior has done everything they can. Now it's up to the Congress to pass new legislation."

Now what had happened during this time? Nat Reed got personally very interested in this. In the winter of 1972, I went with Reed and his two assistants, Richard Curry, and Jim Ruch. I remember flying out of Crissy Field in an army plane. We flew up to and over Redwood Creek--had a very good view of it. At the end of this very good view, Reed simply sat there, put his head in his hands, and said, "Why do you do this to me?" I said, "Because you're the only man who can do anything about it."

Wayburn: Reed then started to try to do something about it. He set up a task force under Curry, which was an interdisciplinary task force, employing particularly people from the Geological Survey as well as Park Service and Forest Service. The principal scientist on this for some three or four years was a man named Richard Janda, who was and is with the Geological Survey. He worked out of Menlo Park. He was up in the redwoods a great deal. The consultant on this was Luna Leopold, who was the chief hydrologist and who resigned just about this time, but retained his interest.

They did two studies, and they had to report these to Judge Sweigert. At the end of the first one he wanted to know why they made no recommendations--just studies--because they could have. At the end of the second one, they made recommendations, and that was again when he said it was up to Congress to act again.

Working with Congressman Phil Burton on an Expansion Bill

Wayburn: This took them from 1971 through 1974 or '75. By this time, I was working closely with Congressman Phillip Burton, whom I'd known since 1964 and who was on the Interior Committee and who, incidently, voted against the bill in the House [1968]--not because he wasn't a good conservationist but because he said the bill was so bad. An interesting little note--he was the brother-in-law of Jeffrey Cohelan, who introduced our first bill in 1965.

Phil Burton took up the cause and each year, from about 1974 on, introduced the bill for the expansion of Redwood National Park. One year I think Senator Tunney introduced it but not at other times. Other people were concerned, but the politician who made this a cause was Burton.

At first, his bill didn't get anywhere, even though he was acquiring power and influence in Congress. It didn't get anywhere, because the chairman of the National Parks Subcommittee--a very nice man from North Carolina, Roy Taylor, didn't want to be bothered by controversial legislation of which he saw no hope for passage and which would tie up his committee. This was the case until 1977, when there was a turnover, and Haley, who was the chairman of the full committee, succeeding Aspinall, did not run again, and Taylor did not run again. So, Morris Udall became chairman of the full Interior Committee, and Phillip Burton was the number two ranking member, and we persuaded him to take the chairmanship of the National Parks Subcommittee.

Wayburn: Having done this, he had said he was going to put through the expansion of the Redwood National Park. Through 1977 and '78 he labored against, at times, impossible odds to do this. Phil Burton himself had never been in the redwoods until he went up there for a hearing in 1977.

I designed the expansion bill, which was essentially the one I designed ten years before. Burton and I were close enough and are close enough so that he said he would accept what I offered him. Then he learned all about the factors that were involved, and he went into great detail in learning about this because not only was the preservation of redwood forests involved, not only was the preservation of the national park, but there was and is, as you know, in the redwood region a way of life that was being interfered with. The redwood region has had a one-industry economy.

Although the establishment of the park and the enlargement of the park would affect that economy by only a couple of years; in fact, it dramatized to all the people of the region, as well as people elsewhere, what was happening.

When we published The Last Redwoods, we were accused of not telling the truth. The redwoods were not the "last," but we knew that they were part of the last primeval redwoods that would ever be saved from the ax--this is what we were talking about.

Vituperative Opposition from Labor

Wayburn: Burton went into the redwood region. He talked to all the people there, and he took a tremendous amount of abuse from the local people there and from organized labor, particularly. This is a curious commentary on mankind, because he probably drafted more legislation benefiting the laboring man than any other congressman. Each time the representatives of the carpenters or the secretary of the AFL-CIO of California, John Henning, would attack the bill, they would always preface it by a remark that they weren't talking about Burton at all--they were talking about that terrible environmentalist bill, and Burton would have to say, "I am the author of this bill." He went through a number of hearings, and he finally did get the bill through against almost insuperable odds.

Schrepfer: By labor you mean the resident labor.

Wayburn: I mean organized labor--the AFL-CIO; George Meany held up the bill by speaking to Speaker of the House O'Neill. I mean John Henning, the executive secretary, the top man of the AFL-CIO in California, who produced the most vituperative language I've heard come out in a public hearing.

##

Wayburn: Henning attacked the environmentalist supporters of the expansion bill in language which was uncouth as well as untrue and had no real basis in fact. I refer to Charlie Nichols, who was, I think, the head of the Carpenters Union. The carpenters were probably the strongest single organized labor force against the bill and probably were the backbone of the opposition.

Then there were the people who worked in the woods, who were not part of organized labor at all. The interesting thing was that any leader of organized labor in California was speaking up on behalf of companies that had never been organized and were violently anti-union, but that was the alliance that was formed against us.

Schrepfer: It's ironic, because Walter Reuther [president, United Auto Workers, d. 1973] was one of your allies before.

Wayburn: Yes, Reuther had been an ally. As it turned out eventually, Burton was able to get support from a number of different unions in the AFL-CIO. The machinists, for example. I think the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers and several of the United Auto Workers all broke away from this anti-redwood stand. But during the hearings, Henning and Nichols were dominant forces.

Burton heard them out in detail, and he heard out the local people in detail. One of the witnesses that he wanted particularly to get and did was the tax assessor of Humboldt County, and he got the truth about how much tax base there was; how much the companies were paying; how much would be lost. And the tax assessor, who was telling the truth, turned out to tell a different story from the companies and local politicians generally.

Schrepfer: Who do you think organized and paid for the loggers' trips?

Wayburn: I believe that the local people did that themselves. The companies paid for part of it--it's quite true, but I have heard from good sources that local people put out their own funds. They had a way of life that they believed in. They didn't believe in what we believed in. And they were fighting in every way that they knew how to fight. I think that the trips that they made to San Francisco

Wayburn: to testify with their big loud trucks, blocking the streets of San Francisco, gained them no friends. I know that their trips across the country to Washington made enemies and opponents for them, but they did it.

Schrepfer: On what basis?

Wayburn: This was a time of energy shortage, and here they were running these great big lumber trucks all the way across the country. They traveled with this tremendous log cut in the crude form of a peanut and this offended many people, including the new president. [laughter]

Schrepfer: I was wondering if maybe a lot of easterners, who haven't maybe ever seen a redwood tree, weren't sort of surprised at the size.

Wayburn: They were surprised at the size, and they were offended that these people would take such a great, big, beautiful tree and make that use of it--because redwoods have always had a great attraction, almost a religious fascination for people. And I think this applies to Americans all over the country, even though they've never seen a redwood personally. They've heard about them, and how big they are, and how tall they stand, and how old they are. And have had the forest described to them a little.

As long as I've been in this business, I've observed this. It is more true of redwoods than certainly any other tree of any other forest.

Schrepfer: So, what you're saying is that you respect the position of the local people. You think it was an honest position on their part.

Wayburn: I think it was a misguided position. There were many local people who felt that this was their way of life, and they had no choice.

Position of the Lumber Companies: Defending a Way of Life, or Greed?

Schrepfer: Do you think the companies helped to stir them up?

Wayburn: I don't think there's any question that the companies helped to stir them up. I have no sympathy for the companies, particularly, which were involved here.

Wayburn: Miller-Rellim was not involved in this at all. Simpson had cut most of its holdings in Redwood Creek years ago, although they had some upper end of this area. I think the Devils Creek portion belonged to Simpson, though I'm not sure; it may belong to Louisiana-Pacific. Louisiana-Pacific and Arcata played a very dirty game. The only thing I can see behind it is greed. Even then it's hard to understand.

Schrepfer: Do you think they wanted to sell?

Wayburn: I don't think they wanted to sell at first. When they saw that it was inevitable, they wanted to sell for the highest possible price.

I think that one has to give them a certain amount of credit again, for this thing that I've called a "way of life." It was a way of life for the companies. It was what the people in charge of the companies and the bosses and the chief foresters knew how to do. They probably didn't think it was wrong, but it's part of an American tradition of "cut out and get out," which has followed the lumber companies all the way across the country and in three hundred years has caused us to change a tremendous, forested country into one that is going to be short on wood products in the future. The redwood forest is the last and the greatest. They just wanted to cut as many trees as they could.

Schrepfer: Arcata was leaving the lumber business--hasn't it been moving out of the lumber business?

Wayburn: Arcata has always been on a liquidation cycle. When they first started to log their lands, Arcata had--I could be wrong about the exact number and would not want to be quoted--but I think they only had 22,000 acres of virgin redwood. And they were cutting at the rate of somewhere around a thousand acres a year. They didn't start to cut until sometime in the late fifties. They had this much virgin timber and nothing else--no cut-over land--no second growth.

They made the promise, when they had to give up that virgin timber in Redwood Creek, Lost Man Creek, in 1968, that they would reinvest the proceeds of their capital gains from the sale in Humboldt County, but they never did. I understand that they had bought some second-growth timber, but I would predict that within a very few years--as soon as they finish logging the Redwood Purchase Unit which they got in exchange for the timber they lost in Redwood Creek--as soon as they finish that they will liquidate and sell their second-growth lands to one of the other companies.

Schrepfer: Simpson maybe?

Wayburn: Simpson, or Louisiana-Pacific probably.

Schrepfer: They've moved into publishing.

Wayburn: Yes, they are big in publishing.

Schrepfer: Do you have some sort of feeling as to when this shift occurred-- their reluctance first to sell and then their feeling that perhaps it was inevitable and their goal was to get as high a price as possible?

Wayburn: I think that they did that in 1968 and pulled an enormous hoax on the federal government. And the federal government had some stupid people working for them who allowed it to happen. Our forester, Gordon Robinson, estimated that the full 90,000 acres that we asked for could have been acquired in 1967 for around a hundred and fifty million dollars, which included, I think, 33,000 acres of virgin timber.

John Miles, who was employed by the companies, gave a figure three times that. Then the government-appointed appraiser took a figure which was halfway in between Robinson's and Miles's. It was those two figures, the government's appraiser and the companies' appraiser, which went before the judge of the court of claims, who had to make the decision as to how much this land and timber was worth. When the judge looked at it, I'm told, he threw up his hands. He said, "Here are two good appraisers, each with his own opinion." And he cut right down the middle between those two.

The problem was that he was not cutting it at the fifty percent mark--he was cutting between the fifty percent and the hundred percent. What I mean is, Robinson, if you call him at zero and Miles at one hundred percent, and the government appraiser at fifty, the balance of this had shifted over so far already that when he took a halfway-between figure, he was taking what was equivalent to seventy-five percent.

Now, that won't happen this time and the other mistakes that the government made won't happen this time, because we've got it in the legislation that the secretary has the right to demand certain things of the companies. He has the right to condemn the land and set a price as of such and such a date.

Wayburn: As it was, and after the 1968 act, the companies kept delaying, and while they were delaying, the price of redwood lumber kept going up. The companies will sue for more this time; they're trying to get twice as much as the \$359 million which is authorized.

Schrepfer: Well, somebody must think they're going to get a good price, because their stock went up.

Wayburn: Oh, their stock went up, certainly. They are getting all this money without having to put in the work that it takes to earn it.

Schrepfer: They're getting the profits they would have made from logging it.

Wayburn: They're getting not just the profits they would have made from it, they're getting all of the value, without having to deduct the cost of the manpower, the workers, the cost of the milling--

Schrepfer: Gross profits--

Wayburn: I think they're getting gross and not net profit. I know they did the first time. But we have the bill written so that they now have to go to the district court, and this decision has to get well under way within one year. I'm not sure whether the decision has to be made within one year or not.

Schrepfer: Do you think that in '68 the lumber companies had an influence within the conference committee that not only helped to set the mechanism by which the price was to be determined--that is the type of court, the type of process--

Wayburn: We thought that the court of claims would be the better in '68, so we can't hold them responsible for that.

Schrepfer: And this time you think a jury is going to be better?

Wayburn: We think that the district court is more likely to be aware of things. I don't know whether there'll be a jury or not.

Schrepfer: Within Aspinall's committee, to get back to '68 just for a second, do you think that the companies recognized that they would get quite a high price and proved willing--particularly Arcata and the ones that sold very large portions--to sell finally? Do you think they cooperated at all at the end?

Wayburn: I don't think they did. I think they fought it as hard as they could. Arcata was sitting on a green goldmine, and they wanted to mine that as long as they could.

Wayburn: As I indicated a little earlier, I think this was partly a psychological affair. Howard Libbey, who was the president of Arcata, was an old-time lumberman.

Schrepfer: He was out by then, wasn't he?

Wayburn: He was out, just about that time. Diehlendorf became the president, and he was a very affable, friendly sort of fellow who, I'm afraid, was a sharp businessman and I would rather have dealt with Howard Libbey. All these new people cared about was making money and getting as much as they could, but at the same time, I felt that they wanted to keep on logging as long as they could, and then they would liquidate.

It's quite true that the establishment of the park made them liquidate sooner. They were so uncooperative with the park--so uncooperative in every way--that I don't know what all their motivation was. I think that probably their officers had a good job and wanted to keep it, and of course, if all their property, all of their lumber went out, they would be out of a job.

There are some people there that were there in 1964 and they're still there. People like Lowell Chapman, the controller, and their chief forester, Hofstadter. These people didn't know anything but logging. People like myself just got in their way. They had no concept of a national park. They had no concept of the glories of a redwood forest. To them this was commercial timber.

The 1978 Act: Protection for the Land and the Loggers

Schrepfer: Before I interrupted you, we were talking about why you feel that the new law will not result in an exorbitant price, and how you arrived at the framing of the bill, but we're kind of ahead of ourselves.

Wayburn: I drew up the boundaries, and I had certain ideas that I wanted carried out and other ideas that I didn't want carried out that went wrong in 1968.

Schrepfer: You mean the boundaries you drew up for the expansion bill, not the '68--

Wayburn: I drew up the boundaries for the Sierra Club bill in '68, and these were essentially the same boundaries that we drew up for the park in this 1978 legislation. There was one difference--there had been so much damage done to the area from the logging; so much soil eroded down the hillside; so much aggradation of Redwood Creek; so much gravel, silt and rock coming down--that we felt the need to protect the trees which were still standing and to do something about the cut-over land.

We got provisions in this bill for rehabilitation of the land and for a park protection zone, which would be upstream from the park itself. The new park is now 108,000 acres, and there's a 30,000 acre park protection zone upstream from that. That includes some of the mainstream of Redwood Creek and all of the principal tributary of upper Redwood Creek, which is Lack's Creek. Lack's Creek is said to carry one-fourth of the burden of silt and gravel that comes into the river at that point.

Under the provisions of the act, if the secretary, which means the Park Service, finds that the park is being damaged by improper logging practices, he can go in and acquire the land if necessary or take whatever measures are necessary to protect the land. Money has been provided for rehabilitation of the land, and money has also been provided to take care of the working men who will be put out of jobs, supposedly, by the passage of the act. Actually, we believe that comparatively few people are being put out of a job by the expansion of the park, and none were put out of a job by the original park.

The redwood lumber industry has been automating since 1950, and every year sees fewer and fewer people working in the woods and in the mills, because of the automation. This was true even when the annual cut grew; the number of people employed were dropped. One of the things that Burton said he would do, and he did do, was to get an appropriation of money and an assurance of job protection for all of these people who had been working in the woods for any length of time at all. I think five years of work would give them seniority enough so that they would have essentially a lifetime of protection until they should retire. They got a better deal than any other displaced person has ever gotten.

Schrepfer: Does this worry you as a precedent in terms of property acquisition?

Wayburn: No, it doesn't because there is no other area like this. There's nothing to follow it. There are going to be no more redwood forests.

Schrepfer: You supported this measure then?

Wayburn: Oh yes. I supported it primarily because Phil Burton wanted it that way, and he was getting this done. Secondly, because we did not want to be in the position of inflicting hardship on any of the people who were working in the woods.

Phil Burton: A Consummate and Environmental Politician

Schrepfer: I think that we have missed something in our discussion of the years 1971 to 1974. We had been talking about the hearings in which Phil Burton participated; you had designed the bill, and he was introducing it each year.

Wayburn: In this session of Congress, starting in 1977, Burton announced that the Redwood National Park expansion would be his priority. He held to that. He held hearings on that first, and he then held hearings on some other bills, but no other bill came out of his committee until he had gotten the redwood bill out.

Burton is a consummate politician. He knows his fellow politicians. He knows how to achieve his purposes. He is a politician, I'd say, in the very best sense of the word. He has nothing to personally gain from it. I'm reminded that last February when he had his anniversary dinner here, two people who came out to be the speakers for it were Tip O'Neill, Speaker of the House, and this is one reason we knew the bill was going to get out of the house soon, because O'Neill wouldn't be coming out to speak at Burton's dinner and not allow the bill on the floor. And the other was Ralph Nader. Nader said he was glad to come out and speak at Phil Burton's dinner because Burton was one politician he could go to and ask for something that he thought was in the public interest, and he would never ask, "What's in it for me?"

The Sierra Club gave Burton the Distinguished Achievement Award this year, 1978, particularly for these two achievements--the Golden Gate National Recreation area and the Redwood National Park. In presenting this to him, I remarked that, while I was proud that he represented San Francisco, his real constituency was not San Francisco as much as it was posterity. He has introduced a new concept, you might say. You remember the "pork-barrel" legislation of the Rivers and Harbors Act, which went on year by year?

Schrepfer: Still does, doesn't it?

- Wayburn: To some extent, but Burton has introduced the "park barrel." He has an omnibus bill at the present time which has passed the Interior Committee and, I understand, will pass the House without too much trouble. It has 150 different items in it, ranging from such big things as the Boundary Waters Wilderness Area, the transfer of Mineral King from the Forest Service to Kings Canyon-Sequoia National Park and to the Santa Monica urban national park down to a small historical monument or \$250,000 for the improvement of an old fort in the Midwest, which is part of an historic site. This is something that has never been done before.
- Schrepfer: Except, as I recall, didn't Reagan try to arrange one of those that Kuchel introduced that included the Mineral King road, and the limiting of Point Reyes--a package bill of anti-conservation measures? [laughing]
- Wayburn: This package is an omnibus bill.
- Schrepfer: Yes, it certainly is. Burton's constituency is fairly liberal too.
- Wayburn: Burton is one of the most liberal congressmen I know. When he was at the height of his political success--he came within one vote of being elected majority leader last year--I asked him if he had presidential aspirations eventually, and he smiled and said, "No, I'm too liberal." I think he does have aspirations of being majority leader and being Speaker of the House, and I think he's got a pretty good chance.

Positions of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations

- Schrepfer: You're saying that the thing that finally precipitated the action on the bill was the increase in Burton's power and his position. Did it also just simply coincide with Carter's election or did you find it impossible to do anything under Nixon and Ford and perhaps with the change under Carter?
- Wayburn: We got nowhere with Nixon and Ford. We did get somewhere with Nathaniel Reed, the assistant secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, who as the years went by became extremely attached to the idea of expanding the redwoods, but he was in a comparatively lowly position, and he couldn't get anywhere. Rogers Morton was the most favorable of secretaries of the Interior under Nixon and Ford. He would have liked to have done something, but he just felt that he couldn't. I think that he didn't have force enough to do this. He was a considerable help in Alaska, as I will come to at another time.

Wayburn: The coming of the Carter administration made a big change, because Carter himself had a commitment to land preservation as he demonstrated in Georgia. He made the commitment further during his campaign. He selected a strong man as his secretary of the Interior. The support of the Carter administration was invaluable.

The Carter administration did not ask for as much as we did or as Burton did. In the final legislation, the administration's position prevailed in considerable part, but it was so good that we couldn't fault it. It was such an enormous change. I remember writing to Secretary Andrus and thanking him for his testimony when he came out in support of the Burton bill. The administration's position was a little bit less, but we got them back up. The bill came out with the higher figure, but if it had been passed with the administration figure, it would not have been bad. This has been my personal experience with the Carter administration and particularly with Secretary Andrus right along. I know some conservationists are not this way, but my particular interests in land preservation, in national parks and wilderness, have been fully supported.

Governor Jerry Brown's Ambiguous Position

Schrepfer: There was one other question--what about the state's actions? There was some question that perhaps the state might have helped or that the state might have provided more protection for Redwood Creek through the legislation available to it.

Wayburn: The state could have done more. We were very encouraged when Jerry Brown came in, particularly when he chose Claire Dedrick, who was vice-president of the Sierra Club, as his resources secretary. We were expectantly waiting for Governor Brown to appoint conservationists to the State Board of Forestry. The Board of Forestry had on it, I think, at the beginning of his regime only one good conservationist, who was Phil Berry [Sierra Club director], and he was one working against eight. Brown made his appointments very slowly; he could have done it much faster. He now has an excellent board: the chairman, Henry Vaux, a former dean of U.C. School of Forestry; Clyde Wahrhaftig, a geologist, who is also a professor at the University of California; Dwight May, who is a rancher from the north coast and has done some logging but is a good conservationist; and Cecile Rosenthal, who is a Sierra Club activist from Los Angeles; and David Pesonen. Those are the new appointees, and they are all good. But the trouble was it took Brown so long to appoint these people that in the

Wayburn: meantime, although the Forest Practices Act could have been used-- it's probably the strongest Forest Practices Act of any state--it wasn't used or it was interpreted by the board and the staff as not being able to be of help.

The Water Quality Act, likewise, was implemented but late in the game. For example, in Redwood Creek, on the Louisiana-Pacific side, a small creek known as Tom McDonald Creek flows into Redwood Creek immediately above the Tall Trees and has been creating a delta there. What the eventual effect will be, we don't know. Louisiana-Pacific got permission in their timber harvest plan to log part of the drainage of Tom McDonald Creek and has done so. Later they got permission to harvest more of it. This time, the Water Quality Board had investigated and gave them permission to have a zero sediment discharge, which meant that they simply couldn't do it. So, they filed off that part of the logging, and they've got some logs in there that they haven't taken out. It would be up to adjudication between the government and the companies as to whether they'd be allowed to take those logs out as their personal property or not. It will be difficult for them to take out those logs and still not cause any sediment to flow down that creek.

The state of California, then, could have been much more helpful than it was, particularly in the early stages. It has been much more cooperative recently, and now I think there is complete cooperation.

Schrepfer: You make it sound as if the lack of cooperation was more of a lack of organization than a result of a--

Wayburn: I wish I knew, Susan. Jerry Brown is a very funny politician. He knows how to ride the waves and ride them high. Jerry Brown is a very smart politician. I don't know how deep he goes in his conservation feelings. He goes back and forth. He doesn't seem to have real principles. One time he'll be talking in one way and another time he'll be talking in another way.

On the redwoods, I had occasion to challenge him a couple of times. I met him in the hall outside of Phil Burton's office in the House of Representatives and greeted him. He said, "What are you doing here?" and I said, "I'm here on Redwood National Park expansion. I think everything is all arranged if you would only come along. You could see that this bill gets passed fast, if the governor of California supported it." He said, "Oh, everybody says that, but it's not true."

Wayburn: Some months later he asked to speak at a Sierra Club meeting. He came in--incidentally the first thing he did was to look all around him, and he said, "I don't see any blacks here," just like that. Then he saw one of the T.V. reporters who was black, and said, "Oh yes, there's one there--but you ought to have more blacks here." And when he had finished with this sort of beginning he made a speech telling the club how it had to do more on the urban scene and so forth. Then he was open to questions. I led off with the fact that "Governor Brown, you could be more helpful in preserving the redwoods if you would." He looked at me and said, "Oh, I know you, I saw you lurking around Phil Burton's office." I said, "Yes, Governor, we were fellow lurkers together!" Then I challenged him on his lack of support for the expansion of the park at the time. He didn't explain things to my, or our, satisfaction.

Schrepfer: What happened when Congress wanted to know what the State of California's attitude was?

Wayburn: When that time came he went along, but not prior to that.

Transfer of State Parks to the Federal Government##

Schrepfer: You were mentioning Huey Johnson and the fact that the Save-the-Redwoods League has changed its position on the transfer of the California state redwood parks to the federal government.

Wayburn: The league has taken a very enlightened position on the transfer of the state parks. They realize now, I think, the advantages of an overall administration of a very large area, and the fact that the federal government has the possibilities of being able to administer that large area better than the state can with its limited funds. There's no question that the state has done a very good job in the management of its redwood parks, and I have nothing but praise for what I have seen in the redwood parks. However, to realize the full potential of the national park, certainly Prairie Creek State Park has to be a part of it.

Schrepfer: Isn't it true that the national park, really, would not be much without those state parks?

Wayburn: In the 1968 park act, the contribution of the federal government was all too small. Of the 58,000 acres of the so-called Redwood National Park, half was state parks, and there was an addition of only 11,000 acres of virgin redwood. The rest of it was cut-over

Wayburn: land, meadow land and beach land. On the other hand, the federal government included three of the finest state parks for a total of about 28,000 acres, the majority of which was virgin redwood.

The Del Norte Coast State park is a fine park, although in considerable part cutover and having a freeway built through it. The Jedediah Smith park is superb. The Prairie Creek Park, of course, is the place where we had the great confrontation in 1963 and stopped the State Highway Department from putting a freeway through the middle of Prairie Creek State Park--either by widening of the present road through the redwood groves or along Gold Beach. Those were the two favorite locations.

As the park stands today, with very considerable expansion in the southern portion of it in Redwood Creek, Prairie Creek state park is an integral portion. This is recognized by the federal government; it's recognized by the Save-the-Redwoods League as well as the Sierra Club. To plan adequately for the southern portion of the national park, one has to plan for Prairie Creek as a part of it. This can be done by transfer of the land in fee, which could be difficult as I understand it, or it could be done by cooperative agreements--administrative agreements between the state and federal government.

Schrepfer: You mean the state would retain the ownership and the federal government would manage it.

Wayburn: That's correct. John Dewitt has recommended that in his resolution for the Board of Directors of the Save-the-Redwoods League, and the League has passed the resolution. I think this will do a great deal towards smoothing a way to getting a successful administration of the park. It's not as necessary for the two northern parks to be tied in as closely, because the federal government doesn't have much land-in-fee there--not near as much as the state parks do. And yet I will predict that eventually--how many years away it is I don't know--the state will hand over those two northern redwood parks.

Schrepfer: Isn't the league still very interested in completing Mill Creek?

Wayburn: The league is extremely interested in completing Mill Creek. What success they will have, I don't know, because Mill Creek has been cut out so heavily, and what is in the middle of the watershed of Mill Creek is an industrial complex, which would have to be removed at very considerable cost. I can see one successful solution to this a long time away, and that is, when Miller-Rellim comes to the end of its redwood trees, they will then, perhaps voluntarily

Wayburn: for a fee, allow that part of Mill Creek to be sold, incorporated into the Jed Smith state park, or perhaps into the national park. If that is done, there will then be a very slow process of reforesting that area. It's not an immediate or bright solution as I see it right now. On the other hand, concentrating our efforts on the southern end of Redwood Creek is going to take up all the money, manpower, and skill that we have to make the Redwood National Park live up to its full potential.

Schrepfer: Is the league, in this resolution, mentioning this question of completing the watersheds? That was their earlier position, that when the watersheds were complete then they would consider transfer.

Wayburn: The league feels that this is very complex--as we do. Therefore they favor formation of a federal-state public commission to formulate possible conditions of transfer. They urge the long-range acquisition of Jedediah Smith and Del Norte Coast to the logical watershed boundaries, including Mill Creek watershed. With respect to Prairie Creek, the league favors a possible cooperative agreement between the California Department of Parks and Recreation and the National Park Service to permit the Park Service to administer Prairie Creek as part of the national park.

Healing the Breach with Save-the-Redwoods League

Wayburn: This is a change in attitude on the part of the league during the past few years. The league has changed dramatically in the past few years.

Schrepfer: By few, would you say two maybe?

Wayburn: Particularly two years. As you know, we felt that the league was not particularly in favor of a national park when we were pushing for the establishment of the park in the early sixties. Then the league and the Sierra Club formally got together at a luncheon at the Palace Hotel in 1964, in which we each endorsed proposals of the other. The club endorsed proposals for completing the watershed of Mill Creek and the league endorsed the acquisition of the Redwood Creek watershed, as we had proposed. Then, as I told you, there was this quiet withdrawal by the league, coincident with the failure of the Rockefeller interests and the secretary of the Interior to support the full park, which we had advocated. There was this unfortunate schism between the two conservation organizations most concerned with the preservation of redwoods.

Schrepfer: How much do you think that cost the park?

Wayburn: I think it cost a great deal. It enabled the opposition to succeed. If the league had not been in the picture, if it weren't known that the league--which had always fought for the preservation of redwoods and had acquired so much redwood land itself--was not advocating Redwood Creek and that some powerful members of the league were actually opposed to the acquisition of Redwood Creek, we would have succeeded in getting much more land in 1968--much more virgin redwood in the basin of Redwood Creek.

Schrepfer: You're saying that some members of the league opposed it, but the league didn't put anything publicly in writing opposing Redwood Creek?

Wayburn: That is correct, but they did not testify in favor of it. They testified in favor of the Jedediah Smith area. They did not help as they could have. It was my understanding that Doctor [Ralph] Chaney was actively opposing this. He did not tell me so. He did tell me that he thought that Mill Creek was far superior. Newton Drury told me that he considered Mill Creek superior.

Schrepfer: Who was Chaney opposing this to?

Wayburn: Well, he told me that.

Schrepfer: Did they go to congressmen perhaps?

Wayburn: I'm not saying that. It was well known in the Congress that the league was not supporting us. When we would go to different congressmen to try to get their support, they would say, "Why can't you and the league get together? It would be much easier." Friendly congressmen would tell us that. Unfriendly congressmen would simply point out the fact that, "You conservationists don't know what you want," and they would oppose it. This was one way in which Aspinall was able to succeed in getting his twenty-eight thousand-acre redwood national park proposal through the House of Representatives.

The schism didn't clear up right away, because feelings were a bit bitter on both sides after '68. Certain people in the league accused the Sierra Club of pushing ahead at all costs without regard to real redwood preservation. People in the Sierra Club felt that they had been betrayed by the failure of the league to go along. Attempts were made in the years following to heal this breach, but the situation just sat there. There wasn't fighting between the organizations, but there was obviously this breach.

Wayburn: Dick Leonard, I remember, invited Mike McCloskey and me--and, incidently, Cole Wilbur was the intermediary; he was at that time, the executive secretary of the Sierra Club Foundation--to meet with him, Newton Drury and John Dewitt in his office one day.

Schrepfer: Do you recall the date?

Wayburn: The date? No, I don't recall the date--I would guess, about 1971 or '72. Mike and I, who were carrying the banner for the club, thought that they wanted to heal things up. We didn't know just how, or what would happen, but they spent the first hour and a half of a two-hour meeting, lecturing us on how the club had been responsible for all this. Of course, we had thought the league had been responsible for it.

But shortly after that, as John Dewitt began to gain power in the league as the secretary and then as the executive director--in title as well as in fact and when Dick Leonard became the president--they did change their whole attitude. In this last campaign for the passage of the Burton bill, John testified very strongly for the expansion. The league's influence was very evident, and I think the success was due, very considerably, to the league.

Schrepfer: So, would you say for the last two, three years, you've had their active support?

Wayburn: Active, very active support.

Schrepfer: Now, do you think that the changes in Mill Creek had anything to do with the changes in the league's position--you know, the continuation of heavy logging in that area?

Wayburn: This is a little difficult for me to see because I made up my mind on Mill Creek in 1964-65 when I saw what was planned there and what was actively going on there.

The Club and Miller-Rellim: "Coincident Allies"

Wayburn: Miller-Rellim was much more open with us than Arcata, or Simpson, or Louisiana--earlier Georgia-Pacific. They took us in--they showed us just what they were doing.

Schrepfer: You think they were hoping you'd advocate a park somewhere else?
[laughing]

Wayburn: We were advocating a park somewhere else, and that may have been one of the reasons that they were so friendly towards us [laughing] because we felt that what was left of Mill Creek watershed was too small. We saw this industrial complex already in the heart of it, causing a shifting of the stream of Mill Creek as it flowed down the mountainside. We didn't see any hope of establishing a national park in time--of getting out all of this development, which was either already in place or planned at a very early date. In addition, they were logging the hillsides in Mill Creek in '64 and '65 in such a way that we thought that the Redwood Creek area, which offered more possibilities anyway with twice as big a watershed, was the thing to push for.

Schrepfer: Are you saying that Miller's logging practices were worse?

Wayburn: No, Miller's logging practices were better than either Arcata or Louisiana-Pacific, but in addition to the logging, they built this industrial development right in the heart of Mill Creek. In this regard, I think by design, they effectively blocked out any national park with any meaning to it. This was evident to me in 1964 and 1965, even though we were supporting the league's position. We never actively opposed the Mill Creek acquisition; we just didn't support it. We were supporting actively the Redwood Creek acquisition.

Schrepfer: So, in other words, you are saying that you thought Mill Creek watershed was no longer a viable park site by 1964, so you think by '68 and '70 it definitely was not.

Wayburn: Definitely was not, no. I've not been back in there since '71 or '72, so I don't know the full extent, but I imagine it looks like any other factory. They had plans for a well-integrated lumber complex which they claim would continue to be able to log redwoods. "Redwoods forever" is their motto--I don't believe it. I think when they finish their old-growth redwood, they will have to shift over to an entirely new type of plant, and I doubt if they've got enough, with their present land holdings, to carry on there.

Schrepfer: So, the league may be able to acquire the cutover land.

Wayburn: That's correct, but if the league acquires all their cutover land, then they're left with this industrial complex in the middle of it.

Schrepfer: That they would have to take out?

Wayburn: That would have to be taken out. By comparison, in Redwood Creek there is still one lumber mill which is actively going. Arcata has a mill right at the foot of Bald Hills Road, and they also have Valley Green, which is their local headquarters, and a housing development. The question comes up of what is to be done with that at the present time because there is a provision in this act that there has to be a scenic highway with proper screening. You can see these places on both sides of the road. Some decision will have to be made as to whether or not that housing will be acquired; whether or not it will be used by the workers who are going to have work in the Redwood Creek watershed for rehabilitation during the next ten years. It would be a logical site for those workers to be living, and if Arcata liquidates, of course, they will have no more use for that housing. I don't know what will happen there.

Schrepfer: One of the logical things that one might assume, looking at the Redwood National Park battle, is that if the lumber companies were divided they could have worked against themselves. Was Miller ever an ally?

Wayburn: Miller was an ally of the Sierra Club, because we were after the same series of objectives in different ways. We wanted, positively, the entire watershed of Redwood Creek from ridge to ridge in the redwood belt. They didn't care anything about that. We in turn did not pursue the acquisition of the Mill Creek watershed, which allowed them to continue to cut in their own chosen lands.

As you know, there's a great difference in the composition, the strategy, and the tactics of the Sierra Club and the Save-the-Redwoods League. The league, as a C-3 organization with full tax deductibility, is not permitted to devote a substantial amount of its resources to influencing legislation. Although they would be invited to come and testify, they could not proselyte people and send them to Washington to testify; they could not tell people to write letters; they could not put ads in the paper in the way that we did; and they don't have the membership that we do. They're not composed of conservation activists the way we are.

So, from the point of view of influencing Congress, we had every advantage on our side. Miller-Rellim knew this, and Miller-Rellim used us to the best of their ability. Shall we say, we never worked together, but we were coincident allies.

Schrepfer: You mean after '64, you never personally talked to Miller?

Wayburn: Oh, yes, I talked to Miller and particularly to Darrel Schroeder, who was his vice-president and general manager. Although in principle we disagreed as to what should be done about redwoods-- whether they should be preserved or logged and we differed in public platforms and privately--still we were very friendly because we knew that our particular objectives and their particular objectives happened to coincide on the passage of a redwood national park bill. If our bill passed, the federal government would not try to acquire the lands in Mill Creek and the Smith River watershed which belonged to Miller-Rellim, and then therefore they would be able to proceed with their logging and processing operations, and they in turn had no interest in protecting the lands of their competing lumber companies. At times, and at the beginning, they did have a united front with the other lumber companies, but Miller-Rellim broke off from that and did not support Arcata and Georgia Pacific.

Schrepfer: What form did this break take?

Wayburn: Well, they didn't support them in the legislative appearances, and they didn't come out strong when the other lumber companies were trying to stop the acquisition in Redwood Creek. Miller-Rellim took no part in this.

Schrepfer: Is it partly manifest too in the fact that Miller had William Ragan as a lobbyist?

Wayburn: That's interesting, because I was thinking this at the time you mentioned it. This was part of it. Ragan, who was a very smart lawyer and their lobbyist, saw the advantages of working along with the Sierra Club, and he was valuable to the club in his suggestions as to how we could proceed. In turn, he wanted nothing from us, except that we lay off of any acquisition in the Mill Creek watershed. Of course, we had no interest in pursuing that so we got along very well.

Schrepfer: And then the other companies had a public relations firm in San Francisco; did they not? And Miller did not contribute to this?

Wayburn: That's correct.

Schrepfer: That's interesting. So the preservationists weren't the only ones who were working against each other.

Wayburn: That's correct. There's no question of that.

Schrepfer: Did you have any allies like Miller in the recent controversy over the park expansion?

Wayburn: No. It was a different sort of thing. The lumber companies were united--particularly Louisiana-Pacific and Arcata. Simpson was working with them, but Simpson didn't have the same incentive because they would not lose any virgin redwood to speak of. They lost a little bit. They had cut out their holdings in the Redwood Creek watershed long before, so they were not a problem, except with regard to their road (the K & K, or Klamath and Korbelt Road, which comes up, I believe, through Ah-Pah Creek from the Klamath River, crosses the Bald Hills Road, and then goes down past Redwood Creek and up the other bank onto Korbelt where they have a plant). They wanted to continue to use that to the extent that they had before and didn't want it used as a park road. We in turn felt, and still do feel, that that should be a park road, but with the vested rights that they had, we thought that a settlement could be made so that they could continue to use it to the extent that they had before.

I think, in passing, that this sets the stage for an inevitable conflict between the public's use and the company's use and that some sort of an alternate will have to be provided to Simpson in order for the successful park use to develop in that whole area. That road furnishes the best access from the Bald Hills Road into the upper reaches of the park down to approach Redwood Creek in the warm belt.

Reasons for Success: The Aura of the Redwoods, Burton's Commitment, Sierra Club Lobbying

Schrepfer: Did you have any other allies? If you didn't have any of the lumber companies and some support, but not too much, from labor, who were your allies in this fight?

Wayburn: First of all, a growing number of people in northwestern California began to realize that it was not in the interest of the area to have a single industry, and it was in the interest of the area to have the national park mean something.

The membership of the Sierra Club, to cite an example, has increased many times since the Redwood National Park fight began. The Redwood Chapter of the club has, I think, around 2,400 members now, and a majority of those are in the north, so there is an increasing sentiment for that. This is in spite of the fact that the media was sided against it. The local media were controlled by the companies. The politicians were controlled too. So this was all under the surface to a greater extent that it was on the surface.

Wayburn: The greatest allies that I think we had were the people and the media of the country at large. I mentioned something about this before. The redwoods have always had an aura to them. People almost regard them with religious feelings. They've had not only everyday people, but people in influence, people in the media, who felt that there was something wrong about the continued destruction of the redwood forest and who in increasing amount came out to support the idea of the park. This created a large grass-roots constituency all over the country. I think this factor more than anything else allowed us to put this over.

More than anything else though, I have to reemphasize, it was the personal, absolute commitment of Phillip Burton who put this over in an indomitable way. I've never seen any politician carry out what he carried out, for a while single-handedly--who took the abuse he did and went right on and announced what he was going to do and did it. This was responsible more than anything else.

Schrepfer: How about Andrus?

Wayburn: Andrus was very helpful. The administration came out early in favor of the bill.

Schrepfer: Before Carter was elected he made some comments about this?

Wayburn: Carter came out in his campaign in favor of the Redwood National Park expansion and I think he carried out his campaign promises admirably.

One thing I might add here, because I'm extremely aware of it--in the first redwood battle we had very few resources in leadership for it. I was the head of it; Mike McCloskey was working right with me. He came in about the time the legislative battle got well under way, and during the passage of the bill in the House and the Senate, and particularly during the conference committee, he was kept in Washington. This was very much of a personal operation, although we had a great help from around the country.

This time we had much better organization. By this time the Sierra Club full-time staff in Washington had grown from one person to a dozen people. There were six professional lobbyists there. One of these lobbyists, Linda Billings, was detailed to the Redwood National Park Expansion Act. Linda worked very closely with me. I was still chairman of the task force, but she represented us in Washington continuously. I went back two or three or four

Wayburn: times, and she did the bulk of the lobbying. She had very able help from John Amodio, who was with the Northcoast Environmental Center.*

##

Wayburn: John Amodio was one of the new breed--a graduate of Humboldt State College who became interested in the redwoods early in his college career and retained it. He was a very able young man with a very good personality who became devoted to the redwood cause. He was a part of the Emerald Creek Committee early and then came over to the Sierra Club. We sent him back to Washington as an assistant to Linda Billings and his present job is now wilderness coordinator for northern California. He's a paid employee, but at the time when he went back, he went back as a volunteer activist and lobbied for us--played a big role.

Another young man in the same category was named Steve Lau. There were others who helped in between, but we had this group of three people, headed by Linda Billings, who worked closely with Phil Burton and worked the Interior Committee and House of Representatives generally; and then went over to the Senate side and worked with the Energy Committee with Senator [James] Abourezk, who was the chairman of the National Park Subcommittee; then on the Senate as a whole.

We were much stronger in the local chapters which we had and infinitely stronger as an organization. Whereas the Sierra Club in 1964 had 16,500 members, the Sierra Club in 1978 has 185,000 members. And whereas we were still in 1968 to a considerable extent a California-known organization, we now have fifty-three chapters scattered all over the country and are, without any question, the strongest activist national conservation organization. This made a difference in how these bills went through, despite the enormous difference in the amount of money which had to be spent and the amount of opposition which we had. The first bill was significant in that it was the first time the Congress had appropriated a large amount of money for the acquisition of private land for a national park, and this time, of course, four times as much money was appropriated--\$92 million in the first act--\$359 million in the second, plus \$40 million for rehabilitation and jobs.

Schrepfer: Were you happy with the figure?

Wayburn: With what figure?

*See John Amodio, Lobbyist for Redwood National Park Expansion, Sierra Club Oral History Project, 1984.

Schrepfer: The \$359 million. Did you think maybe it was too high--too low?

Wayburn: I felt that this was more than should be needed, but this was the appraisal that was put in by government people who felt that it might cost this much. I don't feel that the lumber companies should have this much money for their lands. Only 9,600 acres of virgin redwood is being acquired--the rest of it is cutover land. If you appraise the cutover land at around \$300 an acre--some of it is in very bad shape--you'll see that some 36,000 or 38,000 acres of cutover land would only cost around \$10 million to acquire and that leaves an amazing amount of money for the virgin redwood--I think somewhere around \$35,000 to \$40,000 an acre. I think this is higher than Save-the-Redwoods League has been paying, recently, for the choicest groves.

John Dewitt has commented on that. He knows much more about the figures than I do, and I suggest that you get that from John. It's one more way in which he's been very helpful. In the early sixties we didn't know what the league paid for their land. It was kept more or less quiet. He's been extremely open in announcing this to the Congress. This has kept down the claims of the companies.

Rehabilitation of Damaged Redwood Lands##

Schrepfer: I suppose one last question that occurs to me is, what are your feelings about the reconstruction of Redwood Creek? There are going to be some very fundamental questions about what's natural. What are your hopes about what they do with this?

Wayburn: This is a question that's not easy to answer. It's become more difficult as the years go by. In 1966, we felt quite clear we had the opportunity to preserve the virgin forest--in large part virgin from the sea to the limit of the redwood belt. In 1978, I have much greater qualms. If we can get by the first five to ten years successfully, I think that it will all be worth it--that there will be the perpetuation of the redwood forest in another five hundred years; that we will have the sort of forest that we'd hope to have.

But, as I looked through it on this last trip on Sunday, I saw in addition to the dreadful erosion, the tremendous cuts along the road, the remnants of the beds which had been created to have the trees fall on, the distortion of the small stream watersheds.

Wayburn: I saw the reforestation that the companies had done the last few years--under pressure, but there was some reforestation--and what did they put in? They put in large amounts of Monterey pine, which is an exotic in that area. They had planted large amounts of Douglas fir in order to get a tree which would give them commercial lumber sooner than the redwood would. Both of these trees would do so.

Now both of these trees held the banks to a better extent than the banks would have held up otherwise, but I don't know what all complications there are going to be. In addition, because the land has been so mutilated, other exotics were coming in--broom and thistle growing in areas where there would have been no chance of their growing. The hillsides were slumping in a way that they hadn't before. It's an unstable area anyway, but the redwoods have, in the past, grown well when they've been allowed to grow in this area. I have to express certain doubts and hope that there isn't too much damage.

This damage was all through the Redwood Creek hillside as we traversed it along the so-called C-line of the Arcata lumber company and the K & K line of Simpson.

Schrepfer: What does C-line mean?

Wayburn: Just an arbitrary designation A, B, C.

Schrepfer: I gather they are considering doing some riprapping, check dams, this kind of thing. How do you feel about this?

Wayburn: What is provided in the bill is that labor-intensive rehabilitation be done. It's being surveyed now and hasn't been started. I have doubts about the riprapping, which you mentioned specifically. Claire Dedrick was going to do riprapping of Redwood Creek as a panacea. This was frowned on by the National Park Service, and I don't think it's planned at this moment. The lower creek is riprapped, but up in the park it is not.

Now check dams, some diversion of small streams, is undoubtedly going to be done. There's so much damage that it has to be done. There are people who have worked on this problem. The one I know about particularly is the Center for Manpower Research and Education in Mendocino County, which is headed by a woman named Meca Wawona. They have drafted a plan; they did this for the Sierra Club a couple of years ago. Senator Cranston thought well of their plans and included provisions in his version of the bill, which went on into the act, which may be the type of thing which is done. This involves a great deal of personal hand labor.

##

VII THE GOLDEN GATE NATIONAL RECREATION AREA

Genesis of the "Battle for the Hills of Home"##

Schrepfer: Let's turn now to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, which was an outgrowth of your work on Mount Tamalpais beginning after World War II.

Wayburn: Yes, as I think I told you, I became interested in, and part of my conservation impetus was concerned with, the hills of Marin--as I called it later, the "battle for the hills of home." I got into this through helping out local organizations--the Sierra Club, the Tamalpais Conservation Club--acquire a few acres here and there for Mount Tamalpais State Park, before I began to reason out for myself what was involved.

All my efforts were channeled towards expansion and protection of Mount Tamalpais State Park.

Schrepfer: You mentioned the battle for the hills of home; are you referring to that because you can see the hills from your home?

Wayburn: Yes, and walk right out to them.

Schrepfer: How long have you lived in this house?

Wayburn: Twenty-six years it will be.

Schrepfer: So, you were living here when you began to get involved with--

Wayburn: Not when I got involved first with Tamalpais, but soon afterwards. I would look out there and see this vast expanse of undeveloped land.

Schrepfer: It is certainly spectacular from here.

Wayburn: And think, "Wouldn't that be marvelous if that always would remain that way." As early as probably 1952-53, I remember sitting down at Panoramic Highway--on the hill beside the Panoramic Highway, with James Tryner, who had been sent down by the chief of the Division of Beaches and Parks, Newton Drury, to dissuade me from my efforts to expand Mount Tamalpais to a very large degree. And Tryner, fortunately, ended up agreeing with me. But the genesis of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, from my standpoint, started about that time. One more factor that came up--in 1955, the National Park Service had been doing a survey of the Pacific Coast, looking for possible national park sites and one of the sites mentioned was the Marin Headlands.

Schrepfer: This was the Mendocino--Humboldt Coastal Survey?

Wayburn No. The whole of the Pacific Coast. George Collins was our contact. He was one of the two people who was doing it. Ansel Adams and I, separately, came to the conclusion that there could be no greater monument than the Golden Gate, with all the space on the Marin side and a thin area of comparatively natural scene in the Lands End area and in the Presidio on the San Francisco side. We suggested this to the Park Service, but the Park Service would have no part of it. They said that it would be too much trouble, that they didn't have the manpower or the ability to start this. Then we let it sit for a while.

Shortly after that, however, the federal government began to declare surplus certain areas which were no longer necessary to missions of the military. They did this in parts of Fort Baker and Fort Barry and Fort Cronkite. Those are the three forts on the Marin side. At that time I again went to the National Parks Service people and asked them to acquire these surplus lands for the National Parks System, because, even though they were just bits and pieces, if the Park Service didn't acquire them, it meant that they would be dropped out of federal hands, and the state would have the option, and then the local government, and finally it would go to private parties. There were many private parties who wanted to develop some of this land for housing. But the Park Service would have no part of it.

Fortunately, we were able to find a friendly ear in the person of Charles DeTurk, who took Newton Drury's place as chief of the Division of Beaches and Parks. He agreed to try to incorporate these as Marin Headlands State Park, as each parcel became available.

Wayburn: We formed an organization particularly to support this purpose. The organization was the brainchild of a woman named Katherine Frankforter. She was an artist, and she formed an organization of a dozen men and herself--all the rest were businessmen, and I was the conservationist.

We formed Marin Headlands, Inc., which is still an organization in stand-by status but was most active in getting the state to cooperate and fortunately had such influential businessmen as Fred Merrill, who was the head of the Firemen's Fund Insurance Company--later a vice-president of American Express; and Jacquelyn Hume, an independent businessman who was, I think, Ronald Reagan's campaign manager or treasurer; and John Busterud, an attorney and former assemblyman who had become interested in environmental matters (he was later acting chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality).

This organization was a liaison particularly to the state and had liaison, of course, with Governor Reagan, which was very fortunate. We functioned as an organization until 1970, when we went into stand-by status. I was the one who asked the organization not to dissolve, because I wanted to be sure that there was such an organization in being, and it is still in being as a stand-by, with Jacquelyn Hume as the president. He's also the chairman of the board of the Pacific Medical Center.

This was the situation about 1968, when Richard Nixon became president, and Walter Hickel became secretary of the Interior. Hickel, as you know, had been under fire from the conservation organizations and had sworn to become a conservationist himself. Many people, not including myself, thought that he had taken this up with religious fervor. I never thought much of Hickel as a conservationist, and, as I watch him now, I see him reverting to his previous stance.

But Nixon, in his State of the Union message, I think his first one [1969], announced the legacy of the parks and Hickel formulated the policy of "parks for the people," or "parks-to-the-people," which meant that some urban areas were to be considered. The National Park Service had surveyed some fourteen areas which they felt were worthy of consideration for national park status. The two most prominent of these were around New York and San Francisco. The first two areas considered were Gateway East and, as it was called, Gateway West.

Here in the West there was a complication, which proved very helpful. The Indians had occupied Alcatraz, and they had proved a great burden to the president and the secretary of the Interior

Wayburn: and the word went out, "Get the Indians off of Alcatraz somehow." One way of doing this was to establish a national park. These matters went on simultaneously rather than causatively.

At any rate, under Hickel's supervision, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation was directed to formulate a recreation area plan. They worked on this for, I think, three years, and it never came out formally. We learned a little bit of what it was. To the best of my recollection, it included some three thousand acres, including Alcatraz, the forts along the shore of the Presidio extending up to Lands End, and the forts on the Marin side.

Just about this time, another movement developed. The General Services Administration of the federal government needed an archives building. They selected a site at Fort Miley--an acre site at east Fort Miley, where they would have all the archives from the western states. This happened to be right opposite where a young lady named Amy Meyer lived, on Clement Street. She and some of her neighbors became indignant at this idea and started to fight. They brought it to the Bay Chapter of the Sierra Club. As a result she was made the chairman of a committee to investigate and later to fight this archives center.

Simultaneously with this came the idea of what the Sierra Club should do about the proposed Golden Gate National Recreation Area, and Amy was made chairman of this committee. Amy and her group kept coming to me because of my long interest in Marin County and also in Lands End, and I kept giving them advice. Finally, in January 1971 we reached the conclusion that we should have a separate front organization to fight for the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. I agreed to become chairman of this [People for a Golden Gate National Recreation Area] and Amy, co-chairman. We formed a small, tight steering committee. Then we went about getting all the local support we could, appealing to local pride and local spirit and pointing out the advantages of what could ensue. We built up our organization and got every prominent individual we could--every supervisor, every mayor, every congressman, every senator, to endorse our organization.

An "Outrageous" Plan Succeeds

Wayburn: In the meantime I had been planning. I went to Washington in April, 1971, with two prospective plans to take to the legislators, who were asked to carry the bill. I went to our two senators, who were then Cranston and Tunney, and they agreed that they would support it and thought it should first come out in the House.

Wayburn: I went to [William] Mailliard, who was the congressman for practically all the area, and he said, "Well, it's a lot to ask for, but I'll support it."

I went to Burton and showed him first my 10,000-acre plan-- the acquisition of 10,000 acres, which would have meant 25,000 acres recreation area instead of the 3,000 acres that the bureau had in mind. He said, "Is this what you want?" and I said, "No." "Well, what do you want?" I said, "I want to realize a twenty-five-year-long dream I've had of connecting Point Reyes with San Francisco, connecting Tamales Point with Fort Funston." He said, "Well, go back, and don't bring me anything you don't want. Bring me back, completed, what you want, and I'll put it through."

So I did and in June 1971, we put in this outrageous plan, which the Park Service would not endorse. They did endorse the smaller one after much persuasion, but they said we were asking too much. Our plan went all the way up the Olema Valley to Sir Francis Drake Highway. It effectively made an open space complex of park and recreation land of 100,000 acres by the addition of 34,000 acres as the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. I say 100,000 acres because there were 64,000 acres at Point Reyes. And then an additional 17,000 acres in the Marin Municipal Water District, which is closely tied in here.

By the way, I should mention that we have gone back twice since for additions, and we have an addition in the Burton's omnibus bill now for another 6,000 acres. This will add the total of the open land to well over 150,000 acres, right here adjacent to the metropolitan area.

We got all these people behind us, really before they knew just what we were doing. They all supported the general idea. Our stationery, which you may want to look at, tells what we did. That's fairly recent stationery, but it was all like this. We got the entire Bay Area behind us. In the course of sixteen months, this improbable legislation went through the entire Congress and was signed by the president. We had the president in back of it too. President Nixon came out here on a visit and he encouraged us. He said, "You get out to the Congress. You ought to have this." How much he knew about it I don't know, but those were kind words, and they helped.

One other person I'm grateful to in this regard was Secretary of the Interior Morton, who had flown over the area several times and had approved of the smaller acquisition, but opposed the larger one. But on the last time he came over, he particularly looked at

Wayburn: that area to the north--the Olema Valley and the Bolinas Ridge area. When he came up to testify before the Senate Interior Committee the last time, he said, "I had opposed this, but Dr. Wayburn has convinced me that this should be in the park, and so we now stand in favor of it." This is one of the reasons that I've always been grateful to Rogers Morton.

There were many, many people who had a part in this. Amy Meyer I must mention particularly. I was the architect; she was the straw boss. She worked day and night. The members of this steering committee, many of them whose names you see [on the letterhead] worked very hard. Diane Hunter in San Francisco; Bob Young did all sorts of work behind the scenes--drew up maps and was helpful in a number of ways. Members of the steering committee all were invaluable in helping out in different ways.

Then we had local legislators who went back to testify in support of the legislation. For example, I remember the Marin County Board of Supervisors sent back Peter Arrigoni, who supported the legislation fully. He said that the Marin County Board of Supervisors unanimously supported it. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors supported it. With that sort of local government support, and state support, and with thousands of individuals supporting it, we were able to get through in 1972, in just sixteen months, what had not been thought to be possible. I call this my happiest adventure in conservation legislation.

Schrepfer: Who were your opponents?

Wayburn: We had no real opponents outside the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau of the Budget opposed it, particularly since Phil Burton included \$61 million for acquisition funds and \$58 million for development funds. This was another reason for our success. Burton was able to put this through and we didn't use up all the money the first time around. We spent, I think, only half of it. At the present time there is still authorization for more acquisition money when it should be needed for these new additions that we're proposing.

As time has gone on we found out that to utilize this area properly, we want to get more land closer to the metropolitan area, by the best access. And, strangely enough, what most people conceive of as the way over to that area is actually the long way around. Over the hill it takes a full hour to get to the Bolinas area. If you go the other way, over Sir Francis Drake Boulevard, you can get to Samuel P. Taylor State Park, which is the edge of the other side in forty to forty-five minutes. So now we're trying to

Wayburn: acquire land between Samuel P. Taylor State Park and Point Reyes Station, which would allow for the picnicking and overnight camping that people want to have and allow for additional trails, particularly for riders, which will spare the steep slopes of the mountains in Point Reyes National Seashore, where there's a great deal of erosion going on.

Positions of the NPS and the Local Ranchers

Schrepfer: The National Parks Service's position is rather strange. Were they just afraid to be so pushy for fear that they had other projects that they might lose on?

Wayburn: Hartzog was the director at the beginning, and Hartzog was willing to take in the smaller park, which would acquire 10,000 acres of private land, but not the larger park which would include another 6,000 acres.

Schrepfer: It would seem to me that the Park Service suffered under Nixon's appointments.

Wayburn: There's no question of that. Hartzog was forced out. Hartzog, despite my differences with him, I considered an excellent director. His dominant trouble was twofold: first, he had to learn to think big in the Park Service. He was a lawyer who didn't think as big as he should have. The second big fault that he had was that he tried to do everything himself and wouldn't allow the development of capable people under him. In spite of these faults, he was the ablest of the park directors I have known. He got more done than any of the rest of them.

Schrepfer: Weren't there forces in the Sierra Club, however, who helped push Hartzog out?

Wayburn: Who were not in favor of Hartzog, this is quite true. But remember, the Sierra Club had gotten to be a big organization with divergent viewpoints itself. Of the Park Service directors I've dealt with, Drury was too pure and thought too small. Connie Wirth thought big, but was development-minded and did not think big enough when it came to acquisition of new areas. Mission 66 was his project, and this caused some unfortunate development of parks.

Wayburn: Hartzog came along as a new fresh broom. It took him awhile to learn, but I think he did learn towards the end. It was unfortunate that he and Nat Reed--also an extremely able man, who became Hartzog's immediate superior--didn't get along. Reed thought he had to part with him because Reed had a good candidate for Park Service director, but he was overruled and the appointment was made directly from the White House. When Ronald Walker, the president's advance man, was made director of the Park Service, a more unfortunate choice would be hard to find. He was succeeded by Everhart, who was a good park man, but was too timid and who did not get enough done and did not go ahead solidly in his time.

Now the present director, William Whalen, has not been in long enough to judge his performance. I personally like him very much. He became director after being four years here as the general manager and superintendent of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, and I became very well acquainted with him.

Schrepfer: Most of your dealings after Hartzog came with Walker?

Wayburn: No, I had very few dealings with Walker. Sometimes with his subordinates. Walker just didn't do anything. I met Walker two or three times, and he assured me of his undying adherence to conservation principles, but nothing much happened. His successor did not get very much done either.

I wrote a paper for the American Association for the Advancement of Science*--I don't know whether you've seen it or not--which embodied my philosophy in the Golden Gate area. I thought that there was still, by a miracle, a large amount of undeveloped land immediately adjacent to the San Francisco metropolitan area. This was in part the same as my feeling about Mount Tamalpais, only on a much larger scale, because it involved Mount Tamalpais, Point Reyes, Muir Woods, Fort Point, Alcatraz and all of the land in between. There was comparatively a small amount of private land, except for the communities. I felt that we had to go around the existing communities--it would be foolish to try to take them into this area. We should work with what we had. The ranches were ready for the taking, because the ranch land of Marin County had been overgrazed. The topsoil was getting very thin, and the ranchers were not able to make a living. They failed first on dairy cattle and then on beef cattle.

Schrepfer: What was their tax situation?

Wayburn: There was increasing taxation on the private land. The choice came to these ranchers that they would have to either pay a great deal more taxes, or sell their land for subdivision, or allow their

*On deposit in the Edgar Wayburn papers, Sierra Club collection, The Bancroft Library.

Wayburn: land to go for the park. They got a much better deal than they could have in any other way. As a matter of fact, the best possible deal for them was to sell and to retain the homesite for twenty-five years or for life, as they wanted, or in case of a few people they could graze at a lesser degree of intensity than they had before. Boyd Stewart was one notable exception--he elected to continue to graze cattle and horses, and he's made a great success of it. This is part of the rest of the story of Golden Gate.

Schrepfer: Did those people help you, by the way? The landowners?

Wayburn: Boyd Stewart helped both with Point Reyes and with Golden Gate. The landowners at first were against Point Reyes, not realizing what was what. They changed, and Stewart was instrumental in seeing that they changed.

The Case for a United Jurisdiction with Protection of the
Natural Terrain##

[Interview 5: June 13, 1978]

Schrepfer: We were talking last time about the lack of opposition that you had in the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. Things have now changed, I gather, and there is some opposition developing?

Wayburn: There was no opposition to the first bill because it was an idea whose time had come--to have a large recreation area immediately adjacent to a large city, and the San Francisco metropolitan area was the one place, was the greatest place in the United States where this could be accomplished with comparatively little opposition. There were inexistence a number of separate park entities or park and public entities by 1970. The big one was the 64,000 acre Point Reyes National Seashore, which was established by Congress in 1962, and I had a role in that as a member of the Point Reyes Foundation.

There was the Muir Woods National Monument, which was established in 1908, and there was the Fort Point Historical Monument, which is on the San Francisco side just under the bridge. Then there were several federal forts on the Marin side--Fort Baker, Fort Cronkhite, and Fort Barry. And there was the Presidio and Fort Mason on the San Francisco side.

Wayburn: In addition there were some areas under local jurisdiction, such as Aquatic Park, and Phelan Beach and Ocean Beach and Lands End, the suburb area which is just below Fort Miley, and then there's part of Fort Miley itself which is open space and available. Then there was the Presidio. Incidentally, in this legislation we included all of Presidio, to be made available whenever it was declared surplus by the military, and we had asked for all of Crissy Field to be included at that time. We got only forty-five of the 115 acres of Crissy Field, but that was a start and established a consecutive, contiguous, shoreline belt.

In addition to that there was Mount Tamalpais State Park, which by this time, was close to six thousand acres; and the Marin Municipal Water District of 17,000 acres; Samuel P. Taylor State Park of 2,500 acres; and Tamales Bay State Park. All would be contiguous with the federal land.

I felt at that time that instead of having all of these multiple jurisdictions--I forgot to mention the county park at Muir Beach and the state park at Stinson Beach--it would be highly desirable to have this all under one jurisdiction. This would allow different parts of the area to be utilized to their maximum and save other parts to be protected to their maximum. In the legislation which we wrote and Congressman Burton introduced, there is this provision for protection of the natural terrain. The legislation is stronger than the legislation for Point Reyes National Seashore. (You understand that a national seashore is one of the types of national recreation areas.)

Our vision was then to connect all these different areas. There were some sixteen thousand acres of private land in between, and in the legislation we included all this private land. All of that is now a part of the National Recreation Area. At the same time, we found parts of Point Reyes National Seashore which were incomplete, and we added in that bill and during the next four years bits and pieces of land to both Point Reyes and Golden Gate National Recreation Area. And now we have this large complex of open space. We don't have yet one great big chunk in the middle under this single administration--that is around Mount Tamalpais State Park, which is still administered by the state park service.

Schrepfer: Do you think the state is going to cooperate in a transfer?

Wayburn: The state has gone back and forth. At one time they agreed to transfer and then there was some local opposition from a comparatively small group of people who had been very cooperative in the first legislation--people in a local organization known as the Tamalpais

Wayburn: Conservation Club. But a couple of people felt strongly that the state should continue to administer the state park; they were led by the state park officials--some of the rangers and administrators behind the scenes, who encouraged these people. They influenced the governor's office and the Department of Natural Resources to veto legislation which had gone through the state legislature. This had been authorized by the state legislature, and the governor vetoed it.

Schrepfer: This is Governor Brown?

Wayburn: Governor Brown. We are hopeful that this next year they will see the wisdom of this. Now this lack of vision is not confined to the state. Some of the local people with their vested interests and some people with power in the national government have gotten together to try to keep Point Reyes separate from Golden Gate on the theory that Golden Gate is a recreation area and all sorts of things are allowed in it and Point Reyes is a very special place.

Of course, Point Reyes is a very special place. I've been one of those who's been trying--successfully--to get a wilderness area in Point Reyes, and there is now a 25,000-acre wilderness area (I think that's the figure) inside of Point Reyes National Seashore. But it would be much easier for one single overall administrator to administer this entire area. To do otherwise is like having Yosemite National Park divided into several sections, with Yosemite Valley still under the aegis of the state and administered by the State of California and the north side of Yosemite under one National Park Service administrator and the south side under another.

The larger the jurisdiction, up to a certain point certainly, the more can be accomplished--the more people who can be satisfied with the least damage to the land--and this is my prime consideration. If Point Reyes has to be administered as a single unit, and Mount Tamalpais has to be administered as a single unit, and Golden Gate has to be administered as a single unit and Muir Woods likewise, then, except for Muir Woods, each area has to have picnic grounds, has to have facilities for parking, has to have facilities for camping. They have to duplicate all the facilities. Whereas, if you have one large area, under a single administration, you can pick out the areas that need protection and shouldn't have any of these things and allow intensive recreational use in other parts. That's what we've already done to a very considerable extent in Golden Gate. The San Francisco side includes Fort Mason, which has several buildings in it which are used for intensive recreation and for cultural recreation as well as outdoor recreation. On the other hand it has areas in the Olema Valley which we're trying to keep

Wayburn: from being overutilized in the same way that we are Point Reyes, because it's immediately adjacent to Point Reyes and should administered in much the same way.

Some of the local people who live near Point Reyes feel that they can do a better job of influencing the park administrators to do the right thing if he's right next to them. I disagree with that. I think that local people are likely to protect an area, but some local people are likely to want to overuse the area, particularly if they have vested interests. Some of the people around this park have vested interests; some of that can be good, others can be very deleterious.

Schrepfer: So, you're willing to bank on the Park Service instead?

Wayburn: I'm not willing to bank on the Park Service, no. The Park Service has many influences on it. The conservation influence needs to be there all the time. I have no more utter confidence in Park Service administrators than I have in Forest Service or state park administrators. They're all good people, but they are all likely to be influenced from the outside. And it's the job of the conservationist to be sure that that influence is as benign as possible.

Parks as a Haven for the Biosphere and a Recreational Resource

Schrepfer: Does it worry you that some of the multinational corporations, like TWA, are getting into the concessions of the parks?

Wayburn: I have certain qualms. We're not talking, at this moment, about Point Reyes or Golden Gate, because they don't have such concessions. There are some small concessions, notably stables, which are going to have to be watched, but they are not what you were talking about.

Schrepfer: Would they have concessions in the development of some of these areas?

Wayburn: Yes, they're very likely to. There are concessions of a sort right here at Fort Mason. The Fort Mason Foundation is a public foundation which has a concession over who gets to go into what part of those buildings at Fort Mason--the piers and the separate buildings. There's been considerable discussion about this. This has to be ultimately approved by the Park Service and in effect, by the Golden Gate National Recreation Area Citizen's Advisory Commission. This

Wayburn: is a controlling influence, which so far has been a very good one, and I hope continues to be a good one. It's in its fourth or fifth year of a ten-year life now.

But you were talking about something else, which is the possible malignant influence of the large corporation which has as its first objective the profit motive. That shouldn't be the prime motive in the national parks. If a corporation wishes to make ends meet in the national park, it has to realize that the prime purpose of the park is two-fold: it's not only for the entertainment of today's visitor; it's for the protection of the park for the visitor of the distant future and more than that, for the protection of the ecosphere in which the park exists. This is a little off the subject we started with, but I feel that the day may not be too far distant when the national parks will be the haven for what I call the "biosphere." It's the one place where natural process can go on in a fairly large area with comparatively little influence by man.

Incidentally I just wrote a letter yesterday to the general superintendent of the GGNRA, telling him that thistle and broom, which are exotic plants, had invaded this area, and that they were a result of the erosion and the overgrazing which had occurred before the national park ever acquired this land, but they've become intensified during the past year and probably because of first the drought and then the heavy rains. And I've never seen these exotics to such an extent. Their danger, in addition to being exotics, is that they crowd out the native vegetation such as Ceanothus. One of the dreams that I have is that some day this area will revert to its natural succession so that we will have within this 100,000 acres or more a land which resembles the pre-European days.

Schrepfer: Why is that so important?

Wayburn: I think it's important that some part of our biosphere be allowed to revert to natural conditions as much as possible. It's going to be a difficult proposition in areas which have been treated as badly as this land has and areas which are as close to as many people as these lands are. But particularly in the wilderness areas, I think there may be a pretty good chance.

Why is it important, you say? It's important to know what goes on in the natural chain of life. This is a philosophical and scientific concept. It's important to man to know what areas can be like, comparatively uninfluenced by what he's doing to them

Wayburn: every day. As I said before, there may not be any areas except these comparatively large federal areas, and the national parks I think are number one; the wilderness areas of the national forest and the wildlife refuges, where there is not too much manipulation, are in the number two position. But the combination of national park and wilderness is the best of all of these.

The wilderness areas of the national forest, I guess, would come pretty close. Hunting is allowed in them, which may not be all bad--I don't think that it is all bad if it's controlled enough, because man has taken away the natural predators. This is one of the troubles in the national parks where no hunting is allowed and where the predators are controlled or done away with and some of the other animals overpopulate--the ungulates and the rodents particularly. We have already influenced these areas all too much.

Schrepfer: So you don't have anything against hunters then?

Wayburn: I don't have anything against hunters as such. I do have a great deal against hunters who participate in overhunting, so that the natural resource, in this case the animals, is not allowed to have a core refuge.

I'm not a hunter. I've never cared about being a hunter, but basically man is a hunter--man is a predator. Let me put it in a balder sense. I have respect for the predators as long as they don't waste or use up too much of their patrimony. Now man is doing that. Man doesn't think enough about it. The other animals haven't had the same chance.

Schrepfer: What are you suggesting that they do with things like the thistle and broom? How do they restore an area?

Wayburn: The Park Service hasn't worked this out. No one has worked this out. I'm asking that this be done partly on an experimental basis and partly on a practical basis. There are several ways it could be done. The area could be burned, which is comparable to what the Indians did. I personally would like to see much more burning than is done. The difficulty is that the local fire departments and the National Park Service are afraid that they can't control it. I think that controlled burning is possible, and that it should be done.

Another way to get rid of the thistle and the broom though, is to cut it and to cut it again before it has a chance to pollinate and spread further for the next crop. And then a third way of doing it would be to pull it out by hand and dispose of the plants

Wayburn: so that they would not spread back into the loose soil. These are three possible ways of doing it. I believe that no one has done sufficient research on it to know what the most effective way would be.

Schrepfer: You mentioned some areas of intense recreational use and others of none. Which of the areas do you think are the most suitable for recreation besides Fort Mason?

Wayburn: Well, first of all the flatlands on the San Francisco side, such as Crissy Field and the Presidio, and the beaches--particularly the big beaches like Baker Beach and Ocean Beach. Those lend themselves to intensive outdoor recreation very well. There is Aquatic park, where hundreds of people can fish, or many people can swim--particularly when the bay is cleared up.

Then on the Marin side there are certain areas such as Rodeo Lagoon and the flatlands of Rodeo Valley, where the military barracks have been, and many people are being accommodated in those now. The military hasn't given up all the housing yet. Some day they will. There are many good sites there.

There are parts of Tennessee Valley--that is, the part which is closest to Mill Valley and the Manzanita turnoff, but not farther down Tennessee Valley towards the ocean. And then farther north, Muir Woods and Frank Valley. Muir Woods takes a tremendous visitation. It's a museum for the redwoods--a million people a year visit it.

Schrepfer: Don't the redwoods have a problem with heavy visitation in Big Basin?

Wayburn: Well, there's a problem in Muir Woods with the redwoods. It has been converted into an outdoor museum for the hordes of people who want to see the redwoods, and this is the closest place they can see them.

The Park Service has--and I have to approve of it--paved the walkways with black-top, and they've got a black-top trail running through this and fencing to keep the trees from being beaten down too much--to keep the ground from being beaten down too much.

Schrepfer: You have sprinkler systems in Jed Smith [State Park].

Wayburn: Sprinkler systems?

Schrepfer: I understand they do.

Wayburn: I don't know this.

Schrepfer: To keep the vegetation. Some of these areas were stripped of vegetation before the state park started fencing.

Wayburn: In Muir Woods they have protected the trees with fencing, and they have protected the ground from being tamped down too much with black-top. If you walk on far enough and leave the people behind, you can find a more natural state, but there is always this problem between the number of people who want to see and go through a national park and the number of people it can take, what its carrying capacity is. These are things that we will be running into in Golden Gate, and we're already running into, to some extent, at Point Reyes. There are hundreds and hundreds of people--I might even say thousands--who go out to Point Reyes on a sunny day. They divide, and many of them go to the beaches, but if you go to the headquarters area there is a huge parking lot which is absolutely full on a good day.

These people get out of their cars and either picnic or they go walking. There is an old ranch road which has been improved where more people walk than any other place, but also there are trails which take off over the mountainous areas where a lot of people walk and ride. The Park Service hasn't yet gotten its courage up enough to stop horseback riding in steep areas, where the horses hooves--particularly in large groups, and it's amazing how many times you see a fairly large group of horsemen together--have caused erosion of the trail areas. This is something, again, we're working on through this Citizen's Advisory Committee.

Schrepfer: As a national seashore, Point Reyes is supposed to be used fairly heavily for recreation. Do you approve of that?

Wayburn: Whether I approve of that or not, it's a fact. It's one of the facts that we have to realize--we who have gone out to secure fairly good-sized areas of national parks and national recreation areas, which include national seashores. The people of the United States have bought these areas back from private owners. They are the owners. I'm one who, as I said earlier, would like to see things revert to a natural condition as much as possible, but I do approve of intensive use in areas which can take it. And beaches, fortunately, are such areas.

One has to look out for the edge of the beach, which is often in a critical condition, but where the ocean flows back and forth--between the high tide and the low tide--man does comparatively little. Thousands and even millions of us can occupy that beach, and a little

- Wayburn: while later, nature will reclaim it. This isn't the case in areas where there's topsoil and vegetation--whether that vegetation be grassland, bushes, or trees.
- Schrepfer: I think that I asked you earlier and I'm not sure you really totally answered it, but there is some local opposition going on now to the expansion of the Golden Gate recreation area--realtors and other local interests.
- Wayburn: I should preface this by saying that as Point Reyes and Golden Gate have been used, we, with a planning frame of mind, see the need for the acquisition of certain areas which we didn't see at first and even to the extent that we saw them, didn't dare ask for them.

When I asked Phil Burton for the acquisition of the Olema Valley up to Sir Francis Drake Boulevard, I was asking for something that practically no one believed would be possible, but a combination of events made it possible. That was the fact that the topsoil of the area was being worn down, and the ranchers could not make a living, first from dairy cattle and then from beef cattle; that the county regulations were becoming more stringent as far as the control of sewage and the control of cattle excreta was concerned (this is under their pure water provisions); that these ranchers were going broke trying to make a living; and that their taxes kept going up because the land is assessed for its so-called highest and best use, which means its most expensive use under these circumstances. And the most expensive use is subdivisions because the county could get more money from a subdivision than it could from open land which was being grazed.

As a consequence, when we came along with our proposal for a national park, and the ranchers were offered life estates if they wanted to keep their houses and, in the case of some of them, the privilege of ranching for a number of years--they became cooperative.

Blocking the Spread of Subdivisions in Marin

- Schrepfer: One historian has said that most of the land saved in the national park system were lands that were not particularly valuable for commercial uses. Is that what you're saying was the case here?
- Wayburn: These lands could have been valuable for commercial uses, but the government was willing to pay more than a private purchaser. Earlier we, the conservationists, had blocked the spread of the

Wayburn: . subdivisions over the southern portion of this area. We had blocked the Division of Highways in its plans to put freeways out into west Marin. If that had succeeded, I have no doubt that utility systems would have followed the freeways, and that the subdivisions would have become quite numerous, and we would have had no national park.

Schrepfer: Was water, particularly, one of the big controlling factors?

Wayburn: Water has been a great controlling factor. The only way for west Marin to have had a large population would have been for water to have been imported from east Marin. East Marin hasn't had enough water of its own from the Marin County lake system--the Marin Municipal Water District--but the people of Marin voted against buying water from the Russian River. And this is another one of the factors which played a role. If there was no water, they couldn't have any large subdivisions.

This was done on a smaller scale recently in Bolinas. In 1971 a new group of people who had first seen Bolinas because of their interest of saving the birds from the oil spill, liked the looks of the place and thought they'd stay. As they stayed they saw Bolinas being developed into one of these subdivisions, and the key to this was water. The new people recalled two of the public utility district commissioners, put in two of their own, stopped payment on the land for the new water supply and stopped the issuing of water meters. And as a result of that, Bolinas has grown very slowly in the past half dozen years. But this has been repeated in one way or another over in Marin County.

I'm saying that this land could have been very valuable commercially if it had been developed as subdivision land.

Schrepfer: Was there not a proposal that was very seriously advanced for a housing development right out on the point?

Wayburn: Yes, in the 1960s. Just across the bay from where you're sitting Gulf Oil acquired an area of some 2,500 acres immediately adjacent to Fort Barry and Fort Cronkhite--an area which runs right down in the valley, adjacent to the military land, and runs up in the hills on the other side. Gulf Oil either hired, or I think allowed, a Boston developer whose name was Thomas Frouge to plan for this land. It was supposed to be a planned community, and it ran from Wolfback Ridge to Rodeo Lagoon, Rodeo Valley, and Fort Cronkhite hillside. It was to be a planned community of 25,000 people in this 2,500 acres.

Wayburn: The conservationists fought this as hard as possible, but the Marin County supervisors allowed this man to have a preliminary permit. He was well on his way to success when we were able to get a reversal on the board. A new election for the board of supervisors gave a majority of three-to-two, instead of the minority of two-to-three which had been for the good side before.

Schrepfer: Is there anything you recall in particular about this battle or getting these supervisors in that maybe wasn't written down anywhere?

Wayburn: It was written down in the Marin County papers.

Schrepfer: Anything behind the scenes that might have not appeared in writing?

Wayburn: I think that probably there is quite a bit. I know we fought this as hard as we could. Marin County was at that time on its way to becoming a conservation community to a much greater extent than it had been before, but, as I said, at first there wasn't enough strength. It gradually got the strength. And as I remember the case went to court, and the courts ruled that Frouge had to do certain things that he was not prepared to do.

I remember, for example, a confrontation that I had with a man who was a former professor at Harvard and had come to UC as professor of planning and who had been hired by Frouge to oversee the planning. He felt that if they did a careful enough job of planning, all would be well.

We had as our basic tenet the fact that this land should not be occupied by 25,000 people, and as a matter of fact we wanted to keep it as open land. It happens to be the foggiest of all the valleys up and down the immediate coast and would have been a sad place for people to have lived in these comparatively large apartment houses and townhouses. There was one hotel which was supposed to project over the top of the hills.

When we objected to the hills being surmounted by apartment houses and hotels, they cut down their plans so that you couldn't see these buildings so well from the San Francisco side. We still objected, and yet Frouge went ahead with his plans, because he had the support of Gulf Oil, the land owner. They built a big approach road out of Tennessee Valley. They had a great big monumental edifice at the entrance to the proposed community. It's a monument to them today that the entrance has now been torn down by the National Park Service.

Wayburn: But in the middle of this great fight, Frouge died, and then Gulf Oil wanted to somehow recoup as best it could. We conservationists were gaining strength, and about this time we began to put out the idea for the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. I think this was about 1970. Gulf Oil sent their people out to talk to us, and we got the Nature Conservancy interested. The Nature Conservancy took an option on this land and then bought it because of a gift from the late Martha Gerbode. This became known as the Gerbode Preserve. Martha Gerbode was Martha Alexander, the heiress to part of Alexander and Cooke, one of the five companies of Hawaii a few years back. The Gerbode Preserve rescued this land from development. As we proceeded with our plans for Golden Gate we were able to get the federal government to buy it.

Schrepfer: Was Gulf Oil cooperative?

Wayburn: Gulf Oil at this time was cooperative. Gulf Oil had been one of the big companies which had a cash surplus and decided to invest it in real estate. If you remember, the late sixties were the beginning of huge real estate development, the acquisition of land intended for residential and commercial purposes. A number of the different companies invested in the land and interestingly, many of them lost their shirts on this.

I think Gulf Oil sold the land for less than it paid for it. They probably got a tax break in so doing.

Park and Open Space Reserves: Social Dilemma or Social Opportunity?

Schrepfer: Do you think that there are any social dilemmas in the limits on growth involved in projects as this?

Wayburn: Tell me a little more what you mean by the social dilemmas involved in this.

Schrepfer: For example, the limits on growth such as Marin County has placed with water; limits on growth by designating areas as open space-- this must affect land values, must affect the social structure of the community.

Wayburn: This is quite true.

##

Wayburn: You used the phrase social dilemma and that had me wondering what you meant at first. I would rather say social opportunity. I don't think that there is any question that the acquisition of and the presence of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area-Point Reyes National Seashore complex has done more to influence the growth of the Bay Area than any other single thing. It has kept large numbers of people from settling in western Marin; it has furnished opportunities for all the people of the San Francisco metropolitan area, and particularly the people of Marin County and San Francisco County, to have permanent open space to be able to enjoy recreation, wilderness, in a way that they could never have done, in a way that has made other communities most envious.

It's true it keeps residences and factories out of this area, but it makes for much more quality living for the people who are in the surrounding area. In anywhere from five minutes to an hour almost anyone in the Bay Area can get to one of these places. In a little more time, he can get into the heart.

This is the sort of thing planners have talked about for years and years and thought was desirable. Nowadays it's fashionable that every new community has to have so much park area and so much open space.

We went ahead and established the open space. As I look at the ABAG [Association of Bay Area Governments] maps, it has put more open space into that portion than ABAG envisioned. ABAG envisioned communities occupying different parts of that area to a much greater extent.

Schrepfer: Greenbelted.

Wayburn: Communities with greenbelts around them. This is a massive greenbelt, if you want to call it a greenbelt. It's much greater than a belt and yet it is comparatively narrow and long. At its widest I guess it's about six miles wide, and yet it's perhaps twenty-five miles long--it's longer than that if you go up to the tip of Tomales Point. It includes, for example, seventy-five miles of shoreline where there is public recreation or solitude--whatever you want to call it.

To me, this doesn't pose any social dilemmas, only social opportunities.

Establishing Point Reyes National Seashore; Completing GGNRA ##

Schrepfer: We did not talk about Point Reyes--about the genesis of the movement to save it and the congressional efforts.

Wayburn: Point Reyes was identified as one of the desirable areas for coastal acquisition by a National Park Service team which surveyed the entire Pacific Coast in the early 1950s.

Point Reyes was selected partly because it was as it has been termed so often, an "Island In Time." It did not have massive development on it. In the northern part there was Point Reyes Station and Inverness--both small communities bordering on Tomales Bay--and at the southern end there was Bolinas.

A number of us conceived the idea that this would be a place for the new national seashore concept. At that time I think Cape Hatteras was in existence, and then Cape Cod was established. I can't claim credit for starting this. I was one of the people who became the Point Reyes Foundation, which I think was twenty-five or thirty people--maybe not quite that many. Both my wife and I were interested in it and were members of the foundation, the chairman of which was a man named Joel Gustafson. He was a professor at San Francisco State College (later university), a biologist as I remember.

I'm not sure who originally interested Joel Gustafson, but he was the leader. The local congressman for the first district, a man named Clem Miller, became intensely interested. This became, literally, his life work. He introduced the bills into Congress in successive legislatures. I believe that this was beginning in 1958--I'm not certain. I know it was reintroduced in 1960.

Clem Miller was running for re-election at the time. He was in a small plane which crashed and he was killed. He was posthumously re-elected, and then they had to have a new election. Don Clausen of Crescent City was elected as his successor. But Point Reyes is a monument to the vision of Clem Miller.

There were a number of people who had what you might call a possessive interest in Point Reyes, because it quickly became a symbol as well as a seashore. The Sierra Club was extremely active in this. We published a book called Island in Time. We got Harold Gilliam to write it, and we recruited funds for a motion picture, which was also called An Island in Time, done by Laurel Reynolds and her co-worker, Mitzi Hoover (her maiden name).

Wayburn: This was one of the particular projects of the Sierra Club, and I was one of the representatives of the Sierra Club in this. The club has worked often with a front organization, and this time the Point Reyes Foundation was the front organization, with the club furnishing a great deal of the legislative clout behind the scenes-- openly supporting it of course, but having the foundation be the front organization.

Incidentally, I should add that Mrs. Miller, who met a man named Stewart Johnson after Clem's death, has always retained this possessive interest in Point Reyes and has given funds to help it out, and has worked particularly with a man in the Conservation Foundation named Bill Duddleson. Bill Duddleson has done a great deal of work on Point Reyes too. He came into this originally because he was the administrative assistant of Clem Miller.

Well, back to the joining of Point Reyes and Golden Gate-- we had, at the time of the establishment of Point Reyes, opposition from the ranchers who lived on Point Reyes. They wanted to retain their ranches. They wanted to continue ranching; they thought they could. One of the people among them, a man named Boyd Stewart, who owned at that time close to 4,000 acres in what later became Point Reyes and Golden Gate, saw the handwriting on the wall and joined with the conservationists. He persuaded his fellow ranchers, some of them, to yield their lands. As time went on, more and more of them saw the merit of it because they were going broke with their taxes and their inability to have enough cattle on the acreage which they possessed.

The seashore was established with a rather small appropriation of only a little over fourteen million dollars, which wasn't sufficient to buy up the land. So when the ranchers, shortly after 1962, began to offer their land, the Park Service wasn't able to buy it. This condition went on, and there was a great deal of dissatisfaction among all parties. It went on until a group called "Save Our Seashore" was organized under the leadership of the then supervisor, Peter Behr--later state senator. And Peter Behr earned his stars as a conservationist as the leader of this "Save Our Seashore." He was a lawyer practicing in San Francisco; he was living in Marin. He now lives in Inverness. He was one of the best supervisors that Marin County ever had. He helped establish this conservation majority in the board of supervisors; then he ran for state senator. He was state senator for eight years, and, I say very reluctantly, he is giving up the job although he could be re-elected if he tried. He's tired of it.

Wayburn: As we saw what we had done, and saw the use of Point Reyes and Golden Gate, and saw what was planned by the administrators, we realized that we should have more land closer to the metropolitan area if that were possible. And more areas for picnicking and camping in land that was suitable so that people would not go to more distant areas--and, incidentally, use a winding, narrow, two-lane road, traveling over longer distances--in the middle of the park. This is the reason for the planned acquisition which we have in Congress now.

If we're successful, we will connect Samuel P. Taylor State Park on both sides of Sir Francis Drake Boulevard with the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, and we'll extend the recreation area from Sir Francis Drake Boulevard in Olema up to Point Reyes Station, which is a community which would benefit greatly from it and which is, more or less, the natural terminus of that area. That is on the north. There are some 6,000 acres there which we hope to add. In the present legislation only part of that is in because some of the local people don't understand what we're trying to do. There happens to be one of the local ranchers whose wife doesn't want their land to be acquired.

Schrepfer: What is his name?

Wayburn: McFadden. The Marin Board of Supervisors has endorsed the acquisition. The local congressman wanted an endorsement from the board of supervisors and got the support of the board of supervisors after he had held a public hearing and found that people generally were in favor. But since everyone was not in favor of part of the acquisition in the north, the boundary will go right over the top of the hill, and the new addition will not have some lovely flatland areas along the Point Reyes Station-Tocaluma road, which could be used for picnicking. This is what has been done to date. We hope to improve on it, but we don't know.

There are a number of the local people who live around the area who feel themselves being surrounded by a park. And they see more people from the cities coming out in areas which they had de facto ownership of, because there was nobody else there. So there are people in Point Reyes Station and Inverness who are saying, "Why don't you develop what you have in the park already without acquiring more land?"

Schrepfer: Isn't this a problem in other parts of California--beaches where local people don't want the influx of recreation users?

Wayburn: This is quite true. At another time I can tell you another plan of mine, which is aborted for the time being, for a Golden Gate National Recreation Area south, instead of north. But in the present instance we're discussing the legislation would be incomplete, the park would be incomplete, if this is the way it goes, and then we'd have to come back another time. An interesting facet on this is that Congressman Phillip Burton, who is now the chairman of the National Parks Subcommittee--and I've told you what he's done before--laid the plans for everything we asked for, despite the fact that the local congressman, who was then Congressman Mailliard, was apprehensive about it. He doesn't do it now because the man who succeeded Mailliard is Congressman John Burton, his brother. John Burton wants to please the people of west Marin, and he as yet hasn't come out in favor of the largest acquisition, which we think is desirable.

I haven't mentioned the lands which would be acquired in Point Reyes National Seashore, which are in this same legislation. One is a comparatively small area adjacent to Inverness, called Hagerty Gulch and the other is the lands to the south, next to Bolinas, between Palo Marin, the present southern boundary, and Bolinas.

A large amount of land was left out of Point Reyes Seashore because it belonged to Radio Corporation of America and RCA was using this for trans-Pacific cables. This was considered essential industry, and the land was not in danger of being developed. We are trying now to add some 2,000 acres in that area. This includes part of Pine Gulch Creek, which is on the year-round stream that flows into Bolinas lagoon from the Point Reyes-GGNRA area. And this is the land that I mentioned earlier as having been two-thirds acquired by the Bolinas Public Utilities district when the new people came in and said they didn't want expansion. Now they are asking the National Park Service to buy up their rights in this land. And they are planning a much smaller water impoundment.

Schrepfer: This is why you call the Golden Gate National Recreation Area the vision that grew?

Wayburn: Yes.

Schrepfer: It seems to me that at one point, as I recall, two of your conservation projects came a little bit into conflict, rather than being quite so complimentary, and that was when the Redwoods and Point Reyes became intermeshed in 1968.

Wayburn: You're referring now, I guess, to the matter of funding?

Schrepfer: Yes, funding expansions for Point Reyes and the role of some of the conservationists who supported a small redwood national park. Was that in reaction to Governor Reagan's efforts to use the redwoods to stop Point Reyes expansion?

Wayburn: Point Reyes was not expanded at that time. Point Reyes was not acquired because there was not enough money allotted for it. It was a group of conservationists--helped by Congressman Phil Burton and Congressman Mailliard, and either Senator Kuchel or his successor, Senator Cranston--who got through an increased appropriation for Point Reyes acquisition. As far as I'm concerned this was no conflict. I have never been a member of the school which I call "either-or."

Schrepfer: No, I didn't mean personal conflict, but there were some people who--

Wayburn: Oh, there very definitely were. There always are. I can remember in my early days, particularly as a petitioner in Congress, going up to testify or going up to talk to or to lobby a congressman or a senator, and being asked the question, "Now which would you rather have?" And I would say, "There is no conflict here--both." This was the case with the Cascades National Park. I remember very well back in the late fifties when I had outlined the proposed Three Sisters Wilderness area to go down to Olallie Ridge and to take in, I forget now, I think it was some 65,000 acres or more.

At the same time, I had gotten interested in the Glacier Peak Wilderness area, which we were trying to get up to some 400,000 acres. And the people in the Forest Service, particularly in Region 6 and in the national office, said to me, "Now which one would you rather have?" and I stared back and said, "Both!" And they said, "Well, maybe you can't have both," and I said, "Well, both should be wilderness areas. We're not going to stop working for one because the other is achieved."

Schrepfer: Just to get back for one minute to 1968, did you have any dealings with the people who advanced a small redwood national park? Weren't some of these people associated with Point Reyes?

Wayburn: They may well have been, yes. You are reminding me of certain things. There were people who had the single interest. I mentioned to you earlier some of the people who had possessive interests rather than vested interests in Point Reyes.

Wayburn: Point Reyes was the be-all and end-all of their conservation horizon. There were the local people of Inverness, there were other people in Marin County, and there were the people who cherished the memory of Clem Miller. And this was a very good thing, I think, for them to do. Some of them were caught in this predicament of "either-or" and probably, and I don't remember this for sure, when they went to members of Congress who had to make certain decisions and who perhaps weren't too friendly anyway they would be asked this question and they would answer that, of course, Point Reyes should have the money.

VIII FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON FOREST AND WILDERNESS ISSUES

Tutored by the Forest Service: A Conflict in Aims and Philosophy

Schrepfer: Perhaps we might use this as a point at which to discuss the Forest Service further, because it certainly would be an appropriate period chronologically and there are a number of issues involving the Forest Service which probably played a significant role in changing the club's attitudes.

Wayburn: Quite true. In a way, you could say this all started in California, like so many things.

My role here was first as a member and chairman of the executive committee of the San Francisco Bay Chapter and then as the chairman of the first chapter conservation committee, which was the Bay Chapter; then as president of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs and then as chairman of the conservation committee of the Sierra Club. Then as a director of the Sierra Club. I was taking these successive positions.

The Forest Service was, in the late forties right after the war and in the early fifties, changing from an organization which kept custodial care of the national forests and allowed some logging on them to an organization which was developing a pattern for the systematic logging of all the national forests, except for a comparatively small part which was already reserved since the 1920s as the primitive areas--under what were known as the L regulations and then in the late thirties and early forties under new, more stringent regulations known as the U regulations. The L regulations established the primitive areas and the U regulations--U-1, U-2, U-3--established wilderness areas under U-1; wild areas, which were 5,000 acres or less, under U-2; and scenic areas, in which there was much more possible use, in the U-3 regulations.

Wayburn: I won't go into any more of that--just to explain that I began to grow up in conservation and was tutored by different members of the Forest Service. I worked with these people, particularly Millard Barnum and Earl Bachman. Barnum had become assistant regional forester in 1938. He lasted longer in the Forest Service in one place with some influence than any other individual. And therefore he had a great deal to do with the land-use patterns which developed. He was in charge of land-use planning, of wilderness and primitive areas, and of recreation. They didn't have quite as many people in those days.

Bachman was the director of recreation under Barnum. I'm not sure how it began, but I know that I was a member of the club's conservation committee and the chairman of the Bay Chapter Conservation Committee when they started consulting with me. Then when I became an officer and president of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, they began to be actively solicitous of me.

Clair Hendee was the regional forester in the early fifties. The first regional forester I knew was Pat Taylor. Pat Taylor was regional forester in the late forties. When he retired, he became a member of my conservation committee of the Bay Chapter. That may have been, I'm not sure, how the Forest Service people began to look me up. At any rate, they would consult me for the conservationist viewpoint in different areas that they were working on.

I remember when Clair Hendee left in the fifties, after about five years here, to become assistant chief forester for administration and personnel in Washington. He made a great impression on me, and I saw, clearly, for the first time, what the Forest Service was trying to do.

Schrepfer: You mean what Hendee did?

Wayburn: What Hendee did, because I had worked with Hendee as I had with Barnum and Bachman, but Hendee outlined clearly what the Forest Service was trying to do. He explained to me why it was necessary for the Forest Service to get funds from Congress, and he wanted our help to get these funds, to road all possible areas with commercial timber, so that the Forest Service could do a good and complete job of getting in their roads as early as possible and doing a good job of logging. Then they could establish as wilderness the areas which should be wilderness.

I did not perceive the entire grand scheme at first, but as he talked to me, I began to see that the Forest Service, which had taken me on trips to perspective wilderness areas--"show-me" trips--

Wayburn: was interested in far more than the wilderness. They were interested far more in logging. Clear-cut logging was at that time already becoming the method of choice. This was the reason they wanted to get the roads in early, so that they could do it properly. These men were, I think, men who were doing their duty as they saw it, but they threatened to wreck a great deal of country as I saw it.

Schrepfer: Do you think that on some of these "show-me" trips that they were less than honest with you? Do you think that they ever attempted to manipulate your opinion on them?

Wayburn: I don't like to say that, and I won't say that. We disagreed on where boundaries should be. I remember, for example, in 1953 going into the Salmon-Trinity area with Earl Bachman as the top Forest Service representative, and the forest supervisor for the area, and the district ranger--they always took such a group of people. There would be someone from the regional office--either Bachman or Barnum--usually Bachman--and someone who was the forest supervisor and someone who was the district ranger.

Schrepfer: Did you ask to go?

Wayburn: No, I'd be invited.

Schrepfer: Why did they invite you?

Wayburn: I was invited as either the representative of the Sierra Club or the representative of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs.

Schrepfer: Why did they want a representative of these organizations?

Wayburn: The Forest Service has always been a very savvy organization and they thought that they needed to work with the conservationists, just as they needed to work with the loggers and with industry generally. One of their favorite expressions was, "the Forest Service is always in the middle."

Now, this was true, and I began to see fairly early that our job was to see that there was enough pressure from our side to counterbalance the pressure which was coming stronger and stronger from the lumber companies.

Schrepfer: Did they originally think of you less as a protagonist than as a potential ally?

Wayburn: I think they probably thought of me as an ally because I listened, and when I would offer an opinion which was different from theirs I would offer it with a certain force, but no antagonism.

Wayburn: I can remember outlining what I thought would be proper areas to include in the wilderness; they said, "We can't include all of this because there is too much commercial timber, and we can't include more than a certain amount of commercial timber in wilderness." This was policy which was set in Washington, but it went all the way down the line to the district ranger and his assistants. And from the district ranger it went all the way back up to Washington.

Schrepfer: Who were they trying to kid by calling that wilderness policy then?

Wayburn: Their wilderness policy was likewise set in Washington. It was set by certain enlightened individuals such as chief forester Silcox, who was chief forester in the thirties, and his chief of recreation, Bob Marshall. You see, the Forest Service has always had some people like this, and before they got to be as tight a bureaucracy as they are now, they had these individuals who would speak out and who established policy right at the top.

##

Wayburn: So they had this policy established, but they became less of a custodial agency and more of an active management agency with emphasis on the cutting of the timber. It wasn't on logging alone; it was on use of every part of the national forest. They developed this philosophy of use under some duress from the top--from the Congress, from the states, from the companies--and I think that some of them came to us to help get more pressure from our side. I don't think that there was any question that this was true of men like Barnum.

I think that the Forest Service in its wisdom saw that if it were to be in charge, it had to have active pressure from conservation organizations, from the conservation community, to counterbalance what it saw as too much use, overuse, particularly in logging the national forest. And that idea is going on even today. The Forest Service wants less wilderness than we do, but the Forest Service wants more wilderness and less use of the part of the forest which they log than industry does.

The Forest Service has the problem, sometimes, with the administration. I've talked about the Carter administration being the most conservation-minded, but President Carter himself has announced, "We must get more logs out of the national forest." He was echoing people who suggested that to him, that we need more timber for more housing. This is a simplistic view which some of the advisors of the president have given him.

Schrepfer: You mean by simplistic that it is, perhaps, looking for an immediate solution with a long-range detriment?

Wayburn: That's right. And in addition it assumes that the reason for the insufficient housing is due to insufficient lumber available, and that's not true. We're exporting a great deal of logs that could be used for housing here.

But back to the Forest Service philosophy and positions. The Forest Service is the smartest bureaucracy I've known and the most monolithic. They know their way around Congress; they know their way around the local communities; they know their way around all the way up and down the line. They're trained that way inside the Forest Service.

Furthermore, you have to remember that the foresters come out of schools of forestry and some of these schools of forestry, many of them, believe in maximum use of the forest for wood. You have to remember, too, that many of the foresters, when they retire from the Forest Service, go into industry or they go into consulting work for industry, and this establishes a climate in which it's not easy to be a wilderness-minded forester. The people in the recreational field have more opportunity because they have to stand up for that part of it, but if they stand up high, they're likely to get cut down.

Going on with my personal experiences with the Forest Service, I can remember people like Hendee telling me as a representative of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs that the Sierra Club was too radical, that they were trying to do things that would be to the detriment of the forest because the club was, at that time, probably the organization which was outstanding in trying to get wilderness, to get more recreation areas, to save trees.

The Wilderness Society, of course, was working side by side with us on wilderness. But the Wilderness Society never had the grassroots constituency that we started building up. We'd always had some of that because we were the biggest of the outdoor clubs, but we saw the need for getting a national constituency, and we did. We are as yet not the largest of the conservation organizations. Audubon is, I guess, close to twice the size in number of members. Audubon has over 300,000 members; we have 185,000 members now. The National Wildlife Federation has over two million members, but they're divided into separate organizations, and their national organization cannot command the loyalty and the devotion that the Sierra Club can.

Schrepfer: Were the Audubon or National Wildlife Federation at all involved in the fifties with the Forest Service? You said the Wilderness Society was.

Wayburn: I think the answer is no, for the Audubon Society. Certainly, Audubon cherished its role as a group of birders and as a group which didn't like to get into legislative fights. The National Wildlife Federation got into Forest Service matters--sure. But they didn't fight the Forest Service the way we fought the Forest Service when we had to. They were closely allied with the Wildlife Management Institute and the North American Wildlife Society. The last named is a professional group, and they had many people from the Forest Service in their ranks and they tended to side with the Forest Service.

We had help from small organizations. We were largely in the west, and we realized that we had to get the support of urban people and the people in the east.

Schrepfer: You mentioned that about in 1952 the club began to worry about the notion of cooperation, with industry in particular. Now did this apply--

Wayburn: I didn't say that the club worried about cooperating with industry.

Schrepfer: I misunderstood then. I thought when we were talking about Conservation Associates...

Wayburn: Yes, you were talking about Conservation Associates. They were the group that cooperated with industry. The club was not anti-industry, but it would fight industry just as it would fight the government to achieve what it thought were its rightful purposes.

Schrepfer: Right. That's what I meant. In other words, the club began to be aware of the question of when do you cooperate and when do you not cooperate. How much in the early fifties did this issue of cooperation become important in relation to the Forest Service?

Wayburn: You mean the cooperation with the Forest Service?

Schrepfer: Yes, the Sierra Clubs' cooperation, your cooperation personally.

Wayburn: We always tried to cooperate, but as we would see what was going on we often had differences. The Forest Service would show me what their ideas were, and it was extremely valuable to me. I appreciated it very much because this was the opportunity to see the areas on the ground in a way that you couldn't otherwise.

Wayburn: I began to go out less and less for pleasure and more and more for business [laughing] from that aspect. But usually these "show-me" trips were three to four or five days long. They were comparatively short. They were usually on horseback in order to cover the ground. We would drive or fly to the trailhead, and the Forest Service would furnish the horses and we'd start on in.

Our differences came, principally, from the amount of commercial timber available and how much commercial timber you could put into wilderness. We took the attitude that wilderness was worthwhile for its own sake, and increasingly we saw it as a resource which was valuable to the country at large, to the vegetation, to the wildlife, and to man. The wilderness concept grew up as a homocentric one. I feel that way about it, but I also feel that its greater importance lies, as the national parks do, as a survival issue for the biosphere. This is a quantum jump. I think that it can serve both purposes at the same time.

Wilderness Protection and the Passage of the Wilderness Act

Schrepfer: We've talked about the issue of wilderness as being pivotal in the relations between the club and the Forest Service; particularly, we've talked about Glacier Peak area. We also discussed the Salmon and Trinity Alps Primitive Area.

Wayburn: Glacier Peak was a Limited Area. This was a classification in Region 6.

Schrepfer: Were there areas like this in the Sierra Nevada?

Wayburn: Yes. The John Muir Wilderness, or the High Sierra Wilderness, is the largest in the Sierra--well over a million acres. We, the club and I as one of the representatives of the club, kept trying to enlarge this when it was a primitive area. We succeeded with the Forest Service to some extent and with the Congress to a larger extent. This leads into the whole subject of how the conservationists, and particularly the Sierra Club, have been able through the wilderness bill to protect more land as wilderness than would have been accomplished by Forest Service alone.

One has to give credit to the Forest Service for really getting the wilderness concept started. There were individuals, private conservationists, who encouraged the idea. But the wilderness

Wayburn: regulations were those of the Forest Service. The Forest Service always proudly pointed to this, and in their dealings with us they kept insisting over and over again, "We're the people who know wilderness. We started the whole idea."

But at the time we put over the Wilderness Act. It started at a wilderness conference. The idea was advanced first by the late Howard Zahniser, the executive secretary of the Wilderness Society.

Schrepfer: Which conference?

Wayburn: I think, I'm not certain, this was the 1951 wilderness conference, which would have been the second one. And after some years of discussion, we got the wilderness bill introduced by several senators and congressmen.

Schrepfer: Were there any conservationists in the Sierra Club who felt that this was an attack on the Forest Service and didn't participate in the idea--especially in the mid-fifties?

Wayburn: There may have been, but I don't recall this. I know some people in the club were very close to the Forest Service. Bestor Robinson, for example, was on the Forest Service Advisory Committee--still is all these years later; he has been serving thirty years, ever since World War II. But I don't remember him opposing the Wilderness Act.

The wilderness bill was introduced four times before it was passed. I can remember that one of the original sponsors of the wilderness bill was Hubert Humphrey--someone whom I felt had great promise, but Hubert let us down later; he didn't introduce later wilderness bills. He was not one of the more conservation-minded. He was not anti, but he was not one of the people that we relied on, as we relied on other people later.

Schrepfer: Why do you think he changed his position?

Wayburn: I don't know. I think probably he got more interested in other things, particularly people-oriented things. He was a people-oriented person par excellence.

Other people took up the cudgel for it. The Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society together were the two organizations which put this over. The one individual who has to have the most credit, if you are looking for credit there, is Howard Zahniser, and then Dave Brower of the Sierra Club played a big role.

Schrepfer: You mentioned the High Sierra Wilderness area--there's also the Mokelumne Wilderness area.

Wayburn: Mokelumne is a much smaller area. I think we got about 53,000, maybe 60,000 acres, in the drainage of the Mokelumne River in the Stanislaus National Forest. That was one of those that I was quite interested in and helped get established. That was one in which we had to go to Congress over the heads of the Forest Service.

Schrepfer: You think it played a role in accelerating your interest in the Wilderness Act?

Wayburn: Very likely, because it was one of those that we proposed and the Forest Service did not go along with. There were two reasons that we pushed so hard for the Wilderness Act. The one was that we discovered as the years went by that, although the Forest Service was indeed responsible for the original establishment of the wilderness, as new chief foresters came along and as new forest supervisors and regional foresters came along, any one of them could disestablish wilderness.

The demand to get timber out of the national forest grew; as the private companies exhausted their land, there was a greater pressure on the national forests to furnish more timber. This is the reason that they did not want to put commercial timber into wilderness.

The other thing was that we found--and we really didn't know this until later--that the Congress might be much more amenable to the establishment of larger areas of wilderness than the Forest Service was. Time and time again since 1964 we have gone through the Congress and gotten larger areas of wilderness established than the Forest Service or the Park Service wanted.

At first, actually, we had a harder time with the Park Service than we did with the Forest Service--that's another story.

Wilderness and Roads in the Sierra: USFS, Governor Reagan, and the Club

Schrepfer: Are there any incidents you recall involving either the High Sierra Wilderness area, or San Geronio, or some of the other wilderness areas, over which you differed with Forest Service in the fifties?

Wayburn: There were a lot of personal experiences. I went with the Forest Service--and I think Earl Bachman was in charge of the party again--up into the San Joaquin area. This was a trip to survey the boundaries for the San Joaquin wilderness, which later became part of the John Muir Wilderness Area. I remember we started at Clover Meadow, and I thought the wilderness should come down to Clover Meadow and Soldier Meadow, which were right next to each other, and should go all the way from there to the boundary of Yosemite National Park.

Schrepfer: Soldier Meadow?

Wayburn: Soldier Meadow and Clover Meadow were the two roadheads. I thought the wilderness should go all the way across to Reds Meadow on the other side, and surround the Devils Postpile, which was a national monument. The Devils Postpile should be wilderness too, even though there was a road going down into the Devils Postpile.

There were people in the Forest Service who wanted this wilderness much smaller, and we argued this out in friendly fashion, during and after the trip. One of the issues on that particular survey was the presence of check dams high up in the drainage of the middle fork of the San Joaquin River. We wanted to keep the check dams in the wilderness, and they were "purists" even then; they wanted to keep the check dams out of the wilderness.

I can remember that the late Harold Bradley was a great advocate of the check dam system. I was not. I thought that the fewer check dams, the better. They were structures. I was perfectly happy to include them into wilderness, but thought that further construction, probably, was not wise. I thought that existing water impoundments, otherwise known as reservoirs, could be included in wilderness, and we had included this in the Minaret Wilderness on the east side of the Sierra--three dams and three artificial lakes. I remember Waugh Lake was one of those that we were successful in keeping in the Minaret Wilderness.

Schrepfer: You were going to recall some incident relevant to the question of boundaries of the San Joaquin.

Wayburn: The Forest Service wanted smaller boundaries, and my idea was that the boundaries should go all the way across the San Joaquin and connect with what became eventually the High Sierra or John Muir Wilderness. (As I remember that is now the case. I have to look in my Forest Service wilderness map again because it's a little while since I was following that closely.)

Schrepfer: You were thinking of a personal incident involved with that issue in a trip?

Wayburn: That was a time when the Minaret Summit Road was a big issue. The Forest Service supervisor who went with us--the Forest Service claimed to be in the middle. They took no position on whether the Minaret Road should cross Minaret Summit to the present Reds Meadow Road and eventually come west to the town of Madera, or not. I learned later that Mr. Thomas had been talking before the chambers of commerce of the local communities and advocating the road. One of the reasons that I wanted this wilderness to be as large as it was was to block the road. I thought that there should be no more roads across the Sierra.

Each side was using the road as a weapon in the establishment of the wilderness, or vice-versa. This fight went on for, I guess, twenty years over the Minaret Summit Road. One of the difficulties was that the Sierra Club in the thirties had endorsed the Minaret Summit Road, and it fell my lot to get the club to officially come out against it.

Going ahead of myself a little bit, I fought this road for fifteen years or more and it was none other than Ronald Reagan who was my final cooperator. Ike Livermore, Norman Livermore Jr., was the secretary for Resources of the state of California. He had the Department of Fish and Game under him, and each fall they would have an annual outing. On one of those outings to the Minaret Summit area he invited the Forest Service, represented by Jack Dienema. I knew him well; he was one of the Forest Service people who actively solicited me. I was by that time president of the Sierra Club for the second time, so it must have been 1967, maybe '68, that we had this Resource Agency outing.

Ronald Reagan came along. Reagan flew in. He came part way with the outing and then left it. And he said, "There shall be no road across. The state won't support the road." And that killed the road.

You see, Ike Livermore was a very good high Sierra man; he was a former director of the Sierra Club. The defeat of the road was due to a combination of the Resources Agency and the Sierra Club. Mr. Dienema was sort of caught in the middle there, because he always said that the Forest Service was not pushing the road, even though earlier Forest Service people had indeed pushed for it in the local communities.

Wayburn: There was no reason for this road, since there was already the Sonora Pass road and the Tioga road. If there had never been the Tioga road, then there would have been perhaps a reason for the Minaret Summit road. The Sonora Pass and Minaret Summit Pass were just about the same elevation, I think. The Tioga road is higher; it is the sad part of this, but it's there so we have to deal with it.

We did not want a road across the Sierra between Tioga and Walker Pass. Years ago we were able to stop the Kearsarge Pass road. The club was the agent that stopped the Kearsarge Pass road, which would have gone through Kings Canyon, because the club owned 160 acres, called Zumwalt Meadow, in the middle of Kings Canyon going from ridge to ridge. The only way we would give a permit to the U.S. government to build a road in the Kings Canyon National Park up to Copper Creek--we gave them that much of our property--was to get the guarantee that there would not be a road any further. And, incidentally, later the Sierra Club Foundation sold the rest of Zumwalt Meadow to the U.S. government for park purposes.

Conservatism, Liberalism, and Conservation

Schrepfer: It is quite surprising that Reagan should have taken that position.

Wayburn: Reagan followed Livermore's lead. Livermore was able to lead in a number of ways. Reagan was not as bad, compared to Pat Brown, as he was played up. There's a difference between conservatism and conservation and we had all too often identified liberalism with conservation, and it isn't always true.

Even the John Birchers have sometimes helped us. I've known a few John Birchers in the Sierra Club--good conservatives as well as conservationists, who have been very unhappy with the club for its liberalism in other ways, but as far as the conservation of land is concerned, one often found good conservationists among conservatives.

Schrepfer: I guess a good percentage of the early Sierra Club leaders were Republicans.

Wayburn: I'm a registered Republican and have been. I grew up in Georgia, where Democrats were the most conservative party imaginable, and I became a liberal Republican. I have never bothered to change my

Wayburn: registration even though I have many more friends among the Democratic legislators than I do among the Republicans, I guess. [laugh] I guess at times I'm the house Republican for many Democratic causes, but the people that I worked most closely with are liberal Democrats--first Phillip Burton, second Henry Jackson, and third Alan Cranston, also people like John Tunney, Morris Udall, and John Seiberling; and then of course, on the other hand, with liberal Republicans like Tom Kuchel.

Schrepfer: You mentioned that Reagan wasn't as bad as compared to Brown, as he's been made out to be. What was your feeling about Brown? [Edmund G. Brown, Sr.]

Wayburn: Pat Brown was an awful nice fellow who proclaimed conservationist viewpoints, but was one of the original chamber of commerce boosters. His greatest claim to fame was when California became the most populous state. That's what he wanted most. Pat Brown was a nice fellow, but even today Pat Brown as a lawyer has opposed us vigorously on a number of things, while saying that he is, essentially, a conservationist and wants to work with us on other things. But this is talk rather than accomplishment.

Schrepfer: I think of the redwood freeway issue, in which he vacillated for some time.

Wayburn: He vacillated all the time. We finally got his support, but it was after a great deal of vacillation. It was the Sierra Club which had the most to do with stopping the Division of Highways, and Brown could have done it any time he wanted to take charge. I mean, after all, it was his highway commission, it was his highway department, that was going to bulldoze right through Prairie Creek State Redwood Park. They had as their preferred location Gold Bluff Beach and secondly the existing highway, and they were going to do it. We literally got in the path of the bulldozers there. [laughing]

Opposing Highways in the Redwoods##

[Interview 6: June 14, 1978]

Schrepfer: We were talking briefly about the redwood highway in the last session, and I was wondering if you wanted to discuss the connection between the highway controversy in the redwoods and the redwood national park fight because towards the end they were going on at the same time--1963.

Wayburn: Yes, we had been interested in seeing that the new freeway concept, which had advanced rapidly through the fifties and early sixties, did not destroy the state redwood parks. We were appalled at the compromise decision made to push a freeway directly through some of the finest redwood areas in Humboldt State Redwoods Park in 1955, I believe it was.

Newton Drury, who was then the chief of the Division of Beaches and Parks, had stated that he saw no alternate to it. Looking back, if I had my choice I would have fought for redirecting the whole redwood highway to go along the Main Eel River instead of the south fork of the Eel, thus avoiding the redwood parks for the major part of freeway traffic. By the early 1960s that was, of course, too late. The highway department and the highway commission were at that time pressing to complete the freeway portion of the Redwood Highway--101--and they had selected alternate routes, which went directly through both Jedediah Smith Redwood State Park and Prairie Creek Redwood State Park. There would have been a tremendous wave of destruction through both of these parks if those routes had been selected.

The Save-the-Redwoods League asked for Sierra Club support in defending Jedediah Smith park against a freeway. We investigated that and, at the same time, the proposed freeway through Prairie Creek Redwood State Park. The hearing came up on Prairie Creek first. It's my impression and remembrance that the league would not have fought for Prairie Creek, feeling that they couldn't fight both the battles. Newton, again, was the one I talked to. He felt that we couldn't fight both battles, and he was going to let Prairie Creek go, just like he had let Humboldt State redwoods go.

But the Sierra Club was not willing to sacrifice either area. In turn, we were able to get the support of the league when they learned the Sierra Club was adamant. We were, however, the main antagonist to the highway department on three out of the four alternates which were proposed for Prairie Creek park for the freeway extension. And the fourth alternate--which was opposed by the highway department, opposed by the truckers because it would have to ascend to some fourteen hundred feet in elevation--was our preferred route.

In 1963, I was club president. I was resolved to go up to the Eureka hearings and oppose the highway. I got a telephone call from a friend who was working up there, who said, "Ed, don't come up. I fear for your life if you come." But Peggy and I talked this over and thought we had to go. On the drive up from San Francisco to Eureka, my wife and I discussed the dangers we might be getting

Wayburn: into and was it wise to have taken along our youngest daughter, who was then about eight or nine. We lightheartedly decided that she would be protection rather than anything else so we took her along.

As we entered Eureka, we found a great deal of activity going on. As we approached the meeting hall this got more prominent. There were signs promoting the freeway and condemning people who were against the freeway, notably the Sierra Club and other preservationists. By the time we reached the meeting hall, we were in a tense frame of mind.

##

Wayburn: The meeting was held in a big auditorium, I forget whether it was a school auditorium or the town hall, in Eureka. It was crowded and the first speaker was Sam Hellyer, the district highway engineer. He said there was no other place for the road to go. He showed that you could go along the beach, you could go along the bluffs, or you could take the present alignment. And there was the fourth alignment, which they had put in at the request of the conservationists. That route was over the hill, outside Prairie Creek Redwood Park, through the cutover land.

After he finished, the local legislators got up. Then, very early in the game they called on a person from the Sierra Club, and I got up. It was a hostile audience. I looked around and didn't see many friends, outside of my wife, daughter and two friends sitting on the side. A few people, not many. Almost a quarter of the people who were sitting on the front row on the left side were young fellows in their hard hats, lumberjack shirts and boots. I tabbed those as the people the lumber companies had let off for the day.

I went on and made my speech. I came to my first peroration for stopping the highway, for going over the hill only, leaving the rest alone. I got some applause. I went on this way and didn't get too many boos, too much opposition. These people were fairly quiet. When I finished, I got cheers. I was very surprised. I didn't know what to make of it. I asked my friend, "Why would I get any cheers from loggers? He said, "They're not loggers; they're the Boot and Blister Club of Humboldt State College!"

##

Wayburn: The media in northwest California were entirely controlled by industry, even though some of them were owned locally and some of them were owned outside. One of the editors once told me, "We will be fair to you in the news coverage, but will editorialize against

Wayburn: you, because we don't agree with you." I couldn't complain of this. As a matter of fact, as long as that was the way it was done it was all right, but some of the news coverage was biased.

Among other things, the media and the opponents made the claim that we weren't really interested in stopping the highway--we were really interested in promoting the redwood national park. At the beginning there was absolutely no connection between the two. There was no real basis for this remark.

Schrepfer: In the beginning--what do you mean?

Wayburn: I mean in the late fifties we wanted a redwood national park. We had not come to any decision on the site and had considered, among other things that one or more state parks were the proper place for the national. And the location of highway or the non-building of a freeway was not really connected in our minds. We didn't want the forest destroyed, and we knew that the freeway would cause destruction of the forest. This is particularly true in the redwood parks, where the acquisition plan by the Save-the-Redwoods League and the state of California had been to save the great and most desirable groves. We felt that nothing should interfere with the preservation of those groves.

Later, as we saw that there was just so much old-growth redwood land left, there was a connection between stopping the highway and saving land for the redwood park because the highway could be put through cut-over land leaving larger areas and more suitable areas for the national park.

Schrepfer: Was this by, would you say, 1962-63 or later?

Wayburn: Yes, by 1963 we began to lean towards Redwood Creek as the chief locus of the proposed national park. It was the one place where there was enough forest left and where the forest extended from the sea to the warm end of the redwood belt--warm and dry. Now that area happened to come down to the highway at Orick; therefore, plans for a freeway should take that into consideration.

In the present redwood national park expansion, which has now been accomplished legislatively, there is a plan for a right of way for the state of California to build a highway or freeway going up May Creek and to the east of Prairie Creek Redwood Park, which is almost identical to what we proposed in 1963. That is by design because we planned how the land should be used in this area.

Wayburn: Whether the state will use this right of way or not, I don't know, but it would connect with the freeway which stops at Prairie Creek on the north.

Schrepfer: And wouldn't interfere with the national park?

Wayburn: And would not interfere. It would bypass the national park except for the short distance it goes through the valley north of Orick, right through the national park, which is supposed to be protected by a scenic screen.

Differences on Wilderness Policies: Salmon-Trinity, Kern Plateau, Golden Trout

Schrepfer: We might return to the Forest Service now, for a minute. We had been talking yesterday about the question of differences within the Sierra Club--that is, debates that went on during the board of directors meetings, individuals who took different positions vis-a-vis cooperation with the Forest Service.

Wayburn: I became very active in the middle echelon of the club at the beginning of the fifties as the chairman of the conservation committee of the Bay Chapter and had certain proposals to present as a member of the conservation committee. When Dave Brower was appointed the executive director in 1952, we worked closely together. Dave and I had very similar ideas as to what our reactions to governmental and industrial proposals should be. We thought side by side on what our own proposals for development should be.

Dave, as the professional, did not always participate in the debates. He would come in at selected times. I, as the chairman of the conservation committee from 1955 on and as a director from 1957 on, participated very actively and was the principal proponent for what might be called the liberal side.

Bestor Robinson, whom you know was an extremely able lawyer, presented the conservative side. This was true whether we were talking about national park, state park, or national forest matters--the things that took up the great bulk of our discussions in the fifties and early sixties.

We were concerned with what is now known as traditional conservation. I felt that it was all-important that as much land as possible, particularly land that was desirable for the purposes, be reserved and dedicated for all time for all the American people, or all the people of California.

Wayburn: Bestor would analyze the problem with his skilled lawyer's brain and reach a conclusion on what a judge and jury would decide at the end of analyzing the arguments pro and con, as we would see them. And then he would offer his conclusion as to what the Sierra Club position should be.

Fortunately my position prevailed the overwhelming amount of the time. We went on to fight for what we thought was the proper cause and had a pretty good rate of success, particularly on local and state issues and sometimes on national issues.

Schrepfer: Are you saying that in the fifties Bestor's power was not that great within the board of directors?

Wayburn: Within the board of directors I gained increasing power as opposed to Bestor. When I came on the board and even before I came on the board, Bestor was the predominant influence. Dick Leonard was likewise a predominant influence, but Leonard did not take a strong stand on many things. When he would take a strong supporting stand this would help greatly, because his influence within the board was very great. It has been ever since I've known him.

Schrepfer: Who were your allies, then, in these discussion in the fifties?

Wayburn: Well, my greatest ally was Dave Brower, and Brower, although he had no vote, was an extraordinarily able advocate and speaker, and he could sway the votes.

I would have to look back, really, to see who were the different members, but I think I could usually count on Leonard and Lewis Clark; often on Nathan Clark; on Harold Bradley; sometimes, particularly earlier when he was a member of the board, on Harold Crowe; and sometimes on Alex Hildebrand. But Alex Hildebrand, on a number of things, began to move away from the club position, and finally he left the club entirely. He was the manager of the La Habra refinery for Standard Oil of California. This influenced his thinking, and then later he became a farmer on the banks of the San Joaquin River, and he adopted the riparian farmer attitude, which was opposed to the Sierra Club preservationist, recreationist attitude.

Schrepfer: How about Ansel Adams?

Wayburn: Ansel Adams was an unpredictable quantity. Ansel was usually a great supporter of preservation. Occasionally he would turn around and go with the conservatives. On the whole, he was a supporter. When he was he could be extremely able in his arguments, even though

Wayburn: sometimes they seemed, in some ways, esoteric and beside the point. Ansel was and is a theoretician. As he's grown older, he's accommodated himself to support of the business community. At the same time, he has pushed hard for support of and expansion of national parks. He is greatly interested in obtaining a national park for the Big Sur coast right now.

Schrepfer: Can you remember any specific issues that Bestor and you were involved with?

Wayburn: First let me say that Bestor was along on this "show-me" trip to the Salmon-Trinity Alps, and he sided with the Forest Service plan on that--that we could not ask that the southwestern area which was west of Canyon Creek be included in the wilderness. I felt strongly that it should be. I remember that he was injured by a branch, coming out and sticking him in the leg, and we had an emergency which was not a serious one, in which I took care of him and Peggy then became the nurse. We became quite close friends as a result of going out together, even though we differed in what we advocated as far as wilderness protection was concerned.

Another instance where Bestor and I differed was on the San Joaquin wilderness, which I've mentioned, and then one of the biggest struggles was concerned with the Kern Plateau Wilderness. When I first heard about it, which was perhaps in the late forties, it didn't make much impression on me. A million acres were available south of Sequoia National Park from the Golden Trout area on, which would have made a very fine wilderness area. As Martin Litton termed it in Sunset, a "gentle wilderness."

I first looked into that in the early fifties; through the Federation of the Western Outdoor Clubs I became acquainted with Ardis and Gail Walker, who have been long-time advocates of the Kern Plateau Wilderness. Peggy and I visited them and went up into parts of it and thought that the whole thing should be kept as wilderness down to the Kern River on the one side and over to the Lone Pine Valley on the other.

The Forest Service had different ideas. Although the timber values in this area are low, they felt that the timber had to be utilized, which is again the Forest Service philosophy of utilizing the timber as far as possible. They proposed a Domelands area of some 50,000 to 55,000 acres. The Domelands are so called because of the rock domes which extend throughout this area and which resemble, to some extent, the domes in Tuolumne Meadows.

Wayburn: We thought that this was just one more example of the Forest Service offering the rocks for wilderness and keeping out all possible commercial timber. As we looked into this we found the trees took two or three hundred years to grow to a size that would be commercially practical, so that the so-called sustained yield, which the Forest Service kept talking about all the time, was not a practical possibility. We fought to try to get the whole area in.

This is one of the instances where we thought that the Forest Service had been totally wrong in its whole attitude. Gradually as the years went by, they gave lip service to what we were talking about. In the areas from Tehachapi south and the areas just north of Tehachapi where there was slow growth because of the dry conditions and the poor soil, they would give the land over to recreation. This got us into a whole new kettle of fish, actually, which I'd like to come back to in a minute. But continuing with the Kern Plateau, we fought a retreating battle and actually gained more of the area than we would have if we hadn't fought at all.

So this is an example of different approaches within the Sierra Club. Bestor would have settled for the Domelands; gradually we achieved more land, and now among the achievements we've gotten is the new Golden Trout area of some 330,000 acres, which the Forest Service had originally proposed as about 100,000. Originally, I believe, they were not going to include this area. I had a fair amount to do with this, again through my friendship and contacts with the Forest Service people.

Last night I mentioned Jack Dienema who was regional forester. He succeeded Charles Connaughton. Four regional foresters I have known were first, Pat Taylor; second, Clair Hendee; third, Charles Connaughton; fourth, Jack Dienema. For the past ten years it's been Douglas Leisz, and I have not had very much contact with him because I've been, as you know, involved in other things.

But, Jack Dienema and his family and my family took a trip up into the Golden Trout area in either 1968 or '69--I think it was '68. We went by horseback after traveling a good deal of the climb by car. The local county authorities had put in a road all the way up the side of the eastern escarpment of the southern Sierra towards Army Pass and Cottonwood Pass. There were several objectives behind that. The first was that they hoped to have a ski resort and a summer resort up in Horseshoe Meadows. We were strongly opposed to that. We wanted the eastern escarpment of the Sierra to be its protection, and this road--in those road building days they had to build more and more roads--took away that protection.

Wayburn: We then tried to make the best we could of protecting Horseshoe Meadows and the surrounding country over to the Golden Trout country, but for a while it looked like we were going to fail. Then finally, in part because the development proved uneconomic, we now have succeeded in protecting most of that country.

Well, the Dienemas and the Wayburns took a several-day ride through and again argued the merits of how much land should be included, where the boundaries should be. On the whole, I asked for ridge-top boundaries in high areas and an extension to distant rivers in the lower areas. I guess that I was asking for twice as much as Dienema thought the Forest Service could allow. Eventually we got almost twice as much in the Golden Trout area.

The club board debated for some time, because of the intransigent attitude of the Forest Service, whether or not we should actively campaign to add the Golden Trout area to Sequoia National Park. This was one of our threats in fighting for this area. We wanted to keep it wild, whether as a wilderness area under the Forest Service or the Park Service. The Congress has now settled this, and it will be a Forest Service Wilderness.

This was among the many individual battles we fought with the Forest Service on the congressional level. In general we've prevailed there. We have been able to add statutory wilderness, which is much larger than the administrative wilderness which we would have had if the Wilderness Act hadn't passed. The Wilderness Act was one of the most significant pieces of legislation that the conservationists ever put over.

In talking about the Wilderness Act I had a favorite expression in the early sixties, which confounded both my friends and opponents. I would say, "Well, I don't care when the Wilderness Act is passed." And my friends couldn't understand this: "We've got to pass it." I said, "I know we've got to pass it, but as long as it's before Congress and it has as much support as it has, the Forest Service is going to do more towards the establishment of more wilderness than they ever have before, or they ever will again. The Wilderness Act will take away from the Forest Service some of the privileges that it has had in the establishment of wilderness and in land disposal generally. And I know that if I were a Forest Service administrator I would lean over just as far as possible to establish larger areas of wilderness in order to show the conservationists that they had a better deal under the Forest Service than they could have under the Congress. And to show the Congress that it really wasn't necessary to pass this special

Wayburn: and restrictive act." And it's quite true that, in those years, when the wilderness bill was under increasing discussion and under heavier debate, the Forest Service did do more good in establishment of wilderness than it ever had before and their recommendations were larger than they ever were later.

IX A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE SIERRA CLUB

[Interview 7: October 31, 1980]

Bay Chapter, Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs and the
Conservation Committee, 1947-1961

Lage: We're going to focus today on, or work into, the internal affairs of the Sierra Club, particularly in the sixties. But you mentioned that you wanted to start with your earlier involvement with the San Francisco Bay Chapter and then the conservation committee.

Wayburn: Yes. I went on the executive committee of the Bay Chapter in 1947. I was the vice-chairman of the chapter that year, and the following year I was the chairman.

In 1949, the club decided that it would be a good idea for the chapters to have conservation committees. The club committee was then headed by Arthur Blake, and he and the committee chose the San Francisco Bay Chapter as the logical one to be the first with a conservation committee.

Lage: Was this to devote itself more to local affairs?

Wayburn: This was to devote itself to affairs which were inside the geographical boundaries of the chapters.

I opposed this, on the club conservation committee, because I could see that I would have another job. Indeed, it was true; I was the first chairman of the conservation committee of the Bay Chapter. I think I kept that job from 1951 to 1955, when I took over the club conservation committee as chairman.

Lage: Would you want to say anything about Arthur Blake?

Wayburn: Yes. Arthur Blake was one of the hardest-working conservationists of his time. I didn't know Art too well because he was working in the thirties and early forties, and, I think, during the war he was one of those people who carried on the work of the club when so many of us were away.

Art was what one would call of the old school. He was a "pure conservationist." He was a very rigid taskmaster as the chairman of the committee. He was also concerned mostly with California matters because the whole club in the forties was still very largely a California organization. It knew much more about California; its members were from California. Art was extremely dedicated and proved very good as chairman of the club conservation committee.

It's one of those anomalies, which I'll go into later, that Art Blake was appointed twice to the board of directors by the other directors, but I don't believe was ever elected by the membership at large. But let me come back into that later, when we're not talking about Art Blake alone.

I was concerned with the national and the statewide picture, but as chairman of the Bay Chapter Conservation Committee, had particular interest in local areas, and those included projects as far south as Big Basin and Butano State Parks, in which I had a very active interest; Mount Diablo State Park, which was in our territory and in which I was very interested; and particularly Marin County, where other interviews, I believe, have told the story of the expansion of Mount Tamalpais State Park from 870 to 6,200 acres. And where we became interested in the wider vision of keeping the land and open space up to the tip of Tomales Bay, and got further interested in the California coast, particularly the Sonoma coast at that time, something that led into the Bodega Head controversy.

Lage: Yes.

Wayburn: But meanwhile I was farmed out to the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs. In 1950, on the way back from a Labor Day vacation at Lake Tahoe, I stuck my head very briefly into the meeting of the federation, which was being held at Clair Tappaan Lodge. The following year I was asked to be the Sierra Club delegate to the federation convention, which was always, and still is, held over the Labor Day weekends, and it was that year at Mount Hood.

Lage: When you say "farmed out," was there a purpose in mind, in others' minds, aside from your own?

Wayburn: I don't know. I've often wondered. I had felt that I was caught between conflicting forces myself. I was very interested in the practice of medicine, teaching medicine, and doing research in medicine. I'd come out of the war having done several pieces of research. As I got further hooked into the conservation game, it was obvious that something had to give. The first thing that gave was trying to do research in medicine, because it just took up too much time and conservation took up too much time; and the next thing was my teaching career in medicine, which gradually bogged down as I did less and less of it; and then it began to intrude on the amount of practice I could take on.

Lage: I must say that everybody I talk to says, "I don't know how Ed Wayburn has kept up a professional career with all he has done in conservation!" [laughter]

Wayburn: I've programmed my life pretty tightly, and when I was doing one I didn't do the other.

Lage: You've been active in medicine and the medical society.

Wayburn: Yes. For someone who was never an organizational man, I've done a fair number of organizational things.

Lage: Yes. Well, I've taken you off the track now. Back to the federation--

Wayburn: Back to the federation. The federation in 1951 was composed of thirty or thirty-one clubs, mostly small clubs throughout the Pacific Northwest, a few medium-sized clubs like the Mountaineers and the Mazamas and the Trails Club, and a group of small organizations which might have anywhere from thirty to a hundred or more members. They were, as the name says, outdoor clubs; they were primarily interested in their personal enjoyment of the outdoors.

Talking to some of the people in the Sierra Club Conservation Committee, we felt that the federation might become more of a conservation organization. I don't remember how deliberate this was at the beginning, but in 1951 I set out to make it into a conservation organization because I saw the possibility of spreading the conservation message of the Sierra Club to a wider audience and having a larger group of people who would influence the bureaucracies and the Congress of the United States. The Sierra Club was one entity; each of these other organizations was in itself an entity; and the federation of clubs was still another entity, all of which could be used with advantage in spreading our conservation message.

Wayburn: So, now, I refer to myself as being farmed out in order to do a job. Between 1950 and 1960 I stayed with the federation. It wasn't an onerous job. It would have a concentration around the Labor Day weekend, and preparatory sessions, and thinking about it for a while afterwards. Then, throughout the year, the president would communicate with the club at intervals as to how we were doing. I was able to combine my work in the conservation committee of the club with that of the federation.

Lage: Now, did you chair the federation?

Wayburn: I was in 1951 appointed as the delegate from the Sierra Club. I continued as the delegate from the Sierra Club for a couple more years, but in '52 I was elected vice-president for California. Then in '53 I was elected president of the federation and I was president for two years, the first time they had had a two-year president for a long time, and that was a tradition that we continued for several years after that.

Lage: Did you make a change in the federation?

Wayburn: I think I did. I think I turned it into a conservation organization.

Lage: Was this met with enthusiasm, or resistance?

Wayburn: It was met with resistance by some, with enthusiasm by others. The Three Sisters Wilderness controversy which I talked about before illustrates the conversion of the federation.

Lage: So was it partly events, do you think, that caused them to turn around?

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: More awareness of what was going on?

Wayburn: It was a growing awareness throughout the country of the importance of environmental matters. It was a change in policy, particularly by the U.S. Forest Service--which had vast holdings in the Pacific Northwest where most of these clubs were--which showed them the shape of things to come as far as the places they'd enjoyed were concerned.

Lage: So that made your job easier, I assume.

Wayburn: That made the job easier, and I certainly wasn't the only one who had this in mind. Karl Onthank, who followed me as president, was a great help in this. There were people like Polly Dyer, later president of the federation, who had moved from San Francisco to Seattle with her husband. She became very active, first in the Mountaineers, and was, I think, a leading force in changing the Mountaineers from an outdoor hiking and climbing club into an active conservation organization.

There were people like Al Schmitz, who likewise moved from the Bay Area to Portland; a man named Verlis Fischer, who was at first an enthusiastic supporter and then opposed what we were doing because he was so devoted to the Forest Service. All of these were people who played a role.

Then there was the role of Mike McCloskey, who came along later, but who was the first Northwest representative, representing jointly the Sierra Club and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs. This was in 1961, but the years I'm talking about preceded that.

Having gone through the chairs of the federation from '51 to '55, and having been at the same time the chairman of the San Francisco Bay Chapter Conservation Committee, I became in 1955 the chairman of the Sierra Club Conservation Committee. Art Blake was followed as chair by Harold Bradley. Harold Bradley was followed by John Barnard, and then in 1955 I became chairman of the club conservation committee and remained in that capacity until I was elected president in 1961.

Lage: And you had been a member of the committee?

Wayburn: A member of the committee since 1947.

Lage: Yes. At the same time that you were the chairman of the Bay Chapter Conservation Committee.

Wayburn: Yes. It was the policy of the committee that any chairman of a chapter conservation committee was ex officio a member of the club committee, but I was a member before that. The chapter chairmen were also considered ex officio members of the committee.

Lage: Did the club committee have a large and active membership?

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Where the members really participated fully?

Wayburn: Very fully. It covered everything in the United States that we were aware of.

Lage: Did you have Atlantic Chapter representation, or was that too far to--?

Wayburn: The Atlantic Chapter came in just about--[pauses to think]

Lage: About '50 or so.

Wayburn: Was it '50? Then I would say that it participated by correspondence. We knew a few things that went on in the East and the Midwest, but we were far from aware of the majority of things, and there was no concept at that time of different regions in the club, which were formed later, communicating to the parent committee.

This committee handled everything. The information came to it from a variety of sources, and we handled it with a varying degree of thoroughness. I think I've told before of how we handled the Dinosaur situation when we talked all night about this one subject, the Upper Colorado River Project and the integrity of the national parks, and then eight of us continued the next day to make the decision which went to the board, and the board accepted.

Lage: Now, how was the interrelationship between the committee and the board and the staff--the staff being Dave Brower?

Wayburn: The interrelationship was very close, and now I'm talking about the years that I was the chairman. I personally worked very closely with Dave Brower, and he with me. Dave Brower and I were the closest of comrades, in one sense, and I did not see the other side of Dave personally until I became his boss in 1961.

Election to the Club Board of Directors, 1957

Wayburn: In 1955 and 1956 when I first ran for the board of directors of the Sierra Club, Dave was the man who pushed hardest for me. You might almost say I was the first one whom Dave tried to pack the board with. [chuckles] But the point was that we saw eye-to-eye on conservation matters, and I think I recognized very early Dave's immense potential and pushed him, even as he was pushing me.

When I wasn't elected to the board in 1955 or 1956 and instead one of the outing leaders was elected, Dave was extraordinarily angry. I can remember him going into an emotional frenzy over the

Wayburn: fact that the club would not elect the chairman of the conservation committee to the board, but instead elected the leader of one of the outings.

Lage: Were you writing in the Bulletin at that time? I'm trying to think how you would be known to the average member.

Wayburn: This is the point.

Lage: You didn't get to electioneer or send out a statement.

Wayburn: No, we didn't get to electioneer, and the board in the fifties, continuing a tradition of the board in the thirties and forties, was composed of people who were well known to a small group. There were two small groups which influenced greatly the direction. One was people who came to prominence because they were personally known as outing leaders or they were known as distinguished climbers.

Lage: Of course, Dave Brower came on that way himself, so it didn't always fail.

Wayburn: Right. No, it was an axiom in the club that the people who were the outing leaders in their twenties and thirties became the conservationists who led the club in their forties to sixties, and you go right on through a large list of people who did that.

The other group was closely connected, and that was what might be called the East Bay block. This included Brower and Leonard and Farquhar and [Raffi] Bedayn, who was not elected to the board but was influential in seeing that other people were.

Lage: Those are all climbers also.

Wayburn: They're all climbers as well. They knew each other. Einar Nilsson was another one. It was, shall we say, a mutual admiration society in which people worked well together, trusted one another. The Clark brothers, Lewis and Nate. Lewis was a director, and so many of them were in the thirties. They were very young. They were elected as directors of a young organization which was to a greater extent an outing organization than it was a conservation organization, although it was both. Will Colby, secretary for forty-seven years, was an outstanding example of this.

Lage: And you didn't mention Bestor Robinson.

Wayburn: Bestor Robinson was another one of the East Bay people who was an early climber, slightly older than these other people, except, I guess, Lewis and Nate Clark came in between.

Wayburn: But this group was highly influential in the club from the thirties through the early sixties. Jules Eichorn was another climber who was elected to the board for several years, I think in the fifties.

Lage: He was on in the sixties also. Was this a difficult group to break into?

Wayburn: Yes, it was a difficult group to break into because they were all friends. I became friendly with them, but I was to a certain extent an outsider.

In that connection, I have to remember that years later, at the time of the great blow-up over Brower [1969], Tom Jukes, who was on the fringes of this group--he left Berkeley to go to New York, was a founding member of the Atlantic Chapter, and then came back to the University of California--characterized me as an outsider, as being a Georgian who never really got to know the traditions of the Sierra Club. Well, it was during the time that I was establishing the traditions of the Sierra Club. [chuckles]

Lage: What about the board of directors and the conservation committee? Did they pretty well accept your recommendations on issues?

Wayburn: The board did accept our recommendations. Only one chairman of the conservation committee had been elected to the board. That was Harold Bradley, and he had distinguished credentials, being the son of one of the founders, a very distinguished individual in his own right, a professor of chemistry at the University of Wisconsin, and then coming back after his retirement to his home in Berkeley where the conservation committee used to meet. He had a wide acquaintanceship and a great name in the club, so he was elected, I think, beginning about 1951.

But, as I mentioned, Arthur Blake failed of election. Jack Barnard failed of election. I failed of election when I first ran, but I was elected in 1957, which was, I think, also the first year that the board had three-year terms instead of one-year terms--

Lage: So they weren't electing all fifteen at once.

Wayburn: That's right. I believe I came close to the top of the ticket.

##

Lage: How do you explain such a reversal in the election results?

Wayburn: By 1957, I had been established as the chairman of the conservation committee for over a year, and I had occasion to appear at the board meetings to present the viewpoint and the resolutions of the conservation committee, so that I became known to a wider group of people in the club, particularly influential people, whose opinion would be asked by the electorate at large. And then I had the executive director of the Sierra Club pushing hard for me. I think all these factors played a role. I was writing for the Bulletin to a greater extent than I had before.

Club Presidency, 1961-1964: Defining a Role

Lage: Within four years of being elected to the board, you were president. Is there some sequence there of how that kind of leadership role developed?

Wayburn: Yes. There was a long history in the club of trying to find leaders. There were a certain number of people who were elected to the directors year after year, who by the choice of the directors or by their own choice, were not considered to have the leadership qualities. These included such stalwarts as Charlotte Mauk, who did not want to take the presidency and who the directors felt couldn't.

It also included Ansel Adams, who the directors didn't think could handle the presidency. Ansel wanted to be president in, I believe it was, 1959--it could have been '57--and enlisted me in pushing for him, which I did. But there were a number of people who felt that Ansel would not make a good president, that with all the fine work he did--both his feelings in conservation and his outstanding photography, and his general prominence and leadership in the club--he would not have made a good president.

As a result, there were comparatively few people left to be president. Of the people who had been on the board for many years, the fifties saw, first, Lewis Clark [1949-1951] and then Harold Crowe [1951-1953] and then Dick Leonard [1953-1955] each take their place in line. And then Harold Bradley from '57 to '59. This more or less exhausted the old-timers.

Lage: We have Alex Hildebrand in there somewhere.

Wayburn: Right. Alex Hildebrand was '55-'57. Nate Clark [1959-1961] was elected in '55 or '56 as a director and he, by 1959, was considered ready to be president. Now I think that was the year that Ansel wanted the presidency.

Lage: I'm trying to see how the selection process worked. Did people declare their interest in an open sort of way, and it was voted upon?

Wayburn: No. This was done all in camera. Different directors would talk among themselves. I think, each time, the candidate would profess a certain reluctance but, after talking to people who would talk to him, would be willing. Again, it was quite a different story from the way it's done now, in which, in caucus, each member of the directors declares what he is interested in.

I was very busy with my work as chairman of the conservation committee and as a director, but there wasn't anyone else but Nate Clark and myself who had been elected recently, whom the directors thought they could entrust the club to. I continued as chairman of the conservation committee and became vice-president at the same time. Nate, because he lived in Los Angeles, could not be as active as he might, and I was handling quite a bit of the day-to-day chores of the club and working very closely with the staff in between meetings.

In those days, we had regular meetings of the board four times a year. The meetings would occur on Saturdays, and we would be through. During the fifties, things were handled with dispatch.

Lage: Or maybe there weren't as many things to handle.

Wayburn: There weren't as many things to handle.

I believe I initiated the first two-day meeting after I became president in 1961, because I felt that there was so much that the directors had to do. We began to handle more internal affairs; rather, the internal affairs of the club grew so that they had to be handled.

Lage: Yes. Was there at this time--I'm talking about early on, say, before you became president--a very clear definition of the president's role versus the executive director's role? What were those matters that the president had to handle on a day-to-day basis?

Wayburn: The president of the club, in those days, was all-powerful. At least, that was the opinion of the directors. But from the time Dave Brower was selected as executive director, originally on 5/7 pay and supposedly on 5/7 time--but Dave devoted 7/5 of his time to the club--there was a growing, if not recognized, competition. It wasn't obvious at first. Dave did so many things and handled them so well that the directors had nothing but gratitude.

Wayburn: There were a few times in the fifties--and I'd need to refresh my memory to have this accurately--when some of the directors began to question, was the executive director stepping out of line as the club representative? I know I, for one, encouraged him to do so because we didn't have anyone else who could. This had been one of the troubles with the Sierra Club on the national scene.

In the thirties, I think Francis Farquhar took a leave from his job as an accountant and went back to Washington to lobby for the Sequoia National Park and the Kings Canyon addition, but we were isolated to some extent in San Francisco, and we didn't have people in the East to represent us. We were a very strong organization, but it was literally the Sierra Club of California.

It was this decision in 1950 or '51 to go national, to employ an executive director, and to fight the Colorado River battle as a national thing, which precipitated all the changes. It took a while for that to penetrate, quite a while.

Lage: When you took over as president, did you have some specific ideas in mind in terms of your goals or what your role would be as president?

Wayburn: Yes. I intended to be, and I think was, a strong president.

Lage: So you felt that was the proper role?

Wayburn: I felt that was the proper role for the president; he was the chief executive officer of the club. At the same time, I recognized, as I said before, the enormous potential of Dave Brower and gave him as much leeway as possible.

These two ideas would sometimes come in conflict, and I would have conflicts with myself as to how this should be handled. In large part, I believed in giving Dave his head, and did. I felt that one had to choose between what Dave was accomplishing for the Sierra Club, for the conservation movement of which we were a large part, a significant part, and the way he did things which was not always in conformity with the way the directors wanted it. I had to compromise on a number of occasions in trying to bring together the wishes of the directors and the actions of the executive director. This, as you look through these papers, will come out, I think.*

Lage: Yes. Are you talking again about your first stint as president? Did that occur then?

*Refers to files on internal club conflicts, Wayburn papers, The Bancroft Library.

Wayburn: It began at that time. I overlooked it to some extent because I was working so closely with Dave, and we were working so closely together, and I felt we were accomplishing much more that way. I was always hoping that confrontation could be avoided and that we could get on with the good work that we were accomplishing.

Lage: What was the president's role in relation to the directors? How much of a leadership role did the president take?

Wayburn: I think that I was without question the chairman of the board of directors and the leader of the board of directors. There were sometimes resolutions or directives passed which were aimed at curbing the executive director, and it was my job to try to see that those got implemented and that still the executive director could go on with the work he was doing.

Initial Conflicts with Executive Director David Brower

Lage: This is something I wanted to talk about next, actually. Are you referring to the resolution passed in 1959 limiting critical comments about public officials? [Sierra Club Board minutes, 12-5-59]

Wayburn: That was part of it.

Lage: Now, that was a resolution you seemed to be in agreement with.

Wayburn: Right. I was in agreement with it generally, and I remember trying to work it out with Dave so that one could comment critically without condemning the individual. Dave had difficulty in doing this.

Lage: In the arguments that you find in the board minutes, Dave argues not so much that he has difficulty doing it, but he thinks it's more effective; he talks about motivating people rather than sticking to objective facts.

Wayburn: That's right. This was his style. The board was then a board of gentlemen and ladies--one lady--and it didn't like to do this. Somewhere in between, as is true with so many things, was the most effective way.

Lage: Brower says in his oral history interview* that this 1959 resolution was based primarily on pressure from the Forest Service, which was trying to get him out as executive director. Is that something you would be aware of?

*David R. Brower, Environmental Activist, Publicist, and Prophet, Sierra Club Series, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.

Wayburn: I would have been. Dave was always of the opinion that someone was out to get him. Dave had a paranoid streak in him, a strong paranoid streak. We would have lunch together frequently, and he would tell me of this one or that one who was out to get him. This, mind you, was in his early years when he was really just the bright, golden-haired boy of the directors as well. There were a few of the directors who were openly critical, but I don't believe that anyone on the board of directors in that day was out to get Dave.

On the other hand, Dave threatened to resign on a number of occasions in the late fifties. I remember, after I became president, and maybe as late as '62, Dave came to me all outraged about something and said, "If I can't have my way on this, I'm going to resign." By that time, sentiment on the board had grown enough so that I told Dave, "Dave, if you resign again this time, I think your resignation might be accepted by a majority of the board," because by the early sixties Dave was in often open conflict with different members of the board, and there were some members of the board who felt that the club would do better without him. But the impetus came from Dave's side. The directors were resisting it.

Lage: The impetus towards what, now? Towards conflict, or towards--?

Wayburn: Well, towards conflict. Dave resented the board telling him what to do. He wanted the board to be in an advisory capacity rather than in a policy-making capacity. As long as the board made policy consonant with what Dave thought was right, the board was all right. When it made other policy, he didn't like it; he wanted to go beyond the board. These threats of resignation, along with the perception that someone was out to get him, were manifestations of that.

Lage: Do you remember issues where these resignation threats came up in the early years? I'm surprised it goes back this far.

Wayburn: At this moment, I can't tell you the issues.

Lage: Were they policy things like conservation issues or--?

Wayburn: I think they were.

Lage: Trying to get the board to take stronger stands?

Wayburn: Not so much take stronger stands on conservation policy, but on policies as to whether to go more deeply into the book programs.

Lage: Yes. So, more internal matters.

Wayburn: Yes. But policy, nevertheless. No, it was internal policy which caused the friction. There were very few instances in which the board didn't go along with what Dave thought was good conservation policy, and I was instrumental in that. As I said, Dave and I worked closely; we agreed on conservation policy.

Within the board itself, I think I could be considered the leader of the liberal wing of the board, with Bestor Robinson as the leader of the opposition. Throughout the late fifties and throughout the sixties, I believe you will find the minutes showing that I argued one way; Bestor Robinson would argue the other way. Bestor would want to settle for what he felt would be the eventual settlement, and in his lawyer's mind he wanted to settle out of court before the case came to prolonged discussion in the court; in this case, in one or another legislature.

My attitude, as Dave's was, was that unless we presented the strongest possible front, including the strongest possible arguments and stands, we would lose that much more. I believe that almost without exception I prevailed, and Bestor would settle back into the position of supporting the stand.

Lage: I noticed that, in fact, as you look at the minutes, there are a lot of resolutions that you and Robinson move and second together.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Then maybe this was all hashed out before.

Wayburn: It was.

Lage: And then it looks from the minutes as if you're allied in your point of view.

Wayburn: That's right.

Lage: So, Robinson was willing to support, once the balance of power became evident.

Wayburn: Once the power became evident that it would go against him, he would support it. I can remember him representing the club and making to the outside the arguments that I had made within the confines of our meetings, and, I guess, doing a better job of it than I could have done, because he was an extraordinarily persuasive advocate.

Wayburn: But the dissension in the club, I think, began largely--it was partly, as you say, in Dave's attitude and presentation of that attitude about people in the Park Service, Forest Service--

Lage: But just to be clear about this, you're not aware of any campaign among Forest Service people to get rid of him?

Wayburn: I am not aware of it. Now, it may be that I was and still am a lamb who didn't know what was going on. I heard, as the years went by, for example, that the Forest Service would detail people to take me over, and I got along very well with the people that they assigned to me. I didn't realize it was a conscious effort on their part to co-opt me, because they didn't co-opt me. But I do remember a series of regional foresters, assistant regional foresters, and forest supervisors, even district rangers, who worked with me. I simply thought that this was their job, to work with the conservation organization which I represented, and I worked along with them. I don't think that they influenced me in a bad way at all.

Lage: You were aware of their point of view, but it didn't necessarily affect your actions.

Wayburn: They made their point of view clear, and I made mine.

The Park Service did this to a lesser extent. But people in the services who were friends of mine later told me that So-and-So and So-and-So were assigned to me.

Lage: So, that could have been happening, and you wouldn't necessarily have known about it, as far as a campaign to oust Dave.

Wayburn: This could have happened. It's just my opinion that it did not happen on the conscious, active level; that Dave's fears were really paranoia.

Challenges to the Club "Establishment," 1960s

Wayburn: I know that within the directorate of the club there was every effort made to go along with Dave. Dave couldn't have gotten where he did without the directors. He never appreciated us. [chuckles] He would at times give me some credit. As the years went by, he became more and more, shall I say, apprehensive about the independent directors or the directors who were elected from the ranks, and Dave began to try to pack the board with his own candidates. I was probably the first of the latter because we did get along as well as we did.

Lage: That's interesting.

Wayburn: He then began to find certain people, some of whom were from within the membership or, shall we say, the chapter strata of the club, but more frequently people of prominence who had not worked within the club structure and didn't know, or didn't recognize, what the Sierra Club was as a grassroots organization.

##

Wayburn: This became apparent in the late fifties and early sixties and increased as the sixties wore on. There was a succession of prominent individuals who came on, such as William O. Douglas, associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court; Paul Brooks, then editor of Houghton-Mifflin; Luna Leopold, who was the foremost hydrologist of the country; John Oakes, who was then editor of the New York Times; George Marshall, long prominent in the Wilderness Society and brother of Bob Marshall, chief of Recreation for the Forest Service; Eliot Porter, who gained prominence through his photography for the Sierra Club (In Wilderness is the Preservation of the World and others).

And then people like David Sive, an attorney who represented the Atlantic Chapter, but had worked very closely with Dave on a number of matters; Fred Eissler of Santa Barbara, who was devoted to Dave heart and soul; Pat Goldsworthy, who was Dave's assistant on the high trips for years, who went to Seattle and became the founder and only president of the North Cascades Conservation Council, who was 100 percent with Dave; Larry Moss, a young man whom Dave enlisted to do work on the Colorado River project, who was another devoted disciple; and Martin Litton, the travel editor of Sunset magazine.

All of these people were suggested in one way or another by Dave, and Dave campaigned for them in one way or another. The old adage of "somebody can always win against nobody" was proved. These people either had reputations outside or inside the club, but, shall I say, the ones inside the club were largely specialists, and specialists, particularly, in their devotion to Dave.

Phil Berry was another one--but one who later changed. After all, Phil was like a son to Dave until he became extremely critical.

So the board began to go through changes from the old establishment of the fifties, which had lasted in large part for twenty years. It was not unusual for a director to serve for twenty years, as opposed to the present time when I am the only director who has served for twenty years.

X GROWING INTERNAL DISSENSION: FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS, 1960-1968

New Directions for the Publications Program

Wayburn: As the board changed, Dave began to have more and more influence over the minority of the board, and as this happened the board began to have more dissension within itself, and there were more split votes. But on conservation issues this wasn't true. The conservation agenda would go off in comparatively short order. There would be a presentation and, as the agenda grew heavier, we would have resolutions prepared ahead of time which would be slightly modified by the board. But on internal matters there was increasing dissension, and I guess the books program falls within that category. The publications program was so much a part of the dissension that I think it has to be discussed; it's central to it.

Lage: Let's talk about it now then.

Wayburn: This is a case where Dave Brower, editor, and Dave Brower, conservation leader, began to come together and at the same time have a somewhat schizophrenic personality. Dave had been editor for a long time, just as Dave had been a climber and an outing leader for a long time. Dave was one of those people who felt that he could do almost anything and wanted to do it on his own terms. He continued as an outing leader after he became executive director. The first year that he did this, I think he did it on club time, and it was pointed out that he was not doing his job as executive director. So then I think he didn't take his salary during that time, but took an outing leader's salary instead. Then the directors said that he could not be an outing leader.

Wayburn: This was one of his, I believe, early disappointments with the directors. I hadn't thought about that, but it probably played a role, because it is central to the character of the man that he was the Sierra Club in every aspect.

Lage: You mean in his own mind, or in the minds of others?

Wayburn: In his own mind and on the outside, Dave was the Sierra Club. To those who didn't know how the club worked, he represented the club. He was the only person who was freely mobile, who could go to Washington and represent the club, who could stay there for two or three weeks if necessary, or who could go to Sacramento, and then as the books program developed could devote all of his time to that when he thought he should.

The Sierra Club had always published but was a significant conservation book publisher for the first time, I believe, in 1950, when it published--or, rather, worked with [A.A.] Knopf and Company in publishing--This Is Dinosaur. I believe that [was] edited by Wallace Stegner.

Lage: Who also became a member of the board of directors.

Wayburn: Who was another one of those people Dave got on the board of directors, but who did not like the rough-and-tumble of life on the board of directors, and who resigned after two years, I think. I believe he was 1962-'64. He was a good member of the board, but he couldn't come to some meetings because of his own schedule and his own writing, and he really didn't like the rough-and-tumble. Later, he was one of those who, through his writing, was devastating to Dave's hopes.

But back to book publishing: in about 1955, the National Park Service, for various reasons, told the club that it might not be able to keep the LeConte Lodge in Yosemite National Park. This was one of the old club traditions, and the club felt very strongly about it. The Park Service was accusing the club of just being another recreational organization and having its own lodge inside Yosemite Valley, and other people were objecting to that.

Regardless of what the motivation of other people was, we felt we had to do something about it. Ansel Adams, who was the leader of this movement of the club and who also lived in the valley, volunteered to make an exhibit which would be better than anything that the Park Service had--and he did. Ansel made the photographs, Nancy Newhall did the captions, and this became the "This is the American Earth" exhibit.

Lage: Was Dave involved in the preparation of that?

Wayburn: Dave was involved in the preparation. The details I don't remember, but without question he was involved in it.

"This is the American Earth" became extremely well known in the valley, was praised all over the country, and after two years Dave had the idea that the exhibit could be put into a book and that this would influence the American conservation movement greatly. The Sierra Club directors felt they didn't have the money for this. Between Dave and Ansel, they got a subsidy of, I think, originally \$6,000 from Max McGraw, who was the head of McGraw-Edison Electrical Company; and more, I believe, was given, possibly by Dick McGraw, who was Max's son and a close friend of Ansel's.

This book was an enormous success, as you know, and it set the stage for the Exhibit Format publishing. I think it came out in 1959, and it changed Dave's whole way of looking at the conservation movement. He saw what a book could do--I think he recognized it before any of the rest of us did--and he was the creator. He went on with this effort: Words of the Earth by Cedric Wright, which didn't sell the same way at first, but which has been a constant steady seller and reprinted several times for many years.

Then--I think it was in 1961--Dave came up to our house at 30 Seaview Terrace--he was a frequent visitor there; we worked out a good many things up there--with a batch of photographs by a man I had heard of just briefly because he was a graduate of the same medical school that I was, Eliot Porter. These were a revelation in color photography. They represented years of work on Porter's part, and Dave thought they could be put into a book which would do for color photography what This is the American Earth did for black and white photography. Just about that time, color photography was coming into its own, a greatly improved process. Many more people were taking pictures. The 35 millimeter camera had made more people conscious of it. Again, this was Dave Brower's idea, his inspiration. He showed it to me; I saw it; I agreed with it.

Lage: Was Peggy involved in any of this?

Wayburn: Peggy was not involved in the Exhibit Format series. Peggy's involvement with the club was severalfold. First, she was most supportive of me and working with me. I couldn't have done anything I did without Peggy's support. I became a member of the chapter executive committee before we were married, but from then on she was with me all the way. She would go to conservation committee meetings with me whenever possible, when rearing young children didn't keep her

Wayburn: away. She went with me, of course, to federation meetings. I would write editorials and other articles for the Bulletin, and she was my editor, often rewriting extensively. I had published quite a bit before in medicine. I'm the author of a good many medical articles and editorials but my writing improved because of Peggy.

Lage: Hadn't Peggy worked in writing or editing in some way before?

Wayburn: Yes. When we were married, Peggy was a copywriter for J. Walter Thompson. She had been in the writing field almost since she graduated from college, and she had written some in college. She gradually tapered off commercial writing. I think the first thing she did for the Sierra Club was "The Tragedy of Bull Creek" in 1955 in the Bulletin.

Lage: I thought perhaps she made some of the judgments on the books that you mentioned. But she didn't get in on that?

Wayburn: She may have been in on it to some extent, but that, I think, was secondary.

No, this was Dave Brower, and I was in on it because I was his friend and collaborator in conservation matters. And then I was chairman of the conservation committee and a director, and I helped pave the way in the board of directors for him. When it came particularly to the color books, this was instituting something which was brand new and could be very expensive. I was president of the club, and he wanted to get my okay.

Lage: Well, how did you feel about that venture, money-wise and in terms of the energy required?

Wayburn: This was a case of where do we go and how do we go? Dave, with his supreme confidence in himself--at least he presented that; I'm not sure that he always had it. Dave would get very depressed at times. He sometimes betrayed evidence of mania when he was doing great things, and then deep depression at other times, particularly when he had been rejected by the board.

But I felt Dave could do it, and I could carry the conservation aspects. The conservation policies, I certainly carried. Increasingly through those years I would make trips to Washington, although I couldn't stay. I'd go for hearings and then come back. Many's the time I went on the red-eye special one night, would stay for one or two days, and then come back.

Lage: Did you see this consciously at the time, that if the books became increasingly important, your own role in conservation would have to be increased?

Wayburn: I don't have a remembrance of having that as a deliberate policy, but I guess I did see that I'd have to take on more because Dave wouldn't be there.

Contributions of the Books: Membership Growth, Financial Strains

Wayburn: I was president just until 1964 that time. Those were the years that we were setting things, a great many things, in motion. The first Porter book was an immense success. Then came the second and the third and the fourth Porter books, which were decreasing financial successes. I don't know whether I should start on the financial aspects of this at all.

Lage: It is an essential part of the books. Let me just say this. I thought we'd try to, next time, get into '67 to '69 in more depth and this time stay with some of the general problems that were building up.

Wayburn: Right.

The color books became increasingly expensive. The first one--and I don't remember the figures--cost comparatively little, and we had a \$20,000 subsidy from the Bechtels to do it. That \$20,000 I don't think covered all the costs, but it helped greatly, and the book was a tremendous success and was reprinted.

Dave didn't tell us of the costs; now, I mean, financial, fiscal costs. Dave began, consciously or unconsciously--and probably it was unconscious--to manipulate the fiscal figures of the club somewhere around this time.

The books made the Sierra Club a nationwide organization before its membership did. The books attracted members from all over the country, and the books accelerated the growth of the club. People came into the club because of the books, but the growth of the club had started before, the accelerated growth.

Just a diversion on that--when I joined the club in 1939, there were about three thousand members. When the club decided to go national, hire an executive director, and fight the Upper Colorado

Wayburn: project with all of its might, it had less than seven thousand members; that was in 1951 or '52. When I first became president in 1961, it had 16,500 members. When I stepped down from the presidency in 1964 the membership was 25,000. At the time of our Diamond Jubilee in December 1967 we had 55,000 members.

##

Wayburn: The first period of growth, in the fifties, was due to the increasingly significant conservation activity of the club, to our programs and the attitudes we took, to the increasing awareness of people in conservation, also to the fact that people no longer had to have two sponsors to join. Up until 1950, I think, one had to have two sponsors to join the Sierra Club. This made it difficult for some people who didn't know a member to sponsor them, or felt that they might be rejected. In the fifties and sixties, I personally sponsored over five hundred doctors. But there was then one sponsor, and that was dropped after a couple more years, so that anyone who wanted to could join the club by writing in or just simply signing an application blank that they were sympathetic to the purposes of the club.

This Is the American Earth wasn't published until the end of the fifties, so I don't think that the books can be held responsible for the increase in membership until the sixties. But undoubtedly it played a great role, and I know of many people who joined because of the books.

Sharing the Leadership Role as Club President

Lage: One of the things that Brower says--I think this is in the minutes in 1967. He was talking about the various procedural changes that the board had instituted to try to exercise more control over the finances, and he said, "The board tends to interfere and to stifle and to emphasize procedure over achievement." Now, did you see it that way?

Wayburn: No. The problem was twofold. First, Dave would ignore the directions of the directors; and second, the board was increasingly worried about the very real losses in money each year, about the loss in net worth of the club, about the danger of bankruptcy.

Lage: Was this a concern that you shared?

Wayburn: I shared this concern.

Lage: You seemed to go for a longer time trying to balance.

Wayburn: I went for a longer time trying to balance because I was ambivalent. I knew the problems we faced. I'm an optimist, and I was always optimistic that I could balance these things out. This was the reason I took the presidency again in 1967. First, the directors didn't feel anyone else could handle it. I was the only one who had been able to handle Dave in a nonadversarial position or rather, although it was still adversarial, we were able to work together; and secondly, who had the confidence of the club enough; and third, who was willing [chuckles] to take it on. When I came home and told Peggy this, she was very disconsolate, but she agreed to go along.

Lage: You don't feel critical of the board for not being more creative themselves, say, in finding new sources of funding, or giving Dave more support? Did you have any of those feelings?

Wayburn: [pauses to reflect] A different board might have been able to do it, but a different executive director would never have put the board in that sort of situation. The board became an antagonist because Dave insisted on doing things Dave's way. Not all of the board recognized Dave's worth as much as I.

Lage: Aside from those people that he sort of got on the board, who do you think did appreciate his worth the most? Did [William E.] Siri? Did [George] Marshall?

Wayburn: I think they appreciated him, yes. There's no question that he was appreciated, but these people were trying to do two things: first, to assert that the board was supreme in the club; and second, to keep the club from going into bankruptcy.

I had increasing apprehensions. I was under no illusions during my presidency the second time around [1967-1969]. I had increasing apprehensions the first time around, but I went along because I felt that we together--and when I say "we," I think that I shared the leadership role with Dave at the time as no one else did. But we all together--the Sierra Club was a symbiotic relationship--were doing things which were more important than what was dividing us. I had plenty of apprehensions throughout this time. But the problem was how to accomplish what we were very definitely beginning to accomplish as we became a nationwide organization in fact as well as in announcement, with the conservation battles that we were engaged in and were beginning to show success in, from Dinosaur on, on the national and the local level.

Lage: I'm recalling that, say, in the redwoods issue, you appeared to stake out a territory where you would not necessarily work with Dave, but you would take one campaign; he would have something else. Was there a reason for that?

Wayburn: Yes. In the fifties we found ourselves so overwhelmed with the increasing amount of conservation material which came to us that we had to do something towards programming our work. I think it was in 1961--it was shortly after I became president, I believe--we tried to settle down what were our conservation priorities, and we set out five. Two of them were fairly general. The first was the implementation or the passage of the wilderness bill, which we finally got through in 1964, and then the implementation of the Wilderness Act, which has been occupying us ever since. The second was the rounding out, or the completion, of the national parks system. Each year we'd find out that there was more and more to do in that, and we're still doing that.

But then we had three specific subjects which grew up in the fifties. The first was the Upper Colorado River project, the second was the Redwood National Park, and the third was the North Cascades National Park (originally that was the Glacier Peak Wilderness Area).

Now, Dave had been working on the Colorado River project since 1950. He was the logical person to lead that fight, and, as president, I simply directed him to take charge of it, and I didn't get into that, very consciously. I even--and I've always regretted it--didn't take one of a number of free trips offered me [chuckles] down the Colorado River. But I felt that we needed one individual to be in charge of these campaigns, and Dave was it. I had no time for it; I stayed out of it. There were several occasions where other people challenged what Dave was doing. I supported what he was doing just as far as possible.

On the redwoods, it was the reverse. I'd started it; I had the personal interest. The redwoods were close enough so that I could get there in person. I felt that Dave was busy enough with other things, and I did not want him interfering with what I was doing, so I told him to stay out of it except when I asked his help, and he was very good about this. The places where he came into it, he was enormously helpful; this was as a publicist. He was responsible for getting ahold of Howard Gossage--who was a genius, of the firm of Gossage, Freeman, and Mander--who did our newspaper ads on both the Grand Canyon and the redwoods.

Lage: Were those ads that you, as president or as task force leader for the redwoods looked over and approved, or did Dave take care of those?

Wayburn: I followed every line, every word. The procedure that we followed was--we'd see that we'd need an ad for one purpose or another. The newspaper ads were something new, and I think the first one was on the redwoods. Dave and I would sit down with Gossage and often with

Waybyrn: Mander and figure out what do we need, what should it be. Then Gossage would go off and brainstorm by himself and come up with something. We'd have another meeting. But no ad on the redwoods went out without my personally approving every word of it. There was also one case in which Peggy and I thought up the copy when we were driving back from a trip to the Redwood Creek area. It was originally intended as a letter to Senator Kuchel to get his support for the Sierra Club's redwood bill and ended up as a letter to the president.

Lage: Is that the one that started, "Mr. President--"?

Wayburn: Yes. "There is one great forest of redwoods left on earth; but the one you are trying to save isn't it." That's where we wrote the copy, and Gossage and the others revised it.

Lage: Yes. That's interesting.

Wayburn: The "chain saw legislation" ad was one I changed entirely from what Gossage had originally done and Dave had approved.

Lage: Then did Gossage and Dave approve your changes? I mean, were they happy with them, or did they just accept them?

Wayburn: I guess there was some of each.

Lage: You had a staff assistant, who turned out to be Mike McCloskey, for the redwoods campaign.

Wayburn: Right.

Lage: So, it was sort of setting up side-by-side organizational structures, it seems, rather than having the executive director over the staff. How did that come about?

Wayburn: Well, Mike was not my personal assistant in the presidency. John Flannery was, later; that was in '67. But in 1961, Karl Onthank and I teamed to hire a Northwest representative who should represent the Sierra Club and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs. On Karl's recommendation, I recommended Mike McCloskey to the board of directors of the Sierra Club and he was hired in 1961.

Later, Mike, as part of his Northwest duties, came down as far as the redwoods, so he learned something about the redwoods. When the legislative campaign came on, Mike by that time had been brought down to San Francisco. He came down to San Francisco, I think, in '65 or '66.

Lage: As I recall, he came down as Will Siri's assistant.

Wayburn: That may have been but we felt we needed someone to work in conservation in the central office; we were greatly impressed by what Mike had done in the Northwest, and we were grooming him as conservation director. I don't know whether he got that title right away or not, but that was what it was for.

Lage: So, he wasn't actually your personal assistant?

Wayburn: He was not my personal assistant, but as the redwoods battle increased, we needed someone who could go to Washington and stay in Washington. As I said earlier, Dave had been that person. Dave was no longer available because he was busy on books, he was busy on the Colorado project, and I was running the redwoods project. I'm not conscious of it at this moment, but with the situation the way it was, I may have not wanted Dave to be my representative in Washington, but rather someone who I had more confidence would do what I wanted.

Mike went to Washington, and he was in Washington all through the important days of the legislation. He was on the phone with me almost daily. He was also lobbying inside the conference committee; this was when he played a particularly valuable role. Mike is someone who learns a great many details and achieves a mastery over a given subject. He did that in the redwoods, and he was able to present our position during the conference extremely well. The Senate Interior Committee staff called on him over and over again, and Senator Jackson had confidence in him too.

Lage: I think this is the place to stop for now.

Roots of the Schism: Rapid Institutional Growth and the Freewheeling Personality of Dave Brower##

[Interview 8: November 7, 1980]

Lage: This is November 7, 1980, and we're continuing with our discussion of the internal affairs of the club. You wanted to review something that we talked about last week?

Wayburn: Yes. We had been talking about my experiences in the Sierra Club, and I think I'd indicated that they were highly satisfactory. I don't know whether I specifically mentioned the fact that the directors of the fifties and sixties were some of the finest people that I've

Wayburn: known. We felt in that day that we were doing a great deal to keep the earth a better place for future generations as well as ourselves.

I have always thought that it was tragic that there should have been the split that finally came to fruition in 1969, and yet the club and the environmental movement as a whole came out stronger for the ordeal we went through. The factors that went into this were multiple. The directors of the fifties were still people who had been around since the thirties, in a large part, and the new people elected who had name recognition in the club were largely the outing leaders or famous climbers. There weren't many people who came up through the conservation route. I was the only chairman of the conservation committee elected other than Harold Bradley, who had been famous himself for other reasons.

The club was acquiring more and more work to do, and with the acquisition of an executive director who was an extraordinarily able and hardworking man, it got that much more work to do.

But by 1959 there had appeared certain schisms within the club. We were reluctant to accept this because we felt we were doing a great deal. They may have had to do with the rapid growth of the club, its increasing influence, and the fact that the existing organization was too small, and the plans too small, for what we were undertaking.

They also had roots in the personality of Dave Brower, the executive director. Dave was increasingly a freewheeling personality. Whereas when he first became executive director he welcomed any help that he could get, from about 1957 on he began to want to work without what he called interference.

Lage: So, you place that trouble quite a ways back.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Even before you came on the board.

Wayburn: I didn't realize this until I consulted notebooks in which I had kept a rough log of my Sierra Club experiences from the early fifties. I think this started, or became more apparent, during the presidency of Harold Bradley from 1957 to '59. Harold was an excellent conservationist and dedicated man, but he didn't have control over Dave, and he would often express himself as being angry with what Dave had done. But Dave would go ahead and do it.

Wayburn: From 1959 until 1961, Nate Clark was president. Nate was an engineer for Lockheed and a manager. He was a precise man who knew how to manage, but he was located in Los Angeles, and he had great difficulty in managing the staff of the Sierra Club and specifically in controlling the executive director from that distance.

Board Efforts to Regain Financial Control

Wayburn: It was during that time that the directors realized they needed more financial control than they had, even though this did not compare with what it was later. In either 1959 or 1960, the first administrator, Elmer Maryatt, was hired. Maryatt almost immediately began to have difficulties with the finances of the club. I have a note [in my notebook] dated May 20, 1961, where Maryatt had talked about the budget for 1960, pointing out that we had a deficit of \$27,000 and detailing where it went.

Dave took issue with this, and when similar administrators would point out difficulties, he would take issue with them, pointing out the inadequacy of their figures and bringing up figures of his own. The board, particularly the executive committee, was not able to tell, at first particularly, just what the truth was, and was continually trying to get control of the budget, of the expenses, and of the true financial status of the club.

Lage: Let me ask you this. Apparently these early administrators or business managers reported directly to a volunteer, a member of the executive committee. Was that because of some distrust of Dave, or do you think that was the way the board felt the club should operate?

Wayburn: I believe that Maryatt reported directly to Dave, and then it was thought that there needed to be a controller, someone who reported directly to the treasurer. This was because there was, I guess you would call it, the distrust of the figures that Dave put out, and the fact that the directors realized increasingly that we were not in as good financial condition as we had before, and also because we were making much larger financial obligations with the publication of the books. A great deal of this revolved around the book publication program.

Going on with the administrators or controllers, Elmer Maryatt was there in 1960. Donald Tweedy came on in 1961, and there was some doubt in the minds, I think, of Clifford Heimbucher, the treasurer,

Wayburn: and of Dave, as to whether Tweedy could do the job, although he came well recommended. He stayed, I think, for less than two years. Finally, Clifford Rudden was hired as the controller in 1963.

None of these people produced figures which matched with the figures that Brower produced. Part of the reason was that they didn't know all the expenditures he had made, nor did they know at times all of the income he had gathered. These were kept by Dave until the appropriate time to let us know.

Lage: Do you think that the directors of the club, as a group, approached the sixties with as much vision as they might have? I mean, that certainly is one of Dave's criticisms and one of his explanations for the way he acted. Were they ready and willing to take on the new projects that the country seemed ready for?

Wayburn: Some of us certainly were. As I have said repeatedly, on almost all conservation problems I was with Dave. I was with him as far as what our stance should be on a given issue. I was with him on the employment of a Washington representative, although I was having difficulty in seeing where the money was coming from, and we had to therefore modify our stance as to how much we could afford.

Lage: But you did approve it? Because I think the minutes at one point show some hesitancy on your part, at least, about the Washington representative.

Wayburn: Yes. There was hesitancy not because I doubted that we needed it but because of the amount of money we had available. I think the executive committee particularly--and I was on the executive committee from 1959 to 1971, continuously--was highly disturbed by the financial situation in which we found ourselves over and over again.

There were members of the board who, if you want to put it that way, were not ready for the conservation challenges of the sixties. I have mentioned the fact that, in my remembrance, I was the leader of the liberal wing, and Bestor Robinson was the leader of the conservative wing, and there were others who would go back and forth in between.

Lage: I would think this, though, would pertain to the earlier period and not to when the final break came. Most of the more conservative people had retired from the board by then.

Wayburn: What I'm talking about is from 1957 to 1967. By 1967, as I mentioned earlier, Dave had gotten a good many people who saw the issues and the Sierra Club through Dave's eyes. So, what I am talking about now is this earlier time, as we were changing.

Lage: Yes. Do you want to give more background before we get into your presidency?

Wayburn: Yes. In 1962 and '63, our financial condition was worsening. We hired a firm of consultants named McMurray to make us a report and to give us advice. They had said that we could go either of two ways. We could go with only one staff man, the executive director, reporting to the board, or we could have an independent controller. The board voted to have a controller who would report to the treasurer, and that's when Cliff Rudden was hired.

Increasingly, the executive director was going his way, at odds with the board, and the board felt that because they could not get staff help directly through the executive director, they needed some additional staff help. This is one reason that Rudden was hired to be independent of the executive director, and a reason why an assistant to the president was hired on an intermittent basis.

Lage: It appears that that McMurray report, from the papers you gave me to look over, initially recommended a business manager who would be under Dave, and then a few months later they put out a new report suggesting a separate line of reporting.

Wayburn: Right.

Lage: How did this come about?

Wayburn: I think that was probably--they put out their initial report after consulting largely with Dave. I would have to look back and see for sure. Then they consulted with the members of the board, and after that consultation they felt that there should be a separate controller reporting directly to the treasurer.

One of the things that I initiated when I became president in 1961 was frequent meetings with the staff and with the executive committee as far as possible. I felt that some of the cause of the staff going one way and the board going another way between '57 and '61 was that there hadn't been close enough communication, and particularly since from '59 to '61 the president was in Los Angeles.

I had weekly meetings, some of which were picnics, brown-bag lunches at the club, and others which were short lunches which we'd have with available members of the executive committee and with the executive director, because we were all around the same neighborhood. My office was six or seven blocks from Mills Tower. Dick Leonard, who was secretary or treasurer during this time, was in Mills Tower. Will Siri, who was treasurer, would come over from Berkeley. Cliff Heimbucher, who was treasurer before Will--it was a tragedy that the

Wayburn: electorate didn't elect him after the board had appointed him, because he had such a wide knowledge and mastery of accounting affairs--his office was in Mills Tower. Lewis Clark, who was another one frequently on the executive committee, was an engineer for Pacific Telephone. So we were all within a short distance and could meet much more easily and informally than was the case later on.

Lage: So at these meetings, were you going into day-to-day operating problems?

Wayburn: We did go into day-to-day operating problems at times. We were trying to do that for a couple of reasons: first, because conservation policy was made by the board and we felt that we needed to know as much as possible about the issues; and secondly, because the finances were deteriorating, and we, the board, were responsible for that. As it turned out, they were deteriorating more than we knew, despite the fact that we would try to keep week-to-week control over them.

Lage: What was the tenor of these meetings, as far as the personal feeling went?

Wayburn: Well, in general, we were all friends, but there were times when attempts would be made to put controls on the finances, and these were resented very much by the executive director. In turn, the executive director would take board policy and modify it as he thought was best, and he definitely felt that he knew better than the board what was best.

Lage: Would he also argue persuasively before the board his point of view?

Wayburn: He would argue extremely persuasively. There's no question that Dave was an outstanding persuader. Often members of the board would start out one way and turn around, being persuaded that either, "He's right," or "We'll give him one more chance to prove that he's right."

Lage: This was on matters of conservation policy?

Wayburn: And on matters of administration and finances.

The single biggest problem was the book publications problem. When Dave got the first of his inspirations, there was no separate committee for publications. But this program grew so fast and involved such important matters of policy on what should be published and the cost of publication and the cost to the stability of the club, that a publications committee was directed by the board and was appointed.

Wayburn: I think August Frugé was the first and for a long time the only chairman of that committee. August was, in the minds of most of us, extremely well suited for that. He was in his own right a publisher. He was the only professional that we had at the time, and we were novices. He knew the publishing business very well, and we thought that he was the ideal man for the job.

Almost immediately, he and Dave began to have their differences. Dave would attribute this to professional jealousy and to the fact that August, being publisher of the University of California Press, didn't want the Sierra Club to become too prominent in publishing. August would say that this was totally untrue and was a figment of Dave's imagination.

Lage: Do you have an opinion on that yourself?

Wayburn: I don't think that August had any desire to downgrade or to minimize Sierra Club publications. He was extremely concerned with our ability to raise the capital which he, as a professional, knew was necessary for successful publishing, and which he and we all, to our regret, found out was true.

Dave was remarkably agile in being able to find money at critical times, but at other times the club program would languish because of financial inability. Dave would come to us repeatedly with the plea that we had to give more money to the publications program, particularly since it was so successful and was attracting so many new members. He would point out that we would soon make up the current losses by the number of new members who came into the club because of the publications program; and he would point out the value of the publications program, not only in publicizing the Sierra Club, but in putting across the different conservation programs in which we were engaged.

I, for one, knew that this was true, and this was the reason that I went along on a number of occasions when whatever financial sense I had was saying, "You should go slow."

Lage: You did vote on two or three--well, a couple of occasions--for the extra book, for four books instead of three a year.

Wayburn: Yes, and this was because of my trust in Dave. Dave had produced, in the Exhibit Format books, a series of extraordinarily fine books. They didn't make money. I don't think that a single Exhibit Format

Wayburn: book except This Is the American Earth and In Wildness made any surplus or profit, except in the good that they did for the conservation cause. In that they were of enormous value. And we had to choose.

The spectre in my mind and, I think, in the minds of other members of the publications committee, and reflected to the board, was that if ever Dave published a turkey, we would indeed be in deep trouble. And that time came. That time came in 1968, the year when the club put out two books-- Central Park Country, which did not sell well, and The Galapagos in two volumes, which turned out to be a turkey financially. We went into debt considerably with those books, and it was at that time that we began to get even more strange financing which we, the board, did not know about.

Brower as Lobbyist, Editor, Persuader##

Lage: Some have implied that Dave became more and more interested just in editing and publishing for its own sake, rather than tying it in with conservation concerns.

Wayburn: Yes, he became more the publisher, and he took a less active part in conservation issues. In his early days he would go to Washington, and he would be our conservation representative there. He was an extremely able lobbyist, even though he offended some of the congressmen and some of the bureaucrats. [chuckles] I will always remember, in my early days as a lobbyist--this was an incident that I think took place about 1960 or '61, after we had hired Bill Zimmerman. I think I've mentioned Bill Zimmerman as our first lobbyist.

Lage: Yes.

Wayburn: Bill Zimmerman took me in to see Wayne Aspinall. Aspinall, after shaking my hand, said to me, "This man can bring you in any time. He's a gentleman; he's welcome here; I listen to him. But don't ever come in with Dave Brower. He is--" I think he used other words, but I'm not certain at this time, so I won't put them in right now, but he cursed Dave and said, "He is not a gentleman; he's untrustworthy; he doesn't keep his word," and he went on for fifteen or twenty minutes of the half hour I was supposed to have with him. At the end of his tirade against Dave, he said, "Now, young man, you've got five minutes. What do you want?"

Lage: But he was willing to listen to Zimmerman? It wasn't just that he was so opposed to the point of view Dave had that he didn't listen to him?

Wayburn: No, he was willing to listen. Aspinall was, however, not our friend. Aspinall was an honest man in his terms, but he was the friend of the mining interests and of the timber interests. He was the opponent of the federal government making any financial outlays for national parks or any acquisitions. And yet, by his insistence that the general fund should not be used for acquisition of parks or forests, he was in a way the father, or he was at least the uncle, of the Land and Water Conservation Fund, which is derived from outer continental shelf oil royalties and the proceeds of marine fuel sales. This fund has furnished hundreds of millions of dollars for the acquisition of new park lands and new forest lands, besides getting money for the states and for local institutions. That was one of the reasons that it was instituted. The rationale behind it was that revenues coming from non-renewable resources should go back into non-renewable resources.

That has been an extremely fine program. We don't always, or we didn't always, get as much as we wanted for acquisitions, particularly national park acquisitions, because each year the president has to recommend a budget for acquisition, and then recommend a division between the national and the state portion. Then the Congress has to pass on that. Although the budget has been increased from originally, I think, \$100 million a year to \$300 million a year and most recently to \$900 million a year, full funding has never been allowed, so that the Land and Water Conservation Fund has a lot in it left at the present time. But I'm getting away from the Sierra Club problems.

Lage: We were talking about Dave's getting away from conservation.

Wayburn: We were talking about Dave getting away from conservation. He did, and he wanted more representation than we felt we were able to afford in Washington; but as we grew, we were able to afford more than we had.

After Bill Zimmerman had to give up because of illness (and he died not long afterwards), we had the opportunity to employ Lloyd Tupling, who had been originally a newspaper publisher in Idaho and, I think, in Oregon, and who had been the administrative assistant to both Senator Richard and Senator Maurine Neuberger of Oregon. Tupling was a newspaperman who, again, was a quiet, persuasive type like Zimmerman. He knew the Congress inside and out, and he was an extremely able lobbyist.

Lage: Were these people that Dave found and recommended for the job?

Wayburn: These were people whom Dave found and of whom the board highly approved.

Dave went more and more into publications himself, and he began to spread his wings in this and other ways, whereas he had been more oriented toward specific conservation issues, and he retained that to some extent. As I mentioned earlier, he was our complete boss on the Grand Canyon.

He got into international conservation early and general widespread conservation. The board was lagging behind on the international scene, feeling that we had our hands full on the local, state, and national scene, and did not appropriate monies for this. Dave was ahead of the board and fighting with the board about it. Later on, the whole club got much more interested in international conservation, and now a great many of us are extremely interested. If he had used his persuasive powers rather than fighting the board, I think he would have brought the board along sooner.

Lage: Except for the financial problem?

Wayburn: There was the financial problem, and he chose to go off more and more on his own. More and more, he did not follow board directives, and he would do things, initiate action, carry out action, against board directives or unknown to the board. This created, as is readily understood, problems not only with the board, but also with the vast army of volunteers that the Sierra Club is fortunate to have.

The Club Grassroots Leaders Mobilize

Wayburn: As time went on, Dave began to be more resentful of the whole volunteer structure and domination of the club. On the other hand, many of the volunteer leaders, in turn, were resentful of Dave's domination. They felt that Dave wanted the club to be run by one man, completely dominated by one man, and this led to a great deal of difficulty.

It was perhaps best illustrated by the position of the Sierra Club Council. The Sierra Club Council, as an institution, was part of the vision of club leaders in the very early fifties. They felt that as the work, particularly the conservation work, the external

Wayburn: work, of the board of directors increased, the club needed an internal institution--housekeeping, if you will. So, the council was formed in 1956 with Kathy Jackson as the first chairman.

The council was originally a bipolar organization composed of representatives of principal committees of the club designated by the board, and the chapters. Each chapter had a representative on the council. At that time, there were only about eight or nine chapters. As the chapters grew, the council became unwieldy, and the role of the committees diminished until, I think, at the present time there's only one committee represented on the council, the outing committee, while all the fifty-three chapters are represented.

In the early sixties, and I think this was when Dick Sill was chairman of the council, there began to be friction between Dave and the council. Dave began maneuvers to get rid of the council, even arranging to have put on the ballot a proposition abolishing the council. This failed [in 1968].

Lage: Would you say Dick Sill was a representative on the board then of this group of volunteer leaders, sort of grassroots--?

Wayburn: Very definitely. The council thought that it should have more say in the affairs of the club. The nominating committee for several years would pick someone who'd been on the council, usually the man who'd been chairman of the council for one or two years, as a nominee to the board of directors. Dick Sill was such a one, and he was elected. He felt that he was particularly representative of "the volunteers" on the board.

Lage: Would you say he also did a lot to sort of stir up or foment dissatisfaction among the grassroots volunteers, or did he just represent their feeling?

Wayburn: I would say that he did both. Dick was an extremely active activist who believed in the grassroots system very much.

Lage: How old was he at this time, in the sixties? Do you remember?

Wayburn: I think he was in his late thirties. I'd have to check on that. He was young, in the sense that he wasn't entirely mature. Let us say, he was brash. But he was working for the club in his way just as hard as Dave Brower was working for the club in his way. Dick had a great deal of brilliance and he would come out with long memos, just as Brower was brilliant and would come out with long memos.

Lage: Your papers that you gave me to look at reveal that [laughter] on both sides.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: But Dick's memos were in longhand.

Wayburn: Right--because Dick didn't have a stenographer to type his material. The predominance of resources at the service of the staff was one of the things that bothered people like Dick and others who thought that the volunteers--who were the heart of the club, who represented the grassroots, and the leadership of which was widely representative of all the conservation movement in the club--should have more help. He continually, repeatedly, asked for more help, which the board of directors was unable to supply because there was an insufficiency of funds. Dave was using all the funds that we had and then more.

Lage: You mentioned earlier an exchange of letters with Dick Sill.

Wayburn: Dick Sill, in 1968, was the leader of the group which felt that Brower must go. They had information which they felt was sufficient, which spoke to the fact that he was causing the club to go into bankruptcy and that he wasn't playing square with the club. He wrote me a long, long letter in which he outlined this.

I had not replied to most of the letters which I had gotten during this period of extreme unrest in the club, because I felt it was my job to keep the club together, that a Sierra Club which split, which balkanized, which did not carry on with the work we were doing, was extremely self-defeating. We would be, in effect, committing suicide. I felt I had to defend Dave Brower. I felt that his worth at that time to the club was still greater than all of the problems he was causing--although the problems were increasing. So, I took an aggressive stand against what Sill was doing and answered him accordingly, and I would like to put that into the record at some time.*

Lage: All right. You also mentioned that the fact that you had to reply to Sill like this made you seem more a defender of Brower.

Wayburn: Yes. I mean the fact that I had to do this made me a defender of Brower. I remember, after I had done this, Dave appeared extremely grateful, and for a while our relations were never more cordial, until the next time that I had to stop him from doing something.

*See Wayburn papers, Sierra Club collection, The Bancroft Library.

Lage: Now, this, as I remember, was in the summer of '68, around in there.

Wayburn: Yes, it was, either August or September.

XI THE EXTRAORDINARY SCHISM: 1967-1969

[Interview 9: January 9, 1981]

Presidential Difficulties with Brower--Invaluable and Insubordinate

Lage: We were going to begin with your second presidency term--second series of terms--in 1967.

Wayburn: In 1961 I happened to have been the logical choice for Sierra Club president. It happened that in that same time I was going through the chairs of medical organizations. In the year that I was elected first to the board of directors of the Sierra Club, I had become the editor of the bulletin of the San Francisco Medical Society and then was elected to its board of directors. By 1961 I would have been eligible to be elected president-elect of the medical society and had pressure on me to do that, but I felt much more strongly about what the Sierra Club would do for the future, for our country, for the total environment, and I took the presidency of the Sierra Club instead.

Because the board didn't think there was a suitable candidate after my first two years, I kept the presidency for another year, at the same time announcing that I was going to take the president-elect's job of the San Francisco Medical Society and be more active in the medical politics of the California Medical Association the following year, so that I would not be eligible for president in 1965. In 1965 I became the president of the San Francisco Medical Society.

I had on my own agenda the fact that I felt organized medicine was not doing as good a job as it should. At that time the San Francisco Medical Society had a very considerable amount to say about what was going on in the California Medical Association, and the California Medical Association was leading the American Medical Association, turning it around. The president of the AMA was a

Wayburn: San Francisco doctor. I felt that there were things to do, and I had a limited amount of time available because I was still very actively involved full time in the practice of medicine.

So in 1964 Will Siri somewhat reluctantly, I think, assumed the office of president of the Sierra Club and served the usual two-year term.

By 1966 the directors had literally run out of the usual accepted presidential material, someone who could actively manage the Sierra Club, because it was becoming a bigger and bigger organization and because there was this increasing strife between the board and its executive director. All other things to the contrary, the main cause of that was the fact that the executive director did not follow the directions of the board of directors. The difficulties between the president and the executive director came from the fact that the president was charged with carrying out those directives and policies. This statement is made without any reference to the relative desirability or worth of those policies, but just to the fact that the executive director didn't carry them out.

As I have looked through a great deal of material, going back and forth, they have to do, on the one hand, with how valuable David Brower was to the club--and there's no question of that; I was the first to recognize that as his immediate chief--and, on the other hand, the fact that he was insubordinate, and there's no question of that either. Once again, as the person most involved along with him, I can say this without any fear of contradiction, despite and in accordance with numerous communications he addressed to me, or addressed to others which concerned me.

Well, George Marshall took the presidency in 1966 very reluctantly. George was and is a man of extreme integrity. He knows his own limitations. He knew, and he so stated, that he was not qualified to be the president of the Sierra Club under the conditions that were present at that time, and he tried not to take the presidency. This was partly because of his personality vis-à-vis Brower's personality and the fact that he was not able to be in San Francisco directly on top of the situation or any of the situations as they developed and could only look back afterwards and say, "This was wrong."

Lage: Was there a particular group on the board that was pushing for him to be president, or was it just a matter of elimination?

Wayburn: No, it was a matter of elimination. I was still actively concerned with medical organizations, and I felt I'd served my time. Siri likewise felt he had served his time. There was a tradition in the

Wayburn: club that the directors did not go back for retreads and that on that account the previous presidents would not be chosen. Then there was, to an extent, the fact that the older presidents who had been president before 1961 were beginning to be out of touch with some of the newer aspects of conservation in the club, or they didn't have the inclination.

A man like Leonard could have come back if he had so desired, I think, but he had other things that he was more interested in doing. A man like Bradley could not have come back. I'm not sure whether Harold was still a director in '66 or not. The same applied to people like Crowe and Lewis Clark and, to an extent, Nathan Clark. They were people who felt that the club should not be going into as many things as it did, and they also felt that the tactics that Brower used at times were improper, and they knew that they would not be able to go along with him on as close a personal basis as the president of the club had to have with the executive director.

But back to George Marshall. He was a thoughtful rather than a commanding man. He was torn greatly by this struggle, and it affected him. He did not willingly take the job, and after one year he absolutely declined to run again in spring, 1967.

Back into the Fray: Wayburn's Return as Club President, 1967

Wayburn: By the early spring of 1967, different members of the club had made charges against Dave Brower. By the time of the May meeting, three directors (Ansel Adams, Richard Leonard, and Richard Sill) had proposed that the executive director be fired. I think it was Adams who made this proposal in executive session. This I remember as a session held in the St. Francis Hotel, and the executive session was a long, stormy one.

Lage: Now, would this be prior to your election as president?

Wayburn: Immediately prior.

In an informal vote, these three were voted down, and I think they were joined by one other director, but it was obvious that the majority of the directors felt that the services of David Brower were too valuable to dispense with.

Wayburn: Now, someone had leaked shortly before that to the [San Francisco] Chronicle columnist Herb Caen that the directors were about to get rid of Brower; Caen reported it not as a possibility, but as a flat statement. This came out several days before, and the board was deluged with communications (telegrams, letters, telephone calls) from people all over the country, saying, in essence, "You can't do this." A couple of them said, "You must be out of your minds."

Let me interpose here that Dave Brower was a man of enormous energy as well as ability, and this type of confrontation was in a way made to order for him. He thrived on it. He turned out reams of material himself, I have no doubt, although I have no proof; I never bothered looking for it. But every once in a while I would receive a communication saying, "I'm sending this on to you. I received this from Dave Brower"; a communication where Dave had said, "The anti's are trying to get rid of me, and would you do something, if you think that I am worthwhile, to help me?" We got petitions signed by a group of conservation-minded congressmen. Remember, by this time the Sierra Club had become a very significant organization, and Dave was the man who represented the Sierra Club, so they joined in this plea, this demand, that the directors not fire the executive director.

Well, at that time, I was one of those who had no desire to fire the executive director. I was in the opposition, and we prevailed. The board then turned to the next subject. We had an extremely difficult problem, obviously, in front of us. How could it be handled? How could the board retain its dominance, its supremacy, and yet retain this executive director who was capable of doing so much and yet so often went off on his own, disregarding the policies the board had laid down? And, one has to say, these policies were often laid down after considerable thought and a great deal of debate in which the executive director joined. Although he had no vote, he had a voice, and he used it very effectively to influence votes.

There were a few new people whom Dave had been instrumental in getting elected to the board. These new people were chiefly from outside California. None of them wanted to undertake the presidency. They felt they couldn't, and some of the older members were entirely disinclined to vote for them.

There were people like Ansel Adams, who had wanted to be president of the club. He had not wanted to for many years and then, I think, in 1959 he made an active effort to become president. Then once again he did, and in 1967 he was urged by some of the elder statesmen in the club to run for president. He wrote Francis Farquhar a long

Wayburn: letter in which he admitted that he would like to, but he'd have to have a great many conditions fulfilled. Well, there were other directors who did not think Ansel could handle the presidency.

Lage: And his feelings about Brower were well known.

Wayburn: His feelings about Brower were well known; he communicated several times to Brower or to others the fact that he was one of those people who were instrumental in getting Brower to be the executive director in 1952, and he had worked with him closely, and he supported the publications program. As late as 1963, he wrote an impassioned letter, saying, "The club must continue publishing and must continue doing the sort of thing it's doing."

Lage: I've run across that in your papers, and it was so supportive of Brower and of the publications program that it sort of surprised me. But in that four-year period, he completely turned around.

Wayburn: That's right. He turned around. There were several reasons for that, I think. One was that he was convinced four years later that the publications program was losing a lot more money than was down on the books. Secondly, it was not being run the way he thought it should be run at that time, and he was dissatisfied with the people under Brower. Thirdly, from a technical or philosophical standpoint he was not entirely in sympathy with the emphasis on the color books that Brower had gone to exclusively. He felt they were too expensive, and from a photographic standpoint he was a black-and-white man particularly.

Lage: Do you think some of it was personal pique or a feeling that he'd sort of been discarded for Eliot Porter?

Wayburn: I would have to leave that for others to say. Dave thought that, and he made that plain.

I was in the middle of so much of this, and I mean really in the middle, that I'm reluctant at a late date to go too far out on either side because--well, we've diverted from the topic. Let me go on with the other things that occurred.

Lage: Ansel Adams wasn't chosen, and you became president. I think that's where we were.

Wayburn: Yes. Adams was anathema to the people who were supporting Brower at that time.

Lage: So you, being in the middle, should sort of satisfy both sides?

Wayburn: What it came down to was that the board did not have anyone else whom all sides could trust, and I think that I fulfilled that requirement. At the same time, from the point of view of the people who wanted to control Brower, they felt that I was the only one who could. I had, I believe, demonstrated that in 1961 to '64 when there were already many differences. I was able to keep on friendly terms with Dave, for the most part to stay in command, and the other part to allow him to get away with what he thought was most important, and actually, when we came to certain faits accomplis, to facilitate the actions which he had already set into being and which would have embarrassed the club if they hadn't gone on with.

One of the problems throughout this time was that Dave would take an action of one sort or another and it would have embarrassed the club to not proceed with it. This was mostly in the book program and the commitments made on books. It was to a minor extent in the conservation program; not minor, but to a less frequent extent. In the controversies about the Grand Canyon, Dave went much further in his slashing attacks than many members of the board thought he should.

Lage: But the basic principles were accepted?

Wayburn: Basic principles were accepted, yes. It was the tactics. After consideration, I went along with his tactics because I knew we had the toughest of opponents, and we had a real tough job to accomplish, and there wasn't any other organization that was willing to do it. Some organization had to get out on the line, and we were it, and this was the reason for the very bold tactics we took in both the Grand Canyon controversy and the redwood controversy.

But there was a matter in which some of our people accused Brower of holding back and allowing his southwest representative to hold back on the question of the Hooker Dam, where Dave made an accommodation with some of our opponents, not because he was anxious to put the Hooker Dam on the Gila River but because he felt that in the overall Grand Canyon plight some concession had to be made in order to get the necessary congressional votes for our Grand Canyon fight.

##

Lage: Did he do this totally on his own without coming to the board?

Wayburn: He did this. The board had gone on record as being in opposition to the Hooker Dam, and in his private negotiations (and in those of Jeff Ingram, the southwest representative, acting under Dave) accommodations were made. After I understood it, I went along with them as an expedient but one which should be corrected as soon as possible.

Lage: It doesn't sound like it fit in with his general philosophy.

Wayburn: It didn't. That's the point. This was one of the major reasons for the attacks by Robert Marshall (not to be confused with George Marshall), a southern California conservationist who became one of Brower's leading critics and one of those associated with Richard Sill in Sill's attacks.

After I was approached and told that I was the only one who could do it, I came back and talked to my wife. She very reluctantly went along. Incidentally, she helped me, as I've said before, enormously and I never could have done this without her. She went along, and we talked briefly with the children and they went along.

I had to program my life pretty vigorously. I've often jocularly said, when people asked me how I did it, "Well, I didn't have a TV," and this is true. I mean, I had no time for watching television. I also had decreasing time for the other things that I was interested in. They went by the wayside: first, the research in medicine that I did in my earlier years, up until the time that I got interested deeply in the Sierra Club; and then in the teaching of medicine. Finally, I consciously cut down on my hours of practice because I felt that I had to be at the club or working on club business this much.

As a final matter, because of the fact that things would go on in the office that the board or the president knew nothing about, I felt that the president had to have an assistant who would be in the office and would therefore be aware of what was going on in the office and whose first loyalty was to the president and to the board, whereas the executive director, who would be the normal channel for this, was not carrying that out, and all of the rest of the staff were, as they should have been, working directly under the executive director. I therefore, with the board's full agreement, initiated having an assistant; a man named John Flannery was the one proposed.

Lage: Was he full time in the office?

Wayburn: He was the full-time assistant to the president. He had an office in 220 Bush St., the headquarters of the club. That spared the president a good deal of time, having to be there physically, and he would make regular reports and would meet with him frequently.

Lage: Did he have interchange with Brower?

Wayburn: Oh, yes, as much as Dave would allow, but there were things that he didn't know going on also.

Wayburn: At any rate, I optimistically, although with trepidation, took on the presidency again in 1967. I won't say things began to happen; things continued to happen. I believe I was better able to handle them than George Marshall because I was physically on top as well as being able to handle the situation from what you might call the command post a little better.

Incidentally, because of my respect for George Marshall and the abilities he brought to the board, one of the conditions on which I took the presidency was that George Marshall would be the secretary, so that an accurate record would be made of what was going on, that the minutes would be a faithful record of what took place. Later on, that came in very handy because George Marshall was such a meticulous individual, and he got things down which were very difficult to refute, even though at times Dave would dispute them.

Lage: But the meetings were tape recorded, weren't they?

Wayburn: The meetings were not always tape recorded, but I think that during this particular time of the club's history they were. Sometimes the tapes were difficult to understand too.

Lage: Now, this takes us off the track a little bit also, but did George Marshall have clerical assistance to prepare those minutes? That's quite a job.

Wayburn: I know it. We didn't have suitable clerical assistance. As I remember, George did these minutes by hand, taking the notes, particularly on the more important things, in longhand and all of the motions and resolutions that were passed. I believe he had a tape that he could go to for details afterwards.

Wayburn and Brower: Areas of Agreement and Difference

Wayburn: But back to the early days of my presidency in 1967. I was trying to be as supportive of Brower as possible because I felt he and I believed in the same things. We were trying to protect the earth, trying to succeed in legislation which would piece by piece add to that protection.

Lage: And you both seemed interested in the growth of the club, in expanding its influence.

Wayburn: We were both interested in the growth of the club. We felt that the club could have the clout it needed in the Congress only as a national organization with enough members. There had to be enough members in each state, and preferably in each congressional district, to show the different senators and congressmen that their constituents cared. In that I think we largely succeeded. You know the growth of the club was distinctly faster than either Dave or I had predicted.

Lage: Yes.

Wayburn: We had, I think, in 1967, at the time of the Diamond Jubilee, 55,000 members. I can remember a prediction of Dave's in '62 or '63 or '61 that we would have 30,000 members.

The reason that we were able to get by financially was that we kept getting new members in and they would pay dues, and so the revenue coming into the club was greater than had been predicted. The club was growing in the sixties between 20 and 30 percent per year, and this was net growth.

We had all these new members coming in for several reasons. The first was that we had dropped the requirement that two sponsors (later one sponsor) be a part of joining the club, so that anyone who wanted to could join. The second was that our conservation stature was rising. The third was that we were encouraging growth outside of California and that this growth came faster than in California, where in the Bay Area, for example, expansion was slowed up until in the past few years we've seen an actual net loss. The last reason (and it may have been the dominant one) was that the book program attracted a great many people who had never heard of the Sierra Club and who said, "This is the sort of organization we want to be associated with."

At any rate, that financed these books, and that could do it only to a certain extent because the capital needed for the increasing number of Exhibit Format books was just not there, and we didn't see where to get it.

Lage: And yet you did seem to continue--you personally--to support a more active publications program than some of the people on the board did.

Wayburn: Oh, yes. Yes, we varied all up and down the line. I repeat, many times Brower's general purposes and my general purposes were identical. Often our tactics would be similar, but I am a more cautious man than

Wayburn: Brower and have a different set of ethics. I disapproved of the way he would attack individuals ad hominem--which was a favorite way he had of attacking.

Lage: It seemed to me it was almost a principle with him; he thought it attracted more attention and got more headlines.

Wayburn: Yes. He did that deliberately. He was (again, in Sill's words) the ostensible agency. He was the person who had full time to devote to the affairs of the club; he had an enormous grasp of the issues; he worked very hard at it; and he was a good publicist. He was a good personal publicist. He put himself forward at most opportunities, and when he wasn't put forward he would accuse his superior of holding him back and trying to make him an "unknown"--which was the farthest thing from the truth, because David Brower was by all odds the best-known member of the Sierra Club. As its executive director, he was our front man, and nobody wished to get in the way. Part of the reason was that was his job, and part of the reason was we didn't have the time to do that and still carry out the tremendous amount of work that was incumbent upon directors, and especially on the officers, and particularly on the president.

There were numerous times that Dave wanted me, as the president, to go to meetings or to represent the club, and I would like to have, but I was working to the full capacity that I had, doing what I was doing. I was working ninety hours a week. I would get up well before seven in the morning and do a certain amount of Sierra Club work, and then go out and pay my house calls and hospital calls. And many evenings I would be working after midnight on Sierra Club affairs. Three to four to five days a week I would have lunch with one or another representative of the Sierra Club, most frequently with Dave Brower and whomever he would want to bring along, secondly with the executive committee. The executive committee in those days was concentrated around San Francisco, and we would meet anywhere from one to three times a month, sometimes once a week, in a restaurant downtown, at the top of 220 Bush St. where Dick Leonard's office was, as well as the club's office, or in the cafeteria above my office. We were very closely associated, and we worked as a team. This is one of the other reasons that it became so hard to understand how commitments were made that we knew nothing about.

I have been told that as chairman of the board of Friends of the Earth Dave still has the tendency to proceed without--or against--consultation. There are many reasons for that. He speaks well, he's knowledgeable, he has enormous charisma, and he cultivates the media. All of these things play a role. He has always, or almost always, got

Wayburn: something to say, and he puts it in a dramatic fashion. I don't think anyone in the club was jealous of his role in that, although he often would say this is the reason.

Lage: Well, that's probably the hardest role for anyone else to fill.

Wayburn: Certainly.

Lage: And maybe that's what everybody realized when they didn't want him to leave the club. That was the one role that wasn't replaced when Brower left, it seems to me.

Wayburn: Well, there's no question, his value was enormous, and that's why I for one kept overlooking one violation after another and saying, "Don't do it again!"

A Separate Publishing Corporation--Answer to Overwhelming Financial Problems

Wayburn: Let me come to what I think were the principal differences between the board and the executive director. The overwhelming one was financial. Was the club in good financial shape, or was it not? Was it spending more than it had, or was it not? And where were the commitments that we had leading to? I think I've mentioned earlier that this started long before, that we had a succession of administrators or controllers who were not able to get out figures that matched those the executive director did, partly because they didn't agree with his accounting, partly because he didn't give them all the information. Then after they had drawn up their figures he would come out with additional information which would prove them wrong and make them feel a little silly.

In 1963 the executive committee, working on the advice of a consulting firm named McMurray, hired Clifford Rudden, who is still with us and who was the first man who was able to put out figures that Dave did not entirely contradict. But as early as 1963 it was apparent that Dave was going his own way, regardless of what the board told him, and that the board and the president needed a certain amount of staff help.

Lage: Was this one of the reasons for the idea that publications be separated into a separate corporation?

Wayburn: Publications was taking up more and more of Brower's time and more and more of the club's money. We were a bunch of amateurs running a highly professional program. We had one man, August Frugè, who was the director of the California Press, who was a professional, and he was at odds with Brower all the way through. We had another man, Charles Huestis, who was a financial expert. He was first with Hughes Tool Company and later became the financial vice-president of Duke University; he knew something about books and a lot about finance, and he was often at odds with Brower on what the figures meant.

Yes, the pressure for a separate corporation to handle this increasing book program grew as the book program grew out of bounds. The publications committee, of which I was either an appointed member or an ex officio member as the president, had a very tough time in trying to make decisions, and often these decisions, on big books particularly, by the publications committee were, "No," or, "Get more information." But meantime, Dave would have made commitments which made it almost impossible to go back, and therefore sooner or later each one of these books was published.

Lage: So the authorization often came after the fact.

Wayburn: The authorization often came after the executive director's personal commitment, and these commitments were the thing that Dick Sill later brought up in his arguments about an ostensible agency, which we might go into at a later date or later this morning.

Lage: Yes. Did you support that idea of a separate publications corporation? That was brought up by Siri, I think, just as you became president in '67, at that initial meeting.

Wayburn: It was first brought up by Siri. It was actually thought up by Siri before that. It was brought up at the time. I was again in the middle of that. I felt that it would take away a lot from the Sierra Club. If it went into being, it either had to be completely separate, or partially separate, or under the control of the board of directors of the Sierra Club. To me, none of those fulfilled what I saw as our greatest problem, which was the fact that an increasing amount of money was being diverted from the Sierra Club itself towards the book program.

The book program was bringing in a tremendous amount of desirable publicity for the club, it was doing a great deal for the conservation movement as a whole, and it was a critical publishing success. Originally we thought that--we had been led to believe that it was a financial success, but as the years went by we found that it wasn't.

Wayburn: There were some factors which we understood very vividly and some which we did not. The thing that we gradually came to understand was that it took a great deal of capital for the publishing of books. We didn't have that capital.

We had been able to get, first through Ansel Adams and second through Dave Brower, subsidies for our first two big books. This Is the American Earth had a subsidy from Max McGraw. I think it was \$6,000, which at that time was a great deal of money, and that book, I think, made money. We later got a subsidy of \$20,000 from one of the Bechtels through Dave for the first Eliot Porter book, In Wildness Is the Preservation of the World, and that book was a great success. It was interesting that the first two books of their kind, the first in black and white, and the second in color, were great successes, and they did well financially, and they had subsidies to help capitalize them.

The other books didn't do so well. The book on the Galapagos Islands was, I think, first proposed in 1963 and turned down by the publications committee, but Dave continued to work on it. Finally, he had so much in that book that the publications committee in 1967 authorized it, although with a great deal of apprehension. It proved to be a financial flop, despite the fact that it theoretically had a subsidy of, I think, over \$80,000. This subsidy had to be spent in England and resulted in a great deal of complications, including the fact that over half of it was spent before the board had knowledge of the fact that we had the gift firmly in hand, and was spent without authorization of the board.

##

Wayburn: As early as 1963, when we were riding high on publications, the chairman of the publications committee, August Frugè, had said that he wanted to resign because he was repeatedly not consulted, and that the committee was not shown books to review before they were accepted, and further that despite our success we were running way behind in our promises to the book stores that we would have books for them. Frugè felt that none of the full list of 1963, including our major book of that year, Glen Canyon, would be ready, nothing except a climber's guide, and that therefore the people who were counting on Sierra Club books would not have them. This would have an adverse effect, and he didn't want to be associated with it. He was persuaded to stay on, but he brought out and the committee brought out numerous instances when the board and the publications committee did not have control of the finances of the publications. On the other hand, there were some books that the directors felt should be published that Brower had not brought out.

Wayburn: As early as 1963, a separate publications division was considered and then decided against at that time. But during this time so that we could pay the printers, the borrowing limit was increased from \$100,000, which we had originally thought would be ample, to \$200,000. And \$75,000 of our securities, part of our net worth, was liquidated in order to take care of the publications program.

Throughout '64 and '65, there were several executive committee meetings which were concerned with the publications program losing money. The money came sometimes from the outside, but too often at the expense of the conservation program, which began to be affected. In 1965, President Siri and Walter Ward, who was then the chairman of the council, pointed out the details of what amounted to an average loss of \$50,000 a year for the preceding six years from publications. Ward thought the loss was actually greater. Brower denied it and said this wasn't true at all. But there were discrepancies in expenditures. The executive committee couldn't find out just what the cost of manufacturing the books was, how much went into promotion, and so forth.

The controller, Rudden, by that time was able to point out several reasons: the delay in getting out the cost of printing from the printers, the fact that the inventory was not known and couldn't be found, that there had been too many changes of people in the handling of books; in other words, there were poor managerial and administrative practices. All of this, of course, was under Dave, although he in his defense would say he needed more help to do this.

In 1966, the Kauai book was disapproved by two of the readers and did not apparently go at all to the chairman of the publications committee. In 1967, the executive committee once again went on at length with the fact that the executive director had undermined the board by not following board policy. It was against that background that Siri (who would have been on the publications committee)--who was so closely associated with Huestis as our financial expert and with Frugè as our publishing expert--began to think of a separate publications corporation.

During this time, Dave had dropped a good deal of his conservation activism because he didn't have the time. He didn't have time any more for his frequent trips to Washington, and we had only a part-time representative in Washington. Mike McCloskey was beginning to take up the slack when he came down from the Northwest to be assistant to the president when Siri was president, and then gradually to assume the duties of conservation director. Since it was felt that

Wayburn: conservation was adequately taken care of on the staff level by McCloskey and Brower had been stepping out of it, then a separate publishing corporation was a way for him to devote himself completely to books.

Well, this was first brought up officially just before the May board meeting in 1967. Dave didn't like it at all because, obviously, this would remove him from the overall control of the Sierra Club. He would be headquartered in New York where the publishing was, and he didn't want that either.

But in the meeting of May 1967, after an executive session, a rough outline for a complex organization was drawn up, and two resolutions were passed. One was a resolution of confidence in David Brower, and that was moved by Ansel Adams. During the executive session Ansel had railed vehemently against Brower and said he had to be fired, but after a long discussion he had come around to the fact that that was not feasible, and as I said earlier that was voted down. Ansel actually made a very flowery speech praising Dave Brower and expressing confidence in him, and that was passed unanimously, I think. This was the way things happened.

Lage: It's a little hard to understand sometimes.

Wayburn: It is sometimes a little hard to understand, revolving as it did around a very complex, charismatic, able, hard-to-deal-with personality.

The Publications Reorganization Committee, 1967-1968

Wayburn: The second significant motion there was that a separate publications program be established. I was charged, as president, with appointing a publications reorganization committee, which I did, and you probably have the names of those members.

Lage: I did have a question about the names. It seems that you appointed a number of people who were very much opposed to Brower.

Wayburn: Again, from the position of the presidency, I felt obligated to include people with different views.

Lage: You tried to balance it.

Wayburn: So that it would be a balanced committee. Let me try to run through the names. Charles Huestis was the chairman. Huestis, I felt, was the best possible chairman, as a director, as a man recognized as fair, as a man recognized as our best financial expert, and this involved our finances more than it did anything else. Siri, who had proposed the publications corporation. Frugè, who was our publishing expert. I think George Marshall was on that.

Lage: I didn't note his name.

Wayburn: Well, maybe not.

Lage: [consulting list of committee members] Cutter was one.

Wayburn: Robert Cutter, who was an advocate of the other side, was put on the committee. He was a businessman, and he had a lot of connections with businessmen. Whether he was in favor of the way Brower did things or not, he could lend value to the formation of a business organization, which we were proposing. He was the president of the Cutter Laboratories. The committee also included Warren Lemmon, who became the secretary of the committee.

Lage: I guess what made me ask this question is that I remember seeing a letter from Brower to you, urging that you not appoint Siri, and I think he mentioned Huestis as being too close to Siri. So he apparently saw those people as his opponents.

Wayburn: Yes. Dave wrote me, as you know, a tremendous number of letters. His output was prodigious, and I don't know how he turned out so much material.

Lage: With all the rest he was doing at the same time, how he had time to prepare these memos--

Wayburn: That's right.

Another portion of this was that, with all of his charisma, Dave was a paranoid personality. He was always looking for people who were opposed to him or people who had some sort of a conspiracy against him. Sometimes he was right, more often he was wrong, and this seemed to inspire a great deal of output from him.

Lage: And then you were ex officio on the committee.

Wayburn: I was ex officio on the committee. Oh, one more man on the committee was Gary Torre, who had become our attorney in our tax case, the IRS case which began in 1966. Just as background, we looked in Washington, New York, and San Francisco for the best tax

Wayburn: attorney we could find. We had many people recommended to us. We decided against Washington and against New York because they were so far away from the headquarters of the club. Again, Dave, who was active in choosing, wanted a New York lawyer. He was in New York with the publishing program as much as he was in San Francisco, but none of the rest of us were. Siri and I interviewed people and finally settled on Gary Torre, who was the principal tax attorney, and still is, of the firm of Lillick, McHose, Wheat, Adams, and Charles, which is one of the prestigious San Francisco firms. They had a representative in Washington so that they were privy to what was going on there and could still be in touch with those of us who were in San Francisco at the headquarters.

In his learning about the tax proposition, as I guess any good lawyer does, Torre had learned a great deal about the Sierra Club and he probably, in 1967 and '68, knew more about the details of the club than any other person not personally involved. I felt he'd make a very valuable member of the publications reorganization committee, and besides which he could tell us whether certain things were going to be possible with that corporation, which was supposed to be, if possible, profit-making, and how it might affect the club's tax status.

The reorganization committee tried to work quietly, to get as much work done as it could without it all coming out, because it had to make a report to the board. A number of people wanted to see their reports, and this included people like Dick Sill, who was then a director, and Peter Hearst, who was then the chairman of the council, and other active members, because they knew that Dave had been writing to the committee, and they in their "paranoia" felt that that would undermine the work of the committee.

On the other hand, we had people like Ken Anglemeyer, who, incidentally was, I think, at that time the publisher of the Encyclopedia Britannica. He had become a close friend of Dave and sent out very strong pro-Brower propaganda.

Well, that's the publications reorganization committee in 1967. At the end of 1967--and I don't remember just what the pressures were--I felt that this committee, which was in my opinion a well-rounded committee of the club as a whole, should not only work on reorganization of publications, but also on the reorganization of the club as a whole, since that was what was really involved. I asked them to undertake that task and report to the board in May of 1968.

Wayburn: With further regard to publishing, the board, the council, and many members had wanted a handbook so that a member could learn all about the Sierra Club without too much trouble. The handbook was formerly published once a year as part of the Bulletin, but we hadn't had one for years. One of the people in the office, Susan Cox, had in 1964 spent six months on a handbook, gotten out twenty thousand copies, and run off a photo section. One day Dave walked in and said, "I've changed my mind. We won't publish this."

Finally, the council undertook to put out the handbook, and Kent Gill, who was the chairman of the council itself, agreed to do it. I asked John Flannery to help him get it done, and they did do it. This again caused outbursts from Dave because he had written a separate article which they didn't put in; he'd wanted an additional color section, which was not put in; and he'd wanted to revise the text, all after it had been practically completed. Again, I had to say that it was going forward.

Lage: And that was the last handbook the club has produced, by the way. They need another one.

Wayburn: I know it. That's right. We're aware of it.

In 1968 Dave was publishing books without contracts. Phillip Berry, who was our legal advisor at that time, said that this was dangerous, that we had to have contracts. So Dave drew up contracts, and Phil drew up contracts, and I think Fred Fisher, another attorney on the legal committee, drew up contracts. None of them agreed with one another; at least Dave didn't agree with Phil. This took quite a while, but finally contracts were drawn up.

I might mention that in 1968 another financial matter came up. Dave was spending a lot of money on getting staff members to different conferences and conventions. In view of our straitened circumstances and the fact that I and other board members didn't go places, were economizing, I advised him that he should not be sending ten and twelve members to a conference, which he did at times.

Diablo Canyon: An Unfortunate Aberrancy, But Not the Most Important Issue in the Club's Schism

Wayburn: At this point perhaps we should go back to Diablo Canyon because that started long before. These things were intertwined.

Lage: Everything is so intertwined. It's hard to discuss one without bringing up the other.

Wayburn: Yes.

##

Wayburn: The issue of Diablo Canyon, as an issue, started before PG&E picked Diablo Canyon. It started with the fact that the California state park system and the national park system had identified certain areas along the Pacific coast, particularly the California coast, which would be of great worth to the country in the future and should be preserved in their natural state. One of those areas was the Oceano, or Nipomo, Dunes.

We had a member, Kathy Jackson, who was the first chairman of the Sierra Club Council, who lived in San Luis Obispo and in Paso Robles, who had a great interest in the Nipomo Dunes. She led a battle to see that the dunes were preserved between 1961 and 1964. I was president of the club during that time and I assumed the lead on seeing that the dunes were preserved. I worked with PG&E, asked them not to build the power plant that they had envisioned there; worked with the Division of Beaches and Parks, asked them to establish a park; and worked with numerous others to try to get recognition of the Nipomo Dunes as one of the great scenic and ecological areas of the Pacific coast.

Lage: Now, who were you in contact with at PG&E? Did you have a series of meetings, or what type of contact?

Wayburn: We had a series of meetings. PG&E's front representative was a man named Ken Diercks and the other one was a man named Rick Todd. Diercks was the p.r. man. Todd was in charge of the governmental relations. I also worked directly with the president.

Lage: Was that Shermer Sibley?

Wayburn: Well, Sibley became president later. Before Sibley, the president was a man who had at one time been a member of the Sierra Club, whose daughter was still active in the Sierra Club.

Lage: Was that Gerdes?

Wayburn: Gerdes. Robert Gerdes.

Lage: So he had a Sierra Club connection.

Wayburn: He had a Sierra Club connection.

After long negotiations, PG&E agreed that they would abandon that site and allow the state to buy it, so we were successful there.

Wayburn: Then 1964 arrived and I was no longer president, and Siri took over. Siri assumed my interest in the negotiations with PG&E. PG&E was trying to identify as many different sites as it could and pick the best one from their viewpoint. Kathy Jackson was working very closely with them and, I think, particularly with Ken Diercks at the time. PG&E picked the Diablo Canyon site, and Jackson and Siri went along, and in May 1966 at a board meeting Siri personally presented this with Kathy Jackson's assistance.

Siri, as you know, is a dominating, emotional man who feels very strongly, and when he feels very strongly about things he can be most convincing. He presented the case for the Diablo Canyon site in an absolutely convincing fashion. He thought that it would not destroy anything of scenic value, that it was out of the way enough. He had numerous arguments.

I had a few internal doubts because anything along the California coast I already felt was of value. But PG&E felt it couldn't go inland because it had to have sea water. I don't know whether at that time an atomic plant was proposed for it at first; I think it was.

Lage: I think so.

Wayburn: Once again, Siri was versed deeply in nuclear matters, and the rest of the board was not. I felt a certain obligation to Siri personally. He had strongly supported me, and I felt I should support him. Those were my reasons: lack of enough knowledge otherwise, the feeling that people I had confidence in had gone over this thoroughly, and I went along with them. There was only one board member (I think at that time only one person) who spoke against this site, and that was Fred Eissler, who had made a study of it and had come to the opposite conclusion.

At that time, as you know, atomic energy was not perceived as the dangerous type of thing that it is today. We didn't know near as much about the complications of it. It still rubbed off on us that this was the hope of the human race when all of the other sources of energy ran out. I think there was an eleven-to-one vote by the board [in support of Diablo Canyon as an alternative site to Nipomo].

Well, Eissler, who was a very persistent man, began to gather allies. The first of these was Martin Litton, who was not present at that time and who undoubtedly would have voted against it, from what he said soon afterwards. The matter was brought up on two or three further occasions before the board after a great deal of propaganda, verbal and written. The board continued to support

Wayburn: President Siri's stand. At either the second or the third board meeting, Dave, who had not said anything much about this, I think, at the first meeting, began to be more and more an opponent of what the board's stand was, and once again he began to send out his own propaganda. I remember one letter to the president of PG&E which he came up and discussed with me, and I advised him not to send it. I said that he as executive director could not send this when the board had voted otherwise. You may have seen this letter.

Lage: Was this the one signed by eight directors in '68?

Wayburn: Either that letter or a later one was signed by eight directors. I have a recollection of a letter which he was going to sign personally and/or one that was going to be signed by him and Eissler and Litton. But if it were by eight directors, of course, that would be a majority of the board and would strongly suggest that the board had changed its stand. As far as I remember, the board never changed its stand on an official resolution.

Lage: I think, as I recall it, in '68 eight directors sent--

Wayburn: Oh, by '68. By '68, that's a different story.

Lage: In '66 I remember a letter that Martin Litton himself sent to the president of PG&E.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Maybe that was what you were referring to.

Wayburn: Well, if it was by '68, you must remember that Dave had done a very effective job of packing the board, of picking certain individuals who he considered thought the way he did, and of then proselytizing the membership to the extent that it was a case of somebody voting against nobody: when you heard a lot about certain candidates and didn't hear about other candidates, or heard derogatory things about those other candidates, the first group would be elected. In '68 alone, three or four out of the five people that Dave had endorsed, I think, were elected. They included Phil Berry, who shortly afterwards began to disagree with Dave very strongly and became one of his foremost opponents; Luna Leopold, who was the chief hydrologist of the United States who was a great man and a fine man, but didn't know anything about the Sierra Club.

Lage: Who else came along in that group?

Wayburn: I'm trying to think.

Lage: Was that when Paul Brooks came on, or was he appointed at some point?

Wayburn: Paul Brooks came on considerably earlier [in 1966]. Paul Brooks was another one whom Dave had recruited, but who, as soon as he learned about what was going on in the club, became a very reasoned critic of Dave. Paul is one of the most rational and well-reasoning men you can meet. He was not a blind supporter of Dave, which some of the other people were.

Lage: Well, Laurence Moss, I guess, was one of the group we're mentioning.

Wayburn: Laurence Moss. Right. He was one of those.

Lage: Shall we finish your thought here?

Wayburn: Yes, let's finish here on Diablo Canyon. There were many factors. PG&E, as I look back at it, lied to me. I went to Diablo Canyon on a trip with them in a plane they'd rented, owned by Danny Kaye and flown by Danny Kaye, and they showed me the site. They minimized how large the buildings would be, but more than that I was concerned with the scenery around there, and they told me that that scenery would remain intact. Later, I found out that the whole grove of magnificent old oak trees and the surrounding natural scenery had disappeared. From a scenic standpoint they had promised to interfere with the landscape very little; they did interfere with it a great deal. The wires that came over the hill dominated the scenery for miles; their idealized version had been distorted. So I lost my faith in what PG&E was doing.

Several of the directors (notably, Dick Leonard) continued to support PG&E to this day. Of course, Dick may have some conflict of interest there because his wife is now a director of PG&E. I'm not condemning that in any way because I think that we need people whom we have confidence in, as I have in the Leonards, to get on the inside of corporations. In fact, Peggy and I have bought one to ten shares of different corporations in order to know what was going on and to be able occasionally to try to counteract it. We did it in the redwoods.

Lage: A lumber company?

Wayburn: We bought ten shares of Georgia-Pacific and three shares of Union Lumber Company. At one meeting of the directors of Georgia-Pacific, Peggy got up and made an impassioned plea that they give their holdings to the Redwood National Park, much to the consternation of the chairman of the board.

Lage: The Diablo issue became such an intense and emotional issue, somewhat out of proportion, some felt. Do you have any explanation for that?

Wayburn: Yes. It became an issue as we learned more about the dangers of atomic energy, and as the opponents felt desperate and felt they had to make it the club's overweening issue, and as they got the very full support of Brower, Dave then used everything he had at his command to condemn the directors of the Sierra Club for going along with PG&E, as well as condemning PG&E, doing this as a direct act of insubordination, and publicizing it in the Bulletin. The Bulletin, of course went to all Sierra Club members, many of whom had not heard anything about the Diablo controversy before.

Lage: Several board members, like yourself and George Marshall, seemed to have some doubts about the wisdom of the original decision.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: But did Brower's handling of it cause you to dig in and be more defensive, do you think?

Wayburn: I think that it did, undoubtedly, because here we have not one issue but two issues. One is: should Diablo Canyon be built with the-- not endorsement--but with the allowance of the Sierra Club? And the second is: should the executive director, in defiance of the board, set in motion Sierra Club machinery which would undoubtedly result in the Sierra Club's being split down the middle? This caused more members to be polarized than any other single issue, but it was not the issue which caused the firing of Brower.

Lage: I guess Brower puts a lot of importance on it as the key issue that led to his demise.

Wayburn: Brower did. Sure he did because that put Brower in the position of being the great conservationist opposed to these weak-minded companions of the trail who didn't understand. But Diablo Canyon was one of only several causes of the schism in the club.

Lage: It did seem to be an issue that certainly polarized the board maybe more than anything else. Is that a correct assumption?

Wayburn: It caused a great deal of emotional disturbance, that's true. But it wasn't as much the conservation issue at Diablo Canyon as the fact that the executive director defied the board.

Lage: I see.

Wayburn: Openly defied the board. He didn't mince any words in that.

Lage: You mentioned that financial problems were one of the main causes, but it seems to me that you really do stress insubordination as being very important, in your thinking at least.

Wayburn: That's correct. As will come out, that was the final straw.

Lage: Now, are there more things we should go over on Diablo? I don't know if we need to go over the details of the board's ups and downs.

Wayburn: No. You see, in my mind, Diablo was not the principal issue. The ABC group blew that up into the fact that Diablo represented the entire difference in outlook on conservation of the Sierra Club members. The comparable literature from the CMC side, I think, emphasized the fiscal irresponsibility and the insubordination. I felt Diablo was a very unfortunate aberrancy in the progress of the Sierra Club. [See pp. 244-45 for further discussion of the ABC and CMC slates.]

Lage: You mean that the position the club took was aberrant?

Wayburn: The position the board took. In addition to what I've talked about before, I think it did represent an attempt to see if some adjustment could be made with industry in what it was doing. We had gained a big advantage with the success at Nipomo Dunes, and this was being balanced out locally by Diablo Canyon.

I no longer feel that way, but in the early 1960s things were not quite the same; the conflicts were not as acute. I have repeatedly been more hard-nosed since then, but I realize that a balancing act has to be pulled off at times, and I have had to make hard decisions on more than one occasion, such as to settle for far less than I wanted to. The first Redwood Act was one, and the recent Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act was another one.

But I think this was a time when the club was trying to balance a little more than it should have. This happened again with the Peripheral Canal recently when, on the advice of some of the people who had been working on this the hardest, the board went along with approving the Peripheral Canal with certain conditions. I thought that was wrong. I'm not sure just how I voted on the board about this, but I felt that that was unwise, I know.

Lage: What do you think of the charges that PG&E took quite an active role in club politics? Have you heard this charge that some feel PG&E actually worked to influence the election?

Wayburn: Yes. I have serious doubts about this conspiracy. There may have been a few PG&E members, and we have many of them, who would say to their friends, "Vote this way or that," but during that time

Wayburn: the "Be Bold" people were far more active. I don't remember just when Doris Leonard became a director of PG&E. She did it with the avowed intention of trying to get them to be more conservation-minded.

Lage: I think it was later, though. It was after this controversy.

Wayburn: Well, she went on the PG&E board after this controversy. I think she's been a director about ten years, so it would be after that.

Lage: But you don't think they paid for mailings or--?

Wayburn: Not to my knowledge. I think that would have been a very unwise move if anyone discovered that and could document it, and to the best of my knowledge no one has. I know that Mr. Gerdes and Mr. Sibley have written to me and other prominent members of the club, pleading their position, but that, I think, is perfectly legitimate.

There's one part of this that I haven't mentioned which fits, to me, into other things. That was that sometime in 1967 the board took away the executive director's primacy over the Bulletin and gave it to the president. This was not something I sought at all because it added work and trouble; it meant that I had to read copy on everything that was to go into the Bulletin and that I had to decide whether it was proper material for the Bulletin.

Now, some of that copy dealt with Diablo Canyon. I remember the "Half-Bulletin" of March-April 1967, published just before I assumed the presidency again. Hugh Nash, the editor, didn't get a reply from the pro-Diablo people by the date he'd set, so he published it with only one side giving its viewpoint.

There was another time when I took out pieces by and about Dave Brower, a long paeon of Brower's thoughts and accomplishments. Nash had put these into the Bulletin although they may have been written by Brower. Dave wrote me very irate letters to the effect that I was trying to make him a non-person. However, I did not feel that the Sierra Club Bulletin should be so extensively effusive about the Sierra Club's executive director, fine as he was.

XII A PRESIDENTIAL BALANCING ACT, 1968-1969

Attempts to Accommodate Brower's Brilliance with the Survival
of the Sierra Club##

Lage: I think before we got into Diablo you had brought the publications reorganization committee up till May, '68, and then you said, "Now we should go back to Diablo."

Wayburn: Yes. The publications reorganization committee was an idea which really revolved around one man. I don't think Dave Brower will ever appreciate how far the board went to try to accommodate him. On a number of occasions he told the board about the great things he had done, how he wanted to continue to be a humble working member of the Sierra Club and how he could contribute in the future. Every member of the board realized his worth; some of us realized it more than others. Those who realized it more than the others were those who stuck by him. There was never any question that he was brilliant, able, industrious, an extraordinary person, and that he did a great deal for the Sierra Club.

The people who thought that the board just wanted to fire Brower because of either Diablo Canyon or insubordination or fiscal irresponsibility or any one of a number of other things, had no idea what the board put up with during the last ten years, particularly the last three years, of his term as executive director. He probably doesn't realize this himself at all because people like that don't realize it. But the board, the majority of the board, was anxious to keep him, in spite of the fact that as early as 1967, some directors proposed that he be fired. Before that he had threatened to resign a number of times, until I finally told him, "Don't do it, because I think the board's reached the stage where they will accept it." That was in the early sixties.

Wayburn: The whole publications reorganization committee would have been completely unnecessary if it hadn't been for the personality of the executive director, and the succeeding reorganization committee and a number of other schemes that were concocted in a way to keep the productivity and ability of Brower and yet have the Sierra Club survive--survive as a members' organization (and this was a big factor), survive as a solvent organization (and this was a big factor). In spite of the fact that Dave repeatedly said the books were making money, the board was having to sell securities in order to get enough capital to support the publications program, and the net worth of the Sierra Club kept dropping.

Another controversy went on between the Sierra Club Council and Brower. Dave had never liked the idea of the council. In 1967 and '68 certain members of the council, looking at the board's actions with Brower, said, "How in the hell can you people do this? This man has defied you over and over again, and he ought to be fired, and we of the council will help you get him out." This, in turn, infuriated Dave, and he started a move to get rid of the council. Well, there was a petition and a ballot [in April 1968] in which the council was retained, but this took a great deal of energy and time and money to do.

People were giving energy to these separate causes, all of them, instead of to the conservation effort of the club, although sometimes I wonder, as an afterthought: we were doing so much in conservation during that time; this, I think, was just extra on the emotional side. I remember reading one note from some Brower supporter to Bob Marshall, who was an opponent, saying, "If you'd put your time into conservation instead of assailing our top conservationist, you could do a lot more." Marshall wrote back to remind him that he was conducting some four different campaigns at the same time, and that he regretted having to do this too, but he felt that it was his duty.

Lage: Did it seem to you that the conservation efforts faltered because of the uproar surrounding Brower?

Wayburn: I know it had to falter to some extent. How much is debatable, but I have no doubt that Dave, for one, didn't do as much conservation because he couldn't have cranked out these endless memos to me and to others. He could have been working on conservation or even on books [chuckles] if he hadn't been writing those memoranda.

It was an extraordinary schism. It was an enormously divisive time in the club. Here I was, sitting right in the middle of it, trying to see if these two main ideas could possibly be resolved because, to me, the survival of the Sierra Club was the all-important thing.

Wayburn: I supported Brower as far as I did because of what I felt was his value to the club, even though I felt it decreased as the struggle went on. I was aware increasingly of the merit of the charges of his critics, and I insisted on giving fair coverage to their point of view.

Lage: When you say "coverage," do you mean in the Bulletin?

Wayburn: Coverage in the Bulletin and in the correspondence that was sent out through the club office. This went on through the charges made by Sill, Leonard, and Adams, and that was in September or October of '68.

Lage: Right. I think they brought them up in September, which, ironically, was the same time that the reorganization committee brought forth its recommendations, and then the special hearing was in October.

Wayburn: Right, right. My remembrance of this is that they made vehement charges, but they didn't document them sufficiently to suit me. I was taking no stand on the merits but on the fact that they weren't documented. I knew from my experience that some of the things they were talking about were true--but they were general charges. Fiscal irresponsibility was one of them; insubordination was another one.

Lage: They focused particularly, I think, on the Galapagos book.

Wayburn: Right, and it was true. But, to me, they didn't bring out enough evidence.

The third charge made against Dave was regarding his establishing the club's London office, but, again, they didn't know enough (no one did) to identify the specifics. Dave had kept that very much to himself.

By that time, in '68, the board was packed with Brower directors. The vote was often seven to seven or eight to six, Brower versus anti-Brower, with me in the middle. I refused to vote except to break a tie at that time, and I repeatedly kept emphasizing the importance of keeping the club together.

Lage: Well, on the vote on the Adams-Leonard-Sill charges I don't believe they even got six. Siri didn't vote with Leonard on that.

Wayburn: That's right. I think it was nine to three against Adams, Leonard, and Sill.

Wayburn: Then Dave was given a month to write a rebuttal, and that was a really long one. The board finally acquitted Dave, as I remember, in the December, 1968, meeting.

Brower's Suspension, January 1969: The Earth National Park Ad

Wayburn: In another action in December, the board specifically forbade the publication in any way of the so-called International Series that Dave had proposed. It further stated, and I think it had previously stated, that no ad in any newspaper was to be published without the express consent of the president.

Shortly after that, I became aware that something was going on. Different staff members had told me to watch out, that a big coup was going to occur. I suspected what it was, knowing Dave's nature. I did not want to expose any of the other staff members; I felt that was not fair to go over his head to pry information from members of his staff. And deep inside myself I had the feeling that resolution of this issue might furnish a solution to the club's schism. What action would Dave take in response to the board's explicit command?

Lage: So you had some staff members that were willing to leak things?

Wayburn: They hinted; they didn't tell me. I remember one conversation with a prominent staff member in which I said, "I understand that Dave is going to put an ad in the New York Times. I don't know anything about it," and he just kept still. He knew about it, he told me afterwards, but he'd been sworn to secrecy.

John Flannery, I think, was still with me. He didn't know anything about this, although I think that may be how I learned of the rumor. At one time I think I brought the matter up with Dave and said, "You know that the board has made certain statements." I had been supporting Dave very strongly through these charges, and he didn't say that anything was going on.

Then the first thing I knew was when a newspaper reporter named George Duscheck, whom I knew and who followed Sierra Club affairs fairly closely, called me and said, "Have you seen the New York Times this morning?" I was in bed sick at the time with the flu, and I said, "No, I haven't." He said, "Well, there's a full page-and-a-half ad on Earth National Park signed by Dave Brower and I'd understood that this was not allowed without your permission." I said, "I knew nothing about it." [ad appeared January 14, 1969]

Wayburn: I immediately called up Phil Berry, who was the club's legal counsel, and said, "I will be obligated to suspend or fire Brower. This is deliberate, and I can't go along with it any more. This is the last straw. This is in violation of two different board policies and is very deliberate." He gave me the language I could use; he thought it would be unwise of me to fire him at this time, but that I could suspend him. What I did was suspend his authority to make any financial commitments for the club from that moment on, until the board should take action.

Dave immediately reacted, because I got to him right away. He said I didn't have this authority, that only the board had the authority to suspend him. I said, "I think I have, and you are suspended. I will bring it up at the meeting of the board, which is going to be in ten days or so."

Well, Dave got busy, and a new group of letters and telegrams came in. It had happened that, as I said, I had the flu at the time I did this, and a headline came out: "President of the Sierra Club On His Deathbed Suspends Executive Director" or something like that.

Lage: [laughter] Oh, no!

Wayburn: Well, the board of directors had its meeting in due course. You will remember that the board at that time was packed with people who owed their election to Brower. Certain of them, such as Paul Brooks, reasoned on the Earth National Park ad and said Brower's action was wrong. I think the vote was very close. As I remember, there was a one-vote majority, besides my own vote in support of Brower's suspension.

Lage: Of course, Phil Berry by that time had come to oppose Brower.

Wayburn: Oh, Phil Berry had changed a year before. Phil Berry was the secretary of the club at the time, and he was extremely valuable in sorting out the issues, as well as being the chairman of the legal committee.

Let's see. The executive committee included, I believe, Brooks as vice-president, Berry as secretary, Siri as treasurer, and I think Goldsworthy as the fifth member. Goldsworthy was a firm Brower supporter.

Lage: Do you want to say anything about the other two issues? You mentioned three issues that led you to suspend Brower, and the last one being the ad.

Wayburn: This publication ad was the final one. The London office was the second one.

Lage: The ones you mentioned at the time of the suspension were the Explorer and the one that I think there's less information about, his disavowal of Gary Torre as the club's attorney on the IRS case.

Wayburn: Oh, yes! Right. As I've mentioned earlier, Gary Torre was the attorney we selected in 1966. He went through the business of learning all about the club, and determining in his mind whether or not we could fight the suit, fight the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] ruling regarding the club's tax deductibility.

During the course of this, in 1967, I believe, he went back to Washington for a conference with the IRS commissioner, Mr. Sheldon Cohen, and I think the actual person he met with was Cohen's assistant. They had a long conference lasting several hours. Just as they got out of conference, a telegram came addressed to the secretary of the Treasury, H.H. Fowler, and the commissioner of Internal Revenue, Sheldon Cohen, stating approximately that "this is to inform you that Mr. Torre is speaking not as the representative of the Sierra Club." Just before this, I must add, Dave had asked me for permission to go back with Torre, telling me how inconvenient it would be because he'd have to take the overnight special, the red-eye special, and that he had to go on to do other things, but he would be willing to do this. I said, "Dave, it's not necessary. We have an attorney we as the client have engaged, and this is a conference between our attorney and the IRS."

So he sent the telegram disavowing Torre as our representative. Torre, although they'd already had the conference, was naturally very upset. He got in touch with his firm here in San Francisco; Don Harris, who was on our legal committee and is still the president of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, brought me the news and said, "Something has to be done about this. Torre won't stay on with this standing in front of him."

So I was absolutely obligated to send another telegram to these same people, stating that David Brower had no authority to send the telegram that he did for the Sierra Club, that Mr. Gary Torre remained our representative.

Lage: Was there some philosophical disagreement between them? There must have been something there.

Wayburn: [pauses] Dave wanted to fight the IRS to the end; in fact, we all did. Torre, after reviewing the entire problem thoroughly, said that he had doubts if we could succeed short of filing a lawsuit against the federal government, and that would cost us, in his estimation, at least \$100,000; it might not be successful, and didn't

Wayburn: we want to spend that money for conservation? The board agreed with him. But before he made that statement to us (he may have been telling us of his different findings) he said he wanted to go back to Washington for a full-fledged conference with the IRS, and he offered me the opportunity if I wanted to come back, and I didn't. He did not want Dave because they had been at some odds in the way they looked at things. But the fact was that there was no reason-- this was, if you will, a technical conference, and Dave was not a lawyer. I think at the time I said to him, "You're not a lawyer any more than I am, and I don't see why you should go back." So then he sent the telegram, and then I sent my telegram. This was an act of direct insubordination in which he undercut the board's selected representative, and it could have caused us a tremendous amount of trouble.

I remember there were three issues and that was one.

Lage: I think you also mentioned specifically the publishing of the Explorer without authorization.

Wayburn: Oh, right. The Explorer. The November, 1968, Bulletin didn't come out on time. It often didn't. Instead, all Sierra Club members got a copy of something brand new called the Explorer, Volume I, Number 1, with 50¢ of Sierra Club dues to support it. This was something which had never been mentioned before the board of directors or any other official club body, although it had been brought up by Dave as a way of subtly (and not so subtly) influencing the members on certain issues. Diablo Canyon was probably the main issue. I don't remember the contents at this time. I've got a copy of it if you want to see it.

Lage: I think it was a promotion of the Galapagos books.

Wayburn: It was an entirely unauthorized publication.

Lage: He defended it as an ad for the books.

Wayburn: Yes. I had allowed part of the ads for the book to go into the Bulletin, but not the extensive copy that he wanted.

Lage: I see.

Wayburn: All three of these were acts of direct insubordination.

Lage: So that's what convinced you. Was there some point before January, when the Earth National Park ad came out, where you thought it was inevitable that Dave would have to go, or was it not until that New York Times ad?

Wayburn: That was the breaking point, but obviously I had been thinking about this for a long time, even while I was defending him, hoping against reality that it wouldn't have to happen. But certainly I must have given consideration to it when the charges were brought up by the three dissident directors, and yet steered away from the idea.

Dave was given every possible opportunity to fit in with all of the rest of the Sierra Club as much as possible, but he was determined to have his own way. If he couldn't have it with the Sierra Club, he'd form another organization. He would tell me at times how much he liked the Sierra Club, but he wished that some of the members wouldn't get in his way. He wanted to get rid of the council because it criticized him and got in his way. He wanted to form new chapters everywhere, partly because he believed in the expansion of the club and partly because he was looking for new allies.

Well, the break came. At that time I made the statement that I've adhered to since, but "I wish Dave Brower all the luck in the world, but I will never again be responsible for him fiscally" in any way, and I've stuck to that.

Slate Politics and the 1969 Club Election

Wayburn: Once I had come out and suspended him (in effect, accomplished the firing of him), I became in his mind his greatest enemy. Everything that I did after that he construed in terms of me working for my advantage and against him.

Lage: Are you talking about that immediate time during the election campaign?

Wayburn: Yes. He was suspended, but he took a leave of absence without pay (which simply carried on the feud), in order to run for the board. However, he had decided to run for the board before that. He'd decided, he told me as I remember, after the official slate of nominees came out in November of 1968, to run for the board himself.

##

Wayburn: Dave put out a slate of his own. The slate consisted of him, David Sive, Polly Dyer--[pauses to think of names of others on Brower slate]

Lage: George Alderson.

Wayburn: Oh, yes. George Alderson and Fred Eissler. [the ABC slate: Active, Bold, Constructive]

Yes. I discouraged him from doing this, but he wanted to do it, so I said that was his privilege, even though it had never been done in the club, and I didn't know how it would come out. This was going on simultaneously with the other things we've been discussing.

Now, it happened that in the next issue of the Bulletin after I'd suspended Brower, I had removed a great deal of copy that Hugh Nash had put in, Hugh being Dave's boy, and I had allowed certain things that I had put in, including the announcement of his suspension and the reasoning behind it, because I felt the members had to know. They couldn't just again be faced with the fact, we're getting rid of this fine executive director. They had to know what the specifics were, and I felt I had to document them, and I did that in the Bulletin. He accused me of doing that just because I wanted to advance my own cause. I was running for re-election, and he said I should have stepped down and let the vice-president do all of this. I disagreed.

When Brower put up his slate, the CMC [Concerned Members for Conservation] Committee, which had been in existence for at least two years, maybe longer, and which was the anti-Brower group, picked a slate of five candidates from the people who had been nominated. As you know, they picked Nick Clinch, who later dropped out; Maynard Munger, who was the chairman of the Bay Chapter; Ray Sherwin.

Lage: Ansel Adams.

Wayburn: Ansel Adams.

Lage: And August Frugè.

Wayburn: August Frugè. Correct.

Lage: And that makes five.

Wayburn: What about Charles Huestis--was he not put up that year?

Lage: No, he came on later as appointed treasurer.

Wayburn: I see. Okay.

Neither side put me up. I had offended both sides because I was staying in the middle. The representatives of the CMC came to me and said, "We'd like you to sign this bill of particulars we've got." I said, "I can't do it. I'm the president of the organization.

Wayburn: This would put me on one side." They were angry with me because I had gone so far in supporting Brower up until the actual suspension. After the suspension is when they came to me. I said I wouldn't go along with this, but if they wanted to support me it was all right, and another group, including many of the CMC, formed Volunteers for Wayburn.

Lage: Is this the way you preferred it, that you wouldn't be a member of either slate?

Wayburn: I felt I could not be a member of a slate as such and still carry on as the president. I said to Dave early in the game, after he put up his slate, "I'm interested that you haven't put me up, because of the numerous times I've supported you and saved your hide." I think Dave misunderstood what I was saying. I was surprised, but I wasn't asking to be on his slate, because I told the other side the same thing. Well, the Brower slate did not endorse me, but the CMC slate did endorse me.

Lage: So at that time your cooperation or the feelings between you and the Brower group were strong enough that you thought it was a possibility they could choose you for the slate, because you had supported him for so long?

Wayburn: Well, I had kept him from being fired, and I had supported the different projects that he was trying to put over, as far as was possible; unless the board said, "No"--in which case my first responsibility was to the board.

Lage: If ABC [the Brower slate: Active, Bold, Constructive] had approached you to be on the slate, say in November, would you have turned them down?

Wayburn: Yes. Just as I told the others, I couldn't be on a slate as such. I would not be a member of a slate.

Lage: But CMC did endorse you finally.

Wayburn: CMC did endorse me. Nick Clinch dropped out. He was one of the five they had endorsed around the first of January, and he dropped out so that they could endorse me. It was partly because it was felt that they were trying to get everybody to vote for the same five people, and they had reluctantly skipped over a couple of other nominees. But they knew that the Brower slate would be very firm and entrenched, and the people they got to vote for that mostly would vote just for those five.

Wayburn: As it happened, there was a fairly wide discrepancy in the election. In the election, although not on either slate, I did lead the ticket. Ansel Adams came in a close second. The other three (Frugè, Munger, and Sherwin) were several thousand votes down. But the interesting thing was that Ansel and I got almost thirty thousand votes apiece. Others got in the mid or low twenties. Dave, who was the top vote-getter for the other side, got only sixteen thousand-odd votes. The rest trailed way off, proving that even in this sort of a supposed up and down election the Sierra Club members would vote for who they thought as individuals should be elected--which I think is a good thing.

Lage: Did you do any campaigning? You mentioned the Volunteers for Wayburn.

Wayburn: I didn't do any campaigning, but there was a group. I don't know if you've seen the literature that they put out.

Lage: I think I did in some of your files. Now, it seemed to me from reading your files, that a number of the people on the CMC were actually somewhat hostile to you.

Wayburn: Yes, some of them were.

Lage: This was something I hadn't realized.

Wayburn: They thought that I hadn't been firm enough, decisive enough, in getting rid of Brower earlier. You see, when they were formed, I was still trying to stay in the middle in order to keep the club together, feeling that I could reconcile these two factions. They had become irreconcilable, and they therefore perceived me as a Brower tool if not supporter.

Lage: Was there some ideological gulf there also? Would you say that maybe you were closer ideologically to ABC?

Wayburn: It all depends upon the issue.

Lage: I'm thinking of people like Tom Jukes, who was a power behind the scenes in the CMC.

Wayburn: That's correct. Tom Jukes was, again, a very strong-minded man with ideas of his own, and I don't need to tell you as much as you are getting from other people about Tom Jukes. He probably should be interviewed at some time. Has he been?

Lage: No, no. I have a young man who wants to interview him when he gets the time.*

Wayburn: Tom was a great lover of the Sierra. He was one of the Sierra Club members who had this tremendous love of the Sierra Nevada and, secondarily, of the outdoors, who felt that the Sierra Club should not be getting into issues which did not directly involve nature protection. I use that term now, but I think it would be better to say "involve wilderness and mountain protection," because nature protection involves such things as not building atomic plants, which can cause great damage to nature.

Tom Jukes was a brilliant biochemist. He worked, I think, first at the University of California, and then for years at American Cyanide Company. When he went back to New York, he was one of the founders of the Atlantic Chapter, and then he came back here. He did not appreciate the fact that chemicals could do great harm. It was, first of all, chemicals, and secondly nuclear energy, where Tom Jukes and I, and Tom Jukes and Brower, came into conflict.

Lage: Was he typical of CMC, do you think, in his thinking?

Wayburn: No, he was typical of one part of CMC. I think CMC was chaired by Kent Gill, who was a moderate man, has always been a very moderate man. It included a tremendous number of people. It included, I would guess, the majority of the chapter leaders, the majority of the second and third-echelon leaders of the Sierra Club, and a majority of the top-echelon leaders. That's why they succeeded; it was a much larger force. ABC was a group of devoted cult followers who accused their opponents of all sorts of things that weren't true, just like CMC accused their opponents of certain things that weren't true. As I say, I couldn't go along with either one of them.

Retrospective Thoughts on the Brower Controversy and Its Legacy

Wayburn: Looking back at it, I think that may be my greatest accomplishment-- that I kept this organization together with great difficulty for several years--until the time came when there was just no question about

*A short interview with Thomas Jukes, pertaining primarily to his differences with the Sierra Club on pesticides policies, is now on deposit in The Bancroft Library.

Wayburn: what had to be done. What had to be done was to separate the cult leader from the top position in the Sierra Club. Dave wanted to be the paid president of the Sierra Club (at times he made no bones of that) and he wanted to have as chairman of the board the person who had the title and the power of the president.

We discussed a great many things during our many times together. I don't know how Dave regards me today. I look at him still with affection, still with admiration, still with, I think a realization of the fact that such a man could not indefinitely be the head of such an organization as the Sierra Club. He was intolerant of opposition. He would be willing to change his mind in conservation matters. He would be willing to change for a political advantage; by that I mean to accomplish a purpose. But he was rigid and paranoid when it came to him giving up anything.

He comes to board meetings now. I was one of those instrumental in asking for him to be given the Muir Award, the club's highest award, because he certainly deserved it. He, in turn, in those meetings he's come to, has several times spoken up in support of the issues that I was advocating, and come in at a crucial point with a very good point that I hadn't made, and helped put over the proposition. He would more or less apologize and say, "I really haven't got any right to talk here, but I think this is what you should do."

I think he's a little bothered about me even yet because I was the individual who insisted on keeping the command. I didn't want to do it. Whether I could have done it any sooner or not is hard to say. I wasn't willing to do it without documentation; then I knew what had to be done.

Lage: Well, it sounds as if you waited for an issue where there wasn't much doubt.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: The issue on the Earth National Park ad was easily documented.

Wayburn: Oh, there's no question of that. Let me say I waited, and I weighed it. I was often accused of being too patient, and possibly I was. As Brower's counterpart in the leadership of the Sierra Club, if he were to be retained and there were to be a semblance of order, there had to be someone who would be patient, and my patience was sorely tried a number of times, much more than I let out at the time, because, well, that would have added to the divisiveness. There was too much paper running around as it was. You will find a great many letters to me, and more about me; not too many from me.

Lage: You didn't join the zerox circuit as much.

Wayburn: No.

Lage: You mentioned earlier something about the lasting legacy of the Brower affair, that the club came out stronger for it.

Wayburn: Yes, I think it did.

Lage: Do you want to comment on that now?

Wayburn: Yes, I can. The ABC group had advertised strongly to the electorate that they were the bold group, that they were the ones who believed in and practiced conservation, that they were the militant group, and that the others were simply the old fogeys who were the companions of the trail, who were nice people admittedly, for the most part, but who were not real conservationists. I think that after the elections were held [in April 1969] the first action taken by the board was to assure the club's members and everyone else that the club would not retract one whit on its conservation stand, that it would go forward even more aggressively than it had in the past, although some of its tactics might change.

I believe that more people became grassroots activists at that time. I know that the club continued to grow very rapidly from '69 to '72-'73, the leaders were just as aggressive, and a lot more people were involved.

Lage: Do you think it brought more volunteers into active roles?

Wayburn: I think it brought more volunteers into active roles. Now, that's an impression. The club was growing, so there would be a greater pool. I think there was a certain determination on the part of the CMC leaders, of whom four more were elected directors in April '69 to prove the Brower people wrong. It also confirmed the dominance of the volunteer aspect of the club when its elected board of directors made the decision they would not be staff-dominated. The immediate post-Brower months were for a short time, I think, a bad period for the staff; some of the leading staff was let out, and others resigned. It was a hard time for the club financially because we learned month by month more of commitments that we had made and that we knew nothing about, coming from such spots as New York and London, and those had to be taken care of.

Lage: But you don't see it as any kind of a turning point on the conservation policy of the club?

Wayburn: You mean a regression?

Lage: Well, a change.

Wayburn: A change? It was coincident with what I think would have come up anyway, a wider plunge of the club into more matters. You see, it was by now almost 1970, the so-called Earth Year, when environmentalism was supposed to be born. Well, the club had been an environmental organization for eighty years by this time, but it was largely in what are known as more traditional nature protection areas, and then nuclear power came up as one great big thing. But we had begun to get interested in air pollution and water pollution previously. These issues were accentuated by the development of Earth Day (Earth Day being April 1970), and preparation had to begin before that. I think that whatever change came in the club's direction was in expanding the club's program to include earth, air, water and toxic chemicals, as well as energy.

Lage: But might that have happened had Brower stayed?

Wayburn: Oh, I think there's no question that Dave would have gone in the same direction. The organization he founded a few months later, Friends of the Earth, has done the same thing. Incidentally, a very good outgrowth of all our travail has been that Friends of the Earth--being a smaller organization and one in which the members don't have the control the way they do in the Sierra Club--is able to quickly go out and take a position, one that may be more radical than the Sierra Club's. It often does take some time for the Sierra Club to take a definite position because it's got more people to consider it, and it's an extraordinarily democratic organization. It allows great autonomy to its chapters and to its regional conservation committees. Friends of the Earth, particularly up till recently--I understand that just recently Dave has been shoved out of the command of his own organization a little. But up until recently at least, he would decide to do something and it would be done. So they could move very fast.

Lage: So they've been a nice complement to the Sierra Club.

Wayburn: Oh, yes. It's been very helpful to have an organization which could be said to be more radical than the Sierra Club.

Lage: Right! [laughter] It makes the Sierra Club look so respectable.

Wayburn: Yes.

XIII THE SIERRA CLUB IN THE SEVENTIES: RAPID GROWTH AND
INTERNAL READJUSTMENTS

[Interview 10: February 20, 1981]##

New Leadership, Continuity of Goals

Lage: It's February 20, 1981, and we're continuing with the Edgar Wayburn interview. We're going to discuss the reshuffling period after Brower left. We've taken things through the resignation of Brower, and we want to get some idea of how the new leadership on the board handled the turmoil and financial problems that followed.

Wayburn: As I've said in the previous interview, the so-called CMC [Concerned Members for Conservation] slate was overwhelmingly elected, and we'd come up to the organizational meeting of the board of May, 1969.

I had been through quite a bit of hell during the preceding two years with my priority objective of holding the club together. I thought that I had done that effectively, and by so doing I had sacrificed the opportunity to go ahead with some of the conservation objectives that I had wanted to pursue. When it came time for the election of officers, I had wanted one more year as president and had offered myself as such.

During April I'd heard rumors that Phil Berry had aspirations of becoming the youngest president of the Sierra Club and was pulling all the strings he could. Still, during April, Phil Berry and I were working very closely together on planning what was ahead. Will Siri was working with us. I did not really get from either of them the fact that Berry was going to oppose me. I didn't come out and say strongly that I wanted another year of the presidency, because I was still in the process of settling the year that was still in being. But at the organizational planning meeting I did say this, and Phil--

Lage: This is before the formal board meeting?

Wayburn: No. This is not the formal board meeting; this is the orientation of the new directors and the caucus for election of officers which goes before the formal board meeting.

Lage: Okay.

Wayburn: So at this caucus Phil and I were candidates, and there were some other people who spoke up. I remember, particularly, Dick Leonard, who, in what I thought was an un-Leonardlike performance, not smooth at all but betraying a great deal of emotion, said that "the time has passed that the Sierra Club can have presidents for life," which surprised me because I had no further thought beyond one year. But the people whose ticket I had led were the ones who opposed me, the CMC people. The people who were residual on the board from the Brower days, from the Brower people, supported me. It was a close vote, but Berry was elected, and I was elected vice-president.

Afterwards I said that I was very grateful to Phil Berry because I think he save a few years of my life in that those two years took a tremendous amount out of me; and whether or not I could have gone on, I don't know.

Certainly Phil set about improving the atmosphere within the club very rapidly. He took a great deal of time from his law practice, and he was devoting almost full time to the club (which I would have had difficulty doing) in patching up the wounds which had taken place. He traveled a great deal to the different chapters and made good conciliatory speeches and spoke about prospects ahead. So, although I was opposed to his candidacy, I thought that he did an outstanding job in his first year.

Lage: It was his intention apparently to patch things up and to try to heal the divisions?

Wayburn: Oh, yes.

Lage: Was there still a lot of tension between the ABC and the CMC groups?

Wayburn: There was still a lot in 1969 and the early part of 1970, and he did an outstanding job in patching that up.

He, in the latter part of that period and in his second term in '70-'71, became involved deeply in a lawsuit which the club had started with other legal counsel down in Orange County. During that second year he was devoting more time to that as a lawyer than he was as president because he had to take over the suit.

Lage: I see. What issue was that? Do you recall?

Wayburn: [pauses to think] The people whose cause we took up were named Robinson. It was in Upper Newport Bay.

Lage: He took it on as both; he took it on as free counsel but on behalf of the club. The club, as I remember, had become a co-plaintiff with these people whose name was Robinson, and this was a suit that was in the public interest. I was only peripherally involved.

Lage: I'm hoping to interview Phil Berry, and I can discuss it with him.

Wayburn: Yes. This was all his. But as he did this, he didn't pay quite as much attention to the affairs of the club as he had before because he was so fully occupied. As I remember, we recompensed him in part for his time, the first time that any president had been paid. We developed the principle that as the president took more time from his work than he could afford to, he would be given partial compensation.

Lage: Has that continued, or was that just unique to that one president?

Wayburn: No, that has continued intermittently. I believe that Larry Moss, who was president after Ray Sherwin, was given something. I know that Kent Gill was given compensation for what he had to give up in salary. At the present time, Joe Fontaine is being paid, I think, 40 percent of his salary by the club. The principle behind this is that the presidency takes up a tremendous amount of the time of whomever becomes president (if he is to do a proper job as president, that is necessary) and if he cannot afford to do it for financial reasons, that the club should rightly pay for it; we've reached that stage of our existence.

Lage: It does broaden your pool of people who may take the presidency.

Wayburn: Right. I don't think that Ray Sherwin received anything, but he continued to receive his full-time salary as a judge. He was a superior court judge, I think, and no salary was taken from him. I believe that Brant Calkin likewise got some payment. I don't know about Ted Snyder or Bill Futrell. I'm pretty sure Futrell was being paid full-time by the University of Georgia, so that he didn't take anything more than his expenses--which we all do.

Your next item [referring to interview outline] mentions continuity of goals. The goals of the Sierra Club remained the same through the fifties and sixties and seventies. They broadened, but this was a natural consequence of the club's growth. The issue,

Wayburn: I think I may have said before, raised by the ABC people, that the battle was between those who would go forward on a bold constructive front and those who would be companions on the trail, was totally spurious. There was a difference in the manner in which they approached a number of different things, but the goals remained the same for both groups.

After Brower was ousted, the people who had been responsible for that action felt very much obligated to prove to the world, to Brower and his colleagues, and to themselves the fact that the goals of the Sierra Club remained the same and would be pursued with even more vigor by the now-conquering volunteers of the club. It gave impetus to what became prime developments of the club in the seventies, the dominant role of the volunteer, the spread of the club throughout the United States, the division of the club into many more component units, and the building up of those components into regional units.

The Grassroots Grow; New Chapters Bring Political Clout

Wayburn: Let me go on with this. We learned in the fifties and sixties that we should have more members, and they should be spread throughout the country and the world as far as possible. We learned that in order to have national political clout we had to have local political clout. We developed the grassroots movement of the club on a vastly superior scale, much more extensively, beginning in 1969.

Lage: Let me ask you, when you say "we developed..." do you see it as something developed from the center or something that kind of sprung up from the roots?

Wayburn: Both. It sprang from the roots and it was consciously nurtured from the hierarchy of the club.

New chapters poured in. I don't remember the exact number of chapters; I think there were about twenty-five in 1969. But they rapidly increased in the seventies at the rate of two to five a year, to the present fifty-three chapters. Some chapters, like the Atlantic Chapter and the Great Lakes Chapter notably, which had been fostered from San Francisco, which had been formed in considerable part by expatriates from California, began consciously to subdivide. The Atlantic Chapter split off into a northern Atlantic group, a mid-Atlantic group, and a south Atlantic group, more or less. Then, in

Wayburn: turn, those chapters subdivided, until now we have a chapter for almost each state in the old Atlantic Chapter. The Chattahoochee Chapter has Georgia and Alabama; then Florida; South Carolina; North Carolina [LeConte]; Virginia (Old Dominion); and District of Columbia, Delaware, West Virginia, and Maryland (which is the Potomac Chapter).

And then farther north we now have, instead of just the Atlantic Chapter, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Atlantic, which is New York. The New England Chapter has not done this. They're smaller states and they have not felt that they should split up. Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire and Rhode Island are all still together as the New England Chapter.

The Great Lakes Chapter also split into segments. I think the title of Great Lakes has been kept by Illinois. There are Indiana [Hoosier], Wisconsin or John Muir, Ohio, Kentucky or Cumberland, and Tennessee, all separate chapters. The same thing has happened with the Rocky Mountain Chapter. It's now left with, I think, only the state of Colorado. Wyoming, North Dakota and South Dakota [Dacotah], and Montana [with Idaho, the Northern Rockies Chapter] have all split off.

This has given us a number of people who have responsibility at local levels, at the grassroots, and it has given us a clout in Washington which was not possible before. We can ask people who know local congressmen to work not only on their local issues but also on national issues.

Lage: So that's one of the things responsible for this last item on our outline, the club's success in legislative lobbying in the seventies.

Wayburn: Yes, and we'll come back to that. We used this to its highest degree of perfection in the Alaska campaign. But that is one of the ways in which it happened; that's the breakdown into chapters.

The fifty-three chapters now have among them, I think, approximately 270 groups. Some chapters have comparatively few groups; others have very many. I think that the group idea has been carried out perhaps most notably in the Angeles Chapter, which coincidentally (maybe not coincidentally) has passed the San Francisco Bay Chapter in membership and has stayed ahead of it; and carried out to the least extent perhaps in the Bay Chapter, where I think there are only three groups.

Lage: Yes, it seems the last one to have adopted the group idea.

Wayburn: Yes. Those groups vary in their effectiveness and vary in the type of work that they do, but for the most part they are formed for conservation activist purposes.

Organization on the Regional Level: RCCs and Regional Reps

Wayburn: The other development has been that of the regional conservation committees [RCCs] where two or more chapters gather together to further the conservation work of their particular region. We have now eight of them, plus two chapters which function as regions in themselves (Hawaii and Alaska). The Alaska Chapter has the Knik (Anchorage), Denali (Fairbanks), Sitka, and Juneau groups, and they are the nucleus of a regional conservation committee.

Lage: So they have a chapter and a regional conservation committee covering the same area?

Wayburn: Covering the same area. They wanted status, and they were able to get a little more money and a little more status. The chairman of that regional conservation committee has the title of regional vice-president, as do the other chairmen, and gets to meet with the others, although it is recognized that it's not a real regional conservation committee, in the sense that--

Lage: Although Alaska is certainly large enough to need one.

Wayburn: Oh, yes. No, it's just the same people doing different work, and that's not the case in the others; it's different people doing regional work from the chapter people, who do the local work.

The RCCs other than Alaska and Hawaii are variable in the amount of work they do, the amount of work there is for them, and in their effectiveness. This is inevitable in any type of organizational work which has developed as fast as it has and which has a different degree of leadership and a different amount of territory.

At the same time that these regional conservation committees have been responsible for improvement of the club's grassroots work along with the chapters and groups, we have had regional representatives, who are paid staff. This again has varied rather widely in where and how and what--

Lage: Are they a paid staff for the regional conservation committees, or is this a totally different chain of command and--?

Wayburn: Well, it works both ways. The first regional representative was in the Northwest, where the Sierra Club in 1961, not having enough money to hire a full regional representative, combined with the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs to hire a young man named Michael McCloskey as the first regional representative. The Northwest regional rep is still known as the representative of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, although he's now paid fully by the Sierra Club. In the Northwest we had a number of interested people who were willing to put up part of the money, and we had a great many conservation problems, so there was a double reason for having a paid representative professional on the scene.

As this became a very successful venture, other areas wanted staff representatives, and there was a variation in the reasons. We put one into the Southwest (the states of Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado were included, and parts of Nevada) because of the tremendous number of conservation resource problems we've got there: the clean air problem, the national parks, the particular problems of the desert and the whole intermountain region; and very few people by comparison, very few members (although we have gained a lot of members since that was started).

We put a regional representative in southern California because the southern California chapters had put up the first year's money and then put up a lesser amount of money until the principle became established, and now I think that the club pays the whole salary, although there are some financial arrangements whereby the Angeles Chapter puts up more for the national club staff than it might otherwise.

##

Wayburn: The California chapters generally put up at least half, I think, of the Sacramento representative, who is our lobbyist in the California state legislature and who has other regional resource people working with him. The California chapters are putting up their own money (from the allotment which goes to the chapters) for support of paid staff personnel--for staff personnel who report in line authority to San Francisco and eventually to the executive director.

Lage: Yes. So the chapters don't really control them to the extent that they would chapter personnel.

Wayburn: They do control to some extent, yes. They control on policy, and they do this through the combined Northern and Southern California Regional Conservation Committees of the club and a derivative of that known as the California Legislative Committee. The CLC has three or possibly five members, and they make the decisions on the club's policy in the California legislature.

Lage: Then are they a committee of the regional conservation committees?

Wayburn: Yes, of the two California regional conservation committees. These two committees have a certain degree of autonomy on all California matters. The board of directors through the seventies established the principle that the regional conservation committees wherever they were should have this autonomy on regional matters because there was so much in the way of national conservation that needed to be handled by the board of directors. Even in national conservation where a regional project is involved the board prefers to let the regional conservation committees handle and make the final decision on any project.

Lage: The Peripheral Canal is a good example of that.

Wayburn: The Peripheral Canal was a good example of that. And the proposed legislation for Big Sur is another example where the Ventana Chapter strongly supported the legislation that the Big Sur Foundation was proposing. The Northern and Southern California--particularly the Northern California Regional Conservation Committee, because the area in question was within its confines, has supported it. The board of directors has more or less stayed out of the matter, much to the chagrin of the Big Sur Foundation and, particularly, Ansel Adams, who in his time was used to seeing the board of directors handle all national conservation problems.

Lage: There's no question of the board opposing that stand? It just hasn't lent its weight to it?

Wayburn: No, it's just that it's a matter which is delegated to the regional conservation committee, and Ansel doesn't understand that. He has written to me several times complaining that the Sierra Club hasn't properly supported the Big Sur Foundation in its efforts to get a national reserve for Big Sur, although they have had outstanding support from the Ventana Chapter and even from the regional conservation committee.

Lage: Does he look for a resolution by the board or staff time on the national level?

Wayburn: He wanted more support on the national level and more support--well, he's getting support on the national level, but it hasn't as high a profile or as high a priority as he would like. He wanted more of the Washington lobbyists' time, which was devoted to other matters. This, of course, is one of our problems each year--where to put the allotment of time for the Washington office lobbyists, of whom we have only six, and who have a tremendous amount of

Wayburn: legislation to cover. We have in addition to them, of course, the regional representatives, who take the lead on any local or regional project which is in Washington.

Lage: Does northern California have a regional representative, though?

Wayburn: Yes. There is in the staff a subdivision of the Conservation Department under Carl Pope, and Carl Pope has the overall supervision of California matters. John Zierold handles all of the California legislative matters and he has several assistants. Russ Shay is the northern California-Nevada regional representative.

Lage: So they have a rep like southern California.

Wayburn: Yes. He has a lot of different things to cover. For example, he is the point man on the California Wilderness bill in Washington.

I was talking about the regional conservation representatives. The question always comes up: shall we put our best regional representative where we have a great many members, and that person can mobilize the members and be responsible to the chapter chairmen and to the regional conservation chairman, or shall we put our regional rep into an area where there are a tremendous number of natural resource problems and few members. We've done it both ways.

I mentioned southern California where the power of membership and the power of money (as well as resource problems) caused us to put a regional rep in there, and I mentioned the Southwest where the reverse condition was true. Well, the time came for another one, and we put that person in Alaska, originally in 1969, in cooperation with the Wilderness Society, but that lasted less than a year. In 1970 we put in our own representative Jack Hession, who has been there ever since. Alaska is the outstanding example of a place where we had an enormous amount of natural resources and very few chapter members and comparatively few workers among those chapter members. Then we had a similar condition in the northern Great Plains area where Bruce Hamilton is now the representative--a great many natural resource problems and comparatively few members.

We've had, and we still have, pressure to put regional reps in areas like Texas (the Lone Star Chapter has wanted one for some time), the Southeast where the different chapters of the Gulf Coast Regional Conservation Committee have stated they needed so badly a regional representative (there's been agitation down there for nine to ten years), and in New England where they have asked for one for just about the same length of time. The club hasn't got the money and in those areas have a very strong volunteer organization with volunteers who do a very good job. Some day we'll fill in all the gaps.

Wayburn: We do have one exception, and that is in New York where Neil Goldstein is stationed, not so much as a regional representative but as a national representative who makes contact with the national media and who goes down to Washington not infrequently to lobby and who is associated with the international committee, so that he is in a multiple-liaison job.

Lage: Does all this hang together administratively fairly well?

Wayburn: It's a complex structure and it hangs together. It could hang together better if it were a more regular structure, but the club has been empirical during its growth, and it's taken on what seemed to be the things that it had to take on at the moment. Very few of those things have been dropped.

I should mention one more regional representative, who is in the Midwest; he covers ten or more states and represents a middle ground between areas where we have a lot of members and areas where we have comparatively few members and more problems in natural resources.

It's not a perfect organizational setup by any means, but it's one which has grown in response to needs and which is functioning, I think, pretty well when you consider the vast expansion of the club in the past fifteen years.

Lage: It seems like you have interrelationships between staff and volunteers at all these levels, and yet the staff is still under the direction of San Francisco.

Wayburn: That's correct, in line authority. In policy authority and in working together, if you will, they are perhaps more closely allied to the regional conservation committees.

Lage: Do their territories cover the same ground; is the southwestern rep the same ground as the Southwestern Regional Conservation Committee?

Wayburn: In that case it is, and in the Northwest it is. In the Midwest I think it is pretty well. This is part of the reason that New England and Gulf Coast want regional representatives. It probably is not that they [the volunteers] would do any less work, but they would be able to cover more work.

Financial Turmoil and Staff Morale in the Early Seventies

Wayburn: Let's turn to an item that you had in your first paragraph, "dealing with financial problems" [reading from interview outline]: "How effective were the new Executive Committee and the board in the early 1970s?" In one word, overwhelmed. The board inherited financial problems not of its making.

As you know, Brower was suspended and let out because of the known insubordination and fiscal irresponsibility. What the board didn't know was that many more financial commitments had been made in its name that it didn't know about but gradually discovered and felt obligated to pay. This was particularly true in what was found out about the London office and about a motion picture on Aldabra Island in the Indian Ocean.

Lage: These things were far enough along that you felt you had to honor the commitments?

Wayburn: Yes. A commitment had been made by an agent of the Sierra Club. This was what I referred to in our earlier talk as the "ostensible agent," a term emphasized to us by Dick Sill, who was one of the people most deeply concerned. There were various commitments, particularly on books; people who had been paid royalties, who expected more royalties; and arrangements on books with, I think, both the printers and publishers and authors, which were interpreted one way by Brower and another way by the people on the outside.

The board found itself getting deeper and deeper in debt, and at one time in the early seventies estimated it had a negative net worth. There were some very tumultuous meetings in which proposals were made that the club go into bankruptcy or that it get rid of all its staff or that it not enter into any new ventures, that it drop conservation work. All sorts of proposals were made. Particularly with a group of new directors who themselves didn't know anything about what they were getting into, there was a great deal of turmoil, but we managed to muddle through and gradually come out of it.

Lage: Now, would you say that the problems were really directly attributable to Brower, or was some of it rate of membership growth decline?

Wayburn: No, the rate of membership growth continued through the early seventies.

Lage: At some point the coupon members [those who joined by sending in coupons from the newspaper ads] didn't renew, and I think it was--

Wayburn: Yes. Coupon members didn't renew. A large number of first-year members, no matter from coupons or other causes, did not renew. New members continued to come in by the thousands, but the dropout rate grew higher and higher. From a dropout rate of around 3 percent in 1950, it went up to a dropout rate of 25 percent in the early seventies. That was one of the things that caused the financial difficulties because Brower, particularly, and all of us including most of our staff, had been lulled by the enormous amount of new money coming in with new members. Incidentally, we didn't realize that the new member did not contribute as much financially during his first year as he did each year after that, because there were certain expenses in connection with each new member.

Well, we'll say there was a gradual improvement, but during the first half of the seventies it was not easy.

Lage: What role did you take in the more extreme suggestions? Were these seriously considered, and what role did you take in replying to them?

Wayburn: They were more or less seriously considered, depending upon what was what. I think I continued to stand in the middle, saying that we had to go on with our conservation efforts, that's what we had to do, that we could not drop what we were doing, that we'd have to do it as inexpensively as possible, but that there were certain things that we couldn't drop. A majority of the board took that attitude.

The books program, which was the one which had brought us so much fame and attention and members and expense, was the first to take a severe tumble, and very few books were published during that time.

Lage: Did the volunteers have to get involved a lot in the publication of the books? When you look at those early books right after Brower, it seems like the volunteers stepped in a bit.

Wayburn: Yes, I think that's true, that the publications committee had to get in and do more.

John Mitchell was hired as the books editor and stayed on only a couple of years. He is a superb writer and a good editor, but he was no man for this job, and he knew it better than any one else. He did get out a few notable books, and he left others for his successor, Jon Beckmann, to produce, books which should have come out sooner. I'm thinking at this moment of the Alaska book, which was scheduled for 1973 or maybe '72 and finally got out in '74 under Beckmann.

Lage: What was McCloskey's part in all this, dealing with these administrative problems?

Wayburn: McCloskey had been conservation director. He was suddenly elevated to staff director, not by his choosing but he was very willing. The directors at that time were very apprehensive about having any executive director because of what they had found an executive director could do (incidentally, just the opposite of the attitude the present board is taking), and they wanted to have definite control. So they made McCloskey staff director.

Lage: Did you share these views, the kind of fear of putting more power in the executive director?

Wayburn: [meditatively] No, I don't think so. I felt that we had had a most unusual circumstance, but that a strong president could control this with a board that would stand behind him; that there was a growing need for an executive director of the staff; that the board of directors should not be concerning themselves with staff problems per se; that this in itself was a mistake, just as the staff trying to control the volunteer portion too much was a mistake.

McCloskey did everything he was supposed to do, taking a very heavy load but handling it with extreme delicacy. A year later the board had confidence enough in him so that it made him executive director; he took on distinctly more authority as executive director. McCloskey is a real organizational man. I mean, to me the new title was just an extension of what he had done, but to him the title made a great deal of difference. I remember him standing up before the board, having on a three-piece suit (and I don't remember when he had on a three-piece suit before), and buttoning up his vest, and saying that now that he had this title of executive director he would expect the board to act a little differently, and he would act a little differently. The details of that I don't remember, but the image is still very vivid in my mind, and this was 1970.

The staff was at a low ebb at that time and he built it up. When I say "at a low ebb," it was at a low ebb in morale and had fewer people than it had had during the latter part of Brower's tenancy.

Lage: You lost a lot of staff at the time Brower--

Wayburn: We lost a lot of staff. Some resigned in sympathy with Dave; others were let out because it was felt that they could not work for the club, that they had a primary loyalty to Dave.

##

Wayburn: I would like to fill in the numbers on the size of the staff at the end of the Brower era, post-Brower, and currently. Cliff Rudden would be the best man to know.

Lage: I'll try to get those figures.*

I think it would be important for you to give your opinion of how the tone of the staff leadership or the relationship with volunteers has changed because those things aren't in the financial records.

Wayburn: You've got here [referring to interview outline]--the 1971 furor over the possibility of a paid president. I could take that first and then go on with staff because it's related.

Lage: Okay, let's do that.

Wayburn: McCloskey had just begun to feel his way through his first year as the executive director under Phil Berry when the 1971 elections and election of officers came around. By this time Phil had become extremely interested in the affairs of the club. He was personally involved; he had been personally involved for years. He started going on high trips as a boy. He was almost like an adopted son to Dave Brower, and he was one of those who was elected originally supporting Brower, but as he found out what was going on he became strongly anti-Brower. But there were likenesses between the two individuals: both strong-minded, charismatic, capable of presenting a case very well. Both would get into something very deeply and pursue it in their own fashion, and in that time would let other things go.

Phil, as I mentioned, did a magnificent job in his first year of reuniting the club factions, and then in his second year he got tied up with this lawsuit. At the end of two years he was ready to step down as president, but he wanted to go on with the club. He felt he couldn't afford to be the unpaid or partially paid president of the club; he had been making much more in his law practice.

*The Sierra Club's payroll department supplied the following figures on the number and gross earnings of the staff:

<u>Year-to-Date Gross Earnings</u>	<u>Number of Employees On Payroll at 12/31</u>
@ 12/31/68 - \$ 428,657.76	72
@ 12/31/70 - \$ 580,552.06	93
@ 12/15/80 - \$2,556,031.84	179

Wayburn: Ray Sherwin, who was next in line as president, was elected [in May 1971] and said that he didn't want any compensation, but in turn he would not be able to devote the time to the presidency that Berry had, and proposed that Berry be made executive vice-president of the club, a paid position. That had quite a bit of support among the directors. I was strongly opposed to that and organized the opposition to it within the directors.

Lage: It seems almost a parallel position to the executive director.

Wayburn: He would be executive vice-president in charge of the executive director. I didn't see any other way it could be, although there were representations made that it would be parallel and that he would do things that McCloskey couldn't and McCloskey would continue to handle the conservation aspects of the club. But this, to me, was fraught with difficulties. I remember leaving the room where this meeting was in executive session. Our second-level troops were outside while hour after hour the directors were closeted by themselves. They were very restless, and I remember talking to some of them. When they heard what the idea was, they were against it too, but still this idea was strong among the directors. I'm not sure that we settled the issue that evening.

I can remember talking with McCloskey privately and telling him that he should not bow down to this, that he should say that he would continue as executive director, but he could not see any reason that there should be anyone between him and the board of directors.

Lage: Was he in on the executive session?

Wayburn: No, no. I felt very strongly about the matter, and I think that I held his back straight.

Lage: What might have been his reaction? To accept it, do you think, or to quit?

Wayburn: He had originally said that he could accept it although he didn't like it.

Lage: Now, what was your main objection to the plan?

Wayburn: Well, I thought it would create havoc and sooner or later it would all blow up.

Wayburn: Technically, it was allegedly related to something that I had started in about 1962 when I had an assistant. Dave Pesonen was one of those for a short time. The reason for the position at that time was because the president was unable to get work accomplished through the executive director. The executive director would have his own agenda; the president and the board would have its agenda; and it was felt necessary for the board, acting through its president, to have someone who could do the job.

Well, Pesonen very quickly pointed out--he said, "I can't do this. I mean, I'm down there in the club office working with Dave, and I'm supposed to be doing something else." So he didn't continue with it.

We had a couple more people. McCloskey was originally brought down by Siri in 1965, possibly '66, to be assistant to the president and then was detailed in large part to me for the redwood campaign; he worked closely in the redwood campaign with me, and Brower kept out of it.

Later, when I took back the presidency in 1967, I said that if I were to be at all successful I had to have an assistant. John Flannery was hired and stayed for a year or a year and a half as assistant to the president to carry out the wishes of the board and the president because the executive director did not.

Now, on the other hand, we had an executive director who carried out all the wishes of the board, whose avowed objective was to fulfill the agenda of the board. Therefore, there was no need of interposing anyone else, and I say that Sherwin and Berry were trying to do this.

Changes in the Delicate Balance Between Staff and Volunteer

Lage: Do you think Sherwin and Berry didn't have as much trust in McCloskey as you did?

Wayburn: I think, yes, that's true. I have always felt McCloskey could do the job very thoroughly. He has borne this out. He has taken on a little more authority every year and done it in such a quiet manner that the board has increasingly delegated more and more of its authority to him. As we've had more and more new members of the board who didn't know the history of the club and the board-staff relationship, he's taken on more responsibility formerly borne by volunteers, until, as Berry pointed out in his farewell speech of this term, there could be a distinct danger of the staff taking over from the board.

Lage: Is Berry going off this term?

Wayburn: Berry has to go off because he's had two consecutive three-year terms. I think he'll come back later.

The staff has since 1970 grown incrementally until now, I think, if you count all of the people in San Francisco, Sacramento, Washington, and the different regional areas, it has well over 150 members. And there's always a push for more. Right now the push is to try to get regional representatives in at least two more regions; three regions would like representatives.

The staff has a distinct life apart from the volunteer portion of the club. Automatically each staff member has the opportunity to become a member of the club without cost. (This was not true until a couple of years ago.) The staff goes off on retreats of its own, planning what its next year's work should be, and I think probably indulging in self-criticism of what it has done during the past year. For example, this year, after the Washington meeting of the board on the seventh and eighth of February, the staff had a full week of retreat. Not all of the members could be there all the time. The particular emphasis this time was on improving public relations of the Sierra Club and how the staff, both in Washington and in the field, could do this.

Lage: And no volunteer leaders are present at that?

Wayburn: No volunteer leaders at all, not even the president.

As this has developed, the outside public recognizes the executive director more and more as the voice of the Sierra Club. Invitations to speak, to write, to be members of national committees or international committees or to join with organizations come into the Sierra Club office and are handled by the executive director. Some of these are given to the president of the club or sometimes to some other volunteer who is known to have a dominant interest in a particular conservation project, but for the most part they become staff solutions.

Lage: How strong a role does staff take in determining the policy the board accepts? I know they recommend.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Is that pretty much accepted?

Wayburn: Up to date, the staff has only recommended. But this year, perhaps for the first time, the recommendations were almost set in stone, and the board accepted most of them. There were some distinct objections,

Wayburn: particularly from older members such as Berry and Wayburn; it was explained that the priorities were necessary to enable the Washington staff to plan and carry out its agenda.

Lage: What types of policy now are we discussing?

Wayburn: We're talking about conservation policies, what campaigns we should press and have as our major campaigns.

Lage: Now, when you say it's "set in stone," you mean they've already taken the steps or--?

Wayburn: Well, they've taken some steps, but they could be changed.

At the end of the last Congress, for various reasons, certain of our Washington staff dropped off. Barbara Blake, who was covering Alaska matters, quit to spend a year with her family and to go to Israel. I think that the two members who were covering energy are both leaving (I know one is), and we were short on public lands, and we needed someone to cover clean air more.

The staff hired three more people and left one position blank because of a lack of funds; those people were hired with an expertise in certain fields which had been chosen as campaign priorities.

Lage: By the staff.

Wayburn: By the staff. And I know I brought up the fact that one priority that we should take on, that we had been talking about for fifteen years and hadn't done anything about, that was most important and would perhaps be more important this year, was representation before the appropriations and finance committees of the Congress. It was pointed out to me that if that were the case we should have hired an entirely different sort of person and dropped one of the people that we did hire for a specific kind of conservation job. Well, I know that; I knew that beforehand. But I pointed out that this was a case where perhaps top staff and volunteers should combine to fill the gap, to start to fill the gap. After a discussion, the need was recognized in principle but was not included in the priority projects. It was, however, in what you might call the legislative history, so that attention will be paid to it.

I also pointed out that, after having been for four years the mega-campaign of the club in which everyone participated, Alaska was not mentioned among the eleven priority campaigns, and that it was a mistake to think that Alaska was now safe. It was going to take more,

Wayburn: and if we didn't get the additive funds by the grant that we were trying to get, it might be necessary to assign more personnel to this. Again, this was admitted, but Alaska wasn't put on that list of priorities.

Building Up the Club's Washington Office

Wayburn: In this buildup of staff, it's not only been in quantity; it's been in quality and in special talents. Originally the Washington office, for example, was started on a shoestring. We employed Bill Zimmerman on a half-time basis in the late fifties, and then we employed Lloyd Tupling on a full-time basis in the sixties. These were single individuals. We then got Tupling a secretary and then a part-time assistant. As we reached the seventies, Tupling felt that he had to retire. He had been the ideal man for us. He had been administrative assistant to both the Senators Neuberger of Oregon, he was a good conservationist, he knew Capitol Hill very well, and he could with a minimum of effort accomplish a great deal.

When it came time to replace him [in 1973], we had to figure out whom we could get. Was it possible to get anyone of comparable stature and ability from the ranks of recent retired senators or congressmen? We didn't see any such person. And then we also saw the need of tying someone--if we were going to build up a staff in Washington, of tying the head of that office into the Sierra Club central office per se.

We finally picked Brock Evans, who'd been our Northwest regional representative, to head a staff and with the avowed purpose of building up a staff in Washington because there were so many things that we had to cover.

He very rapidly built up the staff to almost the present strength. Brock is an extremely able advocate. He is an ideal type of convincer. He proved to have deficiencies as an administrator, and although we had a very good staff in Washington, the staff became unhappy. Some left; some were avowedly unhappy.

The first move to try to solve that was to take Chuck Clusen, who was one of the staff, and make him the associate director handling most of the staff. That worked only partially, and particularly after we started using Chuck almost full-time on our Alaska campaign; and then Chuck was stolen from us by the Wilderness Society.

Wayburn: But during the past couple of years a new system has evolved. I think it's to Mike's credit again; he took advantage of what he had and rearranged it. Brock has very notable abilities which can be used. He can talk to the VIPs; he can talk to other organizations; he can make liaisons within government, labor, management; and with all these talents he could be given the title of associate executive director and not have to do the administration of the Washington office.

I'd been instrumental in getting Brock to go to Washington. He didn't want to leave Seattle, but we thought he was the logical man to go back. I also, when this recent move was made, helped convince him that he should not accept it as a demotion but a promotion, doing something the Sierra Club had never done or been able to do before, and I think that the last year has proved this out. He's taken this on with his characteristic enthusiasm and he's done a great job. He's made connections, and he's caused the general public and the media and other organizations to look at the Sierra Club in a different light.

Lage: That's probably just what we need right now.

Wayburn: And then we had, working in the Washington office, John McComb, who had transferred from the southwest office a couple of years before because he wanted new challenges, who as time went on proved to be the best administrator, and who was able to make a number of good personal friends in the Congress, a good lobbyist.

But it was felt that we didn't want a director of the Washington office in competition with the associate conservation director in San Francisco, Paul Swatek. There had always been a certain amount of--not just competition but lack of understanding--lack of fitting together of the San Francisco and the Washington office, which Paul very freely admits now.

And then there was Doug Scott, who had succeeded Brock as Northwest representative, but who was getting restless in that job. Doug had come back to Washington increasingly, first for the Timber Supply Act and then on the Alaska bill and had proved himself as an extraordinary strategist in congressional campaigns, with the ability to lobby, organize campaigns (we didn't have anyone else who could do that), and with good management capabilities.

McCloskey rearranged this by taking Scott out of the Northwest office to bring him down to San Francisco as director of federal affairs, with the understanding he'd be almost half the time

Wayburn: in Washington or in the field; keeping Swatek as the conservation administrator (it's a big job to do, to administer the whole Conservation Department, and his jurisdiction includes the field representatives); and having McComb as the administrator of the Washington office.

Lage: And who does he report to?

Wayburn: The reporting is the thing that makes this work. The only ones who report directly to McCloskey are Evans, as associate executive director, and Scott, as director of federal affairs. In effect, Scott is the conservation director, but with emphasis on federal affairs, and both Swatek and McComb report to him. So this is an entirely new alignment.

Lage: Does it make more highly paid staff people as well?

Wayburn: It does make more highly paid staff people, and that is one of the reasons the costs of the staff have gone up. But it gives us a logical alignment suitable to the people themselves, and this so far has made for distinctly more effective work on the part of the club.

Lage: It sounds as if you recruit very able and highly effective staff members and you have to have some place for them to go, to advance.

Wayburn: That is correct. That's right.

XIV THE CLUB'S MISSION AND ITS MECHANISM, 1970s

[Interview 11: February 27, 1981]##

Implications of Limiting Directors' Terms: A Green Board

Lage: Today is February 27, 1981, and we're continuing the interview with Edgar Wayburn. We talked last time about changes in the relationship between the staff and the board over the past decade. Are there other broad changes we should discuss in the internal affairs of the club, such as the quality of the volunteer leadership or the operations of the board?

Wayburn: In the years '69 to '72, the decision was made to limit terms of the directors to two consecutive three-year terms. This was at first interpreted to mean that when a director had served for six years he would no longer be in the leadership of the club. When the nominating committees had the opportunity to present candidates for the board, they did not at first include any director who had had six years.

At the same time, there were a great many upwardly mobile people coming from the chapters and from the new regional conservation committees. This led to a change in the character of the club leadership.

Lage: Let me just interrupt one second. How did you feel about that bylaw change at the time?

Wayburn: I opposed it vigorously at the time. I thought it incongruous that it should be proposed by people who had themselves served for thirty years or more as directors. The leader of this was Dick Leonard, who had served for thirty-three or thirty-four years and who apparently rather suddenly decided that he was finished with the leadership of

Wayburn: the club, although not really, because there are times ten years later when he steps back in to try to influence what is happening in the leadership. But Dick took the attitude that the old people had served long enough. I don't think he thought this out too clearly, nor do I think Ansel Adams, who was his principal supporter, thought it out too clearly. Ansel likewise had served over thirty years.

The argument was: "We need to get rid of the deadwood." And there were one or two people on the board at that time who had been reelected, who had name recognition enough so that they would continue to be reelected, and they were deadwood. But the majority of the directors serving from before '69 and after '69 were people who had been tried and had been through the crucible of the bad years, and they were in large part proved conservationists, and there were several of them with national reputations--which the Sierra Club needed. Yet those people, once they were out and no longer had the advantage of incumbency, would have had very great difficulty in being reelected again, and the new rules were aligned against them.

The new people who came on, a rush of new people who came on in the early seventies, made for a very green board, and there was considerable difficulty from this aspect. There were a number of new issues which compounded the difficulties. It was a time when new people aspired to the highest offices in the club, particularly the presidency, and they had to learn on the job because they had not had previous experience. These were people who came up from the chapter leadership or from the regional conservation committees, rarely from the council.

In some ways, it's interesting that we all worked together as well as we did, but there were times when outside organizations and outside commentators would comment: "There's the Sierra Club fighting itself again."

Lage: So this would carry over into conservation concerns?

Wayburn: It carried over comparatively little into conservation concerns because those were studied either by volunteers in their own region or in their own issue committee, or by staff, or by both, and just presented to the board as something which should be done. The board was still composed of good conservationists, despite the lack of experience in operations, and the board would accept those things. It would usually take a conservation topic a very short time to be passed on. New policies were being made with comparative ease. It was the internal workings of the club which took up a great deal of time.

Wayburn: One could not predict, really, who was going to be elected to the board. The nominations were sometimes, well, let's say interesting, but on the whole they presented people who had been prominent in chapters or who had been chairmen of the regional conservation committees and who had name recognition in a certain part of the country. But still it was interesting who was elected. There were often people elected from very small chapters and from parts of the country where there were very few members, so I don't know where their nationwide support came from.

Lage: Was any trend observed? I would think that the ballot statements would have an effect because so many members really don't even know the names of local leaders.

Wayburn: That's right. I don't know how much effect the ballot statements had.

Lage: You couldn't pick up a trend?

Wayburn: Certainly, at times, every ballot statement would tell you what a good conservationist the candidate was.

Lage: Well, some stressed fiscal responsibility; some stressed boldness.

Wayburn: That's right. The people who stressed wilderness probably were more likely to be elected than the people who stressed fiscal responsibility. That was an interesting fact. We lost some of our best board members, whom we needed at a time when fiscal responsibility was needed badly, because they stressed their business experience.

It was very difficult in such times to know how to choose out of the body of candidates. I made certain observations. One was that a woman had much more of a chance of being elected than ever before. Whereas I think there was usually no more than one woman on the board, and on one occasion two, prior to 1970, after that there were one or two women elected every election, and one of the advantages for a candidate was to be female. I think we have five, possibly six, women members of the board at the present time.

Lage: But still no woman president.

Wayburn: There has still been no woman president.

Lage: In modern times. Aurelia Harwood was president one year [1927-1928].

Wayburn: Correct.

Wayburn: I personally found this new system--well, I don't know just what to call it--"interesting" might be used as a word again. After being a member of the board for eighteen years or so, I had served out my six years, and I was not renominated.

Lage: You had to take a year off.

Wayburn: I had to take a year off and then was not renominated the following year. They had not renominated anyone, and they were making no exception for me either. I ran by petition and was reelected. The same thing happened the next year; when Phil Berry was not renominated, he ran by petition. We were the only two of the old board to come back, and I think there have been no others since then.

Lage: Haven't there been times when after only three years a director isn't renominated, or is that usually for good cause?

Wayburn: There have been times after three years when a director has not been renominated. Certainly, that's for good cause in certain people who were not carrying their weight and in some cases were disrupting the proceedings of the directors. Finally, this year two very good incumbent members were not renominated by the nominating committee and are running by petition. I don't know the logic of the nominating committee.

Lage: It seems the nominating committee really is an independent body. Is that correct?

Wayburn: The nominating committee is an independent body and should remain that way. The ease of getting on the ballot by petition tends to invalidate what the nominating committee may have in mind. As I mentioned, both of the incumbents who are eligible have been nominated by petition. It's a very easy thing; only one hundred members can put someone on the ballot.

Lage: Would you want to make any specific comments on--talking about individuals even--how the newer individuals differ in terms of their priorities or their capabilities from the "giants," as I think we referred to the older generation earlier?

Wayburn: Yes. This has been commented on by a number of people, and I think it's true that the people who were directors in the fifties and sixties included a number of people with national reputations, people who'd been through the crucible of national affairs, who had achieved recognition outside the Sierra Club, members like Paul Brooks, the author, and vice-president of Houghton-Mifflin publishers; Luna Leopold,

Wayburn: the chief hydrologist of the United States; William O. Douglas, Supreme Court justice of the United States. People like that were nominated and elected.

In this new system we have, there is a great deal of pressure for people who have been through a smaller crucible, if you will, on a regional or chapter basis, then coming onto the national scene. Many of those people, perhaps all of them, are good conservationists. They're without the experience that had been had by the other people, and yet I think it would be extremely difficult now to elect a person with a national reputation outside the Sierra Club. The opportunity hasn't come up; the nominating committee hasn't put up anyone, so I don't know. Some people have commented that I'm at this point the only person with a national reputation left among the directors.

Lage: And that must relate in some way to what you said last time about the fact that more and more invitations to speak come to the executive director, who is the nationally known figure.

Wayburn: Yes, almost all of them do. He is nationally known and rising.

Lage: I'm assuming you're saying the new people are not as capable. Do you mean in leadership, leading the board?

Wayburn: I'm not saying they're not as capable. I'm saying that they're less experienced and that the board/staff relationships have taken a distinct turn, with the staff becoming more dominant, the staff being longer in office and much more stable now, and the directors changing rather rapidly--although in the past few years there have been a few directors who have come back after their year out and run. Some have not been elected; some have been. I recall a past president, Bill Futrell, who ran again, who was nominated by the nominating committee, I think, the first one who was, and who was reelected to the board. This year there are other people making that effort.

Wayburn's Focus on Policies, Not Procedures##

Wayburn: Let's say the board members have been green and growing.

Lage: [chuckles] Have you yourself had any desire to go back to being an officer? You actually haven't been an officer since the early seventies, have you?

Wayburn: That's right.

Lage: Is that by your own preference?

Wayburn: From 1959 to 1971, I was either president or vice-president of the club every year: five years as president, seven years as vice-president. In 1971 or '72, I became president of the trustees of the Sierra Club Foundation, and I felt, as others did, that I shouldn't hold an executive officership in both organizations, that there could come up a conflict of interest which would be generated in that way. I didn't think that there was a conflict with my job as a director and as president of the foundation.

I was interested, as I said earlier, in having the presidency of the Sierra Club at a time when I didn't have to run with such heavy internal agenda as I had with Dave Brower. Club volunteer/staff relationships were on an entirely different schedule and keel when Mike McCloskey took over, and I would like to have been president in the early seventies. However, as time went on, and as I got more and more outside responsibilities for the club, I gave up the desire to have an inside executive role in the club. As the seventies went by, my role in the club developed as one of the few outside directors, presenting the club on the national scene principally. Earlier I had much more interest in the state scene, but there wasn't time for me to do both. Earlier I was concerned with Forest Service matters to a much greater extent, and in recent years it's been largely with national park issues, except in Alaska, which goes across the whole spectrum of the bureaucracies.

I've felt that I've had quite enough to do for the club in this external role, more than I really could do, and I think that there is recognition on the part of other people as well as myself that I can be of more use. As the years have passed, I've made connections with people on the national scene which have been valuable to the club. We can talk about that another time.

Lage: Right.

Wayburn: I just wanted to say that as far as the club directorate is concerned, I have by choice been an outside director and taken comparatively little part in the management of the hierarchy of the club.

Lage: Yes. So you've been interested in the mission of the club and not in the internal mechanism.

Wayburn: In the mission rather than the mechanism (there are many mechanisms that the club can use to fulfill its mission), and in the policies rather than the procedures.

Lage: Yes. I think the club needs that, from reading the board minutes.
[laughter]

Wayburn: Yes. I often grow appalled at the amount of time we take up with procedure rather than policy, and mechanism rather than mission.

Lage: And do you think that has to do with its being a green board?

Wayburn: That has to do on a considerable extent with the board not knowing what its role is and how to manage it, and with each new director coming up with different ideas, and with certain directors having to talk on every subject that comes up.

Lage: And maybe coming up with new ideas that really aren't new ideas but have been hashed over.

Wayburn: That's right! Many's the time when I've turned to someone who knew and said, "I have the sense of *déjà vu*."

Lage: [laughter] I can imagine!

##

A Broadening of the Conservation Agenda

Lage: Between the old guard and the new guard do you see a difference in outlook or priorities?

Wayburn: Broadly speaking, I think not. Broadly speaking, the new people are just as devoted to conservation ideals as the old people were. There has been a change in what is considered conservation. This can be divided in several ways. There is the traditional "conservation" (you can put quotes around that if you want), which is around the saving of the land for future generations of humans and, as we understood more, saving it for the sake of the biosphere itself as well as the human element of the biosphere. My own work has been largely in that; that's what I've thought of mostly. There is, secondly, the recognition that if one were going to save land, one had to save the water running through it and the air above it, and these became (have been) prime issues of the club for the past fifteen years or so. Thirdly, there was a recognition of the fact that man, with exponentially increasing population, could have such a marked effect on the biosphere that he was himself an element of destruction. Fourthly, increasing industrialization, big industrialization, created big pollution, so that one could no longer rely on dilution

Wayburn: effect alone; pollution must be controlled. Fifthly, came other "survival issues" which the club has gotten into in a big way and which are necessary corollaries of what we started out with.

Lage: Has this move to the broader issues been opposed? Have you felt any opposition to it? Did the board come reluctantly along?

Wayburn: There has always been opposition, but in general I think the club has with enthusiasm thrashed its way into new issues. New issues were usually brought up by a single individual or a small group but were rather quickly recognized after some study to be something that the club should get itself involved in. I don't believe that this has been a problem.

The club has been accused, as it has grown larger, of being too slow, being too bureaucratic. I don't think that's a valid criticism. Well, maybe it is a valid criticism in that it keeps the club in the main line of conservation, sometimes way out front, sometimes lagging a little back, but usually on the cutting edge. Specific organizations like Zero Population Growth have taken the lead on population issues, as is quite right. The Sierra Club is a very broad-based organization with its prime interest still in the protection of the natural scene. It can't lead on too many issues and still remain a strong central organization. We haven't the funds enough. We haven't the people enough. We would become, I think, too much divided if that were the case. But we have subdivisions which keep the club's interest high in such things as population control, international conservation, pollution control.

Choosing Priority Issues: Nuclear War and the MX Missile

Lage: What do you think of the criticism that the club is too far-flung and should stick more to its core of interests?

Wayburn: I disagree with that. We have a core, and we always go back to it in the choosing of priority issues. This year, for example, the original outline which the staff put out didn't have what you might call nature protection in it. From a wide variety of sources came that demand, and it ended up as the number one issue of the club.

Lage: Was the staff recommendation modified before it came to the board or after discussion during the board session?

Wayburn: It was modified. Well, what happened was the executive director got an original outline from staff and from some volunteers and sent out a prospectus, and it was not on this original prospectus, but it soon got in in the second phase, and before the final phase of priorities was drawn up it was right there.

We don't pay as much attention to certain issues as some of us would like to see us pay. But as I indicated, there are so many issues and each of them is so important that it sometimes becomes difficult to give priority.

Recently, for example, there has been widespread interest in what would be the effects of nuclear conflict. Everyone agrees that these are absolutely disastrous, completely. This has been popularized within the Sierra Club, particularly by an interview you may have seen in the Yodeler with Dr. Helen Caldicott, one of the principal people working on this. There are individuals who feel that we should drop everything else.

Well, there's no question that this is of paramount interest. If we have nuclear war, particularly, the medical consequences are beyond survival. Now, at the same time I have introduced a resolution into the California Medical Association that the medical association make a study of the medical consequences of nuclear war and make public recommendations. I am saying that this issue is not for the Sierra Club to choose as its top priority, even though many of the things we're working on are not of the same mammoth proportions. Yet, if we don't pay attention to what we have been paying attention to, if we escape nuclear war we still wouldn't have a planet worth living on.

To a certain extent this is a case of the shoemaker sticking to his last. He can use leather or corfam, he can make low quarters or high boots, but he perhaps should stay with footwear.

##

Wayburn: The quote from John Muir--of course, the club always goes back to John Muir--about everything being hitched to everything else,* is probably more relevant today than it was in that day. The stakes have grown so much higher, and the conflicts are interrelated to such an extent that it is often hard to decide what you're going to concentrate on.

*"When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe."

Lage: The MX missile is a good example where the club has taken an interest in a defense-related issue.

Wayburn: That's correct. The MX missile is a prime example of an instrument of war, on the one hand; costing untold billions of dollars, on the other hand; and destroying the terrain of the planet, on the third hand. So we have every reason to be opposed to the MX missile.

Lage: Will this question of nuclear conflict become a club concern? It can be a concern without being a priority.

Wayburn: That's right. It is a concern, I think, without any question, and it has to be a concern of every thinking person. How much attention the club, with its less than 200,000 membership and its widespread environmental concerns otherwise, can give to this issue as a club is questionable. This is why I said that I, as a club director, would not want the club to have this as a primary concern as much as I would the California Medical Association because of the medical consequences.

Lage: But won't you have more trouble convincing the California Medical Association than you would the club directors?

Wayburn: Oh, yes, that's right. But at the same time the club has got so much to do. One issue like this can take up the whole of the club's attention and not only be an awfully big job for an organization like the club, but also, I'm afraid, cause a great deal of conflict within the club because there are some people who are very good land-protection conservationists who don't understand that nuclear power can destroy all that we are working for.

Recently I read in one of our fifty chapter newsletters a pro and con on nuclear power. An ex-chapter chairman had proposed that coal killed more people than nuclear power, and the answer to him was that he just didn't know what he was talking about, that you could control the damage that's done by coal and you can't control the damage that's done by the waste from nuclear power.

Views on Energy Issues and Nuclear Power

Lage: So there's still conflict in the grassroots over the issue of nuclear power, not even nuclear weapons.

Wayburn: That's right, yes, and it comes up very frequently.

Lage: And yet opposition to nuclear power is still a club major concern, is it not, as an energy issue?

Wayburn: Yes. It has to be because energy in the broad sense is such a massive concern of so many people. We have gotten used to having massive amounts of energy furnished to us for so many things in our daily lives, and we don't want to be deprived of any of it. The public listens to arguments that conservation of energy can solve the problem and doesn't believe it. At our highest levels of governmental politics the president states that, yes, conservation is a very fine thing, and we should do everything we can for conservation, but still we need to have all this energy, and we've got to have more.

Needless to say, I disagree with that argument. I thought we were living quite well in the 1950s and that we had plenty of energy in the 1960s, but what happened was that there was the invention of more instruments to use energy, and so we followed through, making use of Peter's Principle, to expand the amount of energy we were using.

Lage: And that we think we need now.

Wayburn: And that we think we need. We have, it's quite true, in the past few years become aware of this to some extent. In today's paper I read that we in the United States are using less gasoline than we've used since 1976, although we have more people and more cars; but still we use a great deal more gasoline than we used in 1965 and 1970.

Lage: We've talked about the relation of the broader issues to traditional conservation and something of your development of your point of view. I am interested in the development of your anti-nuclear views. Was there a turning point in that? I know we've talked to other members of the club about how they came to be against nuclear energy.

Wayburn: Yes. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the peaceful use of nuclear power was the bright hope of mankind. We saw only the good in it; we didn't know the consequences. In medicine this occurs time and time again. A new drug is brought out. If it is powerful enough to help someone or to cure an illness, it's widely used; the use goes up, the impression of what it can do goes up; and then we find that there are what are known in medicine as side effects, which means, again, that everything is hitched to everything else. If something is powerful enough to make a change in one way, it is unlikely that it will not make other changes that you don't look for.

- Wayburn: This is the case in nuclear energy. In the fifties, we thought that nuclear energy could only do good, and there was rapid development of it. By the early sixties we began to have doubts, but still we thought that nuclear plants could be located where they would not be harmful. The problem of nuclear waste had not become a big one in our minds at that time. I think we've talked about the Diablo controversy.
- Lage: Yes.
- Wayburn: I originally, after looking as carefully as I, with my lay sense, could, felt that Will Siri's judgment should be trusted on that and voted for allowing PG&E to build the Diablo Canyon plant. I found out later that officials of PG&E had lied to me, but this was some time later. Today I personally wouldn't okay the PG&E plant at Diablo Canyon.
- Lage: Of course, you probably weren't even thinking about nuclear power when you were making that decision. Were you considering it? Fred Eissler, I know, was.
- Wayburn: Yes. The original power plant along the coast at the Nipomo Dunes was supposed to be fossil fuel energy, but, if my memory serves me right, by the time the site was moved to Diablo Canyon it was either definitely or probably scheduled to be a nuclear plant.
- Lage: I think it was definitely nuclear, but I thought that most of the club leaders weren't considering the nuclear issue, were just considering the site, the scenic site.
- Wayburn: That's right.
- Lage: So even then you didn't recognize the dangers.
- Wayburn: Didn't recognize the dangers of nuclear power at that time, and particularly of nuclear waste.
- Lage: Can you recall how you came to be more concerned? Was there a particular individual or reading that influenced you?
- Wayburn: This happened over a period of years, and I don't recall any particular issue which came up. My mind gradually changed.
- Lage: By the time the club voted for a nuclear moratorium--I think it was '73.
- Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: By that time were you fully in support of that?

Wayburn: Oh, definitely, definitely. And before that.

Attention to Inner City and Labor Issues

Lage: How about the issue of including more urban concerns on the club agenda? Bill Futrell seemed to be in the forefront of that.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Has that been an area where it took some change of mind on your part to accept, or have you always--?

Wayburn: No, that didn't take any change of mind; this was a matter of emphasis. Back in the fifties when I was making talks to club leaders, I can remember making a talk in Southern California on wilderness and saying that the path to the wilderness led right up to our backyard, that we needed to find mechanisms to protect wilderness, and one of those, or a principal one in the protection of wilderness, was to find places for people to have recreation close to their homes and to be able to have open space close to the cities and, if possible, in the cities.

Now, Futrell's issues went beyond that, but long before Futrell I had, in my conceptions and battles for the San Francisco metropolitan area, conceived of very close-in recreational areas, open-space areas; and the premier big urban park is the Golden Gate National Recreation Area-Point Reyes National Seashore complex, which comes right into San Francisco. The citizens' organization promoting the park, People for Golden Gate National Recreation Area, had a small offshoot of people deeply interested in the inner cities. Part of our push was to have a place for people who lived in the inner city to go to. Part of the reason for including the Fort Funston, Ocean Beach, Land's End, and Fort Mason areas was that people in a poverty situation, a poor economic situation, or a situation where they didn't want to go outside the city for any reason, could go by public transportation to open space, which, in this case, was a national park.

Lage: Do you recall some of the people in that group who were particularly interested in inner cities?

Wayburn: Yes. The first leaders that I know were a couple, man and wife, Duff and Mary Em LaBoyteaux. They were the first two people who brought that into our steering committee of People for Golden Gate National Recreation Area, and they were trying to do it with the Bay Chapter of the Sierra Club. They became divorced. He carried on and for several years was the leader of the inner city outings movement in San Francisco and was one of the people who spread the movement wide outside of San Francisco. I think at the same time that the San Francisco Bay Chapter had its inner city outings, a couple of other cities and chapters had the same idea. Whether it started here and spread from here, or started simultaneously in other cities, I don't know, but I was close to it.

Once again, I didn't take the lead. I approved of what they were doing, and that's been my attitude on many of the newer developments in the Sierra Club. As long as there are related issues, and there are people willing and able to carry them out, I'm for them. I've fostered a number of these.

I recall, for example, the coastal issue. It must have been about five years ago. We were having a meeting of the board of directors in southern California at Harwood Lodge. Shirley Taylor--who is a Florida conservationist, very active there, and who is now a regional vice-president and chairman of the Gulf Coast Conservation Committee--and one or two other people had thought that the club should take on the coast as a primary issue.

There was a good deal of discussion in the board of directors saying we already had too many issues, and it was just at that time that we had made Alaska the mega-issue, and that was my personal one. But at the board meeting I made the argument that here we had a group of people who were not asking for club funds (at first), who were willing to go out and do the work themselves, and that we shouldn't in any way hold them back. So I moved a resolution that we make the coast a priority issue, even though we were not furnishing any or much funds for it, and the argument carried; we did. It's been such an issue since then.

There's been a tremendous amount of work done by Sierra Club people, inside and outside of coalitions, on a national scale, and on statewide scales. I think that has helped with such specific issues as the barrier islands legislation. Although it has not yet passed as we want it to pass, it is a prominent issue in the 97th Congress right now. Senator Dale Bumpers and Congressman Phillip Burton both have bills in. The bills are a little different, but either one would give protection to the barrier islands. Incidentally, there is another principle here that everyone doesn't see. It would take away

Wayburn: government subsidies for relief of areas which should not be built on in the first place, and this, I think, will spread to river bottoms as well as to seacoast areas.

Lage: Now, that's something Reagan should be able to have some sympathy with, but I wonder if he will.

Wayburn: Yes, very definitely should, because government subsidies take up a great deal of money, and often this escapes attention when we talk about our national debt and how we run it up. Government subsidies outright or low-cost loans for disaster relief--the government has to pay off those loans at a rate that's sometimes ten times as much as what it lends for.

Lage: Has the broadening of the club's concerns affected its legislative clout? Has this been a help or a hindrance?

Wayburn: I think it's been a help. What has happened is that we haven't had as many lobbyists for public lands or for nature protection issues as we would have had if we'd stuck to that alone. But volunteers have come in and filled in the gap because that's such a prime topic with so many people. We have employed lobbyists to cover the issues which as many volunteers aren't interested in. Also, there are always a few people (and some of these are real experts) who will come in and help, either furnish the material for, or actually lobby for, some of the newer (particularly energy) issues.

Lage: Do you get a reverse kind of helping? I'm talking about outside the club. Will legislators primarily interested in energy show more interest in wilderness because of--?

Wayburn: I think that this type of a coalition or an alliance can be very helpful, and we have been forming more alliances recently than ever before. The success of the Alaska Coalition has caused the club to go into other coalitions, although some of the people who were concerned with the Alaska Coalition said, "Let's not have such a one again that binds us as closely."

We recently have formed loose alliances with labor on topics of mutual concern. Labor, particularly big labor, was definitely anti-conservation in good part. Individual labor leaders understood what it was about, but the labor movement, as a whole, has not helped us until recently, and I think that recently we have been forming alliances which will hold up.

Lage: You think they'll hold up in both areas, not just in protection for workers, but also protection for wilderness?

Wayburn: I think they will, to a greater extent than in the past, but that remains to be seen.

Lage: Yes. That's an interesting new direction.

Wayburn: Yes. [tape off briefly]

[The following portion of the interview is under seal until 1995]

[The following portion of the interview is under seal until 1995]

Changes in Leadership Styles

Wayburn: I will comment on an entirely confidential basis on the leadership of the individuals that you have asked me to.

Larry [Laurence] I. Moss [director 1968-1974; president 1973-1974] was an engineer who was a protégé of David Brower's. He did outstanding work in helping Dave on the Grand Canyon and became a blind follower of Brower. He is a brilliant man, and how he could so blindly follow Brower was rather interesting to me. He did throughout the Brower years, and his methods were sometimes very harsh, not always what other people might think were as good as they might have been.

When Dave was defeated, Larry was left as a director, and he changed his tactics to a considerable extent after that. He obviously wanted to be president of the Sierra Club, and he was defeated in his first attempt, and then he succeeded in his second attempt when he had only one year left in his term on the board. He was the first person who was president from the East, I believe. He lived in Washington, D.C., at that time, and I think he was the secretary of the Engineering Society.

He started a number of things on his own without the knowledge of all the directors. Some of these had merit; some got us into a certain amount of financial trouble. I remember we were in financial difficulties when he, without consultation, hired a new man for the clean-air campaign. Well, this was something we needed, and he did it on a half-time basis. We've still got this man, Carl Pope, who's done a very fine job. He's still half time on clean air almost ten years later, and he is half time doing political work for the California League of Conservation Voters and running SCCOPE [Sierra Club Committee on Political Education], the Sierra Club political arm.

Lage: I'm surprised the president could do that without board approval.

Wayburn: Well, this is among the things that happened during this interval, you see. It was 1973, I believe. Larry was one who would form a coalition with one or two other club directors for the purpose of trying to carry out a policy that he wanted.

##

Wayburn: Moss was the first president to try to take a position in the affairs of the Sierra Club Foundation and tell the trustees what they should do.

Lage: Was he on the trustees?

Wayburn: He was not on the trustees. At that time the president of the club was not a member. That was part of the difficulty, the fact that most of the club directors didn't understand the obligations or the trials of the Sierra Club Foundation trustees.

But after Larry's year as president, he dropped out. He was not eligible to run the next year. He did not try to go on the ballot by petition, and he's had very little connection with the club since then. He's been some help on a special committee along with Mike McCloskey, the Coal Commission I think it was called. He is, I think, now an independent consultant, a very bright man, but he's apparently very little interested in the club.

Kent Gill, a schoolteacher, a gentle soul who has been connected with the club for a long time, did a good and conciliatory job with the Sierra Club Council. That was one of his outstanding achievements, I think.

Lage: You mean as council chair?

Wayburn: As council chairman. He had difficulty being elected to the directorate, failed, I think, two or three times, but he was considered a man of stature enough so that he was put up again [director 1973-1979; president 1974-1976].

He was a compromise candidate for president. This has been his role, as a conciliator, as a compromiser, rather than as a strong leader. He was the first Sierra Club president to be put in as a foundation trustee ex officio, and he did a good enough job and he was well enough thought of so that the following year the trustees elected him to a tenured term of seven years. At present he is trying to effect compromises which would downgrade the position of the foundation vis-a-vis the club.

Lage: We'll talk about that in a minute, I think.

Wayburn: I don't know how that's coming out.

- Wayburn: Gill has not been a conservation leader. He's been an inside man. The new directors, many of them, are inside people.
- Lage: Concerned with club internal affairs.
- Wayburn: Concerned with internal affairs; concerned with mechanisms, procedures. Those people are necessary to keep the wheels turning, and Kent's principal contribution has been along those lines. His ability to make compromises and to conciliate people has been very helpful.

The next one on your list is Brant Calkin. Brant's rise was meteoric. I first met him in 1968, I think, when I went to Sante Fe to talk to the Second Southwest Wilderness Conference. He was the brash new chairman of the new Rio Grande Chapter. At that time he was working at Los Alamos, I believe as a chemist; I think he was, but I'm not certain. He was very interested in conservation, particularly limited to the Southwest; he was one of the first of the regional leaders.

The next thing I knew with regard to Brant was he had gotten a job with a man named Harvey Mudd, who was the son of Henry Mudd, president of Cyprus Mines. Harvey Mudd was a very wealthy young man who wanted to do something in conservation, and he turned to Brant as his guide. Between the two of them, they were trying to buy land and to help the impoverished native population of New Mexico. With Brant's able manipulations, Harvey Mudd became a trustee of the Sierra Club Foundation, and Brant was employed by him personally as the executive director of Frontera del Norte. Frontera del Norte became a fund of the Sierra Club Foundation for purposes of preserving land and improving the social position of these poverty-stricken New Mexicans.

Brant kept that job for several years, even after Harvey Mudd lost interest in conservation (I think, in conservation, and certainly in being active in the foundation) and he resigned as a trustee. But Brant continued to attend those meetings. Brant, using his paid position, became a leading volunteer, or continued as a leading volunteer, for the club in the Southwest.

When a vacancy occurred in the Sierra Club Board of Directors, we, the directors, selected him as a director to fill out one of the terms [director 1975-1977; president 1976-1977]. Well, within a very short time (I think it was months) Brant had declared himself as a candidate for president of the club. There were two other candidates for president at the time, but by the process of elimination of straw votes Brant achieved a majority of the directors who were present at a caucus, and very quickly he became the president of the

Wayburn: club. I don't think he was equipped for that. He didn't have the experience; he really didn't have the temperament. He became involved in certain political machinations, and I am told this secondhand on fairly good authority, that he was responsible for the club getting into trouble with certain prominent politicians, specifically with the selection of Cecil Andrus as secretary of the Interior in 1976.

Lage: Was Brant president at that time?

Wayburn: Brant was president at that time.

At the end of that presidency, the position of Southwest representative on the staff became available because John McComb, who had been there for six or eight years, wanted to change and went to Washington as a Washington representative. That sort of job was made-to-order for Brant, but he still wanted to run for president again.

Lage: And isn't there a rule against--

Wayburn: No, he couldn't do both.

Lage: But isn't there a rule against even appointing someone directly from the board onto the staff?

Wayburn: That's correct. That's correct. That came up a few years earlier for different reasons.

I know I strongly urged Brant to give up the idea of being president again or even a director because I felt he would be outstanding as a regional representative, and he was not good as a president. And he did. He made that decision. Before he could be sure that he would get the job, he resigned as a director; he then was appointed to the job, and he has performed very well since, I think. This is a case of an able man who went beyond what he should have, was suited very well for one thing and not for another. But that is the sort of thing that could happen with the quick change and turnover of leaders.

Bill Futrell [director 1971-1978, 1979-1981; president 1977-1978] is a Southerner somewhat in the mold of Lyndon Johnson, an ex-Marine, who felt that he had to do things for the downtrodden people of the South, and who has established part of his career on that basis. This was his concern with the inner cities that we've talked about a little earlier, and he has made this his prime concern in the club.

Wayburn: He was quite a politician within the club. He is extremely bright, but he doesn't pay attention to some of the things he's not interested in, and he can be rude in directors' meetings to the point of being outrageous, particularly when he doesn't care for someone. He was that way with certain of the directors, which did not endear him to some of the others. He would at times walk out on deliberations when he could have been useful.

Lage: Was this because of lack of concern about the particular issue?

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: He more or less stuck to his issues?

Wayburn: About certain issues or about certain people.

He was another president from the East, who had some trouble in keeping up with the issues in the central office although he made a very good effort to do so. It wasn't consistent. He was another one-term president because he was elected in his last year of eligibility, just as Moss was. While a very able man, I think he might have been a better president if he'd been elected a few years later.

Lage: With more experience than he had?

Wayburn: More experience and more knowing what the club had to offer. But he had, and still has, other agenda which are more important to him. He's been one of the upwardly mobile young men who has gone on. He went from New Orleans (I think he was in the practice of law when he first organized the Delta Chapter) to the University of Georgia (and he may have been at the University of Alabama for a while) as a professor of law. I think he did a good job there. Then he became a Fulbright Fellow and he worked at the Smithsonian Institution for a year, and now he is the executive director of the Environmental Law Society. He is a very able man. I like him. But at times his brusque and often abrasive characteristics didn't help in the directorate of the Sierra Club.

Lage: On the other hand, I've heard him described as being more conciliatory in terms of conservation tactics.

Wayburn: He can be extremely conciliatory. He is quite changeable.

Lage: And didn't he have more ties to national politics than some of our presidents?

Wayburn: Yes, very definitely, he did. He had ties with the Carter administration.

Then in his organization of the Urban Environment Conference, which was held in Detroit [City Care, April 1979], he did a very able job in bringing opposing groups together.

Lage: When you say he has other agenda, do you mean other parts of his life not connected to the Sierra Club, or he has other ideas for the Sierra Club?

Wayburn: No, no. Other agenda for himself. He's changed; I mean, he's gone from project to project rather quickly, which always makes someone like myself wonder, having gone into one profession and having remained in it for forty-five years, and having gone into conservation and become deeply involved in certain projects which never leave me. Even though I wish that they could be finished, they never are.

Lage: It's a different temperament, I think.

Wayburn: Yes, a very different temperament.

Lage: Do you think some of these younger leaders of the club tend to use the club more as a means of their own advancement?

Wayburn: That, I think, is what I'm saying. Until they find what they want, certainly. Moss wanted to cap his club experience with the presidency; then he was through. Gill has stayed on; he's a different sort, as I've pointed out. Calkin--being club president was exciting and a great coup; it was a great honor. The responsibilities were beyond him at the time. He might grow into that sometime. But these are all young men, what I call upwardly mobile young men, except Gill; Gill is older.

Lage: Gill has such a long tradition with the club also.

Wayburn: Yes.

Snyder. I first heard Ted Snyder when he was the spokesman for a new group, the LeConte group, in North and South Carolina, a charming young man with a southern accent. This was in 1969, I think. He was effective in having the group admitted as a chapter; very quickly became the leader of that chapter and then, I think, the regional conservation committee, and within a very short time he was elected to the board of directors, one of the regional people elected [director 1974-1980; president 1978-1980].

Wayburn: As soon as he was elected, he showed a different side. He was obviously scratching his way to the top, and he didn't care who got in his way. He used tactics which were, I think, sometimes less than honorable. But he was an extremely effective speaker, and he concentrated on what he was doing. He was always on the attack and frequently accusing other people and organizations of less than honorable tactics.

The Sierra Club Foundation was one of his victims. He attacked and attacked and attacked in every way he could, accusing the foundation of malfeasance, of ineptness, of incompetence. Then when he was elected president, he practically repeated his tactics as a trustee.

Lage: The presidency of the club, then, made him an ex officio trustee of the foundation.

Wayburn: He was an ex officio trustee for two years, caused a great deal of unhappiness and some schism in the foundation as well as in the board of directors.

In spite of all that, when he was finally elected president he went around to the different units of the club, doing his best to build them up, and he offered assistance to the conservation department and to conservation causes wherever he could. He had attacked me very strongly in connection first with the running of the Alaska campaign, accusing me of being the campaign and the task force and keeping it all under my vest, and then when he was president he came repeatedly and offered assistance wherever he could.

Lage: Do you think he saw himself in a new role as president?

Wayburn: I think he did. He's had his personal problems, I know. How much role that played, I don't know. He's been through what I understand is a messy divorce. He's got one little boy whom he idolizes and takes around with him, used to take around with him, almost from the time he was born, to club meetings. I think he gave up a great deal to achieve his club goals. I don't know. I don't know enough about his personal character and his life outside the club.

But again, having been president, he has dropped out. He hasn't dropped out to the extent that these other people I mentioned did. He's become chairman of the outings committee, which gives him a lot of leeway to do various things, including travel, and to lead trips. But he could have run for the board again this year, and he wasn't nominated, and he didn't take advantage of running by petition.

Wayburn: I would guess we haven't heard the last of Ted Snyder. He is a very ambitious person who, in spite of that, has dropped out of his law practice, and who is independently wealthy enough so that he doesn't have to practice law. But as far as I know, particularly last year, he didn't do anything except run the outing committee of the club; and the year before that, as far as I know, he didn't do anything besides be president of the club. I know he was hoping for a job with the Carter administration in 1976-77, but he didn't get it. In spite of that, he stopped law practice.

Lage: How about as a conservationist? Would you have comments on that?

Wayburn: As a conservationist, he was good. All of these people are good conservationists. I don't think they would do what they do--because there's not one of them who doesn't give enormously of himself--if they didn't believe in the causes of the Sierra Club.

Lage: It's just their personal leadership styles or personal agendas that are--

Wayburn: That's right. This is what I'm talking about, their personal leadership, their personal agenda, and the effect that I think they had on the board of directors of the club. I'm not sure how far this goes out into the grassroots these days.

Lage: How does it affect the balance between staff and the volunteers?

Wayburn: Well, each time one of these people (except for Kent Gill) has been rumored as the likely next president, the staff would freeze. This was particularly true in the case of Ted Snyder.

##

Lage: The only president we've skipped here is Ray Sherwin, in the seventies. Would you want to make any comments about him?

Wayburn: Well, Ray was a transition. Ray was elected as a part of the anti-Brower protest. He didn't turn out to be at all as one had anticipated beforehand. He was a judge, and yet he was very much an infighter and quite a politician. He knew something, but not too much, of the conservation aspects of the club. When he was elected president, he, I guess, was uncertain of himself enough so that he wanted a personal representative to carry on for him. When he tried to put Phil Berry in as executive vice-president, that wasn't done, and he went on to use the regular mechanisms of the staff.

Wayburn: He was not considered a strong president, and he had difficulty in being elected to his second term, which is unusual--which had been unusual before and, I think, would again be unusual if he were considered a strong president. For instance, Snyder was elected to a second term without any difficulty, after having made it the first time after great difficulty. Now, this was the reverse in the case of Sherwin. He was a very logical candidate for the presidency.

Lage: But he hadn't actually been involved that long in the club, hadn't been a director very long.

Wayburn: He had not, no. He was elected a director in '69. Two years later he was the president. I'm trying to remember: did he serve out a full six years or not?

Lage: I think so [director, 1969-1975, president, 1971-1973].

Wayburn: I think he did, but he was not renominated, and he did not run again, and he has dropped out of most club affairs. He served in certain capacities and served well. He was, I know, chairman of the nominating committee one or two years. He served as international vice-president. A very pleasant, ingratiating fellow.

Lage: Okay. How about Joe Fontaine [president, 1980-1982]? Is it too soon to make any comments on him?

Wayburn: Joe Fontaine, I have always felt, has great possibilities. I first heard of Joe Fontaine as a worker in conservation with a small chapter, the Kern-Kaweah Chapter, and he very quickly became the leader locally. He was a leader in the campaign to change Mineral King from Forest Service to Park Service jurisdiction, and in several other local Sierra fights. He became, I think, the key figure in the Forest Service battles in the southern Sierra.

He was defeated, ran very low, as a candidate for director his first time around. I know I was one who felt that we needed people like that as directors, people who had done a leading job in conservation, and proposed him for director, and he was originally selected by the directors [to fill a vacancy in 1975] as a fellow director. I think that his situation was such that he was able to serve out part of a term and then be elected for two complete terms, which haven't finished yet.

As president, he has a hard time being a high school teacher; he has a hard time covering the national scene the way a club president is expected to now. He is one of the people who, along

Wayburn: with Kent Gill and, I think, Phil Berry, have been given some compensation in order to enable them to serve as president. I think he is doing a good job and hope that he will be able to run a second year. He has had his doubts because of certain changes in the school district. This is one of the things that does make for problems, particularly with a large group of new green people, finding someone with ability enough to be president and yet the financial ability and the time to do it.

##

[End of sealed portion]

XV THE SIERRA CLUB FOUNDATION, 1960-1981

[Interview 12: March 6, 1981]##

Trustees for Conservation, 1950s: A Lobbying Arm for the Club

Lage: Today is March 6, 1981, and we're continuing the Edgar Wayburn interview. Today we're going to talk about the Sierra Club Foundation. Let's start with some comments on the beginnings of the foundation.

Wayburn: The roots of the Sierra Club Foundation go back some distance before its actual formation in 1960. The Sierra Club began to become a formidable force through its conscious actions in the early fifties, and as time went on various of us who were in the leadership realized that the club could lose its tax-deductible status if it became too aggressive on the national scene in legislative matters.

The first attempt to do something about that was Trustees for Conservation, which was an organization formed, I believe, about 1955. Trustees was formed for the express purpose of influencing legislation and thus allowing the Sierra Club to reduce its exposure. Trustees did as good a job as one could expect under the circumstances. It had as its mainstay its volunteer executive secretary, a public relations man named William Losh. It had many of the leaders of the Sierra Club on its board for identification. The president of the Trustees every two years was different. I know I served for two years as president, and Ansel Adams served for two years, and many--

Lage: Was it more an honorary kind of position, or did you get actively involved?

Wayburn: One was active as president of Trustees, but still it was honorary to the extent that its prime reason for being was to raise money which was not necessarily tax-deductible in order to hire a lobbyist in Washington. That lobbyist in turn would carry out the program of the Sierra Club.

Lage: But it would be considered a lobbyist for the Trustees.

Wayburn: But he was registered as a lobbyist for the Trustees.

Lage: Were other conservation organizations involved with the Trustees?

Wayburn: Other conservation organizations were to a lesser extent, and there were members of the Trustees who were members of those organizations, people like Howard Zahniser, for example, who was the executive director of the Wilderness Society. He was active in Trustees and was influential in determining its policies in Washington. The first man who was hired as lobbyist for the Trustees was William Zimmerman, and he was hired on a part-time basis.

The Trustees raised about, I think, \$10,000 a year, which was considered respectable, but which didn't do a great job. The problem was that the average person who was going to donate for environmental causes didn't know what Trustees was, despite our efforts to identify this with the legislative programs of the Sierra Club. They knew the club, they were learning increasingly that the club was a formidable organization, and they kept giving to the club. Trustees were continued for about ten or twelve years as an active organization and then became a standby organization. I believe it still exists as a corporation, but it is not doing anything.

It was in the late fifties that we saw that this mechanism might not be enough and that the club itself, if it were to continue to do its job and expand on its job, would have to consciously be into the legislative business to a greater extent.

The Foundation on Standby, 1960-1968

Lage: Let me ask you one thing. How involved was Dave Brower in the ideas for the Trustees for Conservation, and the Sierra Club Foundation?

Wayburn: Extremely involved. Dave Brower was a primary mover in Trustees. I think Trustees was his original idea. I'm not certain of that; I think it was. And he was a prime mover, and I believe it was his original idea that we then go the other way and get protection on the side of deductible income, and that's when the Sierra Club Foundation idea surfaced. It's my memory that Dave put forth the idea originally and engaged Phil Berry, who was, I believe, then a law student at Stanford, to research it. This came up at a board meeting in, I believe, 1960, and I made the motion that we,

Wayburn: the Sierra Club, give our blessing to a group of people who would form the Sierra Club Foundation. There were three incorporators, as I remember, and I'm not sure from memory, but I believe they were Richard Leonard, Bestor Robinson, and Clifford Heimbucher. That you can check.

Lage: Was this something that board members came to reluctantly? Did it take a lot of persuasion to convince them that this was the way to go?

Wayburn: I think it took a certain amount of persuasion, but not too much, because we realized that the way the Internal Revenue Service was being given new directions about that time, there was the danger that our status as a charitable 501(c)(3) organization might be challenged, and we wanted to have a standby organization available in case it was.

Lage: Was this related to the December, 1959, resolution that the board passed (Dave Brower refers to it as a very key resolution) that put many more limits on the club's legislative activities? Do you recall that?

Wayburn: Yes. We were putting limits on the club legislative activity, and I don't think Dave was responsible for that. He objected to them.

Lage: Right.

Wayburn: But some of the more conservative members of the board of directors, such as Bestor Robinson, felt that we had to have limits or we would lose our tax deductibility. There were these multiple movements going on at the same time of how to be most effective and at the same time retain tax deductibility, which was the lifeblood, as far as finances went of the organization. So, at the same time we moved towards letting Trustees for Conservation take over our obvious legislative activity and developed the idea of forming a new organization which would take care of all of the so-called soft money, which was tax-deductible.

Lage: Would you say that when the foundation was formed in the early sixties it created a go-ahead for the club to seek out just how far it could go in the legislative field?

Wayburn: It was a way of allowing the club to be as active legislatively as we, the directors, thought that it should be, and a way of carrying out logically the mandate which was set long before, in the early

Wayburn: fifties, 1951 and particularly '52, of having the club go national and hiring an executive director and dropping the requirement for sponsors for new members and getting as many members as we could.

Lage: Was that series of decisions then--I'm sure we've talked about this, but let's elaborate for a minute--in 1952 or so, was it that conscious? Do you feel that consciously the club directors were saying, "This is a new direction"? Did they have any sense of what was ahead, how the club would grow, if they made these decisions?

Wayburn: Well, some of us felt that way; I doubt if all did. In other words, I don't think it was nicely laid out. The club was an expanding, changing organization, and we knew that there was change in the air, but the exact direction--I would doubt if it was laid out on a platter.

Lage: It wasn't that conscious a turning point, maybe.

Wayburn: I've always thought of 1951-52 as the turning point. I've been talking that way for twenty years, I know, and I was certainly aware of it.

Lage: I'm going to be interviewing Alex Hildebrand next week. He was very involved in hiring Dave Brower. It will be interesting to see if he foresaw it in that way.

Wayburn: Yes. I rather doubt if he did, but I would be interested in knowing that too. Alex was one of the more conservative members of the board. He was a very good logical brain, and he was responsible for a number of the innovative approaches of the fifties, but I don't think that he saw where that would lead.

Lage: Well, I've taken you off your train of thought here, I think. We were talking about the fact that the foundation was formed and the club had more of a go-ahead in the legislative area.

Wayburn: Yes. The foundation was formed and chartered at first as a standby organization. We felt--and I personally, as president of the club from 1961 through '64, felt--that as long as the club was a tax deductible organization, it should make the most of its name and it should itself do the collection of monies which were going to be used for its purposes.

The foundation was formed in 1960 with fifteen of us as the original trustees. They were thirteen ex-presidents of the club; Clifford Heimbucher, who was the club treasurer; and myself, who was

Wayburn: then the club vice-president. It had a number of founding members, and we who were the founding members gave \$200 apiece so that the foundation had an initial pot of some \$10,000 that it could use for grants. The trustees of the foundation were originally called directors; the title was changed to trustees after a few years.

The original organization was not active. The first president was Richard Leonard, and he was president, I believe, for eleven years. The first eight years were inactive years for the foundation. We gave very few grants, but we didn't have much money. We were entirely a volunteer organization, run by the officers, and we were not competitive with the Sierra Club at all. It was my feeling, as I said, that as long as the club was able to raise tax-deductible funds and tell its contributors that their contributions to the club, as well as their dues, were tax-deductible, it should continue that way.

IRS Ruling Activates the Foundation

Wayburn: All of that changed in 1966 when someone whom I term "a small faceless man in a dark blue suit" walked into the club office one June day and told us that the Internal Revenue Service could no longer guarantee tax deductibility to the contributors of funds to the Sierra Club. We fought that; we did not agree that a substantial amount of the Sierra Club activity was influencing legislation. Incidentally, the story of how that came about (and I'm pretty well confirmed in my feeling of this by the principal actor himself, Congressman Morris Udall)--

Lage: He's as much as told you this?

Wayburn: Yes. Udall was having lunch one day with the undersecretary of the Treasury when he opened the paper and saw a full-page ad on the Grand Canyon which compared the Grand Canyon to the Sistine Chapel, and he said, as an advocate of the Upper Colorado River Project and one who was advocating a dam in the Grand Canyon, "Isn't this outrageous? Why should this organization be allowed to get away with influencing legislation this way when it's a tax-deductible charity?"

I believe that Udall didn't have anything further to do with it, but that the undersecretary of the Treasury then went to the director or the commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and within twenty-four hours after that the man appeared in our office.

Wayburn: That was a district decision. It was confirmed after a year or two by the national office. Things usually run very slowly in IRS, but this was the fastest move they had ever made.

I have told you in an earlier interview how we selected Gary Torre as our attorney on this case and how after nearly two years of appeals, the IRS made a final ruling against us. By May, 1968, Torre had reached the conclusion that if the IRS would not change its attitude, we would be unwise to sue them. Torre advised us that in his opinion it was not going to be worthwhile for us, the Sierra Club, to engage in further legal action, which would mean suing the Internal Revenue Service. He thought that this suit would go on for years, and he estimated the cost of it at upwards of \$100,000 in 1968, and he didn't know how much above that it would go. But he thought that we would be well advised to use our money for the primary purposes of our organization (that is, conservation purposes) and to allow the Sierra Club Foundation to raise the tax-deductible funds which were so necessary to us.

At that point, I, who had been opposed to the foundation becoming active, changed my attitude and encouraged the foundation to become active. The directors of the Sierra Club were, I believe, fairly unanimous. I'm not certain of that, but I know that certainly it was the general feeling among the directors that we should encourage the foundation to become active. This was in 1968. The trustees of the foundation were overlapping with the Sierra Club board members, to a degree--Leonard was president; I was the treasurer; Lewis Clark was the secretary, I think; and the ex-presidents for the most part were still alive and functioning as the trustees.

Beginnings of an On-going Conflict Between Club Directors and Foundation Trustees

Lage: Was there any thought at that time, any consideration, given to the respective roles of the foundation and the club? Was it thought that you would raise money and the club would decide how to spend it, or was that even considered?

Wayburn: That hadn't surfaced as a big issue at that time. Here was the Sierra Club, on the one hand, in need of money, and here were the ex-presidents of the Sierra Club, on the other hand, functioning to raise the money.

Lage: And yet there were conflicts at that time between the old guard, shall we say, and the new.

Wayburn: Yes, there were conflicts, but there wasn't enough money involved at the time for there to be a major conflict.

Lage: For instance, I think Dave Brower said that because of the split with Save-the-Redwoods League over the redwoods, Leonard wouldn't direct enough money from the foundation to the club for him to accomplish his purposes.

Wayburn: I think there's truth in that. Of course, I was very heavily involved in that because I was running the redwood campaign.

Lage: Did you feel that Leonard was hanging back in fund raising or sending funds over?

Wayburn: I felt there was a certain amount of that. I was always bemused by Leonard's twin personality, or I'm not sure it was a twin personality-- a double personality. When it came to a conflict between the attitude of the Save-the-Redwoods League and the Sierra Club, he voted as a Save-the-Redwoods director; he voted with the Save-the-Redwoods League. After a certain amount of argument in the Sierra Club Board of Directors, he would vote with us in the attitude that the Sierra Club directors took.

Lage: I've noticed that in deciding on what area to fight for in the redwoods, there's no dissenting vote recorded in the Sierra Club board minutes.

Wayburn: That's correct. As I say, I was completely bemused by Dick Leonard's attitude in this. I spoke to him about it. He always talked around it. But it still baffles me how he would take such conflicting attitudes.

##

Lage: Can you think of any instances to support whether Leonard was reluctant to have the foundation funnel money into the club? Or, as you say, maybe there just wasn't enough money to make it that apparent.

Wayburn: No, I don't know whether Leonard's bias towards Save-the-Redwoods League, which was obviously there, influenced his feelings in the foundation. I didn't get that idea at the time.

As I said before, as president of the Sierra Club I was not anxious to turn the foundation loose on a full-fledged campaign as long as I felt the Sierra Club itself could do the job. So I think it was my influence there more than Leonard's. I was treasurer of the foundation. But from June, 1968, on, I was pushing the trustees of the Sierra Club Foundation into raising money and raising it for the club.

Wayburn: After about a year, and it may have been less, Leonard felt that he couldn't carry the burden of the presidency as a volunteer without any help. At that time, the trustees authorized the employment of an executive secretary, who would be the principal staff person for the trustees and who would have as his charge the raising of funds. The trustees themselves would decide on where the funds would go. The committee to select that person was Dick Leonard, Lewis Clark, and myself. We, in turn, sought the advice of a man named Dudley Kenworthy, who was then and still is associate director of development for Stanford University, a man who was acquainted with people who were in the fund-raising business. He made three recommendations to us, and out of those we chose Colburn Wilbur for our first staff person.

Cole began to try to raise funds and, as an individual, he seemed to be successful. He raised quite a bit in 1969, as opposed to '68, and each year the trustees seemed to raise more funds. However, it was an organization feeling its way, and it would take almost anything that was offered it, not realizing the consequence of some of the gifts, and this was particularly true in the gifts of land.

The Sierra Club had become nervous about its prime lands in Tuolumne Meadows in Yosemite National Park, Zumwalt Meadows in Kings Canyon National Park, Mount Shasta, and Flora and Azalea Lakes at Donner Summit. It was particularly on the advice of Phil Berry, who was, I think, the secretary of the club at the time (he was one of the directors, certainly), that the club gave these most valuable properties to the Sierra Club Foundation.

Lage: Was this in '69?

Wayburn: This was in '68, I believe.

Lage: Were they worried about the possible bankruptcy of the club?

Wayburn: Worried about possible bankruptcy and the possibility of a countersuit involving payment of damages by the club because we had become quite active as a litigant, and we had filed some suits which were of consequence.

Lage: Now, were you saying that this wasn't wise for the foundation to accept the land?

Wayburn: No, I wasn't referring to that. As Cole Wilbur went out and proselyted people for funds, he found that there were certain individuals who could not, or would not, give cash or securities, but who would give

Wayburn: land, and we took on certain gifts of land. I can remember one up in the Mother Lode country which we eventually turned back to the donor, and another one in San Mateo County which probably cost us more for administration, before we finally sold it, than the sale price was. But we, as an inexperienced organization and with a comparatively inexperienced executive, were taking on things that did not give as much remuneration as they seemed to.

In those early years, we also had certain donors who wanted to control their gifts, and we allowed that. The outstanding example was the Frontera del Norte Fund of Harvey Mudd, which was an autonomous fund within the foundation.

Lage: So it really didn't bring anything to the club.

Wayburn: It paid nothing to the club. It helped pay the expenses of the foundation.

Then the trustees, still being a majority of ex-presidents of the club, were not entirely happy with some of the actions the club was taking, and they thought that their wisdom was greater than the wisdom of the directors of the club.

Lage: Are we still talking about the sixties now?

Wayburn: This was at the end of the sixties. And they would encourage certain gifts or certain grants and discourage other grants. It was during that time that the directors of the club became unhappy with the operations of the foundation, and this went into the seventies.

The early seventies saw attempts by the club to influence the foundation. I remember, on an eastern trip that I took to Boston and Washington--this must have been 1973 and I had become the president of the Sierra Club Foundation, a job which I kept for seven years--that Paul Swatek, who was then the treasurer of the club, and Larry I. Moss, who was the president, had a meeting with me to tell me that the foundation was not being run properly and that Colburn Wilbur should be discharged. I rejected that, but I know that it was part of an ongoing disagreement between the directors and the trustees.

Lage: You were sitting on both bodies. How did--?

Wayburn: I was sitting on both bodies throughout this time, yes.

Lage: So could you see the wisdom in each side, or did you feel one side was more correct than the other?

Wayburn: No, there was some wisdom on both sides. I felt that the trustees, and particularly Cole Wilbur, had to be given more time to build up the program. At the same time, I could see that the club was not getting as much funds as it needed.

New Trustees and Concerns about Fiduciary Responsibility

Wayburn: Then a whole series of events happened to broaden this controversy and to stretch it out. The first part of it I had nothing to do with. After the club voted to rotate the directors and limit their terms to six years, the trustees voted to have seven-year terms instead of unlimited terms, with a dropout of one year after that. That meant that there would be much greater turnover in the trustees and that the former presidents of the club for the most part would not come back as trustees.

At the same time, as president of the foundation, I was making a conscious effort to seek out a different type of person as the new trustees. I saw that it was probably no longer possible for national figures like the William O. Douglases and the Paul Brookses and the Luna Leopolds, who were nationally known conservationists, but who had done no yeoman work inside the Sierra Club, to become elected to the Sierra Club board. (Douglas would have been the exception, but Douglas would not have been interested.) I saw that we did not have people on our board who were people of wealth or who represented access to wealth in foundations and corporations and that the Sierra Club Foundation had an opportunity to seek out such people. I consciously tried seeking them out to get a mix of trustees to include those who would know the Sierra Club and its needs and those who would be able to help the foundation in its fund raising. Today we have that mix.

Lage: Would people that you approached be people who had been in any way involved in the Sierra Club, or, if not, why would they take on this position of trustee?

Wayburn: These were people who had shown an interest in conservation. Some of them were members of the Sierra Club; some of them weren't; some of them were active with the Nature Conservancy.

Lage: Can you name some names here?

Wayburn: Yes. These were people like Melvin Lane, who is the copublisher of Sunset magazine. Both Mel Lane and his brother, Bill Lane, have been known as conservationists for thirty years, and Sunset magazine

Wayburn: has taken a much more favorable position toward conservation, has come out as far as any slick general magazine could be expected to. They supported the Redwood National Park, for example, and lost some of their advertisers as a result.

Parker Montgomery, who has been active with the Nature Conservancy, who is the chairman of Cooper Laboratories. Wallace Dayton, of the Dayton-Hudson Stores family, who was known as a philanthropist who'd helped our North Star Chapter in Minnesota.

Jim Roush, who had been introduced to me by Denny Wilcher, in turn had been introduced to Denny by a man named Duke Watson. Denny told me that Jim Roush had his own plane and was interested particularly in Alaska and redwoods--and these were my two paramount interests. Beginning in 1969, Jim started flying Peggy and me into Alaska and did for almost ten years. I must add that during one of those trips, my daughter Cynthia, who had been working for the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund for several years, went along. That was the beginning of a romance which proceeded into their marriage a couple of years ago, so that I have another relationship with him. But Jim Roush is a prime example of the sort of person who is needed as a trustee.

Lage: Did the trustees get involved at all in philosophical approaches to conservation or discussion of priorities, or is it all fund raising?

Wayburn: The earlier trustees were very involved, being the ex-presidents of the Sierra Club, and discussions used to go on at some length. George Marshall was an outstanding advocate of the viewpoint that he, as a trustee, had an obligation to question where the funds went and for what. I think that people like Charles Huestis, Will Siri, Dick Leonard, Alex Hildebrand, and the Clark brothers [Lewis and Nathan] all took this attitude, so that the attitude was very strong as the foundation became active.

Lage: Did that continue into the seventies?

Wayburn: It continued into the seventies because Siri and Huestis and Marshall and Leonard were all trustees through this time, and the Clarks were too. So the change was gradual, and the trustees became less aggressive in this respect as the directors became more aggressive.

Lage: I don't know exactly what you mean by that.

Wayburn: Well, as the seventies wore on and the older trustees became replaced by the newer type of trustee, the newer trustee was not as interested in the philosophical aspects of how the Sierra Club used its money; they were interested in the raising of the money and in the fiduciary responsibilities.

At the same time, the Sierra Club directors, having been discussing this matter for a period of years, began to think that they were not getting a fair deal out of the foundation. With various incidents going on, some completely unjustified, and with certain comments which proved not to be entirely true, the directors of the Sierra Club gradually came to feel that they were being abused by the trustees and the trustees were not doing the job that the Sierra Club considered was the foundation's job; that is, the funneling of money into the Sierra Club.

Lage: Are we talking now about the more current period, '78 and on, or earlier?

Wayburn: I'm talking about right up to the end of the seventies.

Lage: So it's a gradual progression.

Wayburn: A gradual progression.

Many of the trustees felt that their prime purpose was fiduciary, that they had to be reassured that any money which the foundation granted to the Sierra Club was used entirely for tax-deductible purposes, was not used for legislative purposes. The Sierra Club gave that guarantee, and then the so-called block grant process began, in which the foundation would guarantee to the best of its ability so much money to the Sierra Club each year--which the club would ask for at the beginning of the year.

Lage: They gave the club a lump sum, rather than designating amounts to each project?

Wayburn: At first they gave to each project, and that took an unnecessary amount of the time of the staff and directors of the Sierra Club to present it, and it was a legitimate complaint. But the process grew out of the feeling (by earlier Sierra Club directors) that there had to be an organization which could not be challenged as far as tax-deductibility to donors was concerned, that that was the prime responsibility of the foundation, that it should be a Simon-pure organization.

Lage: Did you object to the change to the block grant personally, or did you at the time think that was a good way to go?

Wayburn: This was something that developed over the period of a couple of years, and it was questioned at first, and then the trustees came around to it without much argument.

I should, I guess, insert at this point that Gary Torre, who had been the Sierra Club's counsel, was asked by me to become a trustee because of his great knowledge of the club and because of the fact that I felt we needed expert legal advice. We had a number of lawyers. Some were among the ex-presidents; there was Dick Leonard and there was Bestor Robinson. One of the newer trustees was Nicholas Clinch; he was also a lawyer. But they were not experts in tax law as Torre was, and Torre knew the Sierra Club case better than anyone else.

Torre took the conservative view that, with the IRS as it was in the early seventies, the trustees had to be extra careful because the Sierra Club was still under the gun and the IRS had not reversed its ruling as far as the Sierra Club was concerned, although it had never ruled against any of the other organizations which by the seventies were doing the same sort of things the Sierra Club did in the early sixties.

Lage: So organizations like the Wilderness Society still have their 501(c)(3) status? ##

Wayburn: They have their 501(c)(3) status, although they have been very active legislatively. There is, however, no organization which has, since the Sierra Club lost its tax-deductibility, thrown as much of its resources into legislative activity as the club. Whereas in 1966 I was testifying that the Sierra Club did not put a "substantial" amount of its expenditures into influencing legislation, although its work was "significant," by 1972 I no longer felt that way, and today I certainly don't feel that way. Under any criterion at all we are putting not only "significant" amounts, which we were before; but we are putting in a tremendous amount of our assets, in terms of money as well as staff and volunteer activity.

Lage: So it sounds as if the decision the IRS made had a real effect on the direction the club took.

Wayburn: That's very true. At the present time we have no compunction about engaging in any degree of legislative activity. I would estimate that perhaps half of our total expenses go into that type of activity. Now, what I mean by total expenses includes not only what

Wayburn: we pay our staff (and that has risen enormously since 1966) but what our individual chapters do and what our grassroots activity is. That all counts in the determination of the IRS.

Lage: I see. So they count volunteer activity as well as--

Wayburn: They count volunteer activity, what's a fair equivalent in money. We have such a widespread grassroots operation today involved in legislative activity that I don't think we could pass any test graded on that word "substantial," as inexact as it is.*

Lage: What percentage of the club's budget does it look to the foundation for? What percentage is considered "soft" money, not used to influence legislation?

Wayburn: The club this year has a total budget of around \$10 million. Of that, some \$3 million is in dues. Over \$1 million is in the outings and that is largely a wash. Another \$1.5 million, I believe, is in the books program and that is supposed to be self-sustaining, but actually it's supported to the extent of approximately a hundred thousand dollars by the foundation.

Lage: What about the general services of the club? Can the foundation support that?

Wayburn: No, the foundation cannot support the general services of the club. The foundation can support the conservation, education, and research activities of the club, and in so doing can contribute to some of the field offices' and some of the Washington offices' expenses.

Lage: Is there some guideline, a percentage of the conservation activity that's considered non-legislative? Would that be the educational percentage?

Wayburn: That's right. In general, that is the guideline, that a certain amount of the work in these offices is not legislative. A large part of the activity in the field offices is not legislative.

Now, what we're talking about is a gradually evolving attitude and program. At first none of these recent activities were funded by the foundation, and a great deal of the grants were made for the books

*The IRS grants tax-deductibility only to non-profit organizations which put only an insubstantial portion of their expenditures into influencing legislation--ed.

Wayburn: program because the books had a tremendous debt. I think that the books were \$1½ million behind, going back to the good old days of the Exhibit Format books. Recently, the Books Department has improved greatly from the financial aspect, and I don't know what its accumulated debt is at the present time. But as books improved and as the IRS had more liberal guidelines, the foundation was able to give to other, different aspects of the club.

This year the club has asked for \$650,000 in a block grant from the foundation including \$100,000 from the proceeds of the sale of Flora and Azalea Lakes property. Nick Clinch, the foundation's last executive director, estimated that the foundation would not be able to furnish more than \$550,000, and the trustees backed that up, so that there is a \$100,000 difference in the expectation of the club and the guarantee of the foundation.

In addition to that, the foundation administers approximately \$250,000 in restricted funds for various club-related projects across the country.

Lage: The block grant contributes to the management of field offices and conservation department?

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: And the restricted funds would go to books or--?

Wayburn: Yes. The block grant, which includes both restricted and unrestricted funds, goes to national club programs such as books or programs specified by the donor. Restricted funds also support projects of the national club and local activities.

Lage: Such as the inner-city outings?

Wayburn: Inner-city outings, perhaps, although the club may request grants from unrestricted funds to support these programs, too. But if it's in the club budget, it will probably come out of the combination of general funds and restricted funds which comprise the block grant. If it's not in the club budget, it will come out of funds specifically restricted for a particular project.

Lage: I guess I didn't realize that anything was not in the club budget.

Wayburn: Yes. The club budgets so much, and certain activities can proceed if they're not in the club budget and funds can be raised for them. Most of the funds for the international program, for example, are raised through restricted funds.

Lage: I see. Are they called restricted funds because the donor donates them for that purpose?

Wayburn: That is correct. Whereas in general funds the donor just says to the foundation, "Here is so much money. You decide how you're going to use it." I recall, for example, one gift for the past couple of years has been \$50,000 a year for the international program, which was previously supported with unrestricted funds; however, it continues to be part of the block grant for club budgeted programs. The Alaska program has raised a certain amount of restricted gifts, and the club has put general funds into it too. But the club has a number of different programs which fall into that category.* I believe that the different government grant programs are all outside the budget of the club as is set by the budget committee and by the directors at the beginning of each year.

Lage: I think we have a picture of how the foundation works, and we need to develop the line of the conflict and how that's developed. I guess it's come to some degree of fire in the last couple of years.

Wayburn: It was fiery as long ago as the time that the president of the Sierra Club suggested to me, as the president of the foundation, that I fire the executive secretary, and I refused.

Lage: Did we date that?

Wayburn: That was 1973.

Lage: Oh, I see. So this is a long-standing disagreement.

*During the fiscal year of October 1, 1979, to September 30, 1980, the Sierra Club Foundation made grants totalling \$62,336 (i.e., \$260,000 from its general fund, \$100,000 of the \$320,000 received from the proceeds of the Flora and Azalea Lakes property and \$202,336 from contributions it held restricted for those programs). In addition, the foundation granted \$95,558 in support of the non-budgeted programs of the national club including the regional conservation committees, and \$30,358 to, or on behalf of, its chapters and administered approximately \$55,000 in support of club-related projects such as lawsuits organized locally, regionally and nationally. [This footnote and some factual material in the preceding pages on the current functioning of the foundation were added by Sierra Club Foundation Administrator Steve Stevick, at Dr. Wayburn's request--ed.]

Working Toward a Joint Fund-raising Agreement

Wayburn: Yes. I don't think that the Sierra Club directors realized quite the extent of the change in membership and attitude of trustees as the seventies passed by. These new trustees wanted to do their bit for conservation and for the Sierra Club, but they didn't want a hassle about it. As a result of that, this last year the Sierra Club once more proposed that the fund raising be unified (this has been proposed before) and the trustees have agreed to it. But the trustees have proposed that it be unified under the trustees, and the Sierra Club directors have proposed that it be unified under the Sierra Club staff.

This was proposed again in October of 1980, and on this occasion a committee was appointed of three members from the trustees of the foundation and three members of the directors of the Sierra Club, and that committee got a consultant. As a result of their meetings, they recommended to the trustees that the trustees contract with the Sierra Club for fund raising. That contract is in the process of being drawn up at the present time.

The trustees will retain their fiduciary responsibilities, which I would interpret to mean that the money would come in raised by Sierra Club staff and others under the supervision of a director of development for the Sierra Club, who in turn would be responsible to the executive director of the Sierra Club; under that contract the Sierra Club will draw up a plan for fund raising and will carry out the fund raising. The trustees will have a responsibility by means of the contract. At the same time, the trustees will keep a staff for the administration, investment, accounting and dispersing of those funds.

Lage: I see. Now, what's your feeling about it personally?

Wayburn: My personal feeling has been consistent throughout the past ten years. I have felt that the trustees should be an independent organization, which they remain; that the trustees should do the fund raising for the Sierra Club Foundation and the Sierra Club, except for that which comes through the medium of Sierra Club dues and extra contributions to the dues; and that it should be a unified program throughout. Where the trustees take up and the Sierra Club lets off in this unified program could be arranged by a cooperative agreement. It could be arranged through cooperation that whenever someone contributed more than \$25 or \$50 or \$100 (no matter what the sum was set for) beyond their dues, that donor would be turned over to the Sierra Club Foundation staff for further investigation and solicitation as a donor.

Lage: Will that happen under this new arrangement?

Wayburn: As it stands, it will be the opposite way. Unless the emphasis changes, the prime source of funds will be considered the member who pays his dues. As he pays more dues and is in a higher category of dues payment, either as a contributing member or as a life member, he will have more attention paid to him through special direct mailing. As he goes up in the category of giving, he will have personal attention given to him by a particular fund raiser.

Lage: In the club?

Wayburn: In the club, because the fund raisers will be employed by the club. It had been my impression that the personal, hands-on fund raising could be done better through the foundation. I still feel that way, but having been outvoted I am willing to see how the next couple of years will influence the fund raising.

I have felt that the reason we did not raise more funds in the foundation was severalfold. First, it had been a new organization, but now it is established enough so that it should be raising more funds, distinctly more funds. I felt that we had not employed good enough fund raisers, with one exception. Alice Pinsley, who is our eastern fund-raising director, has increased by a considerable percentage each year and, I think, has done her job, has proved out well. Nick Clinch, whom we hired five years ago, was admittedly not a fund raiser. He was a lawyer who was a good administrator, and I think he has done an excellent job as an administrator, but he has not had the talent for what I call hands-on fund raising. Some people have that ability and others haven't.

With that in mind, when I was appointed the chairman of the search committee to replace Nick, I went to a professional firm. We'd never done this before. We'd tried to get people to come to us, or we had contacted people we knew, and I am now firmly convinced that that was not the right method. What I've seen of the work of this search firm to date convinces me that they have the ability to find the right sort of person for us. Now, as it stands, they will be able to recruit that person, but the person will work for the Sierra Club.

So I anticipate that the income for the foundation will go up. I think it would have gone up just as much, possibly more, if we had kept the two organizations together, raising funds cooperatively, rather than separately, as has been done during the past ten years.

Wayburn: This is one of my great disappointments, that this schism has been there and that I wasn't able to do anything about it. I feel I've failed on that, but we will see what the combined organizations can do.

Lage: I got the impression that there were deep-seated feelings behind this. Perhaps the board felt the trustees of the foundation weren't willing to let go, weren't trusting them, and maybe vice-versa.

Wayburn: I think that there's been a definite paranoia on the part of individuals in both organizations, which still exists on the part of some of the individual directors of the Sierra Club. I think that with the departure of the past presidents of the club as trustees, with the sole exception of myself, that distrust does not exist in the trustees any more.

Lage: Are you still a trustee? I thought you had rotated off also.

Wayburn: I rotated off and came back on last year. The attitude of the majority of the present-day trustees is, "Well, I'd like to keep on the way we're going, but I'm not going to fight about it." As one trustee expressed himself, he said, "I've got lots of opportunities to help in conservation. Another organization I'm on has been after me to be more active. This ought to be fun. I'm not going to spend my time fighting with the directors of the Sierra Club. I'll just get off."

Lage: So you don't see, then, that need to hang on or try to direct the club at this point.

Wayburn: It's no longer a need to direct the club. I haven't felt the need to direct the club as a foundation trustee--well, I haven't felt the need to direct the club at all, because I was a part of the club! I think I've been and remain one of the more liberal directors of the Sierra Club, except perhaps as far as fiscal responsibility is concerned, and there at times I have been bothered when we've gotten ourselves into debt. I'm usually in a dilemma there because the decision in the budget committee is to cut the conservation programs, and I don't think that the conservation programs have been at fault, and I've been a defender of the conservation programs retaining funds and not being cut down too much. But except for that, I think I'm on the more liberal side.

Lage: Well, I wouldn't call that conservative, if you're defending the programs of the conservation department rather than saying you should cut them back in the interest of fiscal responsibility.

Wayburn: Well, that's what I say. I'm on the liberal side. I feel fiscally conservative in that I think the club should retain its fiscal responsibilities and keep its budget balanced.

Lage: Isn't that a generally held opinion among the directors?

Wayburn: Yes, but where they make the cuts is sometimes at issue.

Perspective on Friction Between Sibling Organizations

Lage: Do you have other comments on the Sierra Club Foundation? I think we've pretty well covered the relationship. The story isn't finished because we don't know what will happen next.

Wayburn: Let me try to sum up what I think.

Lage: All right.

Wayburn: A certain amount of friction is perhaps inevitable in sibling organizations, and there is a certain amount of friction with the third sibling of the Sierra Club, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. I believe that the club would probably like to have more influence over the legal defense fund, which the legal defense fund is resisting, and the legal defense fund hasn't given in as the foundation has.

There have been accusations made on both sides of the controversy between the club directors and the foundation trustees, some of which were justified and some of which were not justified. There have been certain individuals who have for their own vested interests made accusations which were unjustified, and there were in the course of this controversy a certain number of untruths uttered which later came out. At times there were funds which were supposed to go to the Sierra Club Foundation, raised by Sierra Club fund raisers, which were diverted either to the club or to the legal defense fund. Those detracted from the total fund raising of the Sierra Club Foundation and made it seem less competent than it was.

Lage: I see. Did that bring up the question of fiduciary responsibility at all if the funds were diverted?

Wayburn: It did, and the trustees were unhappy about that.

Lage: Is this something that involves mostly the directors of the club, or does it involve the staff?

Wayburn: It involves staff.

Lage: Where does Denny Wilcher fit into all of this?

Wayburn: Denny Wilcher was active in the club programs dating back to the mid-sixties. He was a member of the firm of Webb and Wilcher, who were book agents; he became interested in helping Dave Brower with the books program. In the late sixties, he began to raise funds for the Sierra Club. I think he did this at first as a volunteer and then on something like one-quarter pay until gradually through the seventies he went on full pay.

He also raised funds for the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund on a separate contract. This was one of the things that I had trouble understanding. At a time when I think he was being paid 85 percent by the club, 15 percent by the legal defense fund--but there was something in this that suggested that he was being paid 100 percent by the club and then another 15 percent by the legal defense fund. I'm not sure of the details there.

But Denny always wanted to work for the executive director of the Sierra Club. He did not want to work for the Sierra Club Foundation as such. There was a personal conflict--some called it a vendetta; "controversy" is a more general term--between Denny Wilcher and Cole Wilbur, which caused the first of the big schisms between the club and the foundation.

That persisted but was not the cause of letting Cole Wilbur go. Cole was allowed to resign because the executive committee of the trustees felt that he had not continued to progress. While his original work as an individual was splendid, as the trustees and the foundation grew and more money was raised, he had to have a staff, and he didn't adequately supervise that staff. He was more of a one-man fund raiser but had not gone as far as we needed. His abilities, although good, did not seem adequate enough to organize a larger program. What we needed at that time, a little over five years ago, was to have someone who could organize a program for the foundation and carry it out.

That's when we took on Nick Clinch, who did a good job in the organization of the program but who was not able to raise sufficient funds on his own. While he got the organization in place (and it is now, in both the foundation and the club) the individual hands-on fund raising has not proceeded to the point it should.

Wayburn: When I went to Heidrich and Struggles, the search firm, and told them of our needs, they said, "Well, now, just what do you want?" I said, "I want someone who can raise the income of the foundation from \$2 million to \$10 million."

Lage: That's a pretty big order.

Wayburn: Yes. They wanted to know what I wanted.

XVI VOLUNTEER LOBBYIST IN WASHINGTON, 1961-1981

A Close Working Relationship with Congressman Phil Burton: Impact on GGNRA and the Redwoods##

Wayburn: You wanted to talk about lobbying, and I think we have to start with a little history. The personal efforts of individuals have been the backbone of Sierra Club lobbying. It started with John Muir's efforts on Yosemite National Park and later Hetch-Hetchy, and it continued through the efforts of people like William Colby and others into the 1920s. I don't know many of the details, but one of the outstanding efforts was that of Francis Farquhar in going back to Washington and shepherding through the Kings Canyon National Park bill in the thirties.

In the postwar years, the first lobbyist I knew well was David Brower, who as a volunteer was sent back on the Upper Colorado River project in the late forties and early fifties, and then after he became executive director went back to Washington a great deal for lobbying on a variety of causes.

I am not certain of the first time I ever went back to lobby in Washington. I'd done more testifying before the California State Park Commission and a little before the state legislature in the fifties. But I became president of the club in 1961 and from then on became a regular visitor to Washington on behalf of various causes in which the club was interested, in some of which I was the principal. I would go back three to four times a year, usually in connection with hearings on one subject or another, and I would be involved in both legislative and administrative lobbying.

I learned early that lobbying wasn't just a matter of giving testimony, but it was trying to evaluate the people with whom you had to deal. A lobbyist doesn't vote. He has to be a resource person

Wayburn: and a person whom the voter (namely, the congressman, the senator, or the secretary, or the chief of the Forest Service) has to like as well as trust. That's part of successful lobbying.

I formed relationships with a number of people during my many years back there. Earlier I think it was with people in the executive branch and bureaucrats. I would go back to see the chief of the Forest Service, or one of his associate chiefs, or the director of the National Park Service.

Then the most lasting relationship has been perhaps with Congressman Phillip Burton, whom I met in his first year in Congress, which was, I believe, 1964. I went back as president of the Sierra Club to testify in the redwoods campaign, or it may have even been before the legislation was actually before committee. I'm not sure. But at that time I went around to see the various California legislators and was trying to influence people in the Senate particularly. I talked with Senator Thomas Kuchel and Congressman William Mailliard, who was my own district congressman, and Congressman Burton, who was then brand new. Burton, as he told me afterwards, recognized my commitment to conservation. I didn't know at the time of his deep commitment.

Lage: But he did have a long-standing commitment?

Wayburn: He had a long-standing commitment to conservation, even though he was himself not an outdoors person. He was one of the sponsors of the first redwood bill. He later voted against the final compromise of 1968 because it was so bad, as he told me. For several years he introduced the second redwood bill, the one which is the basis of the expanded Redwood National Park, and he couldn't get a hearing for it until he himself had become the chairman of the National Parks Subcommittee of the Interior Committee. Then that was his first order of business.

Lage: So he didn't have to be prodded along. You feel that he was ready to take up the fight.

Wayburn: He didn't have to be prodded at all. He did have to be educated, and he affectionately refers to me as his guru. [chuckles] But he had never been in the redwoods, despite his support, until, at my strong urging, he held a hearing in Eureka.

Lage: Was this for the second bill?

Wayburn: For the second bill. That was the first time he had been in the redwoods.

Lage: Did you get to take him around?

Wayburn: I didn't go with him. But he had not been in many parts of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area outside of San Francisco when he introduced that bill in 1971.

Lage: What do you suppose the basis for his commitment is?

Wayburn: He believes that people should have a decent place to live. He believes that there has to be a place where the ground isn't ground up and buildings aren't put all over it. He believes that there have to be refuges. In introducing him for the first Wayburn Conservation Award a couple of years ago, I said, "He is nominally the congressman from San Francisco, but actually he is a congressman for future generations." He is an impatient man who wants to get it all done at once, and he's gotten a tremendous amount done while there was an opportunity to do it.

Lage: When you say he had to be educated, what kinds of things are you thinking about?

Wayburn: Well, he had this deep commitment, but he didn't know any of the details. He has said to me on a number of occasions, "Ed, you tell me what the conservation aspects of this are, you tell me what you want, and then I'll get it through Congress." It was that simple.

Lage: That's nice to hear.

Wayburn: In all my experience, I've never heard anything like this before, and I doubt if I will again.

Lage: What particular thing would he be referring to?

Wayburn: He was referring particularly to the establishment of a large Golden Gate National Recreation Area. He was referring to the expansion of the Redwood National Park and (what so far is unique) the establishment of a park protection zone in addition to that.

Lage: So did you actually take it from there and write things up?

Wayburn: I took it from there. I designed the Golden Gate National Recreation Area and the Redwood National Park. He initiated and carried on the legislation to passage by the Congress.

Lage: Now, when you say you designed it, was this in conjunction with People for Golden Gate National Recreation Area? Had this all been discussed, what your hopes and--?

Wayburn: Oh, yes. People for a Golden Gate National Recreation Area (I think I've discussed it earlier) was the organization which got behind this. It was organized for the purpose of getting the park established. When the group first met and started talking, we did not have exact boundaries in mind. I conceived the idea that we should try to connect all of the public properties in the area so that there would be continuous public land between the northern tip of Tomales Point and the south end of San Francisco. I personally was not nearly as concerned with the San Francisco side as I was with the Marin side. My interest was in more isolated recreation, with conservation of less developed lands rather than with preservation of historical structures or intensive recreation. But other people had that idea in mind.

We knew that the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation had drawn plans for a three-thousand-acre park which included the shores of San Francisco Bay on the north and south. PFGGNA's first plan was that we would extend this up to the borders of Mount Tamalpais State Park. Then, as I began to think back into the years when I'd been working in Marin County, I thought that that was not enough, that this was an opportunity which would never come again, and that we should connect Mount Tamalpais State Park, Golden Gate National Recreation Area, and Point Reyes National Seashore.

I discussed this with George Hartzog, then National Park Service director, and with Bill Mailliard, the congressman in whose district the park was to be, and they agreed, although they thought it was asking for a lot. Then I discussed the same thing with Phil Burton. He said, "This is what you want?" I said, "No, I have another plan in mind which I personally feel is better." He said, "Well, then, take this back. Bring me what you want."

I came back a couple of months later with what is essentially the plan now. It now goes beyond that, but my plan then was to extend the Golden Gate National Recreation Area northward from the Fairfax-Bolinas Road, where we'd stopped before, across the whole Olema Valley to the town of Olema and Sir Francis Drake Boulevard. That plan, which was distinctly larger, was the one that Burton put through.

Lage: With no discussion or argument or discussion of possibilities?

Wayburn: By him?

Lage: Yes.

Wayburn: No. He just took it, and that was it.

- Wayburn: The extension was not accepted by Hartzog and the National Park Service, but the other congressmen went along. I'd previously been to Senators Gene Tunney and Alan Cranston, and they'd agreed to the smaller plan, and Congressman Mailliard had, so I felt good about that. But they went along with Burton when he introduced his big bill.
- Lage: Now, Burton's very sensitive to labor and other social-related issues.
- Wayburn: Right.
- Lage: Did he have any objections on that basis to extending the acreage for the GGNRA?
- Wayburn: No.
- Lage: I know the jobs issue came into the Redwood Park legislation quite a bit. Did it surface over including so much of Marin in parkland?
- Wayburn: No, Burton has always thought, and I have too, that this was an artificial controversy. Too many people in the labor movement could not see beyond the issue of jobs at the moment. But Burton's regard for people goes beyond just who has a job at this moment, although he tries to see to it that they are compensated if they lose a job. He wants them to be able to have a good place to live in in the future. He sees the changes that are going on. In this respect, we formed a very firm alliance and friendship because I've been talking this way for years. Burton has been of help on every conservation issue that I can remember since I first became well acquainted with him.

And interesting sidelight: Burton was, I think, a brother-in-law of Jeffrey Cohelan, who was the sponsor in the House of the first redwood bill, and who had promised to reintroduce the bill the following year, 1969. Well, he didn't, and the next election he was defeated, so he couldn't carry out his promise. But beginning about 1970, I think, I started carrying a new redwood bill to Burton, and he would introduce it into the House, but it did not get anywhere, in part because Roy Taylor, the chairman of the National Parks Subcommittee, was convinced that it wouldn't go anywhere.

I would go to Burton for a number of other bills to help in conservation. He always helped, but it was not until the GGNRA that I realized how deep his commitment was and how strong he would stand or how consummate a politician he was. He had demonstrated this in putting through some of his labor bills, but I wasn't acquainted with that. He was, I think, the principal House sponsor of the black lung bill. But despite long years at the edge of conservation

Wayburn: politics, I never regarded myself as a politician nor sought any political office and have not kept up with the sort of thing that goes on there. So it was extremely useful to have someone who knew everything about this.

Burton, despite his calling me his teacher, has gone on his own on a number of conservation (and particularly national park) issues. In his first two years as chairman of the subcommittee, his omnibus parks bill passed more national park and wilderness legislation than had ever been passed in a single Congress.* In his second term as chairman of that committee, he duplicated pretty well what he'd done the first time in getting still more parks and wilderness.

Lage: Was the club, or were you, involved in putting together the omnibus bill?

Wayburn: Burton put it through himself. We supported him.

Lage: Did you help design it at all?

Wayburn: No. I mean, we helped on individual parts of it. No, I can't claim credit for designing more than the GGNRA-Point Reyes complex and the redwood and then, later, the Alaska National Interest Lands Act.

Other Friends and Adversaries in Congress--Seiberling, Jackson, Aspinall, Mo Udall

Wayburn: I tried to get Burton to take an active interest in Alaska, to include the national interest lands conservation bill in his subcommittee's agenda, but he felt he had enough to do with what he was doing already. Also, he wanted his friend John Seiberling to have a significant role in what was happening. That was a good move because Seiberling held hearings at long length throughout the lower forty-eight states and Alaska. Burton wouldn't have had time to, nor would he have had the patience to do them the way Seiberling did. Seiberling let thousands and thousands of people have their say.

*National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 added two million acres of wilderness and twenty-one new units to the national park system.

Wayburn: Seiberling is another one with whom I've formed a friendship and go in to see practically every time I'm in Washington. He comes from an entirely different background from Burton, even though they both came from Ohio originally.

Lage: Oh, they did? I didn't know that.

Wayburn: Burton was a son of a doctor who moved out to San Francisco when Phil was young. John was a grandson of the founder of the Goodyear Tire Company, who later formed an offshoot, the Seiberling Tire Company, but Goodyear was the big company. John compares his feelings about his environmental efforts with what his grandfather is supposed to have said when he was an old man--he had given a park to the city, an area that he had originally planned to build on, an office building or something. Years later, he would come out and sit in that park, and someone said to him, "Mr. Seiberling, aren't you a little unhappy about the fact that you gave this to the city and didn't build a building? You could have this building a monument to you." He said, "No. The monument is my happiness in seeing the children play in this park." Seiberling comes from wealth, Burton does not, and yet they're the closest of friends.

Another man I formed a friendship with early on was Senator Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson, who was the longtime chairman of the Senator Interior Committee, more recently known as the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. This came about during the days we were trying to get the Redwood National Park established and also the Cascades National Park in the state of Washington. Jackson was the author of both the bills. He had the interest in his home state, and I had this interest in the Cascades Park dating from 1955.

Then, in the redwoods campaign, where he and Senator Kuchel carried the battle, we had to work on both Jackson and Kuchel, but particularly on Kuchel. Of course, Kuchel was my senator, and I remember going back and taking Peggy with me and talking with the two of them on several occasions. Kuchel had started out with the idea that the Save-the-Redwoods League program for the national park was the right one; he'd been convinced of that by the league. It was only after a couple of years of effort that we turned Kuchel around and he supported the bills which we were supporting.

Lage: Did he support them to the complete extent that you requested at the time?

Wayburn: Not to the complete extent, no. Neither he nor Jackson did. But the bill that he and Jackson put through the Senate was a much, much better bill than the bill that finally came out. It called for, I

Wayburn: think, 66,000 acres, and almost all of it was in Redwood Creek. It encompassed a larger area of Redwood Creek. It followed to a very considerable extent the plan that the professionals of the National Park Service had laid out; I believe it was their plan too, not their biggest plan, but the second one.

Lage: Now, Jackson later was disappointing to conservationists in some of his stands.

Wayburn: Yes. I'll go on to that later, if I may.

Lage: Yes.

Wayburn: Just as to my involvement with people: At the same time that I became well acquainted with Jackson, I became well acquainted with Wayne Aspinall, who was his counterpart in the House as chairman of the Interior Committee. Aspinall was our great opponent. He was the advocate of the miners and the loggers. Aspinall was an absolute autocrat of the Interior Committee of the House in his day. Jackson, in the Senate, and Aspinall, in the House, used to hold hostage each other's plans. They did that way back in the fifties in the Colorado River project. The Colorado River project came out better because Jackson held certain of Aspinall's plans hostage.

When I first met Aspinall, I was introduced by Bill Zimmerman, who was the lobbyist of trustees for conservation.

##

Wayburn: This more or less dates it to the late fifties. I'd gone in to see him about something with Bill Zimmerman. Aspinall, who was a very feisty man and still is, said, "Come in, young man. I want you to know--" (I looked a lot younger, I guess, than I was.) He said, "I want you to know that this man can bring you in any time he wants. He's a gentleman; I like him. But don't ever try to come in with that son of a bitch Dave Brower. He's not a gentleman, and I won't have anything to do with him." He continued his monologue for what seemed longer but must have been not more than ten or fifteen minutes. Then concluded with "you have five minutes to tell me what you want."

It seemed that Dave had accused Aspinall of things that Aspinall resented as an ad hominem attack. I don't remember the details of it anymore, but Aspinall took that very personally, and each time I would come in to see him afterwards he would always precede any discussion that we had by an attack on Brower.

Wayburn: Aspinall did not want to preserve any primeval redwoods beyond the ones that were in the California state park system. He talked as if he would include more. But after the 66,000-acre Senate bill was passed in the Senate, and the House finally had to act on the redwoods, he proposed a bill with only two thousand acres of primeval redwoods. It was practically nothing but the existing state parks. It was less than Don Clausen, the congressman from the First District, which included Humboldt and Del Norte Counties, had proposed. Aspinall had such control over his committee that his bill got out of committee and was, I think, largely if not entirely adopted by the House. The bill then went to a conference committee where, fortunately, the Senate prevailed to a very considerable extent. It didn't prevail enough, and we had to settle for a very bad compromise on the 1968 Redwood Bill.

Lage: Were you ever able to convince Aspinall on any issue? Did you ever feel like you could bring him around?

Wayburn: I felt that we did to some extent, but not materially. We just didn't see things at all the same way. We were friendly enemies, however.

A couple more anecdotes along that line: Phil Burton, when he first met me, didn't want me to leave. He had one hand on my shoulder and the other, a great, big, hot hand holding on to my hand. He said, "I'm going to turn that Interior Committee around. I'm going to get enough new big-city liberal congressmen to go on the committee until we've overcome the chairman's power."

Lage: This is while Aspinall was still chairman?

Wayburn: Oh, yes, and Aspinall was the absolute autocrat. Burton was the brand new freshman.

I just couldn't conceive of this, frankly. I thought he was talking through his hat. But eight years later, just four Congresses later, Aspinall was out. In the meantime, Burton and Udall and some others had united to strip him of a lot of his power. Some of that power came from the fact that he alone had the opportunity to appoint the staff of any of his subcommittees, so the staff of the subcommittee was loyal to the chairman of the whole committee rather than to the chairman of the subcommittee. That was the first thing that Burton and company took away from Aspinall.

Then (and the Sierra Club had a role in this) Aspinall was defeated in the Democratic primary by a Denver lawyer, and that candidate in turn was defeated by a Republican.

Lage: And was the club active in that campaign against Aspinall?

Wayburn: The club was active in the campaign against Aspinall, although something new had come up. You asked if Aspinall ever went with us. This reminds me; he did. There was something that he went along with (I forget at the moment what it was), and in a statement afterwards I was asked about it, and I said, "Yes, Congressman Aspinall was very helpful in this." In his campaign for reelection some of Aspinall's henchmen gave the Denver papers a statement: "President of Sierra Club Endorses Aspinall." [chuckles] Oh, there was quite a commotion over that.

Lage: [laughter] I can imagine!

Wayburn: But the very next day I got a call from Aspinall. He said, "Doctor, I know you didn't endorse me, and I want to apologize for the overeagerness of some of my people, and I will issue an apology"-- and he did.

After he was beaten, I went in one last time to see him. Whereas you always had to wait your turn, and there were other people waiting to see the chairman, and he would usually give me five minutes, that day there was no one in his anteroom. They ushered me right in, and I saw Aspinall sitting at his big desk, surrounded by his lost grandeur. And the first thing he said was, "Thank you for coming in. I know there is no reason. You have nothing to ask of me now." I said, "No, I haven't. I just wanted to pay my respects and say we've always been on opposite sides of the fence, but I respected you for what you were doing and for the fair treatment you gave us." He said, "Well, I have the same regard for you."

For whatever I've been able to do as a lobbyist, I think that such regard might have something to do with it. I think a lobbyist has to be able to be a good resource person. For him to be successful, a congressman has to have some confidence in him and he has to either like or respect him.

Lage: Yes. Do shared values have a lot to do with it also?

Wayburn: Shared values?

Lage: Isn't it difficult to go in to somebody who's just--as you say, Aspinall just couldn't talk the same language.

Wayburn: Yes. Shared values have a lot to do with it. [chuckles] I didn't have many shared values with Aspinall as far as conservation was concerned. But I guess I'll never know whether I was responsible for us getting anything.

Lage: To what extent did having the power, or perceived power, of the Sierra Club and its large membership behind you open doors?

Wayburn: That opened more and more doors. Remember, when I first went back, the Sierra Club was an organization of perhaps ten to twelve thousand people. So that was a modest group of people, and it did open doors, but in order to keep the doors open you had to do it yourself.

You were asking earlier about Scoop Jackson. I got to like Scoop Jackson very much, and I thought we had shared values, as you put it, on the Cascades and particularly on the redwoods, even though my ideas were much larger than his. His ideas were those of the politician who had to make the final compromises; mine were those of the advocate who saw the ideal and would continuously push for the ideal. He would have rational reasons for not going along with certain things, and he would have enthusiasm for pushing others.

Jackson was known as a conservationist in his early years and for a long, long time in the Senate Interior Committee. Part of that may have been due to the fact that he was the chief bulwark against Aspinall. After Aspinall's departure and particularly after Udall became the chairman of the House Interior Committee, Jackson was not as much in the forefront of environmental legislation; his committee would follow the House in the introduction of new legislation on conservation. He also had other interests which became more paramount with him, first in energy and second as a hawk in the military, and these influenced what he was doing and the amount of time he took.

But I've kept close to him over the years, even when practically every other conservationist was condemning him and almost none could get in to see him. I would go in to see him perhaps twice every year, and I would talk to him on the phone. (I've got to talk to him on the phone soon.) When I didn't talk to him, I often talked to his staff, particularly in the days when he had Bill Van Ness as his staff counsel, and you could count on Van Ness pretty well reflecting what Jackson felt. And now I talk more with Mike Harvey, who has taken Van Ness's place as chief staff counsel on the Energy Committee for Jackson.

Lage: Is there any meeting of the minds there on energy?

Wayburn: I have not been a lobbyist on energy. Those who have don't think too highly of much of Jackson's stuff. Jackson, on the other hand, and in talking to me, has asked why the Sierra Club didn't support certain energy bills that he had introduced. But I've not been close enough to that picture to be able to comment adequately on it.

Wayburn: After being extremely helpful early on in Alaska, he has been a disappointment. In the early seventies, when Alaska first began to surface in Washington, after the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, the Department of the Interior advanced various ideas which, I felt, were not in our interest as furthering the cause of conservation. We would get those stopped by writing a letter to Senator Jackson as the chairman of the Interior Committee and saying, "This is something which should be settled by the Congress when it finally takes up the legislation." Jackson in turn would write to the secretary of the Interior and tell him, "This matter is not Interior's prerogative; it should be kept open," and his wishes were usually followed. This happened time and time again.

Then, when the Sierra Club first introduced a bill on Alaska, which was at the time that the secretary of the Interior was mandated to do it--and this was at the end of 1973, of course, the chairman of the committee was asked to introduce the bill. Knowing of this, we were ready; we had our own bill drawn up, and I went to Jackson and asked him to introduce our bill, and he did. He also introduced it by request; he gave it the same status as the administration bill. The administration bill was for approximately 84 million acres; ours was for 110 million acres, as I remember. This happened in two successive Congresses. The bill was not introduced in the House but was introduced in the Senate because of Jackson and our personal friendship.

Then came the change in administrations and Carter's support for an Alaska bill and the fact that Congress had to get to work to fulfill its own edict and pass something by December, 1978. This time around Jackson again introduced our bill and the administration bill by request but didn't act on them. But [Morris] Udall introduced our bill in the House, and Seiberling then began to hold hearings on it. The House committee carried the ball from then on.

So on Alaska, from my standpoint, Jackson was extremely helpful in the first four years and not in the last two or three years.

Lage: Was he in opposition or just not actively helpful?

Wayburn: He was not actively helpful and, as we'll talk about later, he allowed Senator Stevens to dominate too much of the mark-up sessions.

Lage: I see. We haven't gotten to the Udalls.

Wayburn: Morris Udall, I mentioned earlier, is someone who was very influential in charting the future course of the Sierra Club by setting in motion the IRS edict which took tax-deductibility from our donors. Morris Udall opposed us to some extent at first in Colorado River projects,

Wayburn: in Arizona projects, but on the whole since then has been with us as one of the strongest conservationists in the Congress. We can count on Mo to introduce almost any legislation we ask for. I personally have very friendly relations with him, and I go to see him frequently. Our lobbyists in Washington, particularly John McComb, who was our Southwest representative, became very well acquainted with Mo; John is the closest contact.

I sometimes get bothered that Mo will bend before the pressure of the other side a little sooner and a little farther than I would like to see. He will bend sooner and farther than Burton, for example.

Lage: Well, won't everybody?

Wayburn: Yes. Burton doesn't bend easily. Anytime he gives, he's going to get something else, and that's part of the game. Part of the game of a lobbyist is to know what all the stakes are and to be able to, if you have to, give up something in order to get something else which is also very valuable.

Contacts with Secretaries of the Interior Stewart Udall and Walter Hickel

Wayburn: Let me mention my contacts in the executive branch. When I was first in this game of talking with people, I never got beyond the director of the National Park Service and the chief of the Forest Service. And then Stewart Udall became secretary of the Interior. I had met him before that, and I always remember vividly Stewart Udall when I first met him. It was at the 1961 Wilderness Conference. The brand new secretary of the Interior was to be the principal speaker at the banquet, and I went in to see him. He said, "Oh, yes, I know who you are, Wayburn. Just look on the wall. You'll see everything you want to see." And there was a great big graphic chart on the wall showing the amount of national park acreage added by each president since Theodore Roosevelt. It showed the biggest area coming under Franklin Roosevelt, and then going down progressively to Dwight Eisenhower, and being very small before that except for Theodore Roosevelt. Then it showed John F. Kennedy; the shaded graph went all the way across the room. I was duly impressed, and we became very good friends.

Wayburn: I had been interested in redwoods since at least 1955 but hadn't started an active campaign for Redwood National Park until about 1960, and the club directors were holding me in because they felt it wasn't wise to surface such a brash idea, and we had to get the support of the Save-the-Redwoods League and so forth. But at that conference Stewart Udall was seated next to Peggy, and she told him all about our ideas for a Redwood National Park. Well, Stewart had never seen a redwood, I think, and more than Phil Burton had much later [chuckles], but he was impressed by what she said, and he and I talked about the idea briefly. He agreed that he would come out and see the redwoods.

The months passed, and he didn't come out. We would write him, and I'd go back to Washington to see him about something else, and he was always too busy. Finally, he sent John Carver, his assistant secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, and Carver spent several days with us (Peggy and me) in the redwoods. We took him to different locations, but particularly to Blue Creek, a tributary of the Klamath River, where in 1961 there was still an opportunity for a large stand of redwoods.

Beginning in 1963, the professional team of the Park Service decided on Redwood Creek, and after seeing it we agreed. We advocated a bigger area than they proposed because they'd been told they couldn't officially come out with what they knew was right. But we went to Stewart Udall with our plan, and he was enthusiastic.

Every time I'd go back to Washington, I'd go back and sit down with Udall. I'd often take along my maps, and we'd sit down on the floor and outline these. He couldn't have been more enthusiastic or cooperative (he was a very enthusiastic man) until one day in 1965 he just stopped answering my telephone calls. I've told Susan Schrepfer this story in greater depth, so I'll just mention it as far as Udall is concerned. I finally got through to him, and he said to me, "Ed, I'm sorry, but the Save-the-Redwoods League doesn't want this, and I'm afraid I can't support it anymore." That's when I said he was my greatest disappointment because I expected so much of him. I've seen him a few times since. We're friendly.

But, you see, he went out of office in early 1969, shortly after the passage of the first Redwood National Park Act. During his last weeks as secretary I had tried to get him to enlarge the existing park by the use of certain authorities that were in the bill and that Aspinall said could have been used, but he never did do it.

Lage: Did you ever get him out to see the redwoods?

Wayburn: No.

Lage: So he did all this from a distance?

Wayburn: I don't know whether he--he probably has seen Redwood National Park by now, but not to my knowledge.

##

Wayburn: Came 1968 with the Republican administration, and Nixon nominated Walter Hickel to be secretary of the Interior. The Sierra Club opposed him vigorously, and he went through three hot days of sessions of hearings before the Senate Interior Committee. At the end of that time, Senator Jackson, the chairman, said to him, "Mr. Hickel, we're going to approve of your nomination because we feel that a new president has the right to choose his principal cabinet officers, but we want you to know we'll be looking over your shoulder."

Hickel is supposed to have turned into an instant conservationist. I personally met him a few times and was at that time friendly enough, but I never had much faith in him. I did not consider him a conservationist. I considered him an opportunist who took advantage of certain things.

As a matter of fact, I always say that two people I'm indebted to for the GGNRA are Walter Hickel and Richard Nixon: Nixon because he told Hickel to get the Indians off of Alcatraz, and Hickel because he conceived that the way to do it was to make a national recreation area out of Alcatraz. [laughter] And that was the beginning of what became the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. The BOR [Bureau of Outdoor Recreation] worked on a plan which encompassed three thousand acres, including Alcatraz. President Nixon was very friendly to that park. I met him. He came to San Francisco for the purpose of endorsing the park.

Lafe: The total park or the Alcatraz portion?

Wayburn: No, our whole park project. But his visit to the park consisted of going around San Francisco Bay in a small boat and looking at the shorelines. He then came ashore at the Coast Guard pier where a number of us were waiting as a reception committee. On being introduced to me and to Amy Meyer, he shook our hands and said to me, "You get after that Congress. I'll sign that bill as soon as you can get it through. I'm for it."

Friendship with Rogers Morton: Pay-Off on GGNRA and Alaska

Wayburn: Well, this then goes directly to another man, of whom I was personally very fond, and that's Rogers C.B. Morton. Morton was a congressman from Maryland. Before Hickel's appointment, we looked over the choices that Nixon might have for secretary of the Interior and talked to our Washington lobbyist. We thought that Morton was the best person we could have of the different choices, but Hickel was chosen. Morton went on being a congressman from Maryland.

Two years later Hickel was out, and Morton was nominated by Nixon. By this time, I was no longer president of the Sierra Club; Phil Berry was, and Phil Berry didn't like the idea of Morton. I was still on the executive committee. I remember we had a meeting of the executive committee at which we considered the nominations. Phil said he wanted to oppose it. I said, "We can't do that. We were actually proposing Morton's nomination two years ago." Phil said, "Well, may I go back? I want to go back and ask certain questions." So, a little reluctantly, the committee went along with that. Then when Phil appeared before the Senate Interior Committee he opposed Morton's nomination, and the result was that he himself was raked over the coals. Morton went through without any difficulty.

The next time I went back to see Morton, I had an awful lot of trouble. Nobody from the Sierra Club could get in to see Morton.

Lage: Because of Berry's opposition?

Wayburn: Yes. Morton felt it was very unfair.

On one of my trips back there (and I had failed to get in the previous time) I went up again to his office and was told the secretary was busy, but I talked to his assistant. He had then two young assistants working for him, and one was a professor from the University of Michigan named Richard Curry, who's still working in the Department of the Interior. I said to him, "Dr. Curry, please tell the secretary I just want to say hello. I'm not going to ask him for anything. I just want to meet him again." Five minutes later he came back and said, "Come on in."

Morton was not in the big office where Udall always held sway; he was around the corner in a small office which, I guess, was reserved for the secretary as a kind of retreat. He was sitting there very quietly and looked very lonely. He said, "Come in. Have a seat." I said, "I don't need to sit down, Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to come in and shake your hand and say I remember you well from

Wayburn: the days when you were a congressman, and I'd like to come back and talk to you some time in the future." He said, "Well, don't go away. Sit down for a while." I sat down for about five minutes, and he said, "Now, don't you have anything to ask me?" I said, "No," and I left.

But from that time on, Morton and I were friends and, as I will bring up in the story on Alaska, that friendship and trust that Morton had in me paid off in a number of ways. It paid off in the Senate hearings on the GGNRA. Morton had, at behest of the National Park Service, originally opposed our smaller boundaries. At the hearings in the House Interior Committee, he had gone along with the National Park proposed boundaries. We got Morton to come out and look at this park twice, and Nat Reed, incidentally, whom I'll talk about in a minute, played a big role in this. But unbeknownst to me he came out to look at the entire GGNRA-Point Reyes Seashore area just before the Senate Interior Committee hearings.

At the Senate hearings, where testimony was given for and against the expansion, the National Park Service testified for a smaller park. The secretary was the last witness, I think, and he said, "Well, I had been for a smaller park, but I've just come back from there on another visit. I flew over it, and my friend Dr. Wayburn has convinced me that we should have the big park."

Lage: Had you had a long discussion with him?

Wayburn: I had talked to him several times.

Lage: When you talked to him, did you point out special areas, or how did you approach it?

Wayburn: Yes, I showed him how the park that he had endorsed would stop at the southeast corner of Point Reyes National Seashore and be connected with it just by a trail. One park came up to this corner [gestures], the other came down to that corner [gestures], and that was the only connection; whereas if the park were to be as we had proposed, the northern part of GGNRA would dovetail directly into Point Reyes National Seashore and would make the federal estate much more meaningful. If the larger boundaries for the GGNRA were accepted the two parks would be continuous, with nothing between the two but a road, and that road would almost be a park road in that area.

Lage: So he saw the logic of that situation?

Wayburn: Yes, he saw the logic.

Lage: Did he ever come and drive along that road or see it on the ground?

Wayburn: I don't know. With a helicopter you can see a lot more than you can driving. Actually, the boundary of GGNRA is on the west side of the road in some places because in the establishment of Point Reyes National Seashore the boundary didn't always extend to the road.

The other time when he expressed his feelings publicly was just before he went out of office; he was having a farewell reception for the secretary of the Interior's Advisory Board on National Parks, of which I'm now a member, but I wasn't then. Morton took a bit of interest in this board and used it and was giving a final party for it in his office. Nat Reed had invited me up to come to it.

Morton's farewell was a little tearful. He spoke of his years in office and at the end he said, "The thing I'm proudest of is what I have done in Alaska, and for that I want to acknowledge my debt to my friend Dr. Wayburn." That took me completely by surprise; both of these things did. So this is going back to what I've been saying about the role of a lobbyist.

Lage: Does it make any difference to these legislators that you come from the Sierra Club as a volunteer leader rather than a paid lobbyist?

Wayburn: I think it does. Legislators generally are used to paid lobbyists. The other side has lobbyists who get paid in two ways: they get paid to lobby, and the outfit they lobby for gets paid as a vested interest one way or another. The Sierra Club staff is paid to do that work, and they're in touch with the legislator or his staff every day. The Sierra Club field staff, which is also paid, has a very few (by comparison, few) congressmen to deal with, and the lobbyist has more of a personal relationship with certain congressmen.

But the volunteer comes at his own expense, even though he may get some of these expenses paid; he takes time out from his business; he is obviously not a professional; and he's home folks. Well, he isn't always. I've formed relationships with senators and congressmen from other states on a personal basis, but that again is personal. But if you're a volunteer from your own state, and you go to your own state's congressmen or your own district's congressman particularly, then you're dealing with not only all the other things, but what the home folks want and maybe what the home folks will support at the next election.

Lage: Is this something you point out in your discussion? Do you bring out the political power that the Sierra Club might wield?

Wayburn: Only occasionally. This should be done very delicately whenever it's done, just to the effect that the people want it.

Lage: I can see there are a lot of nuances you have to learn along the way.

Wayburn: Yes.

Assistant Secretary Nat Reed, a Supportive Ally

Wayburn: Nat Reed was assistant secretary of the Interior for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks for, I think, six years, throughout Morton's tenure. Reed, like Morton, comes from a wealthy family (Reed's even more so) and went into politics certainly in part from the public service aspect. Reed is a man with very pronounced ideas. Reed, I think, can be classed as one of the real conservationists in the position he held.

It was, I think, about 1970, when I first went to Reed about the redwoods. But it was 1971 when, together with the then new executive director of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Jim Moorman, I went to Reed with a formal legal plea that the Department of the Interior do something about three different authorities in the redwood act that would allow them to protect the Redwood National Park more. Reed was, unfortunately, out at the time, and we dealt with Curtis "Buff" Bohlen, who was his deputy, on almost his first day on the job. He didn't know what to make of being served with a legal document.

But Reed soon took up, and I discussed redwoods with Reed increasingly for the next several years. Reed was the first official who took any interest and who would do anything about the redwoods. He appointed a task force under Richard Curry to study the problem, and they did studies for three years and came up with what we knew long before that.

In the meantime, we had brought suit, and we prevailed in our suit, and we kept talking to Reed, and Reed was trying to do as much as he could. He couldn't get any further, I think, with Morton; he couldn't get any further with the administration; and, of course, the Congress would do nothing. But it finally got to the point where Reed and the Department of the Interior did everything it could under the terms of the first act, and the judge who had ruled in our favor three times said, "I can't go any further. The department has gone as far as it can. The Congress has to take this up now." That's when Burton was able to get his bill through Congress.

Lage: But Reed was supportive throughout.

Wayburn: Reed was extremely supportive, and Reed has been supportive on a number of things concerning conservation. In office, and since he's been out of office, Reed was supportive on the Alaska proposals that we made, and Reed was supportive on a large GGNRA. We still have hopes of making that even larger to the south, and five years ago when Reed was still in office he visited the Bay Area for that purpose. We took him on a helicopter ride over San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Santa Cruz Counties to show him the opportunities. He said, "You're going to have to get some more support. If you can put it through, we'll go along, but it's an awful lot you're asking for."

I still correspond and talk with Nat Reed frequently.

Lage: What's he doing now?

Wayburn: He is now managing a very large estate in Hobe Sound, Florida, for a group of wealthy investors, and I suspect he's one of them. He's active with the Audubon Society; he's a director. He is a member of the National Advisory Council of the Sierra Club Foundation. He came out here for the Crosby Golf Tournament last month, and I had dinner with him.

Lage: Very good. Did we miss anybody? You didn't talk too much about [George] Hartzog or any of the other Park Service directors. Do you want to at this point?

Wayburn: Hartzog was the most dynamic director of the National Park Service and the one with the most potential. He was an attorney who started out without too deep conservation principles. I worked with him closely for years and, I think, was able to convince him in a number of instances. I'd have violent arguments with him, which were always friendly, and sometimes would get him to go along and sometimes not.

He opposed us on the Tioga Road, now many years back. In the years between he had come along enough so that he supported us on the GGNRA to a considerable extent--not as much as his boss did. He was up against the proposition that the National Park Service didn't have enough funding, and he had innovative ideas for getting the funding--which we didn't approve of. We were in direct opposition to him when he put a big wide road into Point Reyes National Seashore because he accepted the idea of Point Reyes as a place which would be freely accessible by automobile everywhere and it would be an automobile park like some others.

Wayburn: I talked to him at length about Alaska and thought I was gradually getting him around to the ideas of some very large new parks in Alaska. I went with him and Senator [Alan] Bible, another man I've had a long relationship with, to Alaska in 1971, and convinced Hartzog and Bible that the Gates of the Arctic region could become our greatest wilderness park. I was going to fly with them to the Wrangell Mountains, but unfortunately the weather turned bad; and the Wrangells have had a hard time getting the recognition they should have.

Lage: Do you think that trip to Alaska might have changed things?

Wayburn: It could have then, because we got a very good view of Mount McKinley, and were able to point out that Mount McKinley National Park took in only half the mountain and not near enough of the wildlife areas. Bible was able to see this from a small plane, and Hartzog too. Hartzog had previously had the idea of a hotel at Wonder Lake in the middle of McKinley Park, and I showed him how that would be entirely inappropriate. Such things do have an influence when these people have to deal with areas with which they're unacquainted.

XVII DISCOVERING ALASKA, 1967: FORMULATION OF A GRAND PLAN

[Interview 13: May 22, 1981]##

Muir and the Sierra Club in Alaska, 1879-1967

Lage: Today is May 22, 1981, and we're continuing the interview with Edgar Wayburn. We want to begin today talking a little bit in general about the beginnings of the Sierra Club's interest in Alaska, and then we'll get into your personal involvement. Do you want to give sort of an overview on that?

Wayburn: The club can claim a deep interest in Alaska from its early days because of the interest and the adventures of its founding father, John Muir. John Muir made several trips to Alaska, often of several months at a time. He was there in 1879 and 1880, 1889 or '90, and again with the Harriman expedition in 1899.

His chief experience was in Southeast Alaska. He went first to Fort Wrangell at the mouth of the Stikine River and explored the Stikine rather thoroughly to its headwaters. In his book on Travels in Alaska, he gives delightful accounts, as only Muir could, of the Stikine country in both Alaska and Canada, and of his adventures in climbing Glenora Peak, and his experience on numerous glaciers. He filled out his very extensive knowledge of glaciology by studying the tidewater glaciers of southeast. He floated the Stikine River by both Indian canoe and small steamer.

He later went by dugout canoe all through the Alexander Archipelago, up to Glacier Bay, and explored Glacier Bay. At the time Muir was in Glacier Bay, it wasn't nearly as big as it is now. The glaciers had begun to recede and there was a bay, whereas two hundred years before when George Vancouver passed there, there was no bay at all.

Wayburn: Muir went to Glacier Bay when it was perhaps half the size that it is now. He found it, as other people have, the most extraordinary example of the new world emerging, of the earth coming out from under the glacial ages, and he described this very fully.

Muir's involvement was a very personal one. He was an extraordinary man physically, as well as mentally and emotionally. He traveled with a party of three to four Tlingit guides and a missionary named S. Hall Young, who was stationed in Wrangell and who was so intrigued by Muir that he insisted on going with him. Muir would leave his party for days at a time to explore glaciers. He did not seem to be affected by the soaking wet weather, or the freezing, or the lack of food. He accomplished so much, and he wrote so much about his adventures that he probably set the stage more than any other man for the scientific exploration of Southeast Alaska.

Muir was likewise engaged with the Harriman expedition, which went well beyond Southeast, up into the Bering Sea in 1899, and Muir wrote about that too. But, although it published some of Muir's adventures, the Sierra Club as an organization for many years thereafter was too small, too far away, too poor, and too much interested in local happenings and problems, so that it didn't get into Alaska for many, many years.

My first knowledge of this came, I think, in 1953 when, as a member of the conservation committee of the Sierra Club (in those days we had only one), we got word that the Forest Service was interested in classifying wilderness areas and, getting no interest from anyone in wilderness areas, turned to classifying scenic areas.

In 1955, when I was chairman of the conservation committee, I was looking for someone who could represent us at a Forest Service hearing in Southeast, probably in Juneau, on the proposed Ford's Terror-Tracy Arm Scenic Area. The only person I knew who might be able to do this was Polly Dyer, who had moved from San Francisco to Seattle and who had, with Dixie Baade, explored part of Southeast in a canoe in the late forties. I got a hold of Polly; she was unable to go, but she, in turn, got Dixie Baade to represent us.

There was then another hiatus, although a number of us knew about Alaska and were interested in Alaska from the distance, and the [Sixth Biennial] Wilderness Conference of the Sierra Club in 1959 did have discussions on Alaska by some of our people who had been there. To my remembrance, these included Lowell Sumner and George Collins.

Wayburn: Then in the early sixties, I believe it was, after the establishment of the Arctic National Wildlife Range by Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton, a work in which the Sierra Club had an advocacy role--

Lage: Do you recall what their role was there?

Wayburn: We asked President Eisenhower and Secretary Seaton to establish a large national wildlife range for the protection of the caribou and the other resident large wildlife, including the grizzly and wolf.

Lage: Was it a written advocacy, or did we have our representative in Washington contact them?

Wayburn: I think it was written advocacy. I am not sure that we had our first official representative in Washington at that time.

Lage: Fifty-nine, yes.

Wayburn: Was it '59? Bill Zimmerman was our first and, if so, he would have been the person who would have presented this in person. I'm a little hazy on just how this came about, but I remember that we were among the organizations pushing for it. Since Lowell Sumner, who was with the National Park Service, and George Collins, who was with the National Park Service, were very interested, I know that we were doing it.

Two of the chief advocates were Olaus and Mardy Murie, who were with the Wilderness Society at the time. Olaus Murie was the director of the Wilderness Society.

The Wayburns' First Alaska Trip: Impressions of Mount McKinley

Wayburn: After that, we heard more and more, and we got more and more interested in Alaska, but we did not get actively into it until 1967. In 1967, as president of the Sierra Club, I went east to New York to open a photographic exhibit, which was a joint project of the Sierra Club and Time-Life Publications. David Brower, who was the executive director of the club, had arranged for the majority of the photographs. Time-Life Publications took care of the production and furnished the place for the exhibit. This was one of our first big forays into the East.

Wayburn: After the exhibition, Peggy and I set out on a planned journey to Alaska from New York. We traveled first to Seattle via Minneapolis, and I remember a dramatic experience over Minneapolis. Our plane couldn't get down its landing gear and had to dump all of its gasoline before it took a chance at landing in Minneapolis. Then we changed planes and got into Seattle late. Instead of the original flight we were going to take north, we had to change to a Pan American flight, which left late in the evening and got into Fairbanks at two o'clock in the morning.

We found a place to sleep for three or four hours in the old Nordale Hotel, which was one of the true old Alaskan hotels which don't exist any more. The Nordale burnt a few years later.

We had a nine o'clock train to catch. We didn't stay in Fairbanks that year. It was drizzling steadily as we boarded the train for Mount McKinley, and we traveled up to Mount McKinley, gradually seeing a little more as the weather cleared. When we got to McKinley station, we heard that there was a full-fledged rain at Fairbanks. (Incidentally, this was the year of the centennial exposition at Fairbanks, the anniversary of Seward's purchase of Alaska from Russia for \$7.2 million.) That rain continued for several days and nights steadily and was the cause of the big flood which inundated Fairbanks for weeks and caused great damage. We sometimes jokingly referred to it as the Sierra Club's first big event in Alaska.

We were met at McKinley Station by Celia Hunter and Ginny Hill Wood, and we went directly out to Camp Denali for a three-day stay. Ginny Wood and Celia Hunter were WAF [Women's Air Force] pilots during the war. They were among the first women pilots employed by the U.S. Government, and they ferried planes from the U.S. up along the Alaska Highway into Alaska; there Russian pilots took over to fly these planes into Siberia, to be used by the Russians in World War II. They had been in Alaska ever since, and they had founded Camp Denali some seventeen years before.

Camp Denali is a fascinating and interesting place to get the first experience of Alaska wilderness. It's just outside the boundaries of the old Mount McKinley National Park at the end of the Wonder Lake road. I won't go into the background of the Wonder Lake road being part of the price that was paid for the support of the miners working with Charles Sheldon, the naturalist, in pushing Mount McKinley National Park, but that's an interesting story.

Wayburn: Camp Denali has a number of cottages for visitors, and they have a program of introducing the visitor to the Alaska Range wilderness. It is on a hill from which one can get a magnificent view of Mount McKinley with Wonder Lake in the foreground, and you will see pictures of photographers from Ansel Adams on down who have documented this magnificent view. One often doesn't get to see Mount McKinley because of the clouds, but we were fortunate at that time and on repeated visits in having at least one and usually several views of Mount McKinley. When you get the view, you take it, no matter what time of day it is. They wake you up at two, three, four o'clock in the morning to say, "The mountain is out," and when it's out, it's worth seeing at any time of day or night. With the long summer nights, you get an extraordinary view during any of the twenty-four hours.

We spent the three days most profitably. Ginny and Celia were wonderful hosts, and they showed us some of the problems that we were to go into more later. They showed us the mining at Kantishna, just a little way off, where the ground was being literally ground up. They showed us Moose Creek, which had flowed clear until a mining company decided that there was an opportunity for placer mining and hydraulic mining, and which had become a muddy stream. They showed us the area which the National Park Service had picked out for a new hotel and campground, up on a series of seven lakes, on a bench across--

Lage: Within the park?

Wayburn: Within the park, just across from Wonder Lake, and a place where, incidentally, the inlet and the outlet were so close together that there would have been quite a problem with contamination of water. Although they said that the National Park Service team the year before had included such eminent people as Sigurd Olson, Sr., and Adolph Murie and that Olson and Murie had gone along with the plan, we made up our minds at that point that there must never be a hotel constructed there. We set about looking for alternate sites so that there would not be this invasion of what was not only one of the wildest national parks over which the U.S. had jurisdiction, but also the greatest display of wild animals in the United States, comparable to the wildlife parks of Africa. We saw on our journey back and forth across the Wonder Lake road more than a few instances of caribou, bear, moose, fox, all kinds of birds. The only thing that I to my regret have never found there is wolves. Let's come back to that later.

Wayburn: Our experience at Mount McKinley was most enlightening. We talked to the superintendent, whose name was George Hall. He was at that time not only the superintendent of Mount McKinley, but in charge of the whole National Park Service in Alaska. In the summertime he would be in Mount McKinley; in the wintertime he would be in his office at Anchorage. The National Park Service only had, oh, somewhere between twelve and twenty people employed in all of Alaska.

The person in charge of Katmai National Monument, which was the largest land unit in the national park system until the recent Alaska Lands Act was passed, was not a superintendent but a management assistant with two or three other people working with him.

Lage: That might have been fortunate because they could do less managing--less trouble.

Wayburn: Yes, that did have its advantages. The superintendent of Glacier Bay National Monument, which was up until recently the largest single unit in the National Park Service, had only two or three rangers working under him. The National Park Service was a very poor agency which was administered from the Western Region offices in San Francisco. Then, when the Northwest Region was established in Seattle, it was run from Seattle.

Lage: When you say "poor," are you speaking about finances or capability?

Wayburn: Finances, and the number of people involved, and its ability to manage. It was in very considerable part, except for Mount McKinley, custodial care. As you say, that had certain advantages and certain disadvantages.

After our stay in Mount McKinley National Park, we traveled to Anchorage on the Alaska Railroad, which at that time was the only way you could travel in and out of Mount McKinley Park unless you took the long route around the Denali Highway, which was then quite rough, and not many cars wanted to do it. Yet, as I look back, there were quite a few cars traveling on the Wonder Lake road by people who had come around from Fairbanks or Anchorage or up the Alaska Highway and traveled across the Denali Highway from Paxson to be able to drive into McKinley. These people would camp at Riley Creek at the edge of the park. Then there were several campgrounds established--at Savage River, at Toklat, at several other places--rather primitive camps.

At that time, the Park Service began to be aware of the fact that when the new road--Anchorage to Fairbanks--came in, they should do something to prevent a real holocaust developing from overuse of the Wonder Lake road, and they did that a couple of years later.

Wayburn: Back to our journey down. The Alaska Railway was a delightful experience. It took an awful long time to travel. I think it took nine to ten hours to travel from Mount McKinley station to Anchorage. It stopped at numerous places. It had a tradition of stopping for anyone who lived along the railroad, and many homesteaders had homesteaded because they could get in and out to their homes by railway. Sometimes the conductor, who knew so many of these people, would go up and down looking for them.

I remember there was one homesteader named Joe, who had gotten into the bar car and had quite a bit to drink and who couldn't be found. After the conductor had gone looking for Joe, they stopped anyway until they were able to find Joe asleep and take him and put him outside the railroad tracks [chuckles] at his homestead.

A few miles farther on we were fortunate enough to be able to see Mount McKinley from the southeast. I had talked with a number of people beforehand, and I was looking for a possible hotel site, one which could be satisfactory as a substitute for the proposed Wonder Lake Hotel. When we got to Curry Ridge, which is quite a distance down, we were able to see Mount McKinley. Curry Ridge rises several hundred feet above the level of the railroad grade. It is an excellent view spot and has outstanding vistas of Mount McKinley and its surroundings, and the mountain is visible much more frequently than it is from the north, where Wonder Lake is.

##

Wayburn: At the end of that journey, I wrote to George Hartzog, director of the National Park Service, and told him that the Sierra Club would strongly oppose any hotel being built on the end of the Wonder Lake road and suggested that there was an alternate site at Curry Ridge, where magnificent views of Mount McKinley could be had by people who could be much closer to Anchorage, much closer to the out-of-state visitors, who were coming to Alaska in increasing numbers each year. Anchorage was the center of this visitation. These people could get to Curry Ridge in a comparatively short time. They could sit in a climate-protected area and view Mount McKinley from almost as close as they could from Wonder Lake and probably get better viewing more days of the year since the south side usually had better weather. I suggested to him that the Park Service push for such a location.

The idea (which may not have been original with me because it was such a natural) was taken up more and more in future years. Now there are various proposals for putting up a hotel and even a city in that general area.

Lage: Is that part of the park, or is that outside the park?

Wayburn: Curry Ridge belongs to Denali State Park now. Some other areas close to Curry Ridge are in the national park. Bradford Washburn, the explorer/mountaineer who was for many years the head of the Boston Natural History Museum, has proposed putting a hotel on the Kokositna Glacier, which is inside the national park now. Former Senator Mike Gravel proposed putting an entire city (which he would cover with teflon) into that area, I think also on or near the Tokositna Glacier. The Curry view would, I believe, look up the Ruth Glacier, although I'm not certain of that.

Any one of these would have magnificent views of Mount McKinley, and I think that as plans grow more and more firm for locating some sort of facility on the south side, one has to consider the type of facility which would do the least damage and at the same time allow the tourist the chance to see Mount McKinley, which is one of the great sights of the world, and the glaciers and mountains which are subsidiary to it.

At the same time this will free the north side of the mountain for what is its highest purpose, that of allowing the wildlife to exist in a refuge, a real refuge, and allowing humans to view that wildlife in what will be greater quantity than now--because up until now the wildlife, which is migratory (the moose and the caribou and the bear and the wolves), all have their winter range to the north of the park. The new park boundaries take in most of the winter range, so that unless too much of the new area is classified as preserve, those animals will be protected.

Now, you understand the difference between a preserve and a park proper. In order to get the support of various wildlife organizations, we who were pushing for the establishment of very large areas of national parks compromised to the extent that some of those areas would be classified as national preserves, to be managed as national parks with the one exception that hunting, sports hunting, would be allowed.

Lage: Would it be regulated hunting?

Wayburn: It would be regulated. Among the conditions in the act there is the provision that if the populations of wildlife are endangered or threatened, the secretary of the Interior has the right to stop hunting or can regulate hunting to the extent that is necessary.

Lage: So has it not yet been decided how much will be park and how much preserve?

Wayburn: Oh, at the present time the boundaries of park and preserve are set forth.

Lage: In the legislation?

Wayburn: In the legislation. There are people in Alaska and outside who want to change those boundaries by extending the preserves further into the park; and we who feel that there is not enough area to insure that the wildlife will not become endangered. We want to extend the park boundaries into what are the present preserves. That is a struggle which will go on between those who want to hunt and those of us who feel that regardless of one's feeling about the killing of wildlife, one has to have a large enough sanctuary habitat so that there will always continue to be a sufficient wildlife population.

Touring the Kenai Moose Range

Wayburn: We had a very pleasant journey on the Alaska railroad and went down to Anchorage. Anchorage is the city with not only the largest number of people, but also more of the bureaucracies, particularly the federal bureaucracies. We made further contact with the National Park Service in their then tiny quarters in the post office building. We contacted the Fish and Wildlife Service and made arrangements to visit the Kenai Peninsula. And we contacted the Bureau of Land Management, which at that time had under its jurisdiction 290 million acres of Alaska divided into two principal districts: the southern district with headquarters in Anchorage and only 100 million acres to manage, the northern district with headquarters in Fairbanks and 190 million acres to manage. I will tell you more of our experience with them.

On this 1967 journey, we contacted Dave Spencer, who was then the manager of the refuges; Charles Evans, who was in charge of river basin studies; and Will Troyer, who was a wildlife expert.

Lage: Now, are these all with Fish and Wildlife?

Wayburn: These were all people with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Incidentally, all of them have since left the service.

Evans, who was an expert pilot, decided, with Spencer's okay, that he would take us down to the Kenai Moose Range. Will Troyer, and Peggy and I were his crew and passengers. We flew down in a Beaver,

Wayburn: which is an amphibian plane. We met Spencer at his headquarters in the refuge. It was one of those overcast days, and we had to fly low, but it was one of those memorable days one never forgets. We saw a great many things which made an impression on us and which influenced what we did from then on.

We crossed Turnagain Arm and almost immediately were in the lake country. The two canoe areas had been established by the Bureau of Land Management, the Swanson River and Swan Lake. Here was one lake after another--many with streams connecting them, others with portages--which the Fish and Wildlife Service and, I believe, the Bureau of Land Management, working together, had set up as areas for recreation, and which were scheduled as wilderness.

Then we flew on to Skilak Lake and Tustumena Lake, two large lakes coming down from glaciers which, in turn, were headed by the Harding Ice Field, one of the largest ice fields in the world.

Lage: Let me interrupt just for a minute and ask you, what was your introduction to these men? Had you written ahead as president of the Sierra Club?

Wayburn: I think we had written ahead to the services, and as soon as we got into Anchorage we went in to see them.

Lage: And the reception was cordial?

Wayburn: The reception was extremely cordial, and these are people with whom we have maintained a friendship ever since.

Lage: Were they in hopes that the Sierra Club would become interested in Alaska?

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: So they were interested in conservation consciousness?

Wayburn: They were interested in conservation and in showing us what they had, undoubtedly with the idea of getting support of national conservation organizations. In just a moment let me come around to conservation organizations in Alaska, because at this moment I am describing the experiences which made such a profound impression on me.

We noted that there were huge areas of the Kenai Moose Range which were crisscrossed, areas where the trees were cut, and we asked, what were these? We were told these marked seismic lines. The oil companies had come in just a couple of years before, and with their

Wayburn: technology as it was at that time, they had to cut down all the trees for many a mile in each direction in order to get their seismic instruments to record properly whether there was a chance of finding oil. They found quite a bit of oil in the Moose Range and outside the Moose Range on the Kenai Peninsula, but they found much more oil in Cook Inlet.

We also saw for the first time on that journey the numerous derricks and platforms of the oil industry, some of them spurting fire continuously as they burnt off the natural gas which came out of the wells along with the oil that went into pipelines and then into ships for transshipment, I think mostly to Japan. Some may have come to California.

Lage: And this was within the Moose Range?

Wayburn: Not the derricks and platforms, which were in Cook Inlet. Cook Inlet was that body of water between the Kenai Peninsula and the mainland.

Lage: So these were in the ocean?

Wayburn: Those were in the water, not in the ocean proper, but in the huge Cook Inlet, which leads up to Anchorage and which is fed by glacial outflow coming down the Susitna and Matanuska through Knik Arm.

We landed at a little lake near Tustumena Lake and wandered around on the ground to see what it was like. We found evidence, as we had from the plane, of a tremendous burn of a few years before. The spruce trees and willows and the other hardwoods had burned. The Fish and Wildlife Service people were very happy about this because it was a case of natural manipulation of the terrain, so that they didn't have to do any artificial manipulation. The moose thrive on the young hardwoods and particularly on young willows, hardwood being birch and poplar and cottonwood, and the moose population, which had become a little low, was thriving at a tremendous rate. Incidentally, the caribou, which had been much more numerous there, were at the same time much fewer in number.

The Fish and Wildlife Service had plans for classifying their land so that they would have a sizeable wilderness area, the Andy Simon Wilderness Area, which I think has been just now classified, fifteen years later.

They were an excellent group of men who, on the whole, had gone to Alaska years before and had fallen in love with Alaska and were staying there. There were some bureaucratic difficulties which later

Wayburn: caused the majority of these old-timers to leave the service, but they stayed in Alaska. All three of these men whom I've mentioned have left the service. Will Troyer now works for the National Park Service, and the other two are working for a private firm, but still doing the sort of work that they did before.

That was a memorable day, in which we saw a great deal and set the groundwork for what we would do later.

It was either that same year or the next year that Will Troyer took us by automobile around Turnagain Arm to the Russian River and showed us the fishing possibilities a little higher up on the slope, showed us areas where fishermen stood arm to arm, even as they do on the Klamath River here, fishing for salmon, and told us of some of the plans that they had.

Once on that journey we were walking along the river, or a tributary to the river. We were in single file, and I was the last one. All of a sudden, I disappeared. After a while, they looked around and couldn't find me and became alarmed. I'd just fallen through a big hole which was about seven feet deep. I was not hurt at all but had to find my way out. Just an interesting sidelight. I was reminded of it years later when reading of Muir's adventures in the glaciers where he found himself suddenly dropping down several feet and had to clamber out from the side of a glacier.

We made the acquaintance of the Bureau of Land Management. Burton Silcock was the area director, and we became quite friendly. We were doing all this in two weeks. We were making our first grand tour. We didn't know then what we were going to do about Alaska.

Roots of Commitment to Alaskan Preservation

Lage: I don't think we talked about why you went to Alaska. Did you go there thinking it would be a conservation interest, or was it a pleasure trip?

Wayburn: Well, it was really a combination, and I should have put this part into the introduction of Alaska. By 1967 I was a very confirmed and dedicated conservationist. I had always been interested in the general idea of saving the world, even as a Boy Scout [amusedly]. I'd had conservation principles impressed on me as a boy in Georgia when I saw the red hills of Georgia, through which one drove in mud in the

Wayburn: winter and through impenetrable dust in the summer. I saw also what had happened to one-crop cotton country, which became absolutely useless as far as growing crops was concerned.

Lage: Was your family knowledgeable about why this had happened? Did they discuss these problems?

Wayburn: No. My family was a town family, and I gradually learned this on my own. I think earlier in my interviews I told Susan about being sent to summer camp starting at the age of nine. But I became completely enamored of what California had to offer when I settled out here in 1933. First I fell in love with San Francisco and its hills and its views of the Bay, and then I began to travel in Marin County and down the peninsula as far as Los Gatos. Each new experience opened up new highlights in my life. I began to look on Marin County as the hills of home.

And then I had seen the Sierra as an adolescent, when my uncle and aunt took me on a visit to Yosemite in 1927; driving in over the Big Oak Flat Road and down into Yosemite brought tears into my eyes. This was the acme of what the world could be. But it was not until I came back from the war and saw what happened to the areas that I'd visited from 1935 on in the Sierra that I became a confirmed conservationist and saw what happened to places in the course of ten to twelve years, even though they hadn't been used much during the war.

At the same time, I had my arm twisted to go on the executive committee of the Sierra Club Bay Chapter and became the first chairman of a conservation committee that any chapter had. That began about 1948 or '49.

What this leads up to is that, within the limits of the time that I had to devote to vacation, I first went into the Sierra with the club and, at times, without the club and explored most of the Sierra. I've been through practically all the Sierra in general and covered the John Muir Trail and learned to love it all.

Then in 1952 I began an experience with the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, which led me to want to systematically explore the mountains of the West. Between 1952 and 1967 Peggy and I did that. We covered the Cascades of Oregon, the Olympics and Cascades of Washington, the Idaho Primitive Area and the Sawtooth and the White Clouds of Idaho, Glacier National Park and Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks in Montana and Wyoming, the Bridger Wilderness and other mountains of Wyoming, the Elk Mountains with

Wayburn: the Maroon Bells-Snowmass Wilderness in Colorado, some of the Wasatch Range and the Colorado Plateau in Utah, and some of the ranges in Nevada, particularly eastern Nevada.

##

Wayburn: By 1967 Peggy and I felt it was time to look north, and for the first time in ten or twelve years we felt that we could go off by ourselves. Our children were old enough so that we could. Our oldest child was working on a Sierra Club trip, and our three youngest children stayed with friends. I think the two youngest went on a Sierra Club High Trip by themselves, and we set out to look at new country. I cannot say that I went for pleasure alone, except the pleasure of seeing magnificent new country, because by that time every place I went had a conservation identification.

Juneau: Meeting Conservationists, Officials, and Regional Forester Johnson

Wayburn: To resume the journey itself, we then went down to Juneau. Oh, one thing I left out here was that we met with Sierra Club people wherever we could. We didn't have time in Fairbanks. In Anchorage, out of the ninety-nine Sierra Club members in Alaska we met with six people, and I remember them very well. They were a civilian with the army engineers named Jim Harle and his wife; the Ganapoles, who had moved up from Bakersfield, Jerry and Mark; and a lawyer named George Dickson and his wife.

We had taken with us a list of all the members in Alaska, and there were ninety-nine, including all the people who were in the military service, people who had gone to villages and towns such as Nome (we had a delightful experience, I think in 1968, with one such couple), people who were in such small out-of-the-way spots as Pelican, and then a fair number of people in Anchorage and in Juneau. I'm not sure at that time whether Anchorage or Juneau had the most Sierra Club members.

Juneau, being the capital, had attracted a few state civil servants and federal civil servants. In 1967 they set up a meeting for us. The chairman of the Juneau group was Don Friedman, who had been a doctor here in San Francisco and worked for the public health department and who had gotten a job in Alaska as commissioner of public health.

Lage: Had they formed a chapter as yet?

Wayburn: No, there was no chapter. In Anchorage the people said to me, "Why don't you form a chapter of the Sierra Club?" In Juneau they said, "Why don't you form a chapter of the Sierra Club in Alaska?" My answer was, "The Sierra Club doesn't form chapters. The local people who are or who want to be members of the Sierra Club form chapters. That's part of the strength of the club, that it is locally rooted and the local grassroots of the Sierra Club are what make it strong." Well, between 1967 and '68 they did apply for and were given chapter status.

But at the 1967 meeting in Juneau there were twenty people who met at the home of a man named Tom Brown. I think his name was Carlos, but everybody called him Tom. He was the recreation supervisor for the Forest Service; often government people belong to the club, either because they're genuinely interested or they want to know what the club is doing.

At this meeting with Brown and his superior, who was assistant regional forester, a man named George Roskie, there were a number of other people, some of whom I remember at this time. I remember particularly Kay and Joe Greenough, who were not at the time members of the club. Joe Greenough, who was working for the Auke Bay Laboratory (he was a scientist in marine biology), made the statement that he wanted to join the Sierra Club.

He was a member of the Steller Society, named after the noted naturalist who was with Bering and who first determined that Bering had discovered the North American continent because he [Steller] found a bluejay which was different, found only in North America. This is Steller's Jay. The Steller Society had been formed locally in Juneau for the protection of the Mendenhall Flats, to keep them from being developed. (That's at the foot of the Mendenhall Glacier).

Greenough said that he belonged to the Alaska Conservation Society for state matters, but that he thought that there were sufficient national concerns that he should join a national organization and that would be the Sierra Club. At that meeting there were several people who did join the club. We had a very successful meeting in Juneau.

One of our chief purposes in going to Juneau was to meet various officials. We met some state officials, and we met especially the regional forester, a gentleman named Howard Johnson. (Incidentally, we had looked up ahead of time Sigurd Olson, Jr., Sig Olson's son, who was a biologist, the only biologist working for the Forest Service in Alaska at that time.) We got an introduction to Mr. Johnson, and we met with him and his staff for some time. We discussed the problems

Wayburn: of the Tongass and the Chugach National Forests. The Chugach is the second largest national forest. The Tongass is by all odds the largest national forest with sixteen million acres, and it takes up most of the Alexander Archipelago. The Forest Service has administration of most of the land in Southeast Alaska. It extends from Yakutat in the north, down to Revillagigedo Island in the south where Ketchikan is, and, on the mainland, the Misty Fjords.

Mr. Johnson was, as all good regional foresters are, very cordial, friendly, and eager to explain to the head of a conservation organization what the Forest Service was doing. The Forest Service has always been in between. They always characterize themselves in the middle. Mr. Johnson had never had much pressure from recreationists or biologists or fisheries people, although there was and is a tremendous fishery resource in Alaska. He'd had--he'd inherited--pressure from loggers, and he'd inherited from his predecessors the principle that in order to help the local economy they had to do something special in Alaska.

What had been dreamed up by his predecessor, a gentleman named B. Frank Heintzleman, who later became territorial governor, was that to preserve the economy of Southeast Alaska they needed to get big timber firms in to build mills and to establish a pulp industry. In order to attract these firms, they gave multi-billion-dollar contracts for logging around eight billion board feet, to be cut over a period of fifty years, and gave them other privileges that no other lumber company had ever gotten. They sold the timber to them at ridiculously low prices so that the federal government was actually losing money.

At the conclusion of a long exposition of how well the Forest Service was doing in Southeast Alaska, I asked him a question. I said, "Mr. Johnson, you've done a very fine job of telling me what you're doing, but you haven't mentioned any wilderness areas. Every region in the lower forty-eight has wilderness areas or areas being studied for wilderness, and you haven't mentioned this. Do you have any?"

Mr. Johnson stared at me. "Wilderness areas? Wilderness Areas? Well, the whole forest is wilderness!"

I answered, "Yes, that may be true today, but it won't be true tomorrow. You have committed a great deal of the forest to logging. You have a provision that a certain amount of the forest will be selected by the state, some 400,000 acres, and they probably will take good forested area in part, good commercial timber. You will have problems coming up that you don't have now. Unless you start the

Wayburn: mechanism for wilderness areas in motion, there will be none, and we don't think that's right. We encourage you to start working on wilderness areas."

He said, "We have the scenic areas." I said, "That's not enough."

Well, I later wrote him a letter in which I summarized my feelings and what I felt were the Sierra Club's feelings. By this time, the Sierra Club was well known throughout the Forest Service, although we had not been in Alaska from an organizational standpoint.

Glacier Bay-Ketchikan-and Home

Wayburn: From Juneau we took a two-day trip out to Glacier Bay National Monument, and we met Bob Howe, the superintendent, and other people working for the Park Service, and we met Frank Kearns, who was the concessionaire. The National Park Service had just finished spending \$1 million on Glacier Bay Lodge, an absolutely delightful establishment, and then rented it out to a concessionaire to run for them, the idea there being that they wanted to get people to see Glacier Bay. Before that there were no accommodations except for Gustavus Inn, which was eleven miles away from the bay itself. The National Park Service thought it was in the national interest to expend this money, the Congress approved of it, and they put up a beautiful lodge.

Lage: Was it well planned so that it didn't interfere with anything?

Wayburn: It was very well planned. It was at the lower end of the bay, and it was off to one side, and it was a place where people could go and start their excursions up into the bay. From the point of view of getting people in to see the geological masterpieces, it was well done.

We went into their long-range plans with them, and they had plans for another lodge some twenty or thirty miles up, which we did not approve of and which, incidentally, has not been constructed. They've changed their ideas since then.

Bob Howe was nice enough to detail a seasonal ranger named Greg Streveler, who was a biologist, to take us up Glacier Bay. We had a wonderful day traveling up through the many inlets and around the glaciers. We got into places that people couldn't see and get to from the tour boat because we were in a small boat. We would anchor and take a dinghy and row to shore. We couldn't get all the

Wayburn: way up into the Johns Hopkins Inlet because of the mass of icebergs coming down, so we anchored and went to shore and had lunch and climbed up alongside the Toyatte Glacier, named for Chief Toyatte, who was John Muir's boatmaster on his first trip up to Glacier Bay.

We later went with the tour boat and saw all the things that the tour boat saw, but the very real exciting part was going up in the small boat. But I must say that getting out in a dinghy from the tour boat and photographing the tour boat against the glacier was likewise very interesting and exciting. It was water you would not want to swim in; the coldest water was experienced coming right out of the glaciers.

We then went back to Juneau and found that we could take a ferry down to Ketchikan. Although it was overcast all the way, we had a very enjoyable trip. We were fortunate enough to get a cabin so we could sleep part of the time. There was a very limited number of cabins.

The ferry system at times is very unreliable as far as keeping scheduled appointments is concerned, but that was one of the pleasures of old Alaska. It was then and still is at times, although they have become much more up to date. We originally got word that the ferry was not going to be on time, and we would have to take a plane down, one of the float planes which we had used to go over to Glacier Bay and of which we'd become already very fond. These were float planes and amphibians, and most of them had been built during World War II. Many were English planes. Haviland was the maker of many of them. Grumman made the Grumman Goose, an American product.

But we found we could go down on the ferry, and we did, and we got a good view of the steamer lanes which the Forest Service was trying to keep as scenic area. They would leave a natural forest up to the three-hundred-foot mark and then they would log above that (something we called to their attention). They were in a quandary about how they would get all the lumber they needed and still keep all the scenery that they knew more and more people were expecting.

Lage: They were concerned mainly with the scenery from the boats?

Wayburn: The scenery which would be seen from the boats.

Another time I will tell you of traveling by plane over the valleys which were completely cut out and that nobody knew about.

Lage: Did they give thought to the effect on the streams, or other ecological damage from logging?

Wayburn: They said that they did, but we learned that many a time they didn't, or at least the loggers didn't.

Lage: Did the Forest Service not seem knowledgeable?

Wayburn: Oh, the service was knowledgeable, but not knowledgeable enough, and the service was too compliant.

At any rate, we got down to Ketchikan by boat, and then we found that we had to hustle to get to another location in Ketchikan in order to catch the plane to take us over to Annette Island where the jets came in. It was a twelve-minute journey from Ketchikan to Annette Island. We got into this Grumman Goose, which had a single pilot and room for eleven passengers.

Peggy, who had not been riding in the front seat (I'd been riding in the front seat with the pilot on most of these trips), wanted to, and so she got into the front seat, and she had a very interesting experience. While the rest of us were enjoying it, she began to notice that the plane seemed to be held together by baling wire, and that as we got up into the air the rain water came in from quite a few leaks, and that we seemed to her to be flying right on the crest of the waves.

So she started asking the pilot a few questions. He couldn't hear her very well but gave her some answers. After what seemed to her to be somewhere between a half hour and an hour, we landed, and she started talking to the pilot again and said, "How long was the journey? A half hour?" He said, "No, Ma'am. Twelve minutes." [chuckles] That's one of her stories, which she tells in greater detail.

Well, the big jets landed on Annette Island, one of the air fields which were put up during World War II. It was a splendid field. Ketchikan did not like the idea of having the big traffic so far away from the city, so they have persuaded the FAA to put in another field on an island just across from Ketchikan, and this is one of the damndest airports you've ever seen. It's on two levels. You come in on one level and you go out on another level, or you taxi up on one level and, I think, go out on the top level. Yes, I guess that's the way it is. Perhaps no one takes off from the lower level, but a small plane can perfectly well.

Then, when you get to the modern airport, you have to wait for a ferry to take you across the channel to Ketchikan, so there's still--

Lage: Was this built since '67?

Wayburn: Yes. In '67 we had to fly out of Annette Island.

Alaska: A Personal Project and a Sierra Club Priority

Wayburn: We flew back to Seattle and to San Francisco, and we had had our great, our marvelous adventure. I was so impressed by this that a couple of weeks later, when the Sierra Club board had its September meeting, I made a talk recounting our adventures because everybody had heard about Alaska, and nobody had done anything about it. I said, "Alaska is the most magnificent place we have left. It's comparable to what the entire West was in the 1830s. It is beyond all comparison with anything that we have in the lower forty-eight, and it must become a Sierra Club priority."

At that time we had five priorities, I think you know: completion of the national park system, completion of the wilderness system, establishment of the Redwood National Park, protection of the Grand Canyon and the Cascades National Park. We were working on those, but we made Alaska the sixth priority. It very rapidly became the first priority, and when the legislative campaign started we made it the megacampaign.

Lage: Was the idea to make it a priority well received by the board?

Wayburn: Yes. In the board it was absolutely unanimous.

I remember a couple of years later visiting John Oakes in New York. John Oakes was then a director of the club and said, "Well, you sure were convincing on Alaska." There was no question that we had to make it a national priority, and events have borne it out.

Lage: Now, what did it mean, practically, to become a priority at that time?

Wayburn: That meant that we would start devoting more and more of our energies and time and money to Alaska, and we would get an Alaska regional representative.

##

Wayburn: During the first few years, Alaska was a personal project of mine. I felt a great compulsion that we, the Sierra Club, had to do something about that. From the very beginning I felt there was not enough reserved federal land in Alaska. There were 290 million acres

Wayburn: of land under the Bureau of Land Management in the State of Alaska. By 1959, the state had the privilege of selecting 104 million acres, and we knew that the natives would be able to select a certain acreage. We had no idea in '67 just what was going to happen there. But it was my feeling that the conservationists had come late; having come late, they had a lot to do.

I have always been interested in wilderness and in national and state parks, but outside of California it's been national parks. My first concepts were that of trying to identify lands to reserve. I quickly saw that a lot of Alaska would not be perhaps best administered by the National Park Service, as the Park Service was at that time, although under a different set-up, as someone said, all of Alaska could legitimately be a national park.

But from first inquiry and first view, I had in mind a great enlargement of Mount McKinley National Park, just a little bit bigger than it turned out to be; and enlargement of Katmai and of Glacier Bay; and from what I'd heard of and not from what I'd seen in 1967, establishment of national parks in the Wrangell Mountains and in Lake Clark. Those were the general concepts I was going by then.

Lage: This was as early as '67?

Wayburn: At the end of this trip in '67.

Lage: Were these ideas something that the conservationists you met with in Alaska had also been thinking of?

Wayburn: In '67 they'd been thinking, certainly. To my remembrance, individuals had been thinking about places they'd been which should be reserved, but in Alaska there was this feeling of "it's all open and wild." Although there had been homesteading and acquisition of land under the Stone and Timber Act, and of recreation sites, there were only about one million acres out of 375 million acres in private hands. Now, that would be a lot of acreage in some states, but the Alaskans felt that they had less proportionately than any other state, and that philosophy had affected the Alaskans.

It was the foreigners and the people who came up from the lower forty-eight, who saw what there was there and who knew what it meant, who began to have ideas about different places, some of them in the services and some of them not: Lowell Sumner and George Collins, Mark Ganapole, who came from Bakersfield, Rich Gordon, who came from Wisconsin. These people were beginning to get their ideas.

Wayburn: Then there was a big push on for expansion of fish and wildlife refuges. There were already twenty million acres of wildlife refuge, and that was recognized as not being near enough, particularly because the birdlife came from all over the world, from Asia and Europe as well as North and South America, to nest or rest in Alaska.

I believe I probably came along at the time that many other people were thinking about this. I think I stimulated it perhaps more than anyone else by stimulating the Sierra Club, and the Sierra Club did more than any other organization. I don't think there's any question that if it weren't for the Sierra Club we wouldn't have what we've got today.

Well, so much for '67, as I recall it at the moment.

Lage: That sounds like a really good introduction, I think.

Wayburn: That was the introduction and the formulation of a grand plan.

XVIII FURTHER EXPLORATIONS IN ALASKA: THE 1968 TRIP

The Alaska Conservation Society and the Sierra Club

Wayburn: In '67 also I remember being interviewed as president of the Sierra Club and asked by an Alaskan newspaper interviewer, "What do you conservationists think about development here in Alaska?" I said, "Alaska seems to me to be one place where good development and good conservation can proceed side by side," but I didn't think that could be allowed to proceed by chance.

Well, my words were proven absolutely false when I got to Alaska the next year. In Fairbanks the first thing we saw was the paper with the headline announcing the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay by Atlantic Richfield.

Lage: That was on your arrival there? It had just been announced?

Wayburn: Yes, that was on our arrival, and at that moment we knew that the battle was under way.

Lage: How was the announcement greeted in Alaska? Did you get some sense of that?

Wayburn: It was greeted in a number of ways: with incredulity, with hope, with great anticipation, and with a certain amount of apprehension, depending on who read the news. Immediately the Anchorage Times started trumpeting that this was the solution to all of Alaska's problems.

Nineteen sixty-eight was a completely different year from 1967. We stayed for almost four weeks instead of two. As usual, we made the rounds of the bureaucrats and of the conservationists.

Wayburn: We had a brand new chapter in Alaska, which had been admitted the previous May, and we had some organizational duties to perform to encourage Alaskans to join the Sierra Club. There was a fairly profound difference between the new Sierra Club and the older Alaska Conservation Society, formed in 1960.

I shall divert here for a little on that. The Alaska Conservation Society was formed in 1960 in Fairbanks by a group comprised largely of wildlife biologists and game managers (some of whom were the same people). It was formed of university people and of fish and game bureaucrats, and it had in it the Fish and Wildlife Service people from the federal government. There were also a few other conservation-minded people who joined in with them.

It was a fairly small organization in '67 and in '68, and it was oriented towards fish-and-game management psychology. They were not inclined to reserve land for national parks. They were hunters. They were perfectly happy to enlarge the wildlife refuges; they understood that. They were very willing to help classify areas of the Bureau of Land Management so that every single acre of land wouldn't be used for every single purpose. They understood that mining could be bad for the land at times and that logging could be. But they were distinctly opposed to any enlargement of the national parks.

Lage: Now, wasn't Celia Hunter involved in that?

Wayburn: Celia Hunter was the executive secretary (I think, the unpaid executive secretary) of it. Bob Weeden, who was a fish and game biologist for the state of Alaska in Juneau and later a professor at the University of Alaska, has been the president intermittenly for many, many years. I think he was in 1967; he was again in 1980. In the meantime, he has done other things.

Lage: So their point of view was different.

Wayburn: Their point of view was different, and they somewhat resented the establishment of the Sierra Club, partly because they did not agree with Sierra Club ideas entirely, and partly because they were the conservation organization of Alaska, and why did there need to be another one? You see, there was no Audubon Society. There were no Friends of the Earth. There was no Isaak Walton League. There was a unit of the National Wildlife Federation called the Associated Sportsmen, the head of which was down in Juneau, and I'm not sure of their relationship. I think they got along because they were both organizations which were interested in the use of wildlife as game.

Lage: So did this turn out to be a continuing problem, this tension between the--?

Wayburn: This was an intermittent problem, yes.

The power of the Alaska Conservation Society was centered in Fairbanks, and the Sierra Club for many years had trouble in getting a foothold in Fairbanks. In 1969, for example, Brock Evans and I, who were there for the Alaska Science Conference, encouraged a unit of the club. It was formed, but it became inactive, and the individual members who were most active became active in the Alaska Conservation Society. Many people belonged to both but would give prime allegiance to one or the other.

Lage: And was the main difference between the two the issue of expanding national parks?

Wayburn: That was one. Another one was, how much shooting, how you treated the wildlife.

Lage: Was there a difference in approach to things like the oil pipeline?

Wayburn: To some extent. I'll come to that in a little while.

Part of it was the fact that the older organization resented the newer one coming in, particularly as the newer one was growing so fast. Then part of it was the rivalry between Fairbanks and Anchorage: the Sierra Club grew rapidly in Anchorage, with its city base and the wide variety of people it appealed to, and it grew rapidly in Juneau, which is the third city in size, whereas the Alaska Conservation Society at first concentrated in Fairbanks. In the mid-sixties they had a chapter on the Kenai Peninsula, and now I think they have six chapters scattered throughout Alaska, but their basic strength has always been in Fairbanks and centered around the university.

In 1968 we went as soon as we could to Mount McKinley. We went to Fairbanks first again. We met with the Alaska Conservation Society, tried to form a liaison with them, and did to some extent. Very fine people were running it, we liked them, and we were trying to work with them.

Crawl Through a Wolf Den at McKinley

Wayburn: At Mount McKinley we met with Ted Swem, who had recently become the head of new projects, and particularly Alaska projects, for the National Park Service; and Bill Everhart, who is an historian in charge of Harper's Ferry.

We stayed the first night in the McKinley Park Hotel and got up at two o'clock in the morning to go out on a wolf hunt. Gordon Haber was a young man who the year before had been a seasonal ranger at Mount McKinley and how had introduced us to Adolph Murie, the great wolf man of McKinley. Haber was now doing a study, which would take eight to ten years, on wolves, and he had offered to show Peggy, Swem, Everhart, Sigurd Olson, and me a wolf den.

We drove to the Toklat River and then got out of the car. It was drizzling gently as we walked down the river and crossed and crisscrossed the river. The Toklat is one of those braided rivers that you can walk across when it's low without any trouble. We got thoroughly soaked, but we kept going till in the distance Gordon pointed out, "Down in there is the wolf den." We were then some five miles or more away from the road.

We stopped in the drizzle and had lunch, made a fire and warmed up, and then went on. One of the party looked and said, "You know, I wonder if I see a wolf." I looked through the glasses and said, "Why, yes, it's a wolf. I see it distinctly." We got all excited and walked very carefully but faster around the stream and through the stream, not paying attention to the weather at all.

We got all the way up to the den (very carefully, because we didn't want to disturb the wolves), and we started looking inside the den. [pauses] There wasn't a wolf! The wolves must have left there a week or more before.

Lage: Oh, dear!

Wayburn: But it shows how vivid an imagination I have. [chuckles]

Lage: But you weren't the only one!

Wayburn: No. We crawled through the wolf den, which was a fascinating thing.

Lage: It was large enough that you could actually crawl through?

Wayburn: Oh, yes. It was like an underground lodge in a hill.

Lage: And do the wolves dig it out?

Wayburn: They dug it out. It may have been some natural cave before, but they certainly dug some. It was a cavelike structure with multiple openings, rather large. It extended over the area of a good-sized house, with half a dozen openings in the side of the hill, and as you crawled through there you could see areas where they'd rested and areas where there were bones, where they'd eaten, and there were some areas where they defecated. But a very clean animal--it reminds you of a clean dog as far as that aspect is concerned. All in all, it was most worthwhile to explore even though we didn't see any wolves.

Lage: You wouldn't have explored the den if you'd seen the wolves.

Wayburn: We might have had some difficulty. [chuckles] But Gordon was able to get very close to wolves, he said, and he had some very good pictures. He said the wolves knew him, and they would not run away from him as they would from other people. These were among the wolves whose winter range is outside the old McKinley Park, and they used to be kept down to a fairly low population because of this, although Haber was of the opinion that some of the wolves learned not to go outside the park.

Then we had to come back. In our excitement we hadn't noticed what had been going on during this rainy day. It had been raining steadily, even if softly, all day. We'd been out for about six hours. We figured that we'd best cross the river entirely, that on our side there were too many side streams and there was better ground on the other side. So we crossed the river. I have a photograph here showing how we crossed. We went by twos; there were six of us. Bill Everhart and Ted Swem went together, the one holding to the other's shoulders; and Peggy went with Gordon Haber, who was the biggest, strongest man in the group; and Sig Olson and I went together. Sig and I went across without too much trouble, although the water was almost up to our thighs instead of being at our ankles, and at times it got above the thighs.

We turned around because we were in the lead, and saw Peggy go down into the Toklat River. Gordon picked her up right away, and they started off again, but within a short time she was down flat again; "rolled" is the term. Then I realized what was happening. She had on a poncho, and with this great mass of swift water flowing down, that poncho acted like a sail picking up the water instead of the wind, and it knocked her over. I said, "Get off that poncho right away!" It was the only cover she had from the rain, but we compensated for that. So after that we were all able to get across well.

Wayburn: We had to make a couple more stream crossings. The water was so deep and when we got under the bridge of the road at the end that we were almost swimming. Peggy got very cold at this time. She became hypothermic. I started pushing her, making her run a way and walk a way, and slapping her on the behind and on the back when she didn't move fast enough. The last part of it, which was across this bridge across the Toklat, we really had to push her. She was in a bad way.

We were bound for the ranger's cabin, and fortunately we got there soon. One of the National Park Service people had a quart of whiskey. We stripped off all her clothes and got dry clothes for her and gave her the whiskey and put her close to the fire. Within a half hour she was coming back all right.

Lage: I didn't know that doctors recommended whiskey for hypothermia.

Wayburn: Only when you can get warm. Whiskey dilates the pores. Whiskey allows the blood to flow through the periphery faster, and if you're cold it will allow more blood to be chilled, but when you're getting heated it will allow more blood to be heated faster.

Lage: I see.

Wayburn: And besides, it makes you feel better! [chuckles]

Lage: Right! [laughter] She needed that by then, I'm sure!

Wayburn: Oh, she needed that!

For months afterwards she was washing silt out of her socks. There's a fine silt in these glacial rivers, and if you get your socks full of it you have an awful time getting them clean.

Lage: Well, that must have given you a lot of respect for nature there.

Wayburn: It gave us a great deal of respect for nature.

##

Wayburn: When Peggy was warmed up enough, we drove on up the Wonder Lake road to Camp Denali, which was our destination. We stayed for the next couple of days in the A-frame which Celia and Ginny kept for themselves and their friends.

During the time that we were traveling, we discussed with Ted Swem the fact that we were later going to visit the Wood River Tikchik, a 2,400,000 acre area which we had heard a lot about the year before and which we understood had been selected by the state. We had talked to Roscoe Bell, who was chief of the Alaska Division of Lands. Swem had said that he would get permission for us to visit it with him.

Wayburn: When we met at Mount McKinley, I said, "We're looking forward to the visit to the Wood River Tikchik," and he said, "I'm sorry. I can't take you." I said, "Why not?" He said, "The state won't give us permission." I said, "Why, that's outrageous! The National Park Service can't get permission to visit an area which has been spoken of as being potentially one of the greatest national parks in the world?" He said, "That's right." So they couldn't take us, but Peggy and I were then determined that we would see the Wood River Tikchik, and we did. That's another story.

Introduction to West Chichagof Wilderness##

[Interview 14: July 31, 1981]

Lage: We were discussing your personal experiences on the early Alaskan trips, and I wanted to ask you a sort of a general question about the relationship between the experiences you and Peggy had on the early trips and the later formulation of a plan for Alaska. Did you want to comment on that?

Wayburn: We were overwhelmed by the magnificence of Alaska, which we felt had features, problems, opportunities which no other part of the United States had. We considered it unique. We saw the small amount of dedicated land in Alaska in 1967: seven million acres of national parks; twenty million acres of national wildlife refuges; another twenty million acres of national forest lands, which were devoted primarily to timber production.

We felt that there was still an opportunity for the dedication of large areas of land in Alaska, lands which would be bounded not by arbitrary lines in small sections but have ecological boundaries. We took this on as a task which we knew would be monumental, but we felt it had to be done at this time if it ever were going to be done.

The opportunities came fast and sometimes out of the blue. For example, in the winter of 1967-68, a letter came addressed to the Sierra Club from Sitka, from a man named Jack Calvin. Jack Calvin, I learned later, had been the co-author with Ed Ricketts of the notable book Between Pacific Tides, which is still being published in later editions. He had gone to Alaska in 1933, married the daughter of the Russian archbishop, I think canoed his way from Seattle to Juneau, and then later had moved to Sitka, where he had lived since then.

Wayburn: He wrote that he had a marvelous wilderness area which had not yet been exploited on West Chichagof Island, but that no one else seemed to be interested. During the preceding year, he had formed the Sitka Conservation Society, a local organization of some twenty people who were interested, but he couldn't get state or national recognition. He felt that he needed to do that to keep the area from being logged as pulp.

Lage: It was national forest land?

Wayburn: It was all general national forest land, part of the Tongass National Forest.

The letter was forwarded to me, and I wrote back that we would plan to visit him on our next trip to Alaska--in the coming summer. In July, 1968, we started on that journey. We arranged for Brock Evans and his wife, Rachael--Brock was then the Northwest representative of the Sierra Club--to go with us.

An interesting sidelight: in the Seattle airport, we had to stay overnight, and we registered in the hotel. A small, elderly man came up behind me to register, saw my name on the register, and said, "Aren't you president of the Sierra Club?" I admitted this. He said, "I'm Ernest Gruening," and this was Senator Gruening, then eighty-two years old, on his way back up to Alaska to campaign for re-election.

We arrived in Sitka and spent the night, I think, at the Sitka Hotel. Then Jack Calvin took us in his boat, the Ootka, meaning "duck," up from Sitka, up through various bays, across Salisbury Sound, and on to West Chichagof Island where we stayed the first night in a place called Elbow Passage.

The Pacific coast side of West Chichagof Island is an extraordinary place with myriad small bays and nooks and anchorages, protected by numerous small islands which separate the mainland from the open ocean. We spent four days traveling up and down first the west coast and then the east coast of West Chichagof Island, finding an absolutely wonderful fairyland, which was different from anything we had found. This was a new aspect of Alaska.

At the end of that journey, I knew that the Sierra Club was not only going to endorse Jack Calvin's wilderness proposal, but we were going to actively fight for it, and we have ever since, and out of that has come the West Chichagof Wilderness, which is a part of the Alaska Lands Act.

Lage: He had formulated a wilderness proposal, then, himself?

Wayburn: He wanted to get as much of West Chichagof Island as wilderness as possible. This would have been 450,000 acres. This is what we pushed for. The final compromise proposal in the Alaska Lands Act is a little less than 300,000 acres. It takes in the entire Pacific coast side of the island, up to a ridge all along the length of it. It does not take in all of the eastern side, which had been partly cut over before.

Lage: I see.

Wayburn: Whether that will eventually come into the wilderness proposal or statutory wilderness, I don't know, but this much is dedicated.

Lage: Is Jack Calvin still on the scene?

Wayburn: Jack Calvin is still on the scene, very active and happy with what he has done.

I could tell, if there were time, a lot more anecdotes about Calvin and about our trip to West Chichagof. I'll tell only one. The five of us had landed at Fick Cove, which is part of Hoonah Bay, on the eastern shore of West Chichagof, and we were quietly walking up an old logging road. It was drizzling, and everyone fell very quiet as we went through this area. Each had his own thoughts. Brock Evans, who is a great big guy, was in the lead; I was behind him, Jack Calvin was next, Peggy was next, and Rachael was far in the rear.

All of a sudden, Brock wheeled around, shouting, "Bear!" and passed me at what seemed to be thirty miles an hour. Instinctively I turned around and started running. I didn't really have fear, but it was instinct that made me follow him, and just as instinctively, without bravery, I stopped a few yards down because I saw Jack Calvin holding his ground, making like a jumping jack as he waved his arms and his legs, and shouting imprecations in a loud voice.

I turned and stopped and started waving with him and at that moment was aware of this tremendous brown bear, which, as I looked at him, I thought was eight feet tall and up on his hind legs, but he proved to be on all fours. He stopped, I think, about ten feet short of us, looked at us, saw these moving figures, gave a huge roar like a lion--I've never heard anything that resembled that sound except a lion's roar--and then turned and rumbled away, while we more or less sank to the ground. We then turned around and quickly walked back to our boat.

Wayburn: Peggy has described that incident in the current Sierra. Her perception was a little bit different from mine, but this is the way I remember it.

From Sitka we went on to Juneau; in 1968 we traveled in an old PBY World War II bomber with a bubble in it; we sat in the bubble. It's interesting that there was a handsome, tall, black-haired young man who was passing out cigars and who had next to him a type with a great big cigar in his mouth whom we spotted as a campaign manager. This young man said, "I'm Mike Gravel, and I'm running for the Senate, and I hope you'll come to my spaghetti party in Juneau tonight." It seemed that year we were following or were being followed by the Alaska Democratic senatorial candidates.

Lage: Yes. Did you follow through on that invitation?

Wayburn: No, we didn't.

Lage: Maybe you could have persuaded him way back then and saved a lot of trouble! [laughter]

Wayburn: I don't think so, but we were admirers of Gruening, who had, as you know, been one of the people who voted against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, who was a very fine man, even though his conservation actions with regard to Alaska weren't always what they seemed. But when I first met him, he said, "I'm so glad the Sierra Club has gotten interested in Alaska. Keep at it," and he invited us to Palmer, in the Matanuska Valley, where he was going to dedicate the Lake George dumping phenomenon. Lake George comes out of the Knik Glacier and flows into the Knik River. A few days later, the National Park Service people took us up to the dedication, and Senator Gruening, who was the speaker at the Palmer Chamber of Commerce luncheon, introduced us and told the group what a fine organization the Sierra Club was.

Lage: Was that this trip that we're talking about?

Wayburn: Nineteen sixty-eight.

Then he was instrumental in our seeing the agricultural products of the Matanuska Valley. The project was started in 1936 by Franklin Roosevelt, and we met a man named Irwin who was one of the original promoters and was still there. He took us to one of the more successful farms, a man named Max something, who raised cabbages fifty-six pounds in weight and fifty-four inches in diameter, and we took pictures to measure them.

Lage: It just seems unbelievable. [chuckles]

Wayburn: Yes, it seems unbelievable, but the secret was that where they could get enough good soil they would have a twenty-four-hour-a-day growing season for three months, and they could raise these tremendous vegetables. They didn't have the taste that the vegetables down south do, and except for exhibition purposes, who wants a fifty-pound cabbage? [chuckles]

But the Matanuska Valley Project had untold millions poured into it, and it had farmers from Minnesota and Nebraska brought up there at great government expense. About half of them went back and half of them stayed. A few did very well, but the experiment was definitely a mixed bag.

Interestingly, at the present time the Matanuska Valley acreage demands high prices, not for its farming value, but for its value as a suburb of Anchorage, which is almost forty miles away. But it is between Anchorage and the proposed new capital of Alaska at Willow, and there's been a great deal of speculation in real estate going on along the road. That's a sidelight which tells you what is happening in Alaska today.

Timber Sales on Admiralty Island

Wayburn: Back to our 1968 journey and its significance. We made a point of going into Southeast Alaska each time we went to Alaska to contact the officials of the state and of the U.S. Forest Service, which had, in effect, in the early years, a barony or a duchy of some twenty million acres: sixteen million acres of the Tongass National Forest and five million acres a little further north in the Chugach National Forest.

The regional forester was Howard Johnson, a forester who, when he talked of having multiple uses, did not mean the five multiple uses which were mandated by the Congress for the Forest Service, but meant multiple uses of timber production, of logs and cants and pulp of spruce and Alaska cedar and hemlock.

Lage: So it was all timber.

Wayburn: He was very timber-oriented and his staff, for the most part, was. He had an assistant regional forester named George Roskie for recreation, and he had one biologist, who was Sigurd Olson, Jr., and we were able to talk to them at some greater length.

Lage: I ran across something in your papers, a memo from Brock Evans which indicated that some southeast forest employee had leaked some information.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Proconservationist. So there must have been someone on the staff there who was sympathetic.

Wayburn: Oh, yes, there was. I think I know who that was. It was a man who was not in the direct line of the Forest Service, but who worked for the experiment station up there, and he's been very helpful. This is public information, but it wasn't easy to get publicly.

We talked to Howard Johnson in '68, and he said, "Come in. Welcome. We want you to know that we now have four wilderness study areas," whereas in 1967 they didn't entertain the idea of wilderness at all.

Lage: So there was some impact of your inquiries on it.

Wayburn: There was, indeed. Apparently no one had ever before impressed upon them the importance of wilderness areas. These wilderness study areas, however, were largely areas of ice and snow and beautiful scenery. They included Russell Fjord and the Tracy Arm-Ford's Terror, but they did not include heavily timbered areas.

At that time we brought up the discussion of what they were going to do with the proposed fifty-year, 8,700,000,000 board feet timber sale, which had been twice sold, once, I think, in 1965 and again in 1967. Both companies, Saint Regis and Georgia-Pacific, had given up their options, figuring that the deal wouldn't be economic enough.

We proposed in 1968 that the Forest Service had the opportunity to establish an entire island of a million acres, Admiralty Island, as a wilderness area, and this would be a unique opportunity. There would be nothing else in the world like it, and it would redound greatly to the credit of the Forest Service. Well, Mr. Johnson told us that they were thinking about selling this again to U.S. Plywood Champion Paper, Inc. We urged them not to do it, and we didn't know until the winter of 1969--because communications weren't as good then as they are now, not nearly as fast--that they had been negotiating and had probably arranged the actual sale before they talked to us.

Lage: Was Admiralty an area that local conservationists were pushing for?

Wayburn: Yes. Admiralty is an area which had been suggested as a national park, as a fish and wildlife refuge, because of the tremendous population of brown bears and the greatest nesting population of eagles in the world, as well as for the wilderness values. Proposals had been made at least thirty to forty years before, for the first time. In the 1930s there was some impetus, but it died out and nothing ever happened.

Admiralty, the west side of Admiralty particularly, happens to have tremendous stands of spruce and hemlock, and was therefore very coveted by the loggers. We learned that this fifty-year sale would include the west half of Admiralty, lands up at Yakutat, and lands on the mainland around Sumdum Bay.

That's as far as we got in 1968. I'll come back to that story because it is the story of the Sierra Club's first big action in Alaska--the Tongass forest lawsuit, which we did not file until 1970.

We had many interesting adventures in 1968. We were able to get an airlift over the Juneau Glacier with Max Miller, the University of Michigan mineralogist, who has spent some twenty-five years exploring the Juneau icecap. We flew up to Skagway and traveled on the White Pass Railroad to Whitehorse; and then by air to Fairbanks and Anchorage.

While we were in Fairbanks, we saw the announcement of the discovery of oil by Atlantic Richfield, and we realized that all of the tentative plans which we had just started to think about for Alaska's protection (along with its development) would have to be compressed into a very few years.

Lage: So the impact of that hit you at the time.

Wayburn: It hit us at the time. We realized that we were going to have to change our projections. It was in '68 that we realized we weren't just back for a year or two, but that Alaska was going to be a very longtime continuing commitment for us personally and for the club and for conservationists generally.

Lage: Was Brock Evans with you on that entire trip?

Wayburn: No. Brock and Rachel went with us to Sitka and to Juneau and then had to come back. Brock was taking time off from his full-time job as Northwest representative.

Lage: Oh, this was time off!

Wayburn: He had Alaska; being the closest conservation rep, he theoretically had Alaska in his province, but I think this was his first visit up there, maybe his second.

Katmai and the Wood River-Tikchik Lakes

Wayburn: We then went on to Mount McKinley, and I've talked to you about that. From Mount McKinley we went down to Anchorage and talked again to politicians and bureaucrats and to the small Sierra Club group, which had doubled in size. The number of Sierra Club members had doubled from the previous year when it was only ninety-nine.

Although the National Park Service could not take us into the Wood River-Titchik Lakes, we were determined we'd go ourselves. So we went first to Katmai, which was the third great national park in Alaska, the only one that we hadn't visited. We flew down on Wein Airways to King Salmon. We flew from King Salmon into Brooks River Camp on a Grumman Goose piloted by a man named John Walatka. He and another man named Ray Peterson were the principal men on the board of directors of Wein Consolidated.

##

Wayburn: Peterson was the president. Walatka was on the board of directors, but he was very happy to just fly the Grumman Goose from King Salmon in and out of Katmai to Naknek Lake and up into the Wein's fishing camps, farther up in Katmai. They claimed to be conservationists, but Peterson's later actions made me wonder just how much they were.

We had a very enjoyable visit at Brooks Camp and went up to the Valley of Ten Thousand Smokes. We saw what happened where brown bears and grizzlies, which are the same thing (they blend into one another), were affected by humans, especially by garbage cans. We photographed yearlings playing on the beach and got very close to them, not realizing quite how dangerous bears might be, but it was very pleasant at the time, in 1968, when we were very new at this game.

When we left Katmai, we flew back to King Salmon. There we boarded an F-27, an old propeller plane, which was bound for Dillingham, the closest town to the Wood River-Tikchik Lakes. We were two of the three passengers, the third being an Alaska state trooper, very resplendent in blue and gold. Two-thirds of the plane was blocked off with freight--composed entirely of whiskey bottles bound for the canneries of Dillingham. The cannery workers had just finished the salmon season, and they were celebrating. When we got to

Wayburn: Dillingham, everybody was there at the airfield, and we wondered if the celebration was for us [chuckles], but we knew it was for the arrival of the crates of whiskey.

There was one distinguished-looking, old, white-haired man who was looking for us, a man named John Pearson, and he welcomed us. He took us in his jeep on the only road out of Dillingham, twenty-five miles to Lake Aleknagik, which is the second lowest of the Wood River lakes. He then transferred us to his boat with an outboard motor up Lake Aleknagik and into River Bay of Lake Nerka, the next lake up, where he had purchased an Indian allotment of some sixty acres, and he had been using it as a lodge.

He was extremely cordial to us for three days, entertained us royally. At the end of that time, he said, "Now, Dr. Wayburn, let's get down to business." I couldn't imagine what he was talking about, but he tried to sell us his property for \$30,000, first \$35,000 and then \$30,000, because he and his wife had arthritis, and they had to move away. He said that this was the only legitimate private property of all of the Wood River-Tikchik country.

Lage: And was the rest state property?

Wayburn: The rest was state property. The state had made this area one of its first selections because they didn't want the National Park Service to have Wood River-Tikchik, 2,400,000 acres--which would have been one of the unique national parks of the world. I protested in vain that I didn't have the \$35,000 or \$30,000 to invest, and that the Sierra Club didn't have it.

He said, "This is the finest fishing spot in the world," and it was. In one hour he would take us out and catch a dozen fish with no trouble at all. The bottom layer would be the salmon going upstream, the next layer would be arctic chor, and above that would be trout.

He said, "Oh, come on, Dr. Wayburn! Everyone knows that the Sahara Club is the richest gambling outfit in Reno!"

Lage: [laughter] He was quite a character you met up with!

Wayburn: I explained that it was the Sierra Club and not the Sahara Club and that somehow the Wein agent in making arrangements had deceived him, that I didn't realize.

Lage: Oh, I see. I was going to ask how you got in touch with him. It was through Wein?

Wayburn: Through Wein.

Lage: [laughter] It makes a great tale!

Wayburn: But when I came back I talked it over with some of our people. The Sierra Club was just in no position to buy land in Alaska.

Lage: What about Nature Conservancy? Or they weren't active at the time you were there.

Wayburn: They were not active at the time. But as I look back on it, that would be a multi-million dollar property now.

Then we had another opportunity, which we looked into very carefully. That was Camp Denali, where Peggy and I stayed with Celia Hunter and Ginny Wood in 1967 and 1968. They had run the place for years and wanted to dispose of it, but didn't want it taken over in a way that wouldn't be suitable for them. I think they offered it to us for \$100,000--which was reasonable. Later they gave over the management to Wally Cole and his wife, who still run it, although I think Celia and Ginny still have a financial interest.

Going on with the Wood River-Tikchik, it is a stupendous array of fjord-like lakes, a dozen of them, coming out of the Togiak Mountains, which rise up to five thousand feet near the sea. The sides of each of these lakes then gradually slope down into gently rolling country, and the upper or Tikchik chain flows into the Tikchik River, the lower, or Wood River, chain flows into the Wood River, and then both of them go into the Nushagak River, which, in turn, flows into Bristol Bay.

The state of Alaska is still trying to decide what to do with Wood River-Tikchik State Park. Their plans now are better than they were, but if the area had been established as a national park, it would have been part of an enlarged Togiak area, an area which would have encompassed some six million acres and would have been one of the magnificent scenic show spots of the earth, and I don't think that the state is going to develop its potential that way.

Lage: Do you think the state will exploit the resources on it?

Wayburn: No. I believe the state will keep the state park, but it's already on a much smaller scale. I'm not sure whether it has established the state park or is just in the process in the legislature, but I think it's for 1,200,000 acres instead of 2,400,000, and the rest will probably be either native selection or state selection for other purposes.

Bureau of Land Management Trip to the Wrangells and the Arctic

Wayburn: In both 1967 and '68 we had discussions and made trips with Burt [Burton W.] Silcock, the director of the Bureau of Land Management in Alaska. The BLM had administration of 290 million acres in Alaska: 100 million acres in the Anchorage, or southern, district and 190 million in the northern district. Bob Krumm had charge of this 190 million acres, and with less than two hundred people employed by the BLM it was obviously impossible to do more than just have custodial care.

They made quite a few mistakes, and they knew they were making them. They were trying to classify areas, which would give the land greater protection from entry by anyone who just wanted to walk in and establish a homestead or trade and manufacturing site under laws which were archaic; laws which had been enacted almost a hundred years before; these laws never should have been implemented in Alaska.

I remember riding on the Alaskan Railroad and seeing area after area which had been partially cleared for a farm, for a homestead, and had the trees piled up at one end, and then eventually the farm had been abandoned. The people in the BLM knew this, but they weren't able to do anything about it.

They took us on several show-me trips in 1967 and '68. I remember particularly going to the Wrangell Mountains, which were so magnificent. For the moment, I said out loud, "When you have administration of this, you don't need Mount McKinley," but still McKinley does tower over it all. The Wrangells go up to sixteen thousand feet.

Lage: And it was BLM land?

Wayburn: All BLM.

Lage: So technically it could be homesteaded?

Wayburn: Yes, and in places it was.

On our first trip there in 1968, we stopped for lunch at a beautiful place called Copper Lake. We flew in a float plane. Absolute wilderness--except for one road coming in at one end, and there were two vans down at that end, which was several miles away from where we were.

Wayburn: I remember another time when we were stranded at Gulkana airfield, and you could look out at vast landscapes in every direction. Gulkana is one of those small airfields constructed by the United States during World War II as part of the ferrying system taking planes to Russia. It became a center, being far away from any other place where small planes would land and they could get fuel and food, much like a rest stop or a service stop on a long automobile road. It's up in the Copper River Valley, and beautiful. The spread of distance is so great you can see for fifty miles in several directions. That was just one of the many places that we saw on our way in and out of the Wrangells.

Lage: Was this also sort of a show-me trip?

Wayburn: They were show-me trips. We wanted to go because by this time we wanted to see as much of Alaska as possible.

Lage: Were they interested in soliciting your support?

Wayburn: They were interested in soliciting our support for their plans. Their classification plans were a great improvement over the state of affairs as it had existed, where they just had custody and could not do anything if anyone wanted to come in and occupy the land, squat on the land, take out a mining claim, take out a patent. They had nothing to do except to say yes. Classification was an innovative idea.

Lage: Didn't it require some kind of legislative change?

Wayburn: No, I don't think it required a legislative change, but it did require a change within the Department of the Interior, an executive order, and they were having difficulty in getting those executive orders. They had to study the area, they had to explain all the potentials, and they had to have public hearings before the executive order could be promulgated. It would be very helpful for an organization like the Sierra Club to come out in favor of this proposal, and particularly with a certain amount of knowledge. I think at that time too the administration was favorable enough so that they were told it was all right to show the Sierra Club around or to show the head of any conservation organization around, and we were shown around by all of the services.

The BLM had the biggest presence in Alaska by far. The Fish and Wildlife Service had comparatively few but extremely knowledgeable men, men who had been in Alaska for anywhere from ten to thirty years, who were devoted to their jobs, who knew the country and knew the people considerably (and the country better than the people), and who

Wayburn: during our time there gradually became fed up with the new bureaucracy that they saw emerging, and they quit or changed jobs one by one. Now there are none of those people left in the Fish and Wildlife Service in Alaska.

Lage: How would you rate the caliber of the men in the BLM?

Wayburn: The BLM had some able men at the top, but they were not as well trained as the others. Silcock was a man of considerable ability. He was the first career BLM man to later become director of the BLM. He was, as so many of the BLM and Forest Service people were, inclined towards development more than I'd like to have seen, but one could always discuss matters with him, and when he was head of the BLM I thought that his words and his actions were evenhanded. I talked with some of his subordinates who didn't think that he was, underneath, quite as favorable towards conservation as he suggested to me or as my own dealings with him went.

He took us not only into the Wrangell Mountain area on two occasions, but also up into the Arctic, over the Arctic National Wildlife Range, and over the Brooks Range, the complete future Gates of the Arctic National Park, and also on our first trip up to the Arctic Ocean--and that was a revelation. We were supposed to go to Prudhoe Bay (I guess this must have been in 1969), and we were unable to land at Prudhoe Bay because of the weather, on two tries. We then went on to Point Barrow and were able to stay there for a few hours and saw all of the pros and cons of that farthest north Eskimo village, which then had about two thousand people, and now has many more.

We then landed at the mouth of the Colville River at the home of Bud Helmericks, who was a big-game guide and an entrepreneur of the old school in Alaska. He had homesteaded this place. He also had homesteaded a gorgeous place at Walker Lake in the middle of the now Gates of the Arctic National Park. And he had homesteaded another place earlier.

We were amazed as we came close to this place on the Arctic Ocean. Here in the middle of the vast wilderness, ninety miles from Barrow, the closest inhabited area, was a two-story Iowa farmhouse. The bottom floor was cemented into the permafrost, and that was where you took off your boots and your parkas and everything else that might get full of mud and guck outside. Then you went in your stocking feet up into a very elaborate wall-to-wall carpeted three bedroom home, equipped with stoves and heating and so forth.

Wayburn: They had two other buildings. One was an airplane hangar shed and the other was a greenhouse, a tremendous greenhouse, where they grew vegetables and fruits all year around.

Lage: This is up at Point Barrow?

Wayburn: No, it's ninety miles away from Point Barrow.

They had a freezer. One of Bud's occupations was catching fish in the Arctic and freezing them in his freezer, which was a hole in the permafrost that went down a hundred feet, and it was absolutely ice cold. The Helmericks would store them there until they had enough to transport in DC-3s back down south, and that was another thing that he did; he owned one or two DC-3s and one or two smaller planes.

Lage: So he's got a mixing of the Eskimo ways and the new.

Wayburn: Oh, yes. He made the most of it.

A year or so later (1970, I think it was), he wrote as a conservationist, a profound conservationist--because one of the oil companies, in carrying in a big girder to one of its new wells, had dropped its load in the lake, which was his back yard, and almost hit his house. He saw what was coming then, and he wrote and talked in violent opposition to what the oil companies were doing there; but still later he went to work for Gulf Oil Company, which he said was doing things in a much more conservation-minded fashion.

Lage: He sounds like a real entrepreneur!

Wayburn: He was and he is. We haven't seen him in some time now, but he visited us once in our house at 30 Seaview Terrace when Janos was a young dog. We had to go out that evening. Peggy prepared dinner for them, and then we went out. When we came back, they told us a very interesting tale.

They'd had dinner, and they were getting ready to leave the dining room. All of a sudden, there was a growling, commanding dog, in a tone that Bud recognized was anger, and so they sat down. Every time they started to get up, Janos would growl, and his hair would come up and his tail would go out. Finally, after a half hour of this, Bud thought to himself, "Here I am, a big-game hunter. I've killed grizzly bear ten times the size of that dog. I've hunted moose many times the size, and all sorts of wild animals, and I'm being intimidated by a young domestic dog!" Then he walked right on by him, and Janos didn't budge! [laughter]

Lage: [laughter] That's funny!

XIX GATHERING SUPPORT FOR ALASKA PRESERVATION, 1969-1971

[Interview 15: August 21, 1981]##

Sierra Club Lawsuit to Protect Tongass National Forest, 1970

Lage: This is August 21, 1981. Today we're going to start with your 1969 trip to Alaska and the developments that took place as a result of that. You wanted to start with Southeast Alaska?

Wayburn: The trip of 1969 really began in 1968. One brief day we were in Fairbanks and saw the headlines of the oil discovery. We felt that that changed all the carefully laid plans we'd had for the gradual, progressive, good development of Alaska with the possibilities of saving large areas for the future. The winter of 1969 brought newspaper clippings which amplified that. Instead of two or three discovery wells, the companies had been drilling twenty or thirty wells at least, and there was obviously a great big discovery at Prudhoe Bay, one which was going to have very far-reaching effects.

Already, in the winter of 1969, there were plans laid for a pipeline. The question came up whether or not the oil would be brought out, because the oil "had to be brought out," whether it would be brought out by pipeline or railroad car or Hercules air tanker or ship tanker. Experiments were tried in various ways. Humble Oil, which is part of EXXON, had a specially constructed oil tanker, which they sent through the Northwest Passage with the aid of Canadian icebreakers. It was labeled as a successful experiment, but it obviously wasn't. The other oil companies knew it, everyone else knew it, and it was abandoned. Very quickly, the companies settled on a pipeline. Atlantic Richfield and British Petroleum even bought pipe from Japan in the winter of '68-'69, and they determined the general route which was later adopted.

- Wayburn: That year our trip was more or less predetermined. We knew we had to go back up to Fairbanks, and we had to go to the North Slope. An invitation to speak at the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Alaska, in Fairbanks, on conservationists' apprehensions about economic development in the far north confirmed that.
- Lage: Is there a record of that speech somewhere?
- Wayburn: Yes. That talk is in a book edited by George Rogers, and I will get the name of it for you.*
- Lage: Okay.
- Wayburn: The oil question wasn't the only one which was stirring in Alaska, though, at the time. I don't know if I have mentioned before the problem of the development of Southeast Alaska, which was the exclusive barony of the United States Forest Service for many years.
- Lage: We got a little background on that. You've talked about talking with the regional forester, Howard Johnson.
- Wayburn: Right. Well, when we to Juneau in 1969, before we went to Fairbanks, we talked to Mr. Johnson again, and we found out what we hadn't previously known for sure, that the Forest Service had taken the lease which had been relinquished by two other major timber companies, and sold it again, this time to U.S. Plywood Champion. While we were in Juneau, we met Gerald Jackson, vice-president of Plywood Champion, who was to be the president of Plywood Champion for Alaska. They had a contract with the Forest Service to cut 8,750,000,000 board-feet over a fifty-year time period. They were supposed to construct a mill to process the wood and turn it into pulp, which they, in turn, would send to Japan.

This disturbed us greatly; we also were surprised to meet a number of our friends, along with Forest Service people and Champion people, in the Baranof Hotel. There were, for example, Dick Leonard and Doris Leonard and George Collins, who were there, I think, on their way to or from a meeting of the Arctic International Wildlife Range Society, and there were seven experts who were there to convince us that the Champion Company was going to do this right. Among these were good friends Starker Leopold and Stanley A. Cain, former assistant secretary of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks.

*Change in Alaska: People, Petroleum, and Politics, University of Alaska Press, 1970.

Lage: Now, when you say they were there to convince you, what brought them there? The company?

Wayburn: The company had assembled a group of seven expert ecologists, each an expert on a different field. The company's Jackson told us that they were determined to do this job right, they wouldn't do it otherwise, and they were going to follow the advice of these various experts.

We ran into them at dinner, in Douglas over across from Juneau, at a restaurant called Mike's Place. We sat down. We saw a great big table on the other side of the room, and Starker Leopold and Stanley Cain came over and greeted us and said to me, "Ed, we want you to know we're not selling out." I said, "That's fine. I'm awfully glad to hear it."

The next morning we had a meeting in which each of these people told us what they were supposed to do. Leopold's role was extremely important. He was the forestry expert, and he had a man working on Admiralty Island to determine whether or not the company's plans, which had been approved by the Forest Service, could be carried out as they said.

We discussed the matter at some length. Dick Leonard had thought that we should go along with the Champion sale because it was being done so carefully. We, in turn, said that we had no quarrel with Champion. Our quarrel was with the Forest Service. We said that this sale involved Admiralty Island, which for many years had been spoken of as either a potential national park or fish and wildlife refuge or other reserve; that after having seen it ourselves, we felt that this was the greatest and last chance to reserve an entire island as a wilderness under either the Forest Service or the Park Service or the Fish and Wildlife Service; and that we felt it should not be logged at all. This was the basis of our protest.

Lage: So you felt, despite what safeguards there were, that you just shouldn't have logging, regardless.

Wayburn: Whatever they did, their plans called for logging the entire west side of Admiralty Island and, incidentally, putting a road along the length of Admiralty Island, a road which was to be part of a marine and land highway which would alter the entire approach to and life patterns of Southeast Alaska. Southeast Alaska is now reached either by air or by the marine highway; this proposal would put roads on every island so that the tourist with a vehicle could take the ferry from one island to another, travel the island by road, and then pick up the ferry, an idea which we didn't think very highly of.

Lage: Did you have experts on your side to counter the company experts, or you didn't feel that was the point?

Wayburn: We didn't feel that was the point. We did have some experts later, but first we debated long and hard whether or not we should file a lawsuit to stop the sale, because it could only be stopped by a lawsuit. In January, 1970, some three or four months after these interviews took place in Juneau, the Sierra Club filed the Tongass Forest lawsuit, which was the first big lawsuit in which we'd taken part--I guess the first lawsuit in which any conservation organization had participated in Alaska. This suit was to change the club's entire attitude on legal actions because it proved to be such a big lawsuit that our volunteer legal committee, then composed of Don Harris and Fred Fisher of the Lillick law firm, couldn't handle it alone.

In the first place, we had to have an Alaska lawyer. The lawyer we got was a young man named Warren Matthews. He had worked for the Lillick firm for three months when he was still in Harvard Law School. He went up to Alaska and opened a practice in Anchorage. We employed Warren Matthews as our Alaska lawyer. That suit caused us to get a number of experts, including, particularly, Gordon Robinson, who had been our forester on different projects previously. The lawsuit was finally tried in November, 1970.

Lage: It seems like it moved pretty fast.

Wayburn: It moved pretty fast once it was filed.

Lage: Can I just go back for a minute? You talked about the decision to file that lawsuit, but we didn't get many specifics. Was that a big issue in the club among the directors, among the staff, or who was involved in making the decision?

Wayburn: The executive committee of the board of directors, I think, was the moving force in it.

Lage: Were people pretty well in agreement with you, or did you have to do a lot of convincing?

Wayburn: Well, people were in agreement with me as to the purpose, as to the reasons. There was a great deal of question whether the club could afford to do it. If you remember we were in a very bad situation financially.

Wayburn: Let's see. Phil Berry was the president at the time, and he was also very interested in legal actions by the club. Besides Fisher and Harris, he was the third person who was most active, and since he was president he was pretty dominant in this decision.

But we had delayed fairly long in making this decision; we should have by all rights, as the law goes, filed an administrative appeal in early 1969. The fact of the matter was that we were not fully aware of what was going on. Even in 1969, communications between Alaska and San Francisco were intermittent and not as good as they should have been, and the full import of what this timber sale was going to do had not become apparent.

Lage: Until your trip in '69?

Wayburn: Until the trip in '69, when--

Lage: This brings into clearer focus, for me anyway, how important the trips were, the personal on-site inspection of the situation.

Wayburn: Yes, that's very true. I'd been somewhat vaguely aware of the potentials of the situation in Alaska before the '67 trip, and they had been brought into sharp focus for me by the '68 trip when we visited West Chichagof and saw personally the extraordinary features of this area. But it was somewhere between '68 and '69 when awareness of the imminence of the multi-year logging sale, what it was going to do to the entire Southeast, awareness of the fact that there possibly wasn't enough timber to do what the Forest Service was planning to do, coupled with the rapidly emerging factors of the oil situation, made me determined to see as much of Alaska personally as possible. The task seemed overwhelming as I contemplated it in '69, but the '69 trip developed several aspects which I'll talk about shortly.

This personal involvement and the ability to see would not have been possible, incidentally, without another factor that happened later that same year when Denny Wilcher told me about a man whom his friend Duke Watson in Seattle knew and who had expressed an interest in two subjects in which I was also very vitally interested, redwoods and Alaska. He was a wealthy man who had his own airplane and expressed a willingness to fly me around wherever I wanted to go. This opened a completely new set of doors because previously I had been hemmed in by the financial matters. I'd furnished some of the money myself; some of it, a lot, was furnished by the club; and a lot of the air travel was furnished by government services whenever we could find a time when one government official or another needed to go to one place or another in Alaska. But with this new development I could go wherever I wanted to go, if the weather would allow.

Lage: Do you want to mention names there?

Wayburn: Yes. This man was Jim Roush, who is now my son-in-law. [laughter] He flew us, or made it possible for us to fly, through Alaska for ten straight years--I guess from the end of '69--when he first picked us up in Juneau and took us south--through 1979.

Lage: Had he been investigating Alaska on his own before this?

Wayburn: No. He'd never been to Alaska before. He did this as a conservation gesture to start with, and then as the years went by we became closer, and we planned the trips every year.

Lage: Did we follow through on the lawsuit, or did I take you off the track there? You said it went to court in November, '70. Shall we follow through on the outcome?

Wayburn: All right. I think that's worth doing.

I went to Juneau on the third or fourth of November, 1970, to overlook and to participate in the Tongass Forest lawsuit, which was tried before Judge Plummer. It attracted a great deal of local Alaska attention. I don't think it was appreciated much outside Alaska, and maybe not much outside Southeast Alaska at the time, but it was a highly significant lawsuit and determined the future of Alaska, of Southeast Alaska and that region, because we now have an Admiralty Island National Monument.

Incidentally, we are probably going to file another lawsuit to preserve the integrity of that national monument, because the Shee-Atika Native Corporation has selected 23,400 acres in the middle of the national monument and plans to clear-cut it.

Lage: That's allowable under the terms of the--?

Wayburn: The Congress allowed that in the compromise Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.

But let me get back to the trial. One of the vivid sights I'll always remember is Judge Plummer sitting in the judge's chair, and on his right, to the left of the audience, there were seven lawyers, between six and seven at any one time. There were at least two lawyers for the government, at least two lawyers for Alaska Champion-- I think by this time Champion Plywood had changed its name to Champion International; it had been formed by a combination of U.S. Plywood Company and Champion--one lawyer at least for the State of Alaska, and there were sometimes three lawyers for Champion and three for the federal government. And on the other side there was one lone young man, Warren Matthews, who was very ably pleading our case.

Wayburn: I had to testify on the subject of laches, which means that, well, you're really too late to file this lawsuit. The government claimed that we were because we had not filed an administrative appeal as we should have, and it was really too late to file a lawsuit. We pleaded that we hadn't been notified properly and that we were not experienced in the law in Alaska, that things were far away, and that it was in the public interest that we be allowed to sue. And it was allowed.

The trial went on for five, maybe six days. The judge threw out many of the claims that we made, because the judge was not favorable to us, but he did allow us to make points on certain issues. At the end of that time the suit was pled. In due course the judge rendered a decision against us, and we in turn appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Alaska as well as California, Oregon, and Washington.

The suit took over a year before the court of appeals heard it. During that time Starker Leopold and his on-the-scene graduate student had completed their study. In the study they reached definite conclusions. They gave their report to Mr. Bendetson, the president of Champion. In order to protect the brown bear and the Sitka deer, Champion had to change its schedules for logging and make other revisions in its plans. There were also certain technical and forest conditions which I don't recall exactly at this time.

Lage: But whatever they'd planned in terms of forest practices wouldn't work.

Wayburn: They could not proceed as they had planned without damaging the wildlife irreparably--the bear, the eagle, and the Sitka deer.

This report became known, and our lawyers took it to the court of appeals. The court of appeals ruled that in the light of the new evidence that had come to their attention, the case was remanded to the district court judge.

Judge Plummer then got this suit back, and he sat on it for almost a year and a half until finally, in more or less desperation, I guess, somewhere around 1976, Champion decided to throw in the towel and said that they didn't want the contract anymore, and the Forest Service had it back on its hands.*

*For further details on the lawsuit, see "Heritage in Probate: Our Tongass Forest," Sierra Club Bulletin, April 1974, pp. 5-8, 24.

Wayburn: So, in effect, although we lost in the original trial before the district judge, we accomplished our objective, which was to save Admiralty Island from being logged and--

Lage: But you didn't have any constraint on what the Forest Service would do next in terms of letting the contract.

Wayburn: Yes, we did, because by that time we had convinced the Forest Service that these fifty-year timber sales were not the unmitigated blessing that they had been advertising, and we had convinced the chief of the Forest Service as well as the new regional forester. By that time Mr. Johnson was no longer regional forester. We had convinced these people in power in the Forest Service that the whole idea of the fifty-year timber sale needed review, and that they should not try to sell this timber again.

Lage: How did the club go about convincing the Forest Service? Was this through a staff lobbyist?

Wayburn: No.

Lage: Or written--?

Wayburn: This was partly through our own efforts with the regional forester, but mostly because of changes that were taking place in Alaska. The greatest change was the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.

##

Wayburn: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act gave native corporations the right to select portions of the Tongass Forest, which meant that (in all probability) they would select areas with high timber potential. The State of Alaska also had the right to select 400,000 acres of the Tongass Forest, and they would probably select areas with high timber potential. Neither of these facts had been taken into consideration in the early 1950s when the Forest Service decided to put out these long-term timber sales as a method of improving the economics of Southeast Alaska.

Lage: So the long-term contract couldn't be entered into any more. Is that the idea?

Wayburn: Well, the long-term contract would tie up too much of the timber of Alaska, and we kept claiming that they did not have as much timber as they said, and they changed their estimate of the timber year by year.

Wayburn: At the present time, with the impact of these two major factors we're talking about and the discovery that the two principal timber firms which had these long-term contracts, Alaska Lumber and Pulp, and Louisiana-Pacific (which was then Ketchikan Pulp) had been in a conspiracy to freeze out the small loggers, there's been a revolution in the attitude of the Forest Service. I don't think at this time they would dream of trying to put out a long-term timber sale.

Lage: Was somebody like Gordon Robinson active in Alaska? For instance, when you mentioned that the Forest Service didn't really know how much timber they had and the club was in the position of telling them they didn't have as much as they thought, how did the club come to know that? Was it local people or forestry experts?

Wayburn: Both. As far as this timber sale was concerned, we asked Gordon to make an estimate of how much timber there actually was in the three areas that were included in this timber sale. Those three areas were the west half of Admiralty Island, and an area on the mainland opposite Stephen's Passage known as Windham Bay, and an area to the north at Yakutat. Gordon helped identify the amount of timber and the kind of timber, how much it was worth, how much stumpage, and so forth.

Lage: The reason I asked that is that one of the interesting points from outside the Sierra Club's perspective is how we made increasing use of technical experts, and that's probably a good example.

Wayburn: Yes. We had a number of technical witnesses who gave us information on various aspects of these problems.

Lage: Was there a story behind the Starker Leopold investigation?

Wayburn: Oh, a great big story! Starker Leopold, as you know, is a distinguished forester and biologist who is curator of the vertebrate zoology museum at the University of California and also a professor of forestry. He was called in to do a number of things.

Lage: And he's also a former director of the Sierra Club.

Wayburn: And he's also a former director and a one-time vice-president of the Sierra Club.

Starker believed in working for a variety of employers, even though they might not be primarily interested in conservation, as he did here. He was an employee of Champion International. On the other hand, Starker was very proud of his own integrity, and this was

Wayburn: evident in the remarks that he and Stanley Cain had made to us in Juneau in 1969. Cain was another such person, a former dean of the School of Conservation at Michigan, and a former assistant secretary of Fish and Wildlife; at that time he was professor of wildlife management at the University of California at Santa Cruz.

Leopold and Cain felt that if industry couldn't get qualified experts, they wouldn't be doing the right thing. So they were willing to work for industry but also intent on keeping their own integrity, and that's what they assured me of. It was Starker's insistence when he made his contract with Champion that he be allowed to publish his report after first giving it to Champion, which gave us our ability to prevail in this lawsuit.

Lage: So it became public knowledge. It wasn't passed to the Sierra Club under the table.

Wayburn: No, it was not under the table. He made his report to the president of Champion and in his original contract he specified that he be allowed to make it public. When it was made public, the fat was in the fire. It was shown that what we'd been saying but couldn't prove they proved scientifically, and I've always felt good about that. Well, this made the big change in Southeast Alaska.

Hiring an Alaskan Representative

Wayburn: The Sierra Club had been trying to get a representative resident in Alaska, and we didn't have the money to hire one entirely by ourselves. The Wilderness Society agreed to pay half the cost of a conservation representative, and the Alaska Conservation Society was willing to have its name attached to the effort, although it was unable to supply any funds.

Originally the club and the Wilderness Society had decided on a man named John Hall, who was an assistant in the office of the chief forester of the Forest Service in Washington, and he had agreed to a contract. I was to meet him in August 1969, in Alaska, but he never showed up. This disappointed us profoundly, and we were in the predicament of trying to find another regional representative.

We were fortunate that Robert Weeden, who had been with Alaska Fish and Game for a dozen years and who was the president of the Alaska Conservation Society, was looking for wider fields than Fish

Wayburn: and Game. He was really interested in an academic career, but he consented, after much persuasion on my part, to be our representative in Juneau for that year, and he stayed until June, 1970.

Lage: Would that be a full-time commitment for him?

Wayburn: It was a full-time commitment for him during that period. He was our first representative, and then we went a few months before we got another one. I don't know if you want me to talk about that now or not.

Lage: You might go ahead and mention the next representative.

Wayburn: We went through the rest of 1970 without a representative, and I started looking. It was more or less given to me to find a representative. I interviewed a few people, and then I got a recommendation from Dick Cooley, chairman of the Department of Environmental Studies at the University of California at Santa Cruz, about a young man named Jack Hession, who had worked with him and who had spent a year as a graduate student at the University of Alaska and then gone back to San Diego, which was his home. After interviewing him I thought that he had great promise, although at the time he was quite young. I guess actually in years he wasn't; he was close to thirty, but he hadn't done anything like this. We hired Jack in the winter of 1971, and he has been with us ever since. He's done an increasingly capable and outstanding job.

Lage: What qualities would you look for in an Alaska representative?

Wayburn: Well, we wanted someone who could be an investigator, who knew political science (and Hession was a political science major), who could get information from bureaucrats and legislators, who could influence legislators as a lobbyist, and who could work with our own people, the conservationists in the area in which he was working.

Lage: He wouldn't need the expertise in forestry or the various fields, but more in political contacts?

Wayburn: Yes. We have hired a wide variety of people for our regional representatives, and they have had a variety different disciplines. We've found that someone with a law degree has more good training than any other single individual. We have hired foresters. We've hired biologists. We've hired people who'd been volunteer conservationists before. But lobbying is needed as one of the characteristics, the ability to work with people, the ability to investigate and find out facts--all of these things are necessary characteristics. It varies from person to person and as to what seems to be needed at the time the job presents.

Lage: What about commitment to principles? Is that--?

Wayburn: Commitment, naturally. Commitment comes first; no question of that. If someone isn't committed, it's not going to work. This was the problem with John Hall. He wasn't committed enough. He was, we thought, very well suited. He'd spent a number of years in Alaska. He'd been on the staff of the Forest Service in Southeast Alaska. At that time, we were particularly interested--

Lage: It doesn't sound like that would be a recommendation, though.
[chuckles]

Wayburn: We were particularly interested in Southeast. But he had evinced a desire to work for conservationists, and he had convinced Stewart Brandborg, who was then the executive director of the Wilderness Society, of his commitment. Although I didn't know Hall at the time, I accepted Brandborg's conviction that he was the right man because it was so hard to find someone. It was not easy to get someone to go up to Alaska, and there was no one in Alaska that we could find. We did get on a temporary basis, I think, the best man that we could get in Bob Weeden. But it was a very difficult matter.

Lage: Well, you've been lucky in Jack Hession staying as long as he has.

Wayburn: Hession is now one of our two senior conservation regional reps, and he has done and is doing an outstanding job there. His one drawback in Alaska is that as he sees his work and goes about doing it he does not necessarily include working very closely with our local volunteer chapter conservationists.

Lage: He works more in tandem with the national headquarters?

Wayburn: He works with the national headquarters, he works with me, he works with Washington, and he works independently with the legislators and bureaucrats in Alaska state politics as well as national politics.

Lage: Has that been a bone of contention with the chapter?

Wayburn: It has been a bone of contention. That at the moment has been solved greatly by the addition of Sally Kabisch to the office. Sally was a secretary in the Washington office who decided to move to Alaska; she became Jack's secretary and has filled this job of liaison with the chapter in an outstanding way. All of the members of the chapter executive committee are enthusiastic about her; she has proved herself a good investigator too; and she has now been made assistant Alaska representative. So this is a story which is very happy at the moment.

Developing Strategy on the Oil Pipeline: Differences with
Local Conservationists

Wayburn: Let me briefly go on to the other portions of this '69 trip and its significance.

We were still traveling with the services and by commercial airline, and we had not been to Kotzebue and Nome, and we thought that we had better do that, to see a part of Alaska we hadn't seen. We did take that in and worked with the only Sierra Club members in Nome, Bill and Sherry Foster, who were high school teachers.

We spent most of the rest of that month in Fairbanks or in and out of Fairbanks. In addition to participating heavily in the Alaska Science Conference, we made the journey to Prudhoe Bay with people from the science conference.

Lage: Was that arranged on the spot there or planned in advance?

Wayburn: That was a planned trip. The companies wanted to take us up, and the science conference planning committee had planned it as a part of what we were to do because the main focus of the conference was oil.

Prudhoe Bay happened to be socked in, and we couldn't land there on that trip. We did on a later trip with British Petroleum. But we went on to Point Barrow and visited the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory there.

Lage: Was this what you'd call a "show me" trip?

Wayburn: It was a "show me" trip, but put on by the Alaska Science Conference Committee rather than the entrepreneur; in this case it would have been the oil companies.

Lage: Oh. So, although they were along and pointing things out--

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Who put on the Alaska Science Conference?

Wayburn: The American Association for the Advancement of Science. They have regional conferences each year.

Lage: I see.

Wayburn: During the course of the ten days that we spent in and out of Fairbanks, we were also trying to get up sentiment among the conservationists. Brock Evans came up, and he and I tried to put life into the Fairbanks Sierra Club group, and we also talked to the other groups. We had one big meeting at which we debated whether the conservationists would go along with the construction of the pipeline. Other conservationists were willing to do this, but Brock and I convinced them that the companies really didn't know what they were doing.

Lage: How did you reach that conclusion? Through your trip?

Wayburn: Partly through the trip, partly in listening to them at their presentations at the science conference, partly from reading their material. We convinced the conservationists to oppose the construction of the pipeline as proposed in June, 1969.

When the companies applied for a permit for a right-of-way for a trans-Alaska pipeline, it was, I think, in the winter or early spring of 1969. They expected to get it within a few weeks, but Russell Train, who was undersecretary of the Interior at the time, felt that there had to be public hearings on this subject, and he arranged for public hearings to be held immediately after the Alaska Science Conference. The Sierra Club was the first organization which opposed the construction of the pipeline.

Lage: Now, this was immediately after the conference. How was that decision made then? Who was involved in deciding that the club would oppose it? Had it been discussed by the board?

Wayburn: No, it hadn't. There wasn't time for this. Brock and I made this decision and convinced the local conservationists that they too should oppose it.

Lage: Were the local conservationists Sierra Club people or Alaska Conservation--?

Wayburn: Partly. Alaska Conservation Society, Wilderness Society.

Lage: How about Weeden? Did he--?

Wayburn: Well, Weeden came along. Weeden originally had felt that the pipeline was all right; although there would be some degradation, construction of the pipeline was inevitable, and we should go along.

Lage: He just thought the power of the oil companies was too strong--?

Wayburn: Yes, and Weeden is a man who will go along with the development to a greater extent than I will. Shall I say he's a more reasonable man? [laughter]

At any rate, we felt that the plans as outlined showed a lack of enough knowledge of what they might encounter, and time proved us right. During the five years between '69 to '74 when they actually got started, they changed the plans for the pipeline enormously. To give one specific example, it was stated in 1969 that fifty miles of the pipeline would have to be laid above ground; the rest of it was to be buried in ground. The final pipeline has over half elevated, some 450 miles, and they changed many of the specifications, which the interim gave a chance to do. The technology was not very advanced for that type of construction at the time (and the details of this I can't give you) but they changed the plans a great deal, and they admitted that it was much better when they finally finished it.

Lage: Did you ever have any thought that you'd actually keep the oil in the ground, or was the idea more to delay for technical reasons?

Wayburn: We, of course, made the argument that the oil had been in the ground for millions of years and would stay there a while longer without any problem, that it should stay there until they found ways of getting it out safely and without harming the environment. The oil companies claimed they couldn't wait, and the developing crisis in the Middle East made that a very conclusive argument.

Lage: By the time of the congressional battle in '73.

Wayburn: Right. By that time there was no question that the pipeline was going to be constructed as soon as possible.

The Sierra Club was the leader in the beginning of the oil controversy, and the Sierra Club made plans for a lawsuit against construction of the pipeline. On the other hand, we had a new chapter in Alaska in 1969, and they were accomplishing things in the state legislature which they thought were important. By April, 1970, when we were ready to file the lawsuit, they telephoned that it would kill them if we filed it. I remember in an executive committee meeting we decided that we would postpone the lawsuit until after the legislature had adjourned.

Lage: Were you in favor of that?

Wayburn: I was in favor of the postponement because of my long-standing feeling that the national Sierra Club should not override the local unit if possible.

##

Wayburn: But we had intervenors in the lawsuit, which was filed by a Washington public interest law firm, the Center for Law and Public Policy. The young attorney who had charge of the lawsuit for us was a man named James Moorman. Moorman felt he couldn't wait, he had everything in order, and so he went ahead and filed the lawsuit on behalf of the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, and one other conservation organization, and without the Sierra Club. The Sierra Club never did get into that lawsuit officially.

Lage: Oh, I didn't realize that.

Wayburn: Very few people realize that, and even now in Alaska the Sierra Club is credited with being the party that filed the lawsuit. The facts of the suit were gathered in very considerable part by our Washington representative, Lloyd Tupling, and Tup threatened to quit the club because we didn't file it; he felt so strongly about it. He didn't quit, I'm very glad to say. But it's one of those interesting combinations of conservation organizations where it all works out well.

Lage: You felt that the club's nature was such that you had to defer to the local chapter.

Wayburn: That we had to defer for two months to the local chapter. That's what they'd asked for. Moorman, on the other hand, as the attorney, felt that he couldn't wait, that he had to go ahead and file then or it would be too late.

Lage: That suit was in the courts for about three years, wasn't it, or more?

Wayburn: Yes, it was in the courts for five years.

There was one other thing that we did during that '69 journey. Following through on seeing as much as possible, Peggy and I went with a Fish and Wildlife Service biologist named Chuck Evans on a long flight up into the Arctic Wildlife Range. It was our first view of the National Arctic Wildlife Range, and we became convinced of its value as one of the last places which should be invaded for oil or any other commercial purpose. We've fought on that basis since. We've won part of our battle, and we've lost part of our battle because in the National Interest Lands Act there is specifically

Wayburn: a provision that the coastal plain can be explored up to a limited extent. It probably means if oil is discovered that Congress will then go beyond that point; the Fish and Wildlife Service already has given permits for seismic exploration to several oil companies.

Lage: You mentioned to me last time that you had three reasons for opposing the pipeline. You mentioned that in our talk after the tape was off. Does that come to mind this time?

Wayburn: Well, the oil was in the ground and could be saved for future great need. The oil companies weren't ready. And the natives had claims on so much of that land that it was the power of oil that greased the Alaska Native Claims Act through so fast in 1971.

Lage: Yes. Did the club or did conservationists work at all with the natives as a way of delaying the oil pipeline?

Wayburn: We did to some extent, not nearly to the extent that we might have. But, again, we were new in the region; we didn't have enough know-how. The people who were there weren't as convinced as the Sierra Club was about the harm that the pipeline could do. It wasn't just the pipeline; it was the fact that there was originally a 4½ million acre withdrawal and that there was going to be a road constructed; that road has now been opened to the public.

Lage: And the Alaskans themselves didn't see this as a real threat as much as you and Brock did?

Wayburn: That's right, and being people who lived there, they couldn't take as hard a stand as we could.

Lage: They were under pressure from public opinion, or--?

Wayburn: From their neighbors.

Lage: Their neighbors. Their employers, perhaps.

Wayburn: And from their employers, sure. All the people who were employees of the University of Alaska or of the state had to be very careful.

Lage: Has that been a factor all through and does that continue?

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Do you think that affects the local chapter's actions?

Wayburn: I don't think it affects our local chapter's actions so much. Our chapter was formed outside the Alaska establishment. The nucleus of the Alaska Conservation Society was the Fish and Game Department of the State of Alaska and the University of Alaska.

Lage: I think you did mention--that was another point I wanted to follow through on last time--that whenever a conservationist became strong he'd get knocked down.

Wayburn: Yes. Well, this was true specifically in what we've been talking about. This meeting of conservationists that we had at the time of the science conference just before the public hearings under Secretary Train was held at the home of Gordon Wright, a Sierra Club member who had moved up from Wisconsin and who came to be chairman of the Department of Music at the University of Alaska.

Gordon was a very strong conservationist, but Gordon incurred the wrath of people in Fairbanks. In addition to being a professor of music at the University of Alaska, he was the conductor of the Fairbanks Symphony Orchestra, and some of the supporters of the Fairbanks Symphony Orchestra didn't like his stand on conservation matters--he was quite outspoken at first--and they suggested to the university management that they get rid of Wright. I was told this just this last year by a woman I didn't know and had just met.

Gordon modified his conservation activities. He still has an interest. He is more aligned with the Alaska Conservation Society now than he is with the Sierra Club. He's also aligned with the Fairbanks Environmental Center, of which he was one of the founders. But he has, if you will, made his peace with the establishment in Fairbanks.

Lage: Do you think this happens in the other parts of the United States as well, that the local chapters' leaders are under more pressure, or is the situation in Alaska more extreme?

Wayburn: Well, I think the situation in Alaska was extreme. Of all the places I have been to, I have not seen pressure on the local citizens of this degree except in Humboldt and Del Norte Counties in California at the time of the redwood battle.

Lage: Of course, those are the areas you're most familiar with.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: I wonder if it does go on elsewhere.

Wayburn: Well, those happen to be two pioneer or frontier type areas and it's more likely to happen under those circumstances. It may be that it occurs in more subtle form in other areas with which I have not been associated. I know this can happen. Oh, it can happen right in San Francisco when someone works for a certain company which happens to have its ox gored, and it will tell certain employees that they had better not do what they're doing.

Lage: Yes, I'm sure it does go on. I wondered whether it came into any of the internal dynamics of the club and decision making between the chapters and the headquarters.

Wayburn: It very likely does, but it would be a little difficult to document just out-of-hand right now.

Traveling with the BLM, 1970: a Mutual Goal of Protection
for the Land

Wayburn: But let's go on into 1970, when I was by this time fully determined to see everything I possibly could in Alaska.

Lage: Yes.

Wayburn: As an aside, I might say that a great deal of what I have done there has been accomplished by going and seeing things on the ground personally and then talking individually or in small groups with people. It's been that way rather than in the context of the big open meetings or public hearings or congressional hearings. I've done some of that too, but I think that possibly my--you were asking what were my unique contributions.

Lage: Right.

Wayburn: I think it was going to a place, becoming convinced that that place should be saved, and working at it doggedly over a period of years. Other people had the same idea, perhaps, and followed it through for a while and then dropped it for one reason or another. Well, for one reason or another, I did not drop projects and they've come to me, they've continued, and Alaska, as the biggest one, involved more of this, involved seeing more. That's why I come back to these trips. A lot of things happened in between, such as--I spoke of the trial on the Tongass Forest.

Lage: Yes.

Wayburn: But it was having this firsthand knowledge of the trips, and I think that Peggy and I were generally granted to know more about Alaska than most Alaskans. From 1971 on, we took Jack Hession with us year after year. By now Jack has much more detailed knowledge.

Lage: Well, not only the areas, but the people.

Wayburn: The areas and the people. Alaska has few enough inhabitants so that we got to know people all over the state and where they stood and what we could expect of them.

Lage: Did you also have a role persuading, being influential, and straightening out viewpoints?

Wayburn: Oh, yes. Maybe I can illustrate some of this from the 1970 trip which we started in mid-July, in Anchorage, and we were still using the services as best we could. We were on very good terms with Burt Silcock, who was the Alaska director of the Bureau of Land Management. Silcock later went on to become the national director of BLM, and then when he retired from that he became the federal cochairman of the Alaska Land Use Planning Commission, which was a joint federal-state planning commission for the Alaska National Interest Lands Bill, and he therefore had a great deal of influence.

In 1969-1970, Silcock was trying to get certain BLM areas classified. The BLM at that time had 290 million acres of land in Alaska to administer in two districts, one of 100 million acres and one of 190 million acres. They were trying to classify them so that they could not be used for everything and would not be open for entry for such things as homesteading.

We traveled with them to some of the areas that they wanted classified most. We went to the Forty Mile region, and I'll describe a trip down the Forty Mile River later. The first part of the trip was by air; we flew to the Wrangell Mountains, which was one of the areas that they wanted to classify, 20 million acres. We flew all through the Wrangells, had lunch down in one of the lakes near Canada, and overnighted in the Tebay Lakes, one of the more beautiful places in the world. As you stand on the one shore, you look up at a series of snow-covered peaks which remind you of the Canadian Rockies.

Lage: I don't mean to divert you, but these things occur to me. How did someone like Burt Silcock respond to the land? I mean, obviously it had a real impact on you. Did it also on him?

Wayburn: I think it did, although I was told by certain people who worked for him that he was putting on a good show for me. I was by then recognized as the conservationists' representative in Alaska. I mean, I'd gone there the first two years as president of the Sierra Club, I was now vice-president, and I was the one outsider who kept coming back and kept coming back and seeing more and showing more interest.

The administrator is someone who wants to do his job right. He's charged by his government with doing it right. He comes under a great many influences; and most of those influences are for exploitation; and if there is no one or no power on the side of environmental protection, he will go farther and farther along the line of exploitation.

I think Silcock's instincts were good, but he had a great deal of influence put on him, so that he was having trouble getting these classifications through, and he was enlisting my help in trying to get these classifications of Bureau of Land Management land through his superiors in the Department of the Interior. There was no question; every time I went on one of these "show me" trips, I knew I was being used for a purpose, but I had my own purposes, and I was using them for a purpose. So this was a mutually beneficial experience, I felt.

My purpose was to see as much of Alaska as possible and, from my past knowledge and from what I saw, to be in a position to make recommendations, particularly for lands with a higher dedication than Bureau of Land Management lands could have at that time. Because the BLM had no organic act, it really had no power to protect its lands, and this is what both Silcock and I were trying to do, to protect these lands in some way. Now, I wanted to give them a higher grade of protection than he could, but we were traveling along the same path as we flew over the ground. The next day, after spending the night at Tebay Lakes, we flew all through the Chugach Mountains, over the Chitina River, and we put down once in Glacier Creek on a tremendous flat which is larger than all of Yosemite Valley.

Then we went on to Kennecott, where Kennecott Copper Company had an enormous copper mine; to get the ore to market they had constructed a narrow-gauge railway all the way from Cordova on the coast up to this area (195 miles). I think this was in existence from 1910 to 1936. They got out all the high-grade copper ore, and there were still more smaller deposits; there's still a lot of low-grade copper in that area.

Wayburn: Then they flew us up to Fairbanks. These trips were made in a Grumman Goose, which could land either on the land or on the water. Silcock couldn't go with us this time and he had Bob Krumm, the manager of the northern district, who took over with our trip.

We flew from Fairbanks all over the central Brooks Range. We flew the Hickel Highway, so called, used as a winter road, and we flew the pipeline corridor, where they were making surveys for where they were going to put the pipeline. The construction camps were already in place, even though at the time Alyeska, the pipeline company, had not any pipeline route officially designated. They had been moving fast and had gotten from the BLM permission for construction camps, eight of them, along, exactly along, the route that they later chose.

Lage: So they'd laid out the route before they'd gotten approval.

Wayburn: That's correct, long before. When I questioned Bob Krumm about this, I said, "Didn't they have to get permits from you to do this?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Why did you give them permits when they had no right of way, no permission?" He said, "I was told to." In other words, no matter how these men personally felt, from somewhere up on high in the Department of the Interior there had been arrangements made so that the pipeline construction camps were in place and everything was ready by the time the pipe was to be laid or before the haul road for the pipeline was there.

We stopped at one of those camps for lunch one day on the Dietrich River. The Dietrich was one of the most beautiful rivers coming out of the Brooks Range, and it has been changed drastically; it now has both a road and a pipeline running along most of its length.

On that trip we likewise saw a little more of the primitive aspect of white men settling in Alaska. A Unitarian preacher named Sam Wright and his wife, Billie, who was a writer, had decided that they would go up to Alaska and live the primitive life. They found a place at Big Lake, which was not too far from the Dietrich River, and they bought an Indian woman's allotment and cabin, and they constructed a second cabin. They went there to live for a few months, and they remained for two or three years that I know of. I don't know what's become of them since.

Lage: Somewhere in your papers is a letter from Sam Wright, or maybe I saw it in the Wilderness Conference proceedings.

Wayburn: That's the same Sam Wright.

Wayburn: From Big Lake we traveled north and went over the northern crest of the Brooks Range, passed the village of Anaktuvuk, and landed there. The weather kept us from finishing the original journey as we had planned, and we turned south to Takahula Lake to spend the night, and then the next day went on for the rest of the exploration of the Brooks Range.

We then went back to Fairbanks, to the old Nordale Hotel, which has burned down since, and we had further discussions with Sierra Club and ACS members.

Encouraging a Broader Vision of the Park Service Role in Alaska

Wayburn: Next, following our principle of being picked up by whatever service we could, we got a lift from the National Park Service. It was the first time the National Park Service had been able to afford a plane. This year Director George Hartzog made it possible for them to have some airplane service, and they showed us around McKinley, from there down to King Salmon. On the way we had our first views of the southern aspect of Mount McKinley and what were to be the new additions. We also flew over the Lake Clark area. We became convinced at that time that Lake Clark should be a national park.

##

Lage: Was the Park Service, on this trip, lobbying you for a certain point of view?

Wayburn: The Park Service lobbied us to some extent, but we were lobbying the Park Service, particularly the director of the Park Service, to a much greater extent. Our ideas for Alaska national parks were much more expansive than those of anyone in the National Park Service. There may have been people who secretly dreamed of large national parks in Alaska, but they didn't come out with those ideas. Beginning with my first trip in 1967, I started lobbying George Hartzog. I think I've told you of the fact that we stopped Hartzog from constructing a hotel at Wonder Lake.

Lage: Yes, you did.

Wayburn: The alternate for that was to have a much larger Mount McKinley National Park and a lodge on the southern slope. Well, I kept on lobbying Hartzog, and gradually Hartzog enlarged his ideas, as I'll come to shortly. But at this time what we were doing was sort of a mutual survey of looking at areas that the Park Service might consider for recommendations as national parks.

Wayburn: After agreement on the enlargement of Mount McKinley, we suggested that a Lake Clark National Park should be given high priority. We were proposing that it be included in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act as a national park. I was trying to get a quid pro quo. Well, that was not to be. We also looked at the whole Bristol Bay area and at Katmai and proposed enlarging Katmai National Monument.

Lage: Could you describe more how the Park Service would respond? Was it a question of their idea of what was feasible?

Wayburn: It was their idea of what was feasible. It was their idea of what they, the National Park Service, were able to assimilate into the national park system. For many years the National Park Service, generally, had been reluctant to add new areas to the national park system because it meant taking on new responsibilities; it meant getting more people in to administer the parks right. Their concern was with their proper administration of the parks. That comes back to haunt us with the present administration: "Let's develop right the parks that we have rather than go after new parks." That's been a theme in the Park Service right along, and the press for expansion of the national parks has come from the outside, from the conservation organizations. We have felt that the time was short and that, in the words which have been expressed by many of us, "What we get in the next few years is all we'll ever get."

Now, why the national parks? Because the mandate of the national parks under its organic act is twofold--to furnish the highest quality "pleasuring ground," as it was called, for the American people, and to preserve intact for future generations those areas. There is no other agency in the federal government which is charged with that sort of a mandate.

All of the other land-managing agencies have other mandates. The Forest Service, even after the Multiple Use Act, has five main uses that it is supposed to promote on its lands. These include wilderness, wildlife, and watershed protection, but also timber and mining and grazing, and some of these are not compatible with the preservation of the natural character of the land.

The Bureau of Land Management until, I think it was 1978, had no organic act. We pressed hard to get an organic act for the BLM. Now it is somewhat similar to that of the Forest Service.

The Fish and Wildlife Service has as its mandate the protection and production of fish and wildlife, but for the protection of the land there is no other agency which is charged as is the National Park Service.

Lage: So you weren't so concerned with how they'd administer these vast areas? I mean, that was a problem you wanted to take care of later?

Wayburn: That is a problem that could be taken care of later. The problem was first to get dedication of the land. That's been my overriding motive in every one of the big battles I've been in, and, of course, Alaska is the biggest.

Lage: It is funny that the Park Service itself has to be dragged along.

Wayburn: The Park Service has had to be dragged along in every one of them.

Lage: Yes. What about the local personnel in the Park Service? Whom were you dealing with?

Wayburn: At that time the superintendent of Mount McKinley was also the head of the Park Service for all Alaska, and in 1970 he was Ernest Borgmann. He was the gentleman who picked us up in this Beach Bonanza and flew us around Mount McKinley--myself and Peggy, and our daughter Laurie for part of this trip. We went around Mount McKinley, and we went through the Lake Clark country and the Togiak country and Bristol Bay, and we saw Walrus Island for the first time and then went over Katmai.

We talked with them. Borgmann was not adverse to enlargement; he just didn't have big vision. He was a very nice man and a good administrator. He was in over his depth in the Alaska situation as it stood at that time because he was supposed to do so many things, and he had no staff to do them. The Park Service had only a couple of small rooms in the post office building.

Lage: So often the Forest Service has charged the Park Service with wanting to gather more, to take over.

Wayburn: That's right.

Lage: Your view seems to be different.

Wayburn: It is definitely different. There were times when the National Park Service asked for certain Forest Service land, but most of the time it was the conservationists who forced the issue. This happened over and over again in parts of the Sierra--at Kings Canyon, in Sequoia, at Mineral King--in the Cascades. It was the conservationists who worked with the Forest Service, trying to get better protection for the land, not succeeding with the Forest Service, and then starting a campaign to establish a national park, and succeeding. [tape off briefly]

Further Exploration by Canoe, Car, and Plane, 1970

Lage: Let's go on with 1970.

Wayburn: After being landed back in Anchorage by the Park Service, we started on the first of what were to prove to be many river trips. We'd been exploring by air and by train and by boat. We had intended to do some backpacking, found out that this would involve a great deal more in the way of conditioning and would be much slower, but that there was a way to get around Alaska which we had not considered originally, and that was on rivers.

We started out slowly. The first time we were taken out by Wayne Boden, who was in charge of recreation for the Bureau of Land Management and who was undoubtedly told by Burt Silcock that he could take me along. We went with Wayne and his wife, Susie, and with another BLM employee named Wendell Elliot, and our daughter Laurie was with us. We drove to the Tangle Lakes, which are at one end of the Denali Highway, and we canoed down the Tangle Lakes and the Delta River just past Eureka Creek. The Tangle Lakes are beautiful, and the Delta is a lovely clear-water river, and then all of a sudden a great big branch comes in from a huge glacier, and the stream becomes much more rapid and very dirty. This was our first experience with glacial rivers, which we were to encounter a lot later.

Lage: Had you had any canoeing experience previously?

Wayburn: I had had one intensive summer experience as canoeing counselor at a boys' camp in Wisconsin.

Lage: Sometime in the past.

Wayburn: That was many, many years before, when I was an eighteen-year-old junior in college, or between my junior and senior years in college.

Lage: Was this difficult to do, then?

Wayburn: Well, we picked it up, and it was lots of fun.

Then after we came back from that we went on a ferry trip via Whittier to Valdez and then drove back over Thompson Pass, which gave us a view of more country that the pipeline was going to have to go through. This trip again had a purpose. We were surveying the route of the pipeline down to Valdez. On these two automobile trips--the one up the Glenn and Richardson Highway to Tangle Lakes and the other up the Richardson Highway from Valdez to its junction with the Glenn to Anchorage--gave us a good look at the country through which the pipeline and the haul road had to go.

Wayburn: We left Anchorage and once more went down to Juneau to talk to the regional forester. Mr. Johnson told us that he and his staff were spending 80 percent of their time on our Tongass Forest lawsuit and that they didn't have time to do any of the rest of the things we'd been asking them to do. [chuckles]

We were picked up by Jim Roush. This was the first time he had taken us on an extensive Alaska journey. He flew us around Southeast Alaska--Endicott Arm, Admiralty Island, up to Echo Cove where Champion had hoped to put their pulp mill, and then the next day took us on a magnificent tour over Glacier Bay, Yakutat, the Saint Elias Mountains, and over to Tagish and Atlin Lakes. We also saw West Chichagof again on the way. We got to explore Glacier Bay by small boat with Greg Streveler.

The following day we flew south over the Inside Passage, had our first view of the Stikine River and another view of the Misty Fjords. We overnighed at Point Harvey on Vancouver Island and then the next day flew over to the Sierra Club Foundation Lodge at Bella Coola. It has since been given to the Western Canada Chapter of the Sierra Club.

I made a note on April 5, 1971, of seeing Senator [Henry] Jackson, which, I think, was about the first time I discussed the Alaska problems with him. At that time we were exploring whether or not some sort of zoning of all Alaska federal lands could be done to classify them or to reserve them before the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act or the decisions on the pipeline were made.

Lage: Now, when you say, "...we were exploring..." whom do you mean, the club or you?

Wayburn: No. I mean Senator Jackson and I were exploring whether this was a possibility. I was asking the questions--Could this be done?--and he in effect was saying that he did not think it could be done.

Lage: What was his basic attitude towards the Alaska land?

Wayburn: Jackson probably knew more about Alaska than any other congressmen before Alaska became a state. He was from Washington, and he had been to Alaska several times, and he'd shown a strong interest in Alaska. He to some extent represented Alaskan interests before Alaska was a state. Then later, as I'll go on to tell, he was very helpful to us in forestalling precipitous action by the Department of the Interior.

The July 1971 Trip: Southeast, the Klondike, Brooks Range,
Forty Mile River, Kodiak

Wayburn: All right. In July, 1971, Jim Roush flew us up from Seattle for the first time, and once again we went to Southeast first. In Sitka and Juneau we had discussions with the Forest Service on the problems of multiple use with Alaska Lumber and Pulp [ALP] and Ketchikan Pulp, the companies with the long-term logging contracts. We had no idea at that time of the conspiracy which existed between those two firms and which has since caused such a great to-do and a judgment against them this past year. In Juneau we discussed conservation matters with Governor Keith Miller and with the commissioner for natural resources, Tom Kelley.

Lage: Now, who was governor at that time?

Wayburn: The governor then was Keith Miller. Kelley was his commissioner for natural resources. He was a young oil man who had recently come up from Texas. Miller I always regarded as a very amiable young man. He had been the lieutenant governor or, as it was called earlier, secretary of state, under Hickel; and when Hickel became the secretary of the Interior, Miller advanced to the governorship. My contacts with him, I say, were always very amiable; "amiable" is the right word to choose. He listened to everything we had to say as long as we wanted to talk, and we asked him a question and he would agree with us. But I found out that he had that habit of agreeing with other people on both sides of the question. He was not as knowledgeable as he might have been, and he was not as reliable as he might have been. He would seem to promise you something when he wasn't really doing it; he was just being amiable.

But he considered himself a conservationist, and I remember after he was defeated for election he wrote me a long letter in which he was rather bitter, and he said he could not understand why the conservationists turned against him when he had favored the position of the conservationists as much as he had. So he thought he was agreeing, but actually the actions that came out were not that favorable.

Lage: Was there a conservation entry into that election? Was Miller running against Egan?

Wayburn: Let's see [pauses to think]. No, Bill Egan was governor during that 1971 trip. It was earlier that I talked to Miller. Egan was elected in 1970 and Miller was governor from '68 to '70. It must have been on the 1970 trip that I talked to Miller.

Wayburn: Actually, Egan was not a good conservation-minded governor, but the conservationists had not taken a great stand in favor of Miller, and that was what bothered him.

Lage: I see. Let's continue with your 1971 trip.

Wayburn: We were enjoying the benefits of having a private pilot, and we were able to see Southeast on a clear day, travel all over the Mendenhall Glacier and the Tracy Arm-Ford's Terror area, and over into Canada to Atlin Lake and land at Whitehorse. While we were on the ground at Whitehorse we learned that the Saint Elias Mountains had clouded over completely, and we could not complete our trip as we had planned. We had planned to fly up to Anchorage via the coast.

So we diverted and went up the Alaska Highway past Kluane Lake and the White River and on up to Dawson, landing at an airfield near the Klondike River, which was the site of the Klondike mining boom of 1898. It was very interesting to see this lovely clear river flowing between vast piles of rubble.

Lage: Rubble left from the gold rush?

Wayburn: Rubble left from the gold mining. They did first placer mining, then they did dredge mining, and then they did hydraulic mining, and they cleared every bit of soil and everything but the base rock away from around that river. Seventy-five years later this was still very apparent and with very little vegetation growing, or beginning to grow, in it.

We found Dawson a very interesting relic, which still kept its image of 1898. Then we found that we still couldn't get back into Alaska because there was a big front, and we diverted still farther north and east, flying across the Ogilvie Mountains all the way to the Mackenzie River, and landing at Inuvik before we turned west again. An interesting phenomenon was how far north the tree line was on the Mackenzie Delta. It goes farther north there than any other place within many miles because the ground level is low and it has the soil coming into it from the Mackenzie River far to the south.

We flew towards the Alaska border, up the Firth River and to Old Crow, and then down the Porcupine River all the way to Fort Yukon. At Fort Yukon we found a most interesting phenomenon. There were some twenty-five or thirty small planes on the ground and some of them were taking off. They were the Flying Farmers of America. Each year they go to a different place, and this year they went to Alaska. They had occupied all the quarters that we were hoping to

Wayburn: find at Circle Hot Springs, and so we had to stay in a lodge at the airfield in Fort Yukon, in a building which was completely distorted by permafrost. The floor was at an angle. The doors wouldn't close. The roof tilted.

Lage: [laughter] It gave you a good demonstration of--

Wayburn: It gave us an excellent demonstration of what permafrost can do.

The following day we explored the eastern Brooks Range, enlarging our experience by a good deal, went up the Chandalar River to Arctic Village over to the Wind River and to the Galbraith Lake and Dietrich River camps, and then finally ended up in Fairbanks.

Then Jim took us over to Tanacross, which is the crossing of the Tanana River, where we were picked up again by the Bodens, who drove us down the Taylor Highway to the south fork of the Forty Mile River. There we put in for a four-day canoe trip and saw what can happen to a beautiful river as the result of the mining, which had been going on there for almost a hundred years. We thought that there were parts of it which had really been badly treated, but from what I hear of what's happening now, with the price of gold up and the invasion of the Forty Mile River by miners, it's just one muddy holocaust.

##

Wayburn: After a fascinating run down the Forty Mile, we went back to Anchorage and then took a day's trip with the Fish and Wildlife Service to the Kodiak Wildlife Refuge, and there I became "bear-blinded" because in the back seat of a Piper Cub over the Sturgeon River I saw forty-seven brown bears in one hour.

Lage: Oh, my!

Wayburn: Then we went over to Fraser Lake where they were putting in an artificial fish ladder to try to get salmon up the Karluk River far enough to have salmon breeding in Fraser Lake.

It was back in Anchorage during the next three days--I was meeting with conservationists and bureaucrats--that I learned that for the first time a group had formed in Alaska, a small group which they called the Wilderness Council, and that they were in a way doing what I was doing on my own. They were mapping out national and state park areas and wildlife refuges and wilderness areas. This was an effort which was coming from inside Alaska, and this was to be a predecessor of proposals for and bills for the National Interest Lands Act.

- Lage: Was this a council of established conservation groups there?
- Wayburn: This was a very small group of people--I think there were only five of them--who had gotten together. As I remember, they included Mark Ganapole (later Mark Hickok); Celia Hunter; I think, Ted Schultz; Dixie Baade; and Richard Gordon.
- Lage: Now, these are people you had contact with previously?
- Wayburn: Yes, I knew all of these people.
- Lage: But they'd sort of formed this on their own without Sierra Club involvement?
- Wayburn: Right. We were working in parallel.
- Lage: Yes. Did you get involved with them?
- Wayburn: I was involved with them and kept in touch with them. They worked on their own, and I was working on my own. Before I put together the proposal that is in the Sierra Club book on Alaska published in 1974 [Alaska, The Great Land], I was in heavy consultation with them and, of course, with Jack Hession and with others in Alaska.
- Lage: Right. That's something I wanted to get to--I suppose we will later--exactly how that was put together.
- Wayburn: Yes. If I don't do these things chronologically, I miss certain things, but we will take this up.

Park Service Survey Trip with Senator Bible

- Wayburn: I had forgotten about the fact that this was the same year that Ernie Borgmann again took me from Anchorage to Fairbanks in a small plane, and we met with George Hartzog, and Hartzog met with the conservationists in Fairbanks to discuss national parks in Alaska.
- Lage: And were you in on that meeting?
- Wayburn: I was in on that meeting. He was agreed that he should go for more than he had before. This time was particularly significant because he had invited Peggy and me to join him and Senator [Alan] Bible and a party on a trip through Alaska with the idea of surveying national

Wayburn: park areas, prospective areas. Senator Bible had come up from Reno with a party of his own friends, and the National Park Service had chartered a Twin Otter out of Fairbanks.

Lage: Now, this was 1971 that this trip took place?

Wayburn: That's right, '71

I remember well that after he met with the conservationists, Hartzog went off to meet the Bibles. Although Peggy and I were part of that party, we were not a part of the party until the next morning because that night Mrs. Bartlett, the widow of Senator Bob Bartlett, was giving a party for Senator Bible, and I gather that by this time the Sierra Club had acquired enough notoriety that they didn't want the vice-president of the Sierra Club in on the party, which was written up in the social news.

Lage: [laughter] That's interesting. Why was Senator Bible included in this?

Wayburn: Senator Bible was the chairman of the National Parks Subcommittee of the Senate Interior Committee. He was the man with whom Hartzog worked most closely; he was the legislator through whom Hartzog worked in order to accomplish anything either in the acquisition of land for national parks or in the administration or development of the parks, or--because Bible was also chairman of the subcommittee on appropriations for the Department of the Interior--if he wanted to get any money. [chuckles] So Bible had a very critical position at that time.

Lage: Yes. Was anyone else along on the trip?

Wayburn: There were two couples who were friends of Bible, and the director of the northwest region of the National Park Service, John Rutter. And George Hartzog and Peggy and myself. We were invited, I think, because Hartzog had finally bought our ideas about establishing large national parks in Alaska, and the four that we had suggested to him particularly were Gates of the Arctic, the Wrangell-Saint Elias-Kluane International Park, Lake Clark, and an expansion of Mount McKinley.

The next day the fates were with us. We left Fairbanks on an extremely overcast day, and we flew for two hours through the overcast, not being able to see anything, and I was very apprehensive. I was sitting in the back of the plane, and Senator Bible was in the front, and everybody was quiet. It was one of those days when nothing seemed to be happening, and I, as I say, was very apprehensive.

Wayburn: All of a sudden we dipped down through the clouds and came out in the sunshine at Allakaket, which is not far from Bettles, and Bettles is the main airport for that entire section north of the Yukon River. From there on everything was wonderful. We had brilliant clear weather with intermittent clouds.

We flew up the beautiful Alatna River, which is a light greenish blue stream with white sand on both sides of it. We passed Takahula Lake, and on our way we saw the Arrigetch Peaks, the most beautiful peaks in all the Brooks Range, some of the most captivating peaks in North America. They're called Arrigetch, which means "fingers of the hand outstretched." We went over to Mount Igikpak, the tallest peak in the area, and down to Walker Lake, the most beautiful lake. Then from there we flew up the north fork of the Koyukuk River and then back along the pipeline route and the Hickel Highway, the winter road.

We saw everything. Senator Bible was beyond expression, he was so astounded by it, and I knew in my heart that we had the Gates of the Arctic National Park.

Lage: Had Bible had experience in Alaska at all, or this was his first trip?

Wayburn: No, I think it was his first trip, and he hadn't imagined that there was anything like this, so he was particularly taken with it.

The next day we took the train down to Mount McKinley. At McKinley Junction we got into small planes and flew around Mount McKinley and, again, you could see everything around it clearly; you could see the magnificence of the mountain and the tremendous glaciers, and I felt very good about getting an expanded Mount McKinley Park. I'd discussed with Senator Bible that only half the mountain was in the park, and he was very receptive.

Lage: You must have worked with him previously on other issues?

Wayburn: Yes, I'd worked with Bible.

Lage: Was he generally receptive to park expansion?

Wayburn: Bible was an interesting man in that respect. He comes from Nevada. He started out as a more or less typical western states congressman, got on the Interior Committee because western interests wanted him to, then as he got seniority found himself with a job that might not have been what his constituents might have preferred; he didn't get the mining subcommittee or the public lands subcommittee; he got

Wayburn: the national parks subcommittee. Working with George Hartzog, particularly--they made a good team--he became more and more receptive, and he liked the parks so much that he later asked for and became a member of the National Parks System Advisory Board.

I used to go see him every year. I would see him every year I'd go to Washington, and he would say, "Well, come in again, Mr. Sierra Club" and "Now, what do you want this time?" He would pretend to be very skeptical and anti-conservationist, but he gradually became more conservation-minded, I think. In the national park issues which I had to present to him, including redwoods and Point Reyes National Seashore and Golden Gate National Recreation Area and the Alaska parks, he was very helpful. He didn't go overboard, but he was really very helpful. He had some other connections in that regard too. He became a friend of Boyd Stewart's, who was a rancher in Point Reyes, and visited Stewart not infrequently and played a large role in the establishment of the Point Reyes National Seashore.

We still see each other twice a year at these meetings of the National Parks Advisory Board, and he always wants to know, "Well, how much land are you trying to grab now?" [chuckles] But he has voted with me, and I like Bible.

Lage: And did Hartzog's vision of what was required seem to be enlarged on this trip?

Wayburn: Oh, yes. Very much.

We had to leave the party in order to get back to keep some appointments in Anchorage and then to get back to San Francisco, while they continued on their journey. They flew down to Katmai National Monument and went fishing; they never did get into the Wrangells because of weather, and I always thought that was the reason we had such a hard time with getting the Wrangell National Park established. It ran into a number of difficulties. I hope it's all right now.

Lobbying Henry Jackson for the Key Preservationist Amendment to ANCSA

Wayburn: As a follow-up on this, in late September 1971 I went to Washington, D.C., for a meeting of the board of directors of the Sierra Club and for the Sierra Club Wilderness Conference, which was held there.

Wayburn: While we were in Alaska we had gotten word that the Native Claims Settlement Act was going through the Congress like wildfire, and I asked Bible about it, how fast it was going through the Senate. Bible didn't know anything about it. It had all happened since he'd left and that was a short time. But we thought that Mr. Aspinall would stop it in the House because the year before Aspinall had offered a bill for 2 million acres to be given to the Alaska Natives and, I think, \$10 million, something like that, whereas Senator Jackson had had a bill passed in the Senate for 10 million acres and, I think, \$100 million. Well, by the time we got to Washington, both of them were sponsoring the bill for 40 million acres and \$1 billion in cash.

When we got to Washington, Stewart Brandborg, the executive director of the Wilderness Society, wanted urgently to see me. He demanded that we convene a small meeting of people knowledgeable about Alaska away from the Wilderness Conference. He said at this meeting, "We've lost everything. The Native Claims Act is going through, and there's no provision for parks or refuges or anything else. We tried to get a provision through the House, and it was lost."

After we'd discussed this matter a little bit and he had brought me up to date where we stood, I said, "Let me speak to Senator Jackson." I called and went over that afternoon to see Senator Jackson. As I remember, I took Jack Hession with me. I think he was the only one. Well, Jackson was pretty busy, and we didn't have long to talk to him, but in the course of a few minutes I said, "Scoop, last year you sponsored a bill to give the Alaska Natives 10 million acres and \$100 million, and this year you're sponsoring one for 40 million acres and \$1 billion. How do you reconcile that with your principles?"

He put his hand on my shoulders and said, "Ed, if I didn't, Kennedy was ready to sponsor one for 60 million acres, and the way things are going in the Congress right now, it would have gone through. What I'm putting through is a compromise."

Then I said, "Well, if you've got to do this, how about giving something to the rest of the people of the United States?"

He said, "What do you mean?"

I said, "I mean about 150 million acres to be reserved for parks and for refuges."

He said, "Aren't you asking for a lot?"

Wayburn: I said, "I don't think so. Three hundred and seventy-five million acres in Alaska--there's still a lot left. The state's getting 104 million acres and the natives are getting 44 million in all. Why shouldn't we reserve that much? What do you want to use it for?"

He said, "I think that's too much. How would 80 million acres suit you?"

I said, "It won't suit me, but I'll take it."

He said, "All right"--just like that. Then he said, "I'll get Senator Bible to offer an amendment to the Native Claims Settlement Act," and he did. I got word on the first of November from Lloyd Tupling that the Bible amendment to ANCSA had passed unanimously--for the secretary of the Interior to identify up to 80 million acres.

A short time later I talked to George Hartzog and asked him to please put on the pressure so that sufficient acreage was reserved.

Lage: It seems so simple getting that 80 million acres in. Were there other people coming from different directions urging this, or--?

Wayburn: Well, there were people coming from different directions all over on the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The Alaska natives had been trying to get justice for a hundred years, and they didn't know how to. In the 1960s they began to get far smarter than they had been. A number of their young people had been educated not only in Alaska schools but also in colleges in the lower forty-eight. The civil rights movement was in full swing and that taught a lot to the Alaska natives. The success of liberal movements generally had made them bolder, and a number of other factors had come up. They'd begun to get some power in the Alaska State Legislature--a few people were being elected--and yet they thought they were regarded as second-class citizens.

They claimed that they had never signed a treaty with the United States, only Russia had signed a treaty, and they were the aboriginal people there, and the land really belonged to them because it was taken from them, and they owned the whole thing. They were actually at one time claiming more land than was present in the whole 375 million acres.

But the thing that really mattered most was that they started filing suit for some areas that the State of Alaska wanted, and this was about 1966 and later in 1968, and Secretary of the Interior Udall put a freeze on disposal of all federal land in Alaska. That freeze was still on when the oil companies wanted to put the trans-Alaska

Wayburn: pipeline through, and the pipeline that they proposed went through areas that certain native villages (I remember specifically Stevens Village on the Yukon River) claimed as their particular property, and they'd already identified this land. The oil companies weren't interested in Alaska native rights, but they were interested in getting the right of way for that pipeline down so they could get their oil out, and so the oil companies threw the full power of their lobbies against Congress.

Lage: So it wasn't a sympathy for native rights.

Wayburn: Sympathy for native rights had been gathering for years, but the combination of the liberals and the native rights groups and the oil companies, aided to some extent by the conservationists, who saw this as a way to break a logjam on getting more land reserved--

Lage: Did this idea to attach an amendment on reserving land come out of this meeting in Washington, or had that been in the works for some time?

Wayburn: That had been in the works for some time. I had this idea from the first time that I knew about the Alaska native claims legislation. I thought this should be a part of it. I was very disappointed when the secretary of the Interior withdrew land just for the pipeline corridor and did not withdraw any other land at the same time. My feeling was--is--that when the federal government gives up land for an exploitative purpose, it should at the same time do something for protective purposes. So I viewed it, and there were many people who viewed the Native Claims Act as a vehicle to get something else at the same time.

As I mentioned earlier, Congressman John P. Saylor and Congressman Morris Udall had made an attempt to get an amendment through the House bill but had failed. So my particular contribution was, through Senator Jackson, to get another amendment introduced into the Senate. At the time, I didn't know that this had been for the same amount of land. That 80 million figure had been talked about before, undoubtedly, but this was just my personal experience. Other people, I understand, tell this story in different ways, but this is how it happened.

Lage: Did the conservationists have any role as, say, staff people working with the conference committee or working with the Senate committee to write the bill?

Wayburn: Yes. Well, I think that they did, but my role concerned this Section 17.

Lage: Yes, right, just that one section.

Wayburn: We were not greatly concerned with a good deal of the bill, but we were supportive of the whole bill and particularly because of what it would set up for the future.*

Lage: Okay. Well, I think this is a good place to pause.

##

*The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, signed December 18, 1971, granted 40 million acres and nearly one billion dollars to Alaska native peoples. Section 17(d)2 of the act, the national interest amendment, required the secretary of Interior to withdraw up to 80 million acres of unreserved BLM lands suitable for national parks, forests, refuges, and wild and scenic rivers. The secretary was also granted authority to withdraw an additional 54 million acres for classification.

Once the lands were withdrawn, the secretary was given two years to make precise recommendations for the lands to Congress. Congress then had five years, until 1978, to designate the lands and delineate boundaries.

XX ALASKA ISSUES, 1971-1975

[Interview 16: August 28, 1981]##

The National Organizations and the Alaskan Conservationists:
Developing the Preservationist Plan

Lage: Last time we talked about the club opposition to the oil pipeline and the passage of ANSCA, and then we were going to turn to 1971 and the Alaska Conservation Conference. Was that a conference where plans were developed, the final plans for Alaska, or the preliminary plans?

Wayburn: That was a gathering of many people interested in the conservation development in the north country. It was held in Anchorage in December, 1971, and a good many speakers gave their outlook, mostly conservation speakers. The conference then turned to the question of how could one carry out these various ideas in Alaska. The conclusion was that there needed to be some sort of an umbrella group in Alaska with representatives from different conservation organizations, but also a forum which was expressive of the will and intention of people living in Alaska to do something about conservation.

Out of that came a proposal for the Alaska Environmental Center, which was to be located in Anchorage. Originally this proposal was very ambitious. Then, like many other conservation plans, it had to be tuned down a great deal; this was very disappointing to some people while very encouraging to some of us. It was disappointing to those proponents who wanted to have a great big organization rise full-blown, but it was still encouraging to those of us who felt that it meant a start toward getting many more Alaskans interested in conservation and being able to influence the Alaska state and local governments.

Lage: What was the nature of the center?

Wayburn: Well, the center still continues. It deals rather largely with comparatively local matters around Anchorage, but it also is one of a group of different Alaska conservation organizations which work in coalition. The others include the Fairbanks Environmental Center, which grew up on its own and the Southeast Alaska Conservation Council. SEACC is composed of eight different organizations, including the Juneau and Sitka groups of the Alaska Chapter of the Sierra Club; the Sitka Conservation Society; the Petersburg Conservation Society, and so forth. These organizations have greater local status in Alaska because they are home-grown. They also have some support from national organizations such as the Sierra Club.

Lage: You hear a lot about "Alaska for Alaskans." Now, did that enter into the conservation tensions as well?

Wayburn: That enters a great deal into the conservation problems. Alaskans are isolated to a very considerable extent from the lower forty-eight. Alaskans believe in the states' rights principle very much and that includes our local conservationists. They want to be perceived as doing things as Alaskans and not having things forced on them from "outside." The sad part of that is that most, practically all, of the massive exploitation and development of Alaska has come from outside, and the local exploiters have in the past lacked the resources.

If the exploitation of Alaska were carried on by the little miner or even the little oil company or the small logger, there wouldn't be an undue amount of exploitation. But as it is, it's done by multinational companies with tremendous resources--from all over the world. Of the three major developers at Prudhoe Bay, for example, one was British Petroleum, which has the controlling interest in Standard Oil of Ohio; one was Atlantic Richfield; and one was Humble Oil, which is a subsidiary of EXXON, the largest oil company in the world. So in Alaska we conservationists were really fighting exploitation by the largest and most powerful exploiters, not only in this country but in the world.

Lage: I notice that a lot of your arguments for preservation of Alaskan wilderness brought up the point of saving this for the American people, that the wilderness belongs to all of us.

Wayburn: Right.

Lage: Now, did that go over with the Alaskan conservationists?

Wayburn: To some extent only, but to an increasing extent. This goes over very well with the type of conservationist who is in the Sierra Club, who may have moved to Alaska from outside to enjoy what Alaska still

Wayburn: has and other parts of the country haven't. It didn't go over so well, and particularly at first, with the people in the Alaska Conservation Society, who felt that there was this vast amount of Alaska still to be enjoyed by anyone interested in wilderness or in conservation. It took a long time to convince some of the best people there that the highest degree of dedication of the land by the highest authority of the nation, such as could be obtained in a national park or a national wildlife refuge, was the most important first step.

Lage: Did they come around to that view?

Wayburn: I think they have largely, but in the final debates on the Alaska National Interest Lands, there were still statements by prominent members of the Alaska Conservation Society that they went along with the plan of the Alaska Coalition because they thought it was best overall, but there were individual parts of it that they didn't approve of and would speak out against at the proper time. Now, actually they haven't, but there's always this fear that they might.

Lage: It's still an ongoing fear that they could make a change at this point?

Wayburn: Oh, yes. The other side always likes to point up a split among the conservationists and for the next four years, at least, there are going to be proposals for regulations and general management plans in these new conservation units, and how they will be managed will be influenced greatly by the plans and regulations.

Lage: And is that the type of thing that the split occurs on, the level of--?

Wayburn: It can. Originally it did over how much land was to be set aside, and we had quite a job convincing some of our Alaskan friends that the areas should be as large as we were able to get eventually. They felt that the state could manage its land just as well and that the Bureau of Land Management could manage other parts of the land just as well. Those things, we felt, weren't possible.

Lage: Did the same disagreement occur within the Sierra Club, the Alaska Chapter versus the Alaska Task Force?

Wayburn: There was, I think, a mild disagreement on who should be doing what, but as far as the principles and the extent of what should be in the units were concerned, I don't think there was any difference. That came about because of starting early. As soon as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was passed in December, 1971, groups in Alaska--particularly the Alaska Wilderness Council--were working on boundaries,

Wayburn: just as we were working on boundaries from here, and it happened that our ideas were very similar as to what areas should be set aside and how much should be set aside. I confess in certain instances of wanting to include larger areas, particularly in national parks, but we were able to put our ideas into general form so that they meshed.

Lage: When did you do that, now?

Wayburn: In 1972 and 1973.

Lage: In formal meetings or private meetings?

Wayburn: Occasionally in formal meetings, more frequently in discussions and exchange of maps and written expositions. But it had to be done that early, as witness the Sierra Club book on Alaska, The Great Land, published in 1974; the material for that book had to be in a good deal before 1974.

Lage: And that material--the recommended lands in Alaska, The Great Land--were the result of the agreed-upon proposals?

Wayburn: They were to a considerable extent, but they were my own recommendations. I was responsible for those; no one else was. I worked them out particularly with such people as Jack Hession, our Alaska representative--he and I saw eye-to-eye on practically everything--and with Mark Hickok and Richard Gordon of the Alaska Wilderness Council.

Lage: Mark and Richard were both with the Alaska Wilderness Council?

Wayburn: Yes. Mark Hickok played a significant role in the early days of the Alaska Chapter, too. Her first husband, Jerry Ganapole, was the second chairman of the chapter; he was chairman for, I think, two, possibly three, years.

Richard Gordon had been in Alaska off and on since the fifties. He was the librarian for the Department of Fish and Game for a number of years, and, as a man with a terrific eye to detail and the ability to work on specific subjects in detail for day after day, he was extremely helpful. It was people like that who could say that the plan for Alaska was drawn up by Alaskans. Really, we were all Alaskans.

Lage: Could you say what the primary considerations were in drawing up the land plan? There's lot of mention of wildlife.

Wayburn: Well, my first consideration was, has been, and is throughout--the protection of land in units large enough to protect sizeable ecosystems in the geographical area we picked out. In Alaska those had to be fairly large because the variety of plants and animals in Alaska is not as great as it is in a more temperate zone; the chances of doing great harm either to the vegetation or to the wildlife are much greater with a smaller stimulus. I was frankly trying to get units which could protect both the flora and the fauna and to keep the terrain in a natural condition or near natural condition as far as possible.

I conceived of six regions in Alaska to be set aside. A little bit earlier we might have been able to keep those intact. At the time, in the seventies, it wasn't possible to keep them all in just six units. But there should have been one unit of the Arctic; that is, the Brooks Range and north. The discovery of oil and the pipeline divided that into two separate units: the Arctic east of the pipeline and the Arctic west of the pipeline.

Other people long before me had recognized that the Yukon River was a tremendous barrier which affected everything on one side or the other of it, and the PYK line (meaning the Porcupine-Yukon-Koyukuk river line) was the basis of a great deal of thinking among scientists and planners in the early years of the century and right on up to the fifties.

Lage: So you had a lot to build on.

Wayburn: Oh, we had a great deal to build on.

Lage: A lot of expert input also, it sounds like--archaeologists, geologists.

Wayburn: Yes. Oh [chuckles], in no way did this spring full-blown out of my head or the heads of the people working with me. People had been thinking about Alaska and what would happen eventually for many, many years.

Working with Secretary of Interior Morton on Alaska Land
Withdrawal, 1971-1973

Wayburn: The crunch came with the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, and the crunch was on a particular individual, Rogers Morton, secretary of the Interior. Between 1971 and 1973 he had to come up with a plan for the Congress. He had to identify not more

Wayburn: than eighty million acres to be reserved as national interest lands. Well, while Morton had his teams from the Park Service, from the Fish and Wildlife Service, and from the Department of Interior generally working on identifying areas to be set aside for eventual national park, wildlife refuge, wild and scenic rivers designation, the conservationists likewise had been working, and that's just what I was talking about a little earlier.

I worked closely with Morton during those years and met with him a number of times, was on the telephone with him a number of times, worked with him and Nat Reed, who was the assistant secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks.

Lage: Whom you'd already worked with in the redwoods.

Wayburn: Already worked with, in the redwoods particularly. Reed and I worked together on redwoods and on every one of the major projects that I had.

Lage: How did the cooperation go? Are you going to elaborate on that a little bit more, your assessment of Morton and his receptiveness?

Wayburn: Yes. Morton was nominated by Nixon in 1970 to take the place of Hickel as secretary of the Interior. Morton had been the Sierra Club's first choice in 1968 when Hickel was chosen secretary.

Lage: I hadn't realized that the club had endorsed Morton.

Wayburn: I don't know whether it was a formal endorsement. Of the various nominees, we thought that Morton would be the best.

When we endorsed Morton in 1968, I was the president of the Sierra Club. When Morton came up as Nixon's replacement for Hickel in 1970, Phil Berry was the president of the club. Phil felt that Morton was not qualified to be a good secretary of the Interior. After a good deal of discussion, he got permission from the Sierra Club Executive Committee to go back to Washington and question the nomination. He was specifically asked not to oppose it. In fact, he went back, and he did oppose the nomination. The Interior Committee, however, was all set to confirm Morton and was very friendly during the confirmation hearings, although they did give Phil a bad time in his opposition.

It happened that this made my work a little difficult for a while. I had been fairly close to different secretaries of the Interior and I went up to pay my respects to Morton, knowing that he was resentful of the Sierra Club because of its opposition, and the first time--

Lage: Were you already familiar with him? Had you met him?

Wayburn: I had met Morton before when he was a congressman from Maryland, and he had been a helpful congressman.

The first time I went in, I was told that there was no appointment available. The second time I went in, the same message came back, but I got ahold of one of his younger assistants, a man I was to have a good deal to do with later--his name was Richard Curry--and told him to tell the secretary that I just wanted to have five minutes to pass the time of day with him; I wasn't going to ask him anything else. So after a few minutes he came out and said, "The secretary will see you."

I found Morton, not in the large room where I used to go see Stewart Udall, but in the small anteroom off of it, looking very sad and being very quiet, but he kindly ushered me to a seat and said, "What can I do for you?"

I said, "Mr. Secretary, I have nothing to ask of you. I was in Washington; I wanted to say hello and tell you that I'd like to work with you more closely in the future."

He brightened up and said, "Well, fine. You must have something you're interested in now."

I said, "No, I haven't. I just wanted to shake your hand and that's all."

Well, from that time on, it was fairly easy for me to see Morton. He--

Lage: Was this meeting before the ANSCA deadline had come up?

Wayburn: Yes, it was before. It was when he first came into office; that was in 1970. ANSCA didn't pass until December, 1971. In Section 17(d)2 it mandated that the secretary of the Interior withdraw not more than 80 million acres as national interest lands. By March, 1972, Morton had drawn up his preliminary plan, some 80 million acres. Conservationists were very pleased with it. It included our most desired areas, and we noticed one other thing by looking at the documents, that around these 80 million acres which were designated as the so-called D-2 lands which should be looked at by Congress for permanent retention, there were a number of other lands which were marked "areas of national concern." If you combined the areas set aside by Morton with the areas of national concern, you had approximately the areas that we had designated. He had 80 million acres. We had at that time 104 million acres set aside in our plans.

Lage: And he actually withdrew almost 200 million acres, didn't he?

Wayburn: He withdrew not quite 200 million, but, yes, close to that. But this was for a combination of D-2 and D-1 lands. D-2 lands were lands which were designated to be set aside in the national interest, conservation lands. D-1 lands were lands still managed by the Bureau of Land Management to be set aside in the public interest, which essentially meant that they could be used for other than specific conservation purposes. Then there were the lands that the State of Alaska was trying to identify as part of its 104 million-acre endowment, and the 44 million acres of the native entitlement. In many cases, two or more entities wanted the same lands, and all of that hasn't yet been settled.

Lage: Do you think Morton had an eye to the conservationists' plan as he was doing this, or do you have any evidence that he did?

Wayburn: Well, we were in there pitching with him throughout this time, and we were friendly with the people in charge from the National Park Service (Ted Swem) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (Bill Raffault), who were giving him advice on this. I, personally, had several meetings with Morton during this time and afterwards, telling him what I thought there should be. I met with him several times in Washington and, I think, twice in Alaska.

##

Lage: When you met with him, was there ever--you mentioned a quid pro quo on oil. Did this come in in a direct way at all? Was there mention about the Sierra Club's lawsuit that was delaying the pipeline?

Wayburn: Remember, this was not the Sierra Club lawsuit. It was the conservationists' lawsuit. [laughter]

Lage: Okay! That's right, the conservationists' lawsuit.

Wayburn: I don't think that came up as such. It may have. I don't recall it at this time.

But I mentioned meeting with Morton in Alaska. I remember particularly one meeting in the Westward Hotel in his suite. He invited me to come up there and meet with him and his staff. He had Jack Horton, who was his special deputy for Alaska; Harrison Loesch, who was assistant secretary for mining; and several others whom at this moment I don't recall. But there were people representing the conservation side--parks and wildlife refuges.

Wayburn: It must have been early '73 because at that time President Nixon had revised his cabinet setup so that he had four superchiefs in the cabinet. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz was in overall charge of natural resources, which meant that Morton had been downgraded. Butz, for the Forest Service, demanded that the Forest Service be given a sizeable amount of the Alaska national interest lands to administer. These included such areas as the 5.5 million-acre Porcupine forest in the Arctic.

Lage: There couldn't have been too much lumbering on that.

Wayburn: The trees were perhaps three inches in diameter. And also the Koyukuk forest and the Innoko forest, all in the interior of Alaska where there were generally very small trees.

The discussion was on about the Forest Service apportionment. After a little bit, Morton turned to me and said, "I don't see any reason why the Forest Service should have any land given to it up here. Do you, Ed?" And I said, "No!" [laughter] Jack Horton said, "But Secretary Butz thinks that there should be!" And Harrison Loesch said, "Yes, the Forest Service feels very strongly about this."

Now, just what all the considerations were, I don't know.

Lage: Well, he was under pressure from above as well as from below.

Wayburn: That's right. The Forest Service is a land-managing as well as a timber-cutting agency, and there were a few stands of white spruce along the rivers. There was also the thought that there were hard rock minerals and oil underneath that land, and this was part of the reason the Forest Service wanted it. They also said they wanted to teach the Alaskans to practice good forestry.

I've always felt that Morton had very fine instincts. He didn't know as much as he might have known about some of these matters, but one of the memories that I always treasure was that as Morton was leaving after several years as secretary--

Lage: When did he leave? Did he stay on through Ford?

Wayburn: He stayed on, I think, through 1974. He and Nat Reed invited me to a reception he was giving one time I was in Washington. He was giving this for the National Parks Advisory Board, on which he relied quite a bit. At the reception he let his hair down. He was almost tearful as he bade the board goodbye, and he said, "I've had a lot of fun in this job. The thing that I'm the proudest of is the decisions that I made in Alaska, and I want to thank Dr. Edgar Wayburn for that more than anyone else."

Lage: That's quite a compliment.

Wayburn: [pauses] I was quite taken aback, and the tears came to my eyes too.

Lobbying Both Sides of the Aisle as a Registered Republican

Lage: So, to get back to the way we started this side of the tape, your way of working with political figures is different from, say, Phil Berry's.

Wayburn: I generally like to work behind the scenes. I have done a lot of public hearing testimony, but I like also to work, as it's called, on both sides of the aisle, which comes back to a different subject.

Coming from Georgia and rebelling against the conservative Democrat-run South, I first registered as a Republican, which was in those days a strange thing to do for a southerner. I've always continued that Republican registration because I wasn't interested in any office politically myself; another factor was that in the medical profession, trying to influence doctors, you could do it as a Republican a little bit easier than a Democrat; and when it came to state and national medical politics as well as conservation politics, the Republicans usually needed more influencing than the Democrats did.

Lage: Would that help you influence a man like Morton? I mean, did you let it be known you were a Republican?

Wayburn: I don't know whether I did or not. I may have. I know Reed knew of it, and Phil Burton, with whom I've worked more than anyone else.

Lage: He is aware of it.

Wayburn: Oh, he's been aware of it. Phil Burton knows your background from A to Z. Once when I ran into Phil on the Capitol steps as he was coming down with a couple of Democrats and Republicans, he said, "I want to introduce my favorite conservative Republican."

Lage: [laughter] Well, do you think that's an apt characterization?

Wayburn: What? Of me?

Lage: Conservative Republican.

Wayburn: No. I actually am an independent. I've always been an independent. I didn't switch during some very trying times when all of my Republican friends in the Sierra Club were switching to be Democrats. I believe people like Dave Brower and Phil Berry were Republicans, and they switched because of what they saw the Republican party doing. I've always felt independent and always been independent. I've supported more Democrats than I have Republicans and have been on more sponsoring committees for Democrats than Republicans [chuckles], but I feel that I'm freer to do as I choose, and I get the literature of both sides. If there were a way of registering independent and being able to vote in the primary or of influencing the general elections more, I would undoubtedly be registered as an independent.

Lage: Is being a Republican going to help you more now with Reagan in, do you think?

Wayburn: I don't think so. No, the Reagan administration has been just about as hard on liberal Republicans as it has been on Democrats. As a matter of fact, in this instance the Republicans haven't got as much leverage as the Democrats have. [laughter]

##

Wayburn: In talking about my politics, I repeat, I have never felt strongly about partisan politics at all. I've been interested in issues, and have been willing to side with the politicians who supported the same issues that I have, and have worked with both Republicans and Democrats equally to get their support for those issues. It so happens that through a large part of my conservation career the Congress has been controlled by the Democrats, and I have worked with the Democratic politicians on the hill; at the same time the presidency has often been Republican, and I have worked with administration officials who were Republicans as much as with the Democrats.

In all of this time I don't know whether anyone questioned whether I was a Republican or a Democrat. There were often times when people were surprised to find out that I wasn't a Democrat or to find out that I was a Republican, and probably they were right, because I was neither [chuckles] or both.

Lage: Were there ever people in the Nixon administration that you worked with? Did you work with Ruckelshaus at all?

Wayburn: I worked with Ruckelshaus a little. I worked with Russ Train a great deal, and I was in a way responsible for John Buserud getting his first job with the Nixon administration as deputy assistant secretary of defense for environmental matters. That happened through

Wayburn: a circuitous route. Cole Wilbur's brother, Richard Wilbur, was the assistant secretary of defense for health, and he was looking for someone to handle the environmental aspects of his job. I, of course, knew Cole well, and I knew Dick well and recommended John to him. John later became a member of the Council on Environmental Quality and its acting chairman.

##

Working with Native Leaders on Boundaries and Hunting Issues

Lage: I had some question about working with native Alaskans. Did you get involved at all working with native leaders?

Wayburn: Increasingly. The first year or two, I didn't know any natives. My first real exposure to natives, I guess, came at the Northwest Wilderness Conference, which was about 1969, possibly 1970, when we were looking for an Alaska native to come down and represent the position of the Alaska native before the Alaska Native Settlement Act. We had great trouble in finding one who was articulate enough and who was willing to appear before conservationists. We were finally able to find a man named Nils Anderson from Dillingham, who was at that time with Ruralcap.

Lage: With what?

Wayburn: Rural Community Action Program, which was working with the natives.

Lage: I see. Could he be said to represent a native group?

Wayburn: He was representing Ruralcap, which was working with the natives generally, and he was a member of the Bristol Bay Native Association. He was a man who, although he was part white--I don't know whether he was half Eskimo or one-quarter Eskimo--but he was one of those who had a chip on his shoulder, and it was obvious. He came down and gave a stirring speech condemning the white exploiters, and he had his ticket all ready to go back to Alaska right away. At the Northwest Wilderness Conference in Seattle he got great applause, and several of us went up afterwards and congratulated him on his stand, which happened to coincide with our stand as far as protection of the land was concerned. He stayed over. He changed his plan and stayed over, and he had a good time, I think.

Lage: Was he a good interpreter of the native point of view, or was this something you wished from him?

Wayburn: He did interpret the way they felt and with the intensity of feeling that they felt. I told him that I liked a great deal of what he said and that I'd like to visit him back in Dillingham, and he invited me to do so.

In 1972, I guess, we began to look up the different native leaders, to meet with as many as we could, and in '72, '73, '74 we met a great many of them. It may have started in '71; I think it did. At first we looked up the different groups that had headquarters in Anchorage, such as Cook Inlet Regional Native Corporation and Ahtna, and with Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, and then we went up--

Lage: Are these corporations, now, or associations?

Wayburn: They are corporations. In 1973, particularly, we made a point of visiting as many as we could. In '73, which was the same year that we met Jay Hammond, we went back to Dillingham to meet with Nils Anderson and Harvey Samuelson, who was the president of the Bristol Bay Native Corporation. At that time Anderson was the executive director. Then we went up to Nome and to Kotzebue and later to Point Barrow to meet with the heads of the Nana and Arctic Slope Corporations.

Lage: Was this you and Peggy?

Wayburn: This was the year that Peggy and I and Jack Hession were the team.

Lage: And what was the purpose of the meetings?

Wayburn: We were trying to establish a rapport with them and to agree as far as possible on general boundaries to see if there were any conflicts between what we wanted for the national interest areas and what they were going to select for their regional and village corporations, and at that time they seemed minimal. I forgot one other corporation we visited that year; that was Calista in Bethel, and we went out to a village in the middle of the wildlife refuge, a village called Chevak. We have, during the course of these journeys, met with representatives of all the different native corporations.

Lage: Do you have an overall impression of their concerns or their sensitivity to environmental issues?

Wayburn: As I have put it at different times, there is no monolithic native. The Alaska Native Claims Act completely changed the whole outlook and the whole future of the native peoples. It, on the one hand, gave them a much greater sense of pride, gave them a sense of ownership which they hadn't had before, although they claimed that they owned all of Alaska. Except for a comparatively few fishing villages, they were nomadic, and they traveled from place to place, following the game, or where the fishing was good, or where the marine mammals were plentiful.

They had very early become intermixed with the Europeans. The earliest ones were the Russians (and you see that a lot of Russian names survive) and then the Scandinavian traders. Along the seacoast particularly you see a great many names like Anderson and Samuelson and Johansen and the like. Then when the United States took over there was still further mixture. But with comparatively few exceptions the Europeans who came in had a tendency to look down on the natives.

The natives, in the early Alaska legislatures, did not have many representatives up until about 1970 when it was obvious that the native claims bill was going through and that the natives were going to become rich and powerful. Then all the people with one-quarter native blood declared themselves natives, and there was a great improvement in the general situation, but new tensions and conflicts arose, and this alone would take a whole book.

Lage: [laughter] Yes!

Wayburn: But, just in brief, the Congress set up regional corporations with certain limitations, twelve regional corporations inside Alaska and one outside corporation, and those were all profit-making corporations. In order to supply them with capital, the Congress allocated land up to 44 million acres and money up to \$1 billion. Some of the corporations began to utilize their money and their land immediately, some of them held back; some of them went into ventures which caused them to go deeply into debt, and others made a profit right from the start. There were comparatively few people at the top of these corporations, and most of these were young people who had been newly educated in the ways of the outsiders.

There was and is a conflict between the regional corporations and the village corporations. Some of the village corporations still abide by the old ways, whereas the regional corporations have changed completely. Then there are the split personalities of the villages, which are allowed to have both profit-making and nonprofit corporations, and I think almost all of them have each.

Lage: It sounds extremely complicated.

Wayburn: It is extremely complicated. You have a division among the natives who believe in subsistence living, and those who want to go on a cash basis, and those who want both. There have been books written on this, and this is a very superficial brief overview.

Lage: I think what we might want to discuss here, if you can recall, are specific encounters you had or things that brought insight to you as to their point of view.

Wayburn: I've had always a great sympathy with the old native traditions. In former times the Alaska natives used the land very lightly. Part of it came from the fact that they were nomadic, that they didn't stay in one place and use up either the land or the animals too fast. Part of it was due to the fact that up until recently they didn't have the weapons to kill either needlessly or for commercial purposes. Part of it was the tradition. All of these things are changing very rapidly now and whether the natives' subsistence way of life can survive is quite doubtful.

Lage: Did you take a stand on the bowhead whale issue that came up later?

Wayburn: On the bowhead whale issue the Sierra Club sided with the natives, and we did this because we felt that the natives were not responsible for the great drop in the bowhead population. And although they were taking a certain amount of bowhead each year, they were not doing this to the point of extinction. We were split in our own ranks to some extent because our Alaska Chapter, with its states' rights attitude and its pro-native attitude, sided with the natives, and our wildlife committee, which had a national viewpoint, did not want anything done which would endanger the bowhead more in any way. I, as chairman of the Alaska Task Force, was right in the middle of that.

We felt that if the natives could have more responsibility, they would see it was in their own interest not to kill too many bowheads, and this has in fact happened. Now, since they have their own bowhead commission, their own whaling commission, they have kept the quota low. They haven't done away with the quota entirely as some of our people would like, but I think this is a matter of judgment, and if bowhead can be protected from killing other than for native subsistence, I think the chances are pretty good. It's one of those moral versus practical versus scientific questions which is extremely difficult to decide.

Lage: Did you tend to side with the Alaska Chapter as opposed to the wildlife committee?

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: What about the question of subsistence hunting in the parks? That must have been another controversial issue.

Wayburn: We didn't anticipate too much difficulty with subsistence hunting in the parks because the original idea was that subsistence hunting would be allowed to continue in the places where it was traditional, and there are very few places in the national parks where subsistence hunting was traditional. One exception to that is in the Gates of the Arctic, which includes an enclave at Anaktuvuk Pass, "Anaktuvuk Pass" meaning "place of caribou droppings." The Arctic Slope natives established a village there because that's where the caribou came through. Yet most of the national parks did not have much hunting. The rest of the Gates of the Arctic didn't have too much, the Lake Clark region has it over on the western slope, Katmai and Mount McKinley had hunting prohibited in the portions of those parks established before 1980. The Wrangells was the place there there was most difficulty because of the Dall sheep.

We compromised in the Wrangells with the idea of the preserve, and while that's personally objectionable to me, I went along with it because I thought this was the way of bringing the conservationists who were hunters along with us.

Lage: Now, did the idea of the preserve include recreational hunting as well as subsistence?

Wayburn: Yes, it did, and recreational hunting was more of a problem than subsistence hunting in the early phases of this. As to how it's going to work out, I don't know.

Lage: Does the idea of the preserve include all kinds of recreational hunting, by airplane for instance?

Wayburn: No. Hunting from airplanes is supposed to be ruled out. Airplane hunting is taboo. Although airplane hunting is used at times, it is illegal in the national parks.

Lage: So you did come to accept the idea of the preserve.

Wayburn: Yes.

##

Lage: Was that a long time in coming?

Wayburn: It was several years in coming, but when bills got into the Congress it was apparent that a certain number of powerful congressmen and the whole influence of the hunting lobby would be turned against us if we didn't make some concessions. Those concessions were made, and as a result, the National Wildlife Federation and the Izaak Walton League both joined the nonhunting conservationists who had united in the Alaska coalition. Together we were able to put through a bill with preserves as well as pure parks.

Lage: Did that cause difficulty with our wildlife committee?

Wayburn: It did, yes.

Lage: There's a strong antihunting sentiment, it seems.

Wayburn: That's correct.

Lage: In the club, in part of the club.

Wayburn: In parts of the club there's a strong antihunting sentiment, and yet the club has never been an antihunting group. This has come up over and over again; while I'm not a hunter myself, I have always felt that we could not constantly challenge the hunting groups who were otherwise good conservationists.

Lage: Was this based on political thinking or just respecting their point of view?

Wayburn: Both. From the political viewpoint, it was realistic, but from the other standpoint, man has been a hunter throughout his existence; if hunting is confined to certain areas and there are large enough refuges, real refuges, left for the wildlife, they will survive. On the other hand, in our modern society, if no hunting is allowed, wildlife will not survive because man in his omniscience has tended to get rid of the predators and allow the prey to expand, and there are some very foolish things that have been done in that regard. The ungulates are the prey which have most notably survived to the point that they have overused their habitat in certain areas.

We have all sorts of strange matters existing side by side. For example, here at Point Reyes National Seashore in the mid 1940s, a surgeon named Dr. Ottinger took several exotic deer--from the San Francisco Zoo, axis and fallow deer--out to his 2,100 acre ranch at Point Reyes, to utilize as game for shooting. For some years those animals were kept under control by shooting.

Lage: This is while it was still private land.

Wayburn: It was then private land, but in 1962 some of the area that he owned became part of Point Reyes National Seashore, and suddenly no shooting was allowed, with the result that the deer rapidly expanded to a population of around a thousand and were, and still are, a great nuisance--which should not be allowed in a national park. Yet, at public hearings, a few of the local people stood up for keeping the deer because they looked pretty, and the Park Service has had a very great problem in controlling those deer by ranger shooting and keeping them down to a level of a herd of 350 each--in a place where they don't belong. In other places--Angel Island, for example--deer have so overgrazed their habitat that they have become ill, and they've had many casualties. It's one of the problems that man has created and has not solved.

Lage: And there's such an outcry against--

Wayburn: There's a great outcry against killing any animal, and this includes the burros which have been destroying the vegetation of the Grand Canyon. The Park Service has its hands full with that sort of thing.

Lage: That's right.

To get back to the natives for a minute, I noticed that in the 1973 plan you presented in The Great Land, the native villages were inside some of the national interest areas.

Wayburn: That's right.

Lage: And there was talk about native participation in administration and planning.

Wayburn: This is particularly true in the wildlife refuges. The natives had gradually spread over a large area of coastal and interior Alaska. These are areas where a very large percentage of wild fowl of North and South America--and to some extent Asia and even other continents--nest or rest. Therefore it was desirable to have these areas established as wildlife refuges. However, natives already were occupying that area, and therefore they had selection rights. The way chosen out of that was that the natives would have their selection rights, the federal government would take the significant areas around them and in some cases in blocks alternating with the native blocks, and there would be native representation on supervising bodies. That's in effect at the present time.

Lage: Was that worked out in discussions with natives, and were you involved in that at all?

Wayburn: I was to some extent in the early phases.

Personal Visits to Native Villages--Chevak, 1973

Wayburn: It brings me back to 1973 when Peggy and Jack Hession and I were on this trip in which we were particularly trying to contact natives. Jay Hammond flew us to Bethel and left us there. We talked with native leaders in Bethel. One of the native leaders was a man named Harold Sparck, who was from Philadelphia. Harold Sparck had married Lucy Jones, who was a full-blooded Calista native. The Jones family lived in Chevak, and Lucy's father was the mayor of Chevak.

Jack, Peggy, and I and a wildlife biologist named Dick Hansel, who was the first biologist from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service appointed as liaison to the natives, flew out from Bethel to Chevak. We arrived there in the late afternoon and saw the Jones family.

Chevak is a small village with fairly modern houses and a boardwalk which runs all around it because it's so wet there. One large building is the National Guard armory, which is sometimes used as a church and always used as a meeting place for different groups.

We had dinner with the Jones family and expected to be served some sort of fish or eggs, some kind of subsistence food. Instead, we were served fried chicken that had come from California.
[chuckles]

Afterwards, about eight o'clock at night, and this was the time of year with the long evenings but the gray overcast skies of western Alaska, we were invited to a meeting. The way the meeting came about was that all of the young boys of the village ran around from house to house shouting, "Meeting! Meeting!" and we all went up to the National Guard armory. As we outsiders walked in, we found the elders along one side of the armory, seated along benches, and the vast mass of the rest of the 250 people of the village seated on the floor, the women and the children. They let us by as we came up, and there were five chairs at one end. One was for John Paul Jones, who was Lucy's brother and our interpreter; one was for Dick Hansel, the wildlife biologist; and then one each for Peggy and Jack Hession and myself.

The questions were all directed at Hansel. The natives had never had a government biologist appear in their village before except briefly--to chastise them for something they'd done wrong: someone had killed an animal they shouldn't. Someone had taken fish out of season. Someone had gathered too many birds' eggs. They didn't understand why he was there. He explained he was there as a liaison, to be friends with them. They quizzed him over and over and over again.

Lage: Why was he there? Had he come as part of your party, or was he in an official capacity?

Wayburn: He came in an official capacity. He was the first man appointed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to make liaison with the natives, to explain to the natives that they had their rights inside the wildlife refuge, that they would be called on for a certain amount of advice, and that the old days in which they were just allowed to live there by tolerance of the Fish and Wildlife Service of Uncle Sam were gone. This was very hard for them to comprehend. They asked questions in their native dialect and in English for over an hour, just hammering away, and I can still see poor Dick Hansel perspiring freely as he answered these questions. He did very well, and after more than an hour they were satisfied.

Then they turned to me: "A vice-president of the Sierra Club? What's that? A conservationist? What's that? Where are you from? California? What are you doing here anyway? Why do you want to come here?" We answered a few questions and--

Lage: Was this difficult for you to--?

Wayburn: No. I explained why we were there, that we were interested in the same things they were, that we were interested in seeing that their subsistence way of life could be perpetuated, and that we had a common interest because we wanted the fish and the birds to be there always, and they needed the fish and the birds to be there always in order to continue their subsistence way of life.

Well, that satisfied them. They weren't really too interested in us. They asked Jack a couple of questions. They weren't used to seeing women traveling around the way Peggy was, so they didn't ask Peggy too many questions. None of the three outsiders got much attention.

After two hours the meeting was over, and John Paul and a couple of others took us walking out on the moors, these low rolling hills up above the sea. It reminds one of the moors of Scotland. We had walked out a half hour or an hour, and by now it was close to midnight, but it looked the same--the light hardly changed. All of a sudden, a couple of the stronger boys came running out: "Come back! Come back! We're going to have a dance!"

We came back and after midnight they started the dance. This was a recognition of the fact that we had done well, particularly Dick Hansel, and so they were going to entertain for us with their traditional dances. It got started, as I say, after midnight, and

Wayburn: they went on for two hours. After two o'clock in the morning I could hardly keep my eyes open. I was looking for an excuse to get away when all of a sudden the dance, which was a very lengthy thing and with everybody participating, was stopped, and it was bedtime.

They found places for us to sleep on foam mattresses in the one place that had an extra room and that was the post office. The post office was the largest single cottage there, and we rolled out our sleeping bags on foam pads and slept soundly till the next day.... That was the type of meeting we had with the natives in their own village.

Lage: That sounds like quite an experience. Now, was that an unusual one or a more intense one, or was this repeated time and again, this type of thing?

Wayburn: Each encounter was different. Many of them were with the leaders alone. There weren't many with the whole village participating like that. We had meetings in Anaktuvuk, more informal and with the whole village participating. I think that's the one place where everybody was in on it.

Lage: Were Alaskan conservationists also meeting with natives and developing liaison?

Wayburn: Yes. They were trying to. Sometimes it was difficult. It took a while to make the connection. I think that as of now there is a good deal of intercommunication, but now we have a new problem. That is that the native corporation--either village or, particularly, regional--wants some type of development, and other natives are against it. The white developers, of course, are all for it; very often the state or national government is for it; and the conservationists are against it. So we find ourselves with new allies on these projects. I could name numerous of those, but I don't think this would be the time to do it.

Club Efforts to Influence the Oil and Gas Pipelines

Lage: I wanted to ask you a question about the final passage of the oil pipeline in Congress in '73. Apparently the club did fight it, and I've seen memos from Brock Evans describing what they had done to try to lobby congressmen, and, of course, they were defeated. Would you tell us about your role and your point of view in that?

Wayburn: By 1973 the matter of how oil would get out was already five years along. The club had opposed the original pipeline proposal. The club had worked up a lawsuit against it, and then hadn't participated in the suit, leaving it to other conservation organizations to carry on. That suit went on until congressional action took place; this superseded all lawsuits and all preceding acts of Congress.

I was concerned with this, but I felt that the Congress was bound to pass a bill to authorize the trans-Alaska pipeline. The Sierra Club opposed it, but I felt it was a foregone conclusion that the bill was going to go through and that we should try to get as much protection into the language as possible. We didn't get near as much as we'd like. Our people in Washington fought hard, but with the power of oil greasing the way, and the state government and the Alaska natives all being on board on the other side (not all the natives, but the majority of them), it was a foregone conclusion that the bill would go through, and it did.

While this was going on, there was already discussion about getting gas out of Prudhoe Bay. This was complicated by the fact that the Canadians had discovered gas in a moderate amount, more than moderate amount, in the MacKenzie Delta and in the islands north of the MacKenzie Delta. There was not enough gas there to bring a pipeline all the way down through Canada economically. There was, on the other hand, I think, 24 trillion cubic feet of gas at Prudhoe Bay by estimate, as opposed to 7 trillion cubic feet in Canada, and so there were proposals to combine these into one pipeline.

This pipeline was originally proposed by Gas Arctic Company to go across the Arctic coastal plain, from Prudhoe Bay across the Arctic Wildlife Refuge, and to join up on the MacKenzie River with another pipeline from the north of Canada; the combined pipeline would then go southward. We opposed this very strongly. We pointed out that there were already two pipeline withdrawals, and one was being used for oil, and that if any pipeline should be constructed it should be in that same utility corridor. We outlined a general route, which was to follow the existing trans-Alaska oil pipeline corridor to Big Delta, from there roughly follow the Alaska Highway into Canada, and then the Alaska-Canadian Highway down to existing pipelines.

This was the proposal of Gas Arctic. There was another major competitor, El Paso Natural Gas, which wanted to have the gas go through the trans-Alaska pipeline corridor all the way to Valdez, and at Valdez convert the gas to liquid, and then trans-ship the liquid natural gas to ports in the contiguous United States. A group of us worked with both Gas Arctic and El Paso.

##

Wayburn: Gas Arctic was very secretive about its plans at the time, didn't want to talk with us at all. We had to come out in public opposition to them. El Paso wanted to work with us, that is, with the Sierra Club, and we had a small group working with a couple of their vice-presidents.

Lage: Did this include Mike McCloskey?

Wayburn: I think it included Mike and Brock Evans and myself.

Lage: Now, would this be authorized by the board for you to meet with them, or is this--?

Wayburn: No. No. These were informal meetings. There may have been some authorization from the board, but I'm not sure. We met, I think, twice here in San Francisco, with Gas Arctic on December 4, 1973, and with El Paso on December 5, 1973. El Paso came down to meet with us, and I know that Brock also was meeting with them in Washington, and there may have been a meeting in Alaska too.

El Paso tried to get us to endorse their project. We saw many advantages. They would be using the same corridor; it would not disturb more land. We were concerned about the liquid natural gas because the ships carrying it are different from the oil ships. They have to carry it up high, and there have been stories about exploding, but on the whole it was thought to be fairly safe.

The thing that finally kept us from endorsing El Paso's proposal had nothing to do with Alaska; it had to do with the terminals on the west coast of California, Washington, or Oregon. We could not agree to any of the proposals that they made. The places in California would have been either at--[pauses to think]

Lage: Point Conception was one, wasn't it?

Wayburn: Point Conception was the one they finally decided on, and that's the one that we were the most against because of its wild character. There was also Ventura, which we had generally agreed with, and San Pedro, which we thought was too crowded already. Our Los Padres Chapter was violently opposed to the Ventura terminal. So, El Paso not giving us any definite assurances, we just more or less let the project drop, and El Paso more or less dropped out of the picture. I have recently seen somewhere that El Paso is again interested in transporting the gas. If they did, they would not use Valdez but supposedly some place in Cook Inlet as the Alaska terminal.

Lage: Then did the club continue to oppose the Gas Arctic line?

Wayburn: We opposed the route that Gas Arctic had proposed. We have been moderately encouraging of Gas Arctic going through the utility corridor, and at the present time surveys are being done of the utility corridor by Gas Arctic. I think they've given up on the idea of going along the Arctic plain.

Lage: Because of opposition from conservationists?

Wayburn: I think we had something to do with it. I won't say that that was the entire factor. Their problem at the present is not with us, because we have agreed that if they use a common utility corridor we will not oppose it, but with the costs. It was originally supposed to cost, I think, \$8 billion; now the cost is somewhere around \$16 billion. Maybe the cost was originally much less than that. Yes, I think it was much less than that.

The contract was taken away from Gas Arctic and given to Northwestern Energy. Northwestern Energy and we have talked, and we have gone along with them. There are conservationists in Canada who claim that Northwestern will do so much damage on the Canadian side that they should not be allowed to go through.

Meantime, feeder lines have been constructed both into California and into the Midwest from Foothills Gas, which supplies natural gas out of Alberta, and part of the arrangements which have been made is that they will be able to get gas from northern Canada and from Prudhoe Bay to replenish their supplies. So this is a complex economic, international problem as well as a conservation problem.

Alaska National Interest Lands Bill, 1974-1975: Role of
Morton and Jackson

Lage: You were going to tell us about some of the behind-the-scenes things that went on before the first bills on the Alaska National Interest Lands were introduced, and you talked about discussions with Morton, early discussions.

Wayburn: Yes. By December 18, 1973, Secretary Morton had to submit his proposals to Congress, and he did this in communications to the chairmen of the Interior Committees of the House and Senate. The Sierra Club likewise drafted a bill, which was the work of people like Jack Hession and Rich Gordon working with me. We also went to

Wayburn: the chairman of the Senate committee, Senator Jackson. Although he felt our proposed 106 million acres was a lot to include, he agreed to introduce our bill at the same time that he introduced the administration's bill. He said that he would probably introduce them both by request, which meant that he was not taking responsibility for them at that time, but that he thought that they were important enough so that he was introducing them. This pleased us greatly because he was giving the same rank to our bill as he was to the administration's bill.

Before that had happened, Secretary Morton had told us that he would respect those lands that we'd chosen, but which had not been included in his selections, as far as possible. He instructed his aides not to make commitments on those lands, not to award them to the state, not to award them for native selection if possible.

Lage: So he was willing to safeguard them until the Congress reached its decision.

Wayburn: Yes. We also took the precaution of asking Senator Jackson to write an official letter to Secretary Morton, asking him not to commit any lands which were in any bill presently in Congress until the Congress had had a chance to act on it. He agreed to send a letter to Morton asking him to hold in abeyance all transfer of land identified as D-2 at any time or proposed as a federal reservation by any congressman.

This was one of a number of requests that we made of Senator Jackson in the years from '71 to '76 in which he preserved the right of the Congress to make the final decisions and at the same time preserved the opportunity that the conservationists felt was necessary for the later dedication of lands not in the original administration bill. If it hadn't been for those two men acting as they did separately, but both friendly to the cause of conservation, there might well have been some lands, which later became part of the conservation units, that would not have been available because they had been committed to the State of Alaska or to the natives.

Lage: Was it difficult to persuade them to take these actions, or were they receptive?

Wayburn: They were receptive, both of them, and I've always been grateful to both of them.

Since 1976, Senator Jackson has been accused of being anti-conservationist a number of times. I've always pointed out to my conservation friends that he was a friend in need when we needed him,

Wayburn: and this applied not only to Alaska but also to the situation in the redwoods where he was responsible for saving areas in the Point Reyes GGNRA complex, and in a number of other instances.

Lage: He was a strong supporter of the oil pipeline right away.

Wayburn: He was the man who introduced that. He was a strong supporter. He felt that there was no alternative to it. Jackson is a very practical man. As I told you earlier, when I reproached him for introducing the bill to give the Alaskan natives as much land as he had, he had very practical reasons for doing that, and in the same conversation he agreed to introduce the Jackson-Bible amendment, which was the beginning of the Alaska National Interest Lands Act.

When Senator Jackson introduced our bill by request into the Senate along with the administration's bill, Representative Morris Udall introduced it into the House for us. In 1973 and '74 we did not anticipate that there would be much action, although we were hoping that they would start to have hearings in one or the other of the two houses. However, that was not to be.

We worked closely with Senator Jackson during those years. Whenever we needed a request of information from the Department of the Interior or asked for consideration of some particular topic, as we did, for example, on Lake Clark, he would send in a letter to the department for us. I remember once, in August 1974, he asked the department not to prejudice any decision that Congress might want to make in the future.

In this Congress and in the next Congress, the same thing happened. The administration reintroduced its bill under a new number. We introduced our bill, slightly modified, under a new number. Jackson and Udall were the sponsors in both cases. The Congress did not hold hearings and did not act on them.

Lage: Why was there no action at that point?

Wayburn: The Congress had given itself five years, from 1974 until December 1978, and there were many problems that were pressing. This was admitted to be a great big subject, which would take quite a while to work out, and each Congress would postpone it to the next session. Then there was the composition of the Interior Committees, particularly in the House. Representative James Haley, who had become the chairman after Aspinall, wasn't too eager to push the entire project along, and Representative Taylor, who had become the chairman of the National Parks Subcommittee, didn't want to push the national parks issue separate from the national wildlife refuges. He would not fight

Wayburn: for jurisdiction for the parks portion. The Public Lands Committee, which I think was under Congressman John Melcher, was given jurisdiction, with the idea that the National Parks Subcommittee would have review of the parks later.

[Interview 17: November 6, 1981]##

Wayburn: In the Senate, Senator Jackson kept saying that he would get moving as fast as possible on it, and he kept emphasizing how important it was, that he did not want to give it over to a subcommittee but wanted the entire Senator Interior Committee to work on it. We had no assurance when it would come up. We discussed this with him and with his aides on a number of occasions, and we were disappointed at his failure to act on what were apparently good intentions.

There were introduced during this Congress a number of draft bills which were amendments to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The state of Alaska and the House Public Lands Committee, as well as the secretary of Interior and the Sierra Club, all had introduced draft bills related to the national interest lands.

Lage: Was the Sierra Club working alone at this point?

Wayburn: The Sierra Club was basically working alone.

Our Alaska Task Force was working with conservationists in Alaska, both in the Sierra Club and in other organizations, preparing the groundwork for both principles and geographical areas to be included in our bill. At the same time, we were preparing films. We published a beautiful film called "Alaska in the Balance," which gave a very good idea of what Alaska was all about. We were putting out slide shows and preparing large prints of critical areas in Alaska.

Other conservation organizations were beginning to get interested in Alaska, but we were the ones who'd had the longest and the deepest interest, and we were the only ones with a very firm organization. But I'll bring that up when I talk about the formation of the Alaska Coalition.

XXI ORGANIZATION FOR CONSERVATION VICTORY IN ALASKA

The Alaska Task Force: a Lobbying Network of Volunteers

Wayburn: During that time, too, we were building up our own internal organization of Alaska coordinators. We had at one time between 200 and 250 people as Alaska coordinators.

Lage: Now, was this the task force structure?

Wayburn: This was the structure of the Alaska Task Force.

##

Wayburn: Feeling the need for a concerted, concentrated, centrally controlled group, we had formed the task force in 1973 or 1974 and had as members of it between 250 and 300 people outside the Sierra Club hierarchy. We had mailed to a lot of people who we thought were interested and got this many responses. We did this because we knew that people in the so-called hierarchy of the Sierra Club--that is, the chapters, the regional conservation committees, and so forth--already had a great deal of work to do, and we needed people who could work independently on this.

Lage: This was sort of a new direction, wasn't it?

Wayburn: It was a new direction, and it did very well. We had our own newspaper, and we sent out communications keeping these people up to date as often as was needed.

When the Alaska Coalition was formed, we put the task force group at the disposal of the coalition, and we also recruited members of the Sierra Club hierarchy--regional conservation committee, chapter, group--to the cause. These people were far more knowledgeable than

Wayburn: many of the people who had just come to work as a part of the Alaska Task Force. The Sierra Club probably had well over a thousand people actively working the grassroots at the height of the Alaska campaign.

Lage: Yes. Now, what was expected of these grassroots representatives of the task force?

Wayburn: Well, they were supposed to become knowledgeable about the material we sent them, and they were supposed to contact other people and proselyte them into joining in the effort, and they were supposed to contact their congressional representatives, urging the point of view that we had propounded in the bills we had drafted and then later the bills which were put forth by the Carter administration and ourselves.

##

Lage: You mentioned having over two hundred Alaska coordinators. What was a coordinator? Were they in charge of a group of volunteers?

Wayburn: They were a group of volunteers, and they worked directly under the task force.

I should mention the fact that I had a series of assistants, beginning way back about 1969, 1970, starting with a couple of young women who came from the University of California, Santa Cruz. The first was Sally Gibert. The second was Claire Henjum. They were on a fairly short-term basis. The first one on a longer-term basis was Marcia Fowler, who worked with me for, I think, over two years. She did a great deal of administrative work in getting these plans under way.

Lage: Was this something for which there was a precedent in the club, this extensive network system?

Wayburn: It was the precedent. It had never been done in the club, and it was used and has been used since. I tried to organize the network system entirely separate from the club hierarchy because everyone in the club hierarchy had more to do than she or he could possibly do. I was trying to get a group of people who were fascinated by Alaska to take up the burden. We did get a number of good people, although we did not cover all the congressional districts. We were trying to organize by congressional district. We got a number of good people, but we found that we couldn't get sustained action from all of them, and after one or two years of this organization we fell back on the club hierarchy to use, in addition.

Lage: By that you mean chapter chairs?

Wayburn: Chapter chairmen, conservation chairmen of the chapters, sometimes the regional conservation committees, and sometimes council members. We had to fall back on people with a tried record who we knew would not disappear.

During this entire time, we also had our own newsletter called Alaska Report, which came out every two to three months to keep these people particularly interested in Alaska aware of what was going on, not only with regard to the national interest lands, but also with regard to resource development and relationships with the natives in Alaska.

Marcia Fowler, after two years, married an English artist named Allan Green and left to live in England. We have just seen her. She was succeeded by Ceil Giudici [Dickenson], who stayed for another two years and left to take another job with the Sierra Club and is now Carl Pope's assistant in SCCOPE [Sierra Club Committee on Political Education]. In turn, she was succeeded by Winky Miller, who stayed with me two years until she succeeded in getting Ceil's job as campaign coordinator when Ceil was promoted.

Lage: I thought Winky stayed through till the end; until the passage of the bill.

Wayburn: She did stay through till the passing of the bill. This was last March. Last March I took on Ann Goldsmith, who has now, in turn, gotten a full-time Sierra Club job.

Lage: [laughter] You have trouble keeping your assistants, then. They're too good.

Wayburn: Yes. At present I have Kathy Lee, who has a background of working part-time with the club.

This was the central organization we had here in San Francisco working along with the Conservation Department down on Bush Street. Then, on the Alaska side, we worked particularly with Jack Hession, who is a wonderful resource person, and with the Alaska Chapter, and a number of different people have assumed that liaison. Those include Lin Sonnenberg, Jim Barnett, Paul Lowe, Peg Tileston, Mark Hickok, and a number of other people.

Lage: It's an impressive array of forces that the club put into this.

Wayburn: Yes. This was--well, other people have said it as well as I--this was the biggest campaign that the club had ever gone into. I have put it in two ways: it was the campaign for which the club was founded, and it's the biggest, most impressive land-acquisition achievement of the twentieth century.

Lage: Was there pretty much unanimity among club leaders that this significant portion of the club's resources should be put to Alaska?

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Or were there any points where people--?

Wayburn: There was at first a certain amount of question, but as the years went by I think that all of the people on the board of directors became convinced that this was it, that this was important enough, this was big enough, it had the club's resources on the line enough, so that we had to put everything into it. For the years 1976 to 1980, it had a major portion of the club's conservation resources. This was in manpower, money, interest, publications--

Lage: I noticed that you even sent regional reps into Washington to work on Alaska.

Wayburn: Yes. They volunteered, and the board of directors went along, that during this time they would devote 25 percent of their time to the Alaska campaign. No, it couldn't have been put over without the wholehearted support of so many people, and I'm speaking now of the Sierra Club. But let's go on to the Alaska Coalition.

Lage: That seemed to be the club's first formal coalition that I'm aware of. I know the Sierra Club has worked with other conservation groups many times, but not in a formal way, had it?

Wayburn: This one was a little different from the way all others had been. Now, as I say, the club was deeply into the Alaska campaign. We made it one of our priorities in 1967, and it was increasingly important when the 1971 Native Claims Act passed and we had this handle to work on, Section 17 d-2.

Lage: And the deadline.

Wayburn: And the deadline. Other organizations, particularly the Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society, and Friends of the Earth, became deeply interested in it. Friends of the Earth had someone in Alaska from about 1969 or '70 on. The Wilderness Society did not have

Wayburn: a representative in Alaska, but they had people in Washington who worked very hard on it. The Audubon Society put Dave Cline in sometime in the early to mid-seventies and had other people working on it too.

Coalition Efforts to Draft an Alaska Bill, 1976

Wayburn: We've covered, then, up to 1976, when the Carter administration came in. The Carter administration was committed far more than the Nixon-Ford administrations had been to Alaska. In his campaign speeches, Mr. Carter pledged to carry through a strong Alaska bill and, as one of his first directions, instructed Secretary Andrus to prepare a bill which was far stronger than the bills of the Nixon administration.

When the Carter administration went about preparing that bill, they consulted with the conservationists. It became evident very quickly that conservationists, in order to be able to respond quickly and with a unified voice, should have an organization in place in Washington for that purpose. This was the impetus for the Alaska Coalition.

The Alaska Coalition was formed in 1976. There was a preliminary meeting of the heads of several organizations--Sierra Club, Audubon Society, Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, and possibly National Parks and Conservation Association--in New York in either September or October in which the coalition was agreed to, but it was on November 8 that we had a big meeting in Washington, D.C. If you are interested, I can run through the people. I don't know whether minutes were kept or not. I know that Tina Stonorov of the Alaska Conservation Society was supposed to keep minutes, and I just don't remember ever getting any, but I have written down the people who were at that meeting. [refers to his notes taken at the meeting]

For the Sierra Club there were Mike McCloskey, Jack Hession, Chuck Clusen, someone else whose name I'm not clear on, and myself. The Audubon Society had Gene Knoder, their western roving representative; and Cynthia Wilson and Steve Young, their Washington lobbyists. The Wilderness Society had Fred Davis, who was then their executive director; Brec Cooke, their Alaska representative; Celia Hunter, who was then their president; and Cliff Merritt, their Colorado representative.

Wayburn: Friends of the Earth had Jim Kowalsky, who had been their Alaska representative, and Pam Rich, their Washington lobbyist. National Parks and Conservation Association had Destry Jarvis. Defenders of Wildlife had Toby Cooper. ACS had Stonorov, and the Izaak Walton League had someone there whom I don't remember.

That meeting was a two- or three-day meeting held with the idea of drafting a bill that would be suitable for all the organizations. We had also invited two native representatives, Willy Goodwin of NANA [Northwest Arctic Native Association] and George Allen of Ruralcap. Willy Goodwin and George Allen were both interested in subsistence more than anything else; this was their chief interest, and they took up all of the first morning talking about it.

Goodwin said that NANA was going to draft its own bill because they were concerned particularly about subsistence and cooperative management with the natives having a large role. He stressed that rural, and particularly native, peoples should have the use of all the land for subsistence, and that they had difficulties with environmental impact statements which put out regulations. He said that NANA was willing to work with the conservationists on cooperative management with the agencies, that 90 percent of the 4,500 people in NANA were subsistence users.

George Allen said that the people in rural Alaska had the same goals as the conservation movement, that he was going to have a meeting of subsistence users a week later, that he considered habitat as the important thing in the wildlife resources. There was considerable discussion about how this should be included in the bill.

There was another native there, David Friday, and he represented the Calista Corporation and Nunamkitlusi. This was the nonprofit corporation of Calista and was composed of the forty-seven village presidents in Calista.

Lage: Now, how was the reaction among the conservationists to the concerns of the natives?

Wayburn: Well, the conservationists generally were, and have been right along, most sympathetic to the subsistence desires of the natives and have felt that they had a great deal of justice on their side. At the same time some of us were very concerned with the fact that the increase in subsistence users, which was becoming apparent in the sixties and seventies, meant that there were eventually not going to be enough animals on which an increasing number of people could subsist; we were looking for safeguards for that situation.

Lage: Were these mainly natives, an increased population among the natives, or were these non-native people coming up to Alaska?

Wayburn: And also Caucasians who were moving to the bush. Rural whites claimed they had just as much right as natives, and their claims had been borne out in the courts. Many whites living in the cities say that they are just as much Alaskans, and they use subsistence as part of their livelihood in order to survive in Alaska. They shoot moose, catch fish, shoot caribou.

Lage: So what was the way out of that?

Wayburn: The way out was not found at that meeting, and the way out has not yet been found, but there have been rather generous provisions for subsistence in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. As yet, the problem has not been settled at all.

Lage: Was it a matter of controversy at the meeting? Were people willing to openly oppose the natives' point of view?

Wayburn: There were some who did. I don't recall the whole conversation, but there were a lot of questions asked, not that they were opposing the natives but they were speaking up for the survival of the wildlife. Defenders of Wildlife was one such organization which felt that subsistence hunting was not feasible; and of course, it's against their principles generally.

##

Wayburn: After the natives left, we went on with other parts of the bill, and we reached general policy decisions on how large a geographical area should be included for subsistence users and on inclusion of Southeast Alaska as part of the bill.

Up until that time, I had been extremely doubtful about including Southeast as part of the National Interest Lands Bill for two reasons. First, the Native Claims Settlement Act specifically included as national interest lands those lands which were unreserved public lands, and Southeast was completely the province of the U.S. Forest Service. It was not unreserved public land; it was reserved. The second reason was that by the introduction of something which was outside the purview of the Native Claims Settlement Act geographically, we might give our opponents an opportunity to try to dynamite the whole thing.

Wayburn: My fears were justified in that at the end Southeast got the rawest deal of any part of the National Interest Lands Bill. On the other hand, I went along with the inclusion of Southeast lands because I felt, along with other people, that the Congress would devote its attention to this one massive project, but that when it finished with that project it would not take on a similar one within many years, and in the meantime Forest Service policy and local pressures would have proceeded with logging the areas we thought should be kept as wilderness. Looking back, I think that that was a sound decision to make.

Lage: Who was the group or person who most pushed to have Southeast Alaska included?

Wayburn: Well, the people who pushed most were the people from Southeast. They were our Sierra Club people in Southeast, the new Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, and particular individuals like Ted Whitsell (to whom we had given a grant), who was working for SEACC [Southeast Alaska Conservation Council]. They were people like Lee Schmidt, who was, I think, then the president of SEACC, and Jack Calvin--all of these people had as their dominant concern Southeast, as opposed to those of us who were concerned with all of Alaska. They convinced us that Southeast should be in the overall bill.

If you look back at the Sierra Club book on Alaska published in 1974, where we have anticipated this whole action, you will see that I've divided Alaska into, I think, five regions for the purpose of a national interest lands act, and then said that there is a sixth one, which was equally important, but which was not mentioned as a part of the D-2 lands--that's Southeast Alaska--and then talked about that.

The decision was made, and we stuck to it through thick and thin, and sometimes, particularly at the end, it was very difficult to get what we wanted for Southeast Alaska.

Lage: Was it for the reason that you described, that it was already reserved land? Was that what was brought up, or was it just because of the Forest Service lobby and the timber?

Wayburn: It was all of those, and in addition to that, for one reason or another, Senator Stevens--who, as will come out, played possibly the leading role in the decisions--had a very strong feeling that we should not have some southeastern wilderness; this had to be reckoned with all the way through.

That was the formation of the Alaska Coalition.

Lage: So the Alaska Coalition changed the congressional bills by including Southeast Alaska and accepting subsistence hunting?

Wayburn: There was to be introduced a new bill.

Lage: Yes.

Wayburn: Again, the work on that bill was done by the Sierra Club. As soon as we had the general principles we wanted, as a result of this meeting, I asked Jack Hession to go to work on drafting a new bill, and he and I were in correspondence through November and December into the beginning of January.

Functioning of the Alaska Coalition

Lage: I'm curious to learn more about the organization of the coalition.

Wayburn: All right. Now, we had a problem with the coalition. We knew that the coalition was going to be a lobbying organization. We in the Sierra Club and, I think, some of the other major organizations working with the coalition did not want the club to be identified as a member of a coalition which might incur debts or might be sued. So the coalition was formed, actually, of a number of people in Washington. Our representative, Chuck Clusen, who by then was full time in Alaska--he was also the associate director of the Sierra Club Washington office--was the Sierra Club representative, and he was elected the chairman of the coalition. Each organization had one member on a seven-man steering committee, and that in practice was the coalition. Now, for policy--

Lage: So it wasn't a coalition of groups?

Wayburn: It was not a coalition of groups, and yet it was. This was fuzzed up a little.

Lage: How about funding? Did the organizations pledge a certain percentage?

Wayburn: Funding was done out of the steering committee rather than out of the organizations, although some seed money came from the organizations.

Lage: You mean they raised their own money?

Wayburn: With the known backing of the organizations, different contributors gave to the Alaska Coalition, which had its own bank account.

Wayburn: The different groups that had members of the steering committee (which worked on this every day and lobbied every day) were the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society (originally it was Cynthia Wilson, and later Steve Young), the Wilderness Society (originally it was Brec Cooke), Friends of the Earth (that was Pam Rich at first), National Parks and Conservation Association (that was always Destry Jarvis), and--[pauses to remember names of other organizations and their steering committee members]

Lage: Izaak Walton League or Defenders of Wildlife?

Wayburn: Izaak Walton League and National Wildlife Federation did not become members of the coalition, but they worked very closely with the coalition; the Wildlife Federation had a representative at almost every meeting, although not an official member.

Lage: Why were they not officially a member?

Wayburn: For that you'd have to go into their internal workings. My guess is that this was the way that Tom Kimball, who was executive vice-president, had of keeping in close touch with us and yet not offending some of his affiliates too much. After all, among the affiliates of the National Wildlife Federation were the Alaska Sportsmen, who were violently opposed to what the coalition was trying to do, and they testified in opposition to the National's testimony at hearings. But by staying out of the coalition Kimball could legitimately say to them, "We are keeping an independent stance," and the Izaak Walton League, I think, had a similar type of psychology.

Lage: But they were supportive at the national level.

Wayburn: They have both been extremely supportive.

Lage: Did they work towards more hunting being allowed?

Wayburn: They worked towards more hunting. (You're anticipating a great deal when you ask these questions.) As it developed, the coalition backed off of a no-hunting stance in national parks in order to get the full cooperation and backing of the National Wildlife Federation and the Izaak Walton League. The concept of the national preserve in Alaska national parks, the preserve where hunting would be allowed, was the result of the concurrence of the Alaska Coalition and these other two organizations that were outside of it.

Lage: So they did maintain their independent stance throughout?

Wayburn: They maintained their independence. I can tell you how Clusen and Kimball and I testified at a hearing a couple of years later where this was solidified.

At the beginning the coalition was not a hard and fast organization. Rather rapidly it became very well disciplined, and I sort of compare it to a group of graduate students who are working on a great big project for a professor or a group of professors, and in a way that was what the coalition members in Washington were. They were these individuals who were doing the work for organizations whose policies were set by their chiefs, and in the case of the Sierra Club I was setting the policy.

They met together at very frequent intervals, at least once a week, in this steering committee, and it was the steering committee which set the day-to-day policy of what they would do, the tactics. The organizations and the senior people like myself were setting the long-range policy and some of the short-range policy, but they were doing the day-to-day work.

Lage: And was this primarily focusing on the lobbying effort, or were there other--?

Wayburn: This was focusing on the lobbying effort. Yes, it was primarily a lobbying organization. To some extent they had to be setting policy, day-to-day policy, and Chuck Clusen particularly, as the chairman of the group; later on, in the second Congress that was working on the bill, Doug Scott, who had taken over for the Sierra Club when Clusen became the conservation director of the Wilderness Society. Doug was working on policy changes on a day-to-day basis with the staff of the Interior Committee.

Lage: Yes. But would he be in touch with people like yourself?

Wayburn: Clusen and I, and later Scott and I, were in almost daily conversation.

Lage: And then how would things be cleared with the Sierra Club board, say, or Mike McCloskey and the executive committee?

Wayburn: The Sierra Club board had to approve the overall decisions; otherwise, the Sierra Club board did not get into it.

Lage: It would have been impossible, I imagine.

Wayburn: It would have been impossible. The board delegated further decisions to the Alaska Task Force. Now, I don't know whether I've gone into the Alaska Task Force composition. Have I?

- Lage: Only in the sense of the grass-roots organization.
- Wayburn: The Alaska Task Force had a steering committee. Originally I was the Alaska Task Force, and then the board said, "This won't do. We've got to have wider representation." So we set up a steering committee of five members. There were three members from outside and two members from the Alaska Chapter. The members were at first appointed by the chairman and confirmed by the president. After a while the Alaska Chapter received the privilege of selecting their two members. Through the course of the campaign, I think the outside members were always Joe Fontaine and Jim Roush and myself, and the Alaska members were at first, I think, the chairman of the chapter executive committee and the chairman of the regional conservation committee. The first regional conservation committee chairman was Ginny Harris. Then Lin Sonnenberg of Juneau succeeded her, and Lin has been a member ever since.
- Lage: Okay. So it was the Alaska Task Force that would consult on policy changes.
- Wayburn: Yes. In the long run it was my decision, with their help and with the help of Jack Hession, particularly, and with other knowledgeable Alaska members such as Rich Gordon. Jim Barnett was on the task force for a couple of years.
- Lage: Was there any division of labor among the various conservation groups? I don't know where I got this idea, from you or something I read, that the groups focused on different aspects of the campaign, like the Sierra Club on lobbying; another organization as public relations.
- Wayburn: There was this division in the Alaska Coalition steering committee. The different committee members took on different responsibilities, and their organizations helped them with those responsibilities. The Sierra Club was in general charge of lobbying--although the other organizations furnished lobbyists for various purposes. Audubon furnished lobbyists on wildlife, for example. We had a number of different people, apropos of the graduate study analogy, who concentrated on key members of Congress.

For example, one of ours was Barbara Blake, who had worked with the House Interior Committee members along with Chuck Clusen, then went over to the Senate side because she'd become very well acquainted with Congressman Paul Tsongas, who was one of our strong people in the first session of Congress. He ran for senator, was elected, and became our principal champion in the Senate. She had such a good acquaintance with him that she was assigned to him when the second go-around came.

Lage: You say she was assigned to him. What would be her role? He's already convinced, I assume.

Wayburn: That's right, but she was our principal liaison to him.

Lage: I see.

Wayburn: He as an individual, I think, was convinced, but Tsongas at that time had never been to Alaska. Tsongas knew very little personally about Alaska. When someone like Senator Stevens would come along and say, "Well, this is just a little change. You shouldn't mind having this portion of your proposal amended," he would not know enough to say, "No, Under no circumstances."

Lage: Now, was there an easy enough relationship that he would call up Barbara Blake and get her opinion and her advice?

Wayburn: I think there was. And if he didn't she would keep in touch with his assistants and with him on a frequent enough basis so this could come out.

Lage: So there really was quite a network of contact.

Wayburn: There was. There had to be. In this sort of a campaign, there has to be. In order to succeed, you have to have a tremendous network. The lobbyist has to be more than someone who goes up and advocates a position. The lobbyist has to be someone whom the legislator trusts and has confidence in, and when he wants some information he will go and say, "Now, I want to know the truth about this," and the lobbyist in turn will have to come back with the truth even though it may not be entirely favorable to his position.

We had this sort of thing going very well. Again, the graduate student analogy. These all were young people. Clusen was the senior by far except for Jarvis, who was not too active in the House campaign, which was the first big campaign, the House campaign of '77. Clusen was in his early thirties.

Lage: And he was the senior by far?

Wayburn: By far. These others--Barbara Blake, Dave Levine, Allison Horton, Steve Young--they were in their early twenties. Some of them had come from college. Peter Scholes, who had just been appointed as Wilderness Society representative in Alaska--he had been in Alaska for some years; he was another one of the U.C. Santa Cruz people--came back to Washington, and he was the Wilderness Society's representative on the steering committee. They were college stopouts, or dropouts, or just through with college.

Wayburn: I mentioned Allison Horton. She had gone up to Alaska fairly briefly as assistant to Dave Cline, the Audubon's representative in Alaska. Dee Frankforth was another one. She's a native Alaskan, and she and Peter were very close. She worked, I think, for Friends of the Earth.

These were the people in the front-line trenches. These were the people who made almost daily contact with either the congressman or his administrative or legislative aide.

Lage: Were they very idealistic young people, would you say?

Wayburn: Extraordinarily so.

Lage: Or enjoying the political side of it?

Wayburn: Oh, I think they enjoyed the political side, but they were extremely idealistic.

H.R. 39, 1977--A Coalition Bill

Wayburn: Jack Hession gave me and I gave to Chuck Clusen a draft which, as far as possible, embodied the changes that the different organizations in the coalition had asked for. This was sometimes difficult, and all of the differences weren't settled even when the bill was introduced.

When Clusen got the bill, he went to Harry Crandell and other congressional aides, particularly of John Seiberling and Mo Udall, and they worked very hard. I have a note of December 6, 1976, from Chuck saying that the National Interest Lands bill hadn't yet reached the principals, meaning Udall and company.

##

Wayburn: At that time, we were still trying to get the Ford administration--this is a separate thing--to establish national monuments in Alaska. Chuck had been working with Richard Curry in the Department of the Interior, and they had environmental impact statements all ready. You see, the Ford administration had another three weeks to go. Nat Reed, who was the assistant secretary of Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, was a very strong supporter of Alaska, and he was part of the push behind it, and we in the conservation organizations were part of the push. This would force the Congress to consider

Wayburn: these areas, even as two years later the establishment of all the national monuments forced the Congress to do something when Carter established them.

At the same time, we were working to get our primary sponsors. In the House it was Udall and Seiberling, and in the Senate we were trying to get Henry Jackson, Lee Metcalf, and Dale Bumpers.

Lage: So you still had the hope that Jackson would support a strong bill.

Wayburn: Yes. I spoke to Jackson in December, and he agreed that he would introduce our bill, but he said he'd have to do it by request until he knew much more about it personally and that he would get Senator Clifford Hansen, the ranking minority member of the committee, to introduce it. They did later, by request. But it was not until April that Senator Metcalf introduced it as a personal bill corresponding to HR 39.

During this interval the Congress had changed. Mr. Carter had been elected president. There was a complete turnaround in the Interior Committee of the House. Representative Haley, the chairman, had retired. Representative Taylor, the chairman of the National Parks Subcommittee, had retired. Representative Harold [Bizz] Johnson had become the senior majority, or Democratic, member. We did not want him to be the chairman. He was also the ranking Democrat on the Commerce Committee, and fortunately he took the Commerce Committee instead of the Interior Committee.

This cleared the way for Morris Udall to become chairman of the House Interior Committee. At the same time, Congressman Phil Burton was defeated as majority leader of the House by one vote, and Burton, who had become extremely interested in environmental affairs, became the chairman of the National Parks Subcommittee. Between them--he was the number-two man under Udall--they made Representative John Seiberling chairman of a Special Committee on Alaska and Oversight. Coincident with all this, on the 4th of January, at the very beginning of the Congress, Udall introduced HR 39.

Lage: That's '77 you're talking about, are you not?

Wayburn: Yes. January 4, 1977, with twenty-five cosponsors. This was the work of this Alaska Coalition, of these young people in Washington that I speak about.

Lage: Was HR 39 the bill that the club had drafted?

Wayburn: As far as policy was concerned, HR 39 was drafted largely by Jack Hession with Rich Gordon's assistance, and then coming through me, transmitted on to Chuck Clusen, who then worked it over with the legislative aides to Mo Udall and John Seiberling.

It had comments before we sent it in. It had comments from all of the other organizations in the coalition, so that it did represent a real coalition bill. There was a great meeting of the mind in this, and comparatively few of the organizations held back.

The Alaska Conservation Society was not happy with some of the provisions, but they did not oppose it, to their credit. They asked for more meetings then. They were asking for a meeting in Fairbanks, but the rest of us felt that the time for meetings of this sort had passed. We had a bill in which there was a consensus, and most people were happy with the bill that we had. It now had to go through the congressional process, and if we delayed further it could only give our opponents a chance to say, "These organizations which are sponsoring this bill are not in agreement." This is the reason that the Alaska Conservation Society kept its criticisms more or less to itself.

Lage: Do you recall what the issues were that they disagreed on?

Wayburn: They were, I think, largely fish and game issues.

The natives were with us but not with us. They had a great fear about the wilderness provisions. I remember Harold Sparck of Nunamkitlusisti called up from Bethel to tell me that the natives didn't want wilderness around them. They were afraid of what wilderness might be. This was partly because they didn't understand and partly because our opponents had been telling them that they would not be able to travel in snowmobiles in wilderness and not be able to shoot.

Lage: Was that a fact that wilderness meant no snowmobiles, no shooting?

Wayburn: We compromised again in Alaska to allow snowmobiles for subsistence purposes in wilderness and even in parks. We were keeping in as close touch with Alaskans, including natives, as we could as we went through this process.

Well, John Seiberling was assigned the task of conducting hearings, and there couldn't have been a better person for it. He was most enthusiastic, and he immediately set hearing dates at the earliest possible moment, which was in March of 1977. He was determined to give this issue the airing he thought it should have.

Wayburn: He considered it the most important issue he could have and one which was of great importance to all of the people of the United States. So he scheduled originally six (five actually took place) hearings outside of Washington, in the lower forty-eight, and then he scheduled hearings in every city and most hamlets in Alaska.

Again, as far as the Sierra Club was concerned, we had a very good and efficient arrangement going. Chuck Clusen in Washington and I in San Francisco would correlate. There would be times when we'd put out the same sort of thing, and we'd have to check back with one another on our statements, but we kept in almost daily touch. Chuck really did a superb job of managing the coalition and keeping in touch with the Congress, on the one hand, and with his home office, on the other.

There were other trends going on at the same time. The state of Alaska was trying to hold up congressional proceedings until the Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission could finish, and the Land Use Planning Commission couldn't make up its mind as to just what it wanted to do. The minority on the group, consisting of Celia Hunter, George Rogers, and Dick Cooley, wanted to push ahead, but the others didn't. Cooley was very disappointed and actually had a minority report for them. Governor Hammond did not want to move until the Land Use Planning Commission had told the state what it thought the state should do. The Alaska delegation was stalling at every opportunity.

At the April hearings of the House Interior Committee, I gave testimony on the same day that Governor Hammond did. Hammond was saying that Alaska didn't have to be dismembered, that they needed a creative new approach, and that while he supported the philosophy underlying Section 17 d-2, the federal systems were not designed for Alaska's problems. He was trying to introduce what we called the fifth system, which would have weakened greatly the federal power in the federal lands.

Lage: And have the state participate in federal lands?

Wayburn: And have the state and the local people participate.

Lage: I see.

Wayburn: Seiberling answered him very well, stating that he believed in having a planning commission, but that there were some decisions that the Congress had to reserve for itself.

Nationwide Public Hearings on Alaska--the Seiberling Committee, 1977

[Interview 18: November 13, 1981]##

Lage: Last time we met, we were leading up to the 1977 House hearings in Washington regarding the Alaska bill, and you were going to tell about your participation in those.

Wayburn: I had been working on Alaska continuously for years when the time finally came for the first hearings before the House Interior Committee's Subcommittee on Alaska. Although we'd had Senate hearings the year before, they were more or less oversight and selective, and these were the first public hearings. There was a tremendous crowd present.

There was at that time still a certain amount of difference of opinion among different members of the coalition as to how far and how hard we should push for what we all considered the ideal National Interest Lands Bill. The Sierra Club's testimony was to be uncompromising, asking for what we thought was right. It's been my feeling for many years that someone has to carry the banner for the optimum that we think is right from the conservation standpoint, that others can compromise early, but that in the long run one never gets anywhere unless somebody is way out in front. Compromises have their place because of the many points of view of what's right and what isn't right, but it's much better to carry as far as possible what you think is the full package.

I testified in that April hearing just after Governor Hammond. I was surprised at the time that Governor Hammond apparently hadn't made up his mind. He was, in effect, still pleading for a delay. He was making statements such as, "You people don't know our country.... We know our state best....The state should be divided up into many parts....Federal jurisdiction is not what we Alaskans want....We can manage our own affairs," and so forth and so on.

After the hearings in Washington, which from our side we thought went very well--we conservationists believed that we had a majority of the "good" testimony (I always put that in quotes)--Congressman Seiberling and his committee held hearings in several other cities in the lower forty-eight--in Atlanta, in Chicago, in Denver. They were supposed to schedule hearings in San Francisco and in Seattle, Washington, and we had made rather elaborate preparations in San Francisco for the hearings.

Wayburn: Practically at the last minute, Congressman Seiberling called up to say that he was calling off the hearings in San Francisco, that he had been working very hard, having hundreds of people at each of these hearings, which were time out taken from the committee's, and particularly from his, regular work in the Congress--he would usually hold them on weekends--and they'd gotten a very full sampling of how the people felt.

The hearings in Chicago and Atlanta went overwhelmingly in favor of HR 39 as it was introduced. In Denver there was a strong representation by miners, but we still had a pretty good majority. It looked like, from what they foresaw in San Francisco and Seattle, people writing in ahead of time, the same thing was going to be true. So we were given the opportunity of putting our testimony in writing and sending it up to the Seattle hearing, where it would be given the same weight as if it had been presented in person. As a matter of fact, we deputized a couple of people, who wanted to go under any circumstances, to hand-carry the testimony of a number of other people and put it in as if it were being presented in person.

Lage: Atlanta would be a place that you wouldn't expect to have strong feelings about Alaska.

Wayburn: Pardon?

Lage: I wouldn't expect that Atlanta would show strong feelings about Alaska. Was there a strong Sierra Club chapter there at that time?

Wayburn: There was a strong Sierra Club and a strong Alaska Coalition organization of people. We had people representing the Alaska Coalition and the club both go around to interested people and tell them that now was the time they could express their feelings, and they did.

I have notes on how enthusiastic these hearings were, but I won't put them into this.

For my own testimony I had asked Jack Hession to get facts together for me. Jack was at this time in Alaska, I think. He was back and forth between Alaska and Washington for two years. He spent more time in Washington than in Alaska. He was very busy, and he couldn't do it. I was very busy and, as a consequence, I got my testimony ready more or less at the last minute and was still revising it after I got to Washington.

An interesting personal sidelight to me is that my daughter Cynthia was in charge of the hearings for the conservationists in Seattle. She is a very good organizer, and I began hearing early and

Wayburn: I heard for sometime afterwards that she did a superb job of organization. As a result, although Seattle is a place where a great deal of Alaska business originates, the conservationists were able to outnumber and outperform the opposition to HR 39.

This was particularly important, I think, because the leader of the opposition in the House subcommittee had become Representative Lloyd Meeds of Washington. The role of Congressman Don Young of Alaska was to delay action as long as possible and then to oppose specific proposals of HR 39. He was partially successful, but Congressman Meeds, who had prepared a substitute bill and many amendments, came very close at times to putting over his viewpoint.

Lage: In the committee.

Wayburn: In the committee. Of course, Washington is also the home state of Senator Jackson, who was to conduct the hearings in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.

Shortly after the Seattle hearings, I once again went up to Alaska and this time concentrated on discussions with as many people as possible, particularly with native leaders, to try to get them to understand our viewpoint. I remember talking particularly with Cecil Barnes, who was the president of Chugach Native Corporation. He felt that Chugach Incorporated had been given a very raw deal by the Native Claims Settlement Act and wanted to redress the wrongs in legislation in the National Interest Lands Act. We were not in favor of that position.

We talked for some time. His outlook was that Chugach, which, by the way, had only two thousand stockholders and was in a very critical area from the national interest point of view, should have self-determination and not have what it considered its lands under the control of the federal government, be it National Park Service or National Wildlife Service or Forest Service; that they were entitled to dispose of this land as they chose.

Roy Hundorff was the president of Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated. They had six thousand stockholders, and their land had been occupied by the city of Anchorage and the small towns around Anchorage. They had gotten a special dispensation, and we had gone along with them, so that they could get other lands to compensate them, lands on the opposite side of Cook Inlet.

Lage: What would be your approach in trying to reason with the native leaders? Would it be offering to work for compensation?

Wayburn: It was, first of all, for me to try to understand what their view-points were and to see if there were any lands that we felt weren't essential to being incorporated into national parks or wildlife refuges, so that we could cooperate with them in urging the Congress to make a legislative decision for them.

As I say, we went along with the compromise on Cook Inlet, but with Chugach it was a different problem. Chugach wanted specifically land that we felt and that the Fish and Wildlife Service felt--people who were acquainted with the biological aspects and ecological aspects of the Copper River country--had to be protected. We were for a Copper River National Wildlife Refuge and for inclusion of all the Bremner River lands in the Wrangells-Saint Elias National Park. The Copper River refuge, as we envisioned it, included the lands around the Bering River. (Bremner is part of the park. Bering was to be part of the refuge. They are in different watersheds.)

That struggle was not settled, that issue was not settled in the Native Claims Act and is going on right now. There has been for the past year a working group composed of Forest Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, state, a special representative of the secretary, and Chugach Incorporated, trying to work out what lands should go to Chugach. We, the conservationists, have had representation listening in on that and making suggestions to that group, and it's still not settled.

Lage: So it didn't get settled by the 1980 legislation?

Wayburn: No, it didn't.

I remember talking to Jeff Richardson of the Tundra Times, which is the one state-wide native newspaper. They were very interested, and Richardson was pretty sympathetic to the point of view we presented. Of course, I talked to the different heads of the different bureaucracies and to the people on the Land Use Planning Commission at that time, trying to reach some agreement and often not doing it.

The Special Committee on Alaska under Congressman Seiberling went up to Alaska in June of that year, and they held hearings in Sitka, Ketchikan, Juneau, Fairbanks, and Anchorage, the principal cities. They also had members of the committee or of the staff go out to every village that they could visit in Alaska. They went to Kotzebue and Nome and Dillingham, Fort Yukon, and a host of smaller places in order to get the testimony.

Wayburn: We, the conservationists, were quite pleased by the testimony that was given in Alaska. The first hearing was in Ketchikan and, knowing that it's a very strong lumber town, we expected to be overwhelmed, but I think we got about a third of the testimony in our favor in that hearing.

The second hearing was at Sitka, a city dominated economically by the Alaska Lumber and Pulp Company, which is a Japanese-owned concern, although just below the top level it employs mostly Americans. ALP sent out a notice before the hearing to all of its employees offering them a day off to testify against HR 39. As a consequence, although a few of the employees bravely testified in favor of HR 39 (and, I think, were given notice afterwards), and a number did not show up, the overall testimony in Sitka, I think, was 75 percent against HR 39. It took a lot of bravery to stand up in that crowd.

Lage: When did it become known that they'd offered this day off? Was that known to the hearing officers?

Wayburn: Yes, it was known, and I believe that Congressman Seiberling alluded to it. They also sent out postcards and had typed on them their opposition to HR 39, and Congressman Seiberling remarked that that sort of testimony didn't carry much weight with him.

The committee then went to Juneau, where we were delighted to get over 50 percent of the testimony in our favor, and the same thing happened in Fairbanks and in Anchorage. It was particularly gratifying in Anchorage to see that. [consults notes] The figures were, as put together by a member of the staff in Anchorage: 136 people testified for HR 39, and 131 testified against, and 10 were neutral.

Lage: Do you think that the testimony is a factor in developing support in Congress?

Wayburn: I think there's no question that it's a factor. I know that Representative Seiberling announced both before and afterwards that he would be influenced by thoughtful testimony, and he did change some of his recommendations as a result of testimony.

Lage: So they were listening not just for an emotion but for fine points and suggestions?

Wayburn: That's right. Seiberling is a very judicial man who is eager to get facts, who researches the facts energetically himself, and who listens very carefully. For months he was absolutely occupied with these hearings. He did a job that few people could have done.

Lage: What about the situation as you described in Sitka where the lumber companies are obviously setting it up?

Wayburn: Well, Seiberling and his aides knew what was happening and took that into account.

Lage: Of course, the other side might say that the conservationists were setting it up also.

Wayburn: Well, and undoubtedly did. There is some difference, that no one pays the conservationists to do what they do; and whereas in Sitka the testimony of the mill workers was practically word-for-word what someone else had said, the conservationists' testimony was that of each individual. I think that congressmen can recognize the difference between someone who's paid to do something and someone who's doing it on his own because he feels strongly about it.

Interior, the Forest Service, and Alaskan Compromises

Wayburn: I should mention what was happening in the administration. After Cecil Andrus became secretary, in accordance with candidate Jimmy Carter's campaign promise (and he stuck by it after he became president), Andrus ordered a revision of the studies that the Department of the Interior had made. You will remember that Secretary Morton had recommended to the Congress some 83.4 million acres.

Secretary Andrus kept on his staff Buff Bohlen, the Alaska expert in the assistant secretary's office, who was very knowledgeable and very sympathetic, who went as far as he felt he could in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and had been recommended by Assistant Secretary Reed to Secretary Andrus to stay on. Andrus kept him for about six or seven months and finally fired him from the job. There had been friction between Bohlen and some of the other people in Andrus's department. Cynthia Wilson, who had been the Washington lobbyist for the Audubon Society, was appointed by Andrus as the Alaska coordinator in the Department of Interior, as a special assistant to Andrus himself. She was given the overall control and direct access to Andrus.

Other changes included the fact that Bill Whalen, who had been the superintendent of Golden Gate National Recreation Area and whom we'd worked with very closely for years, became director of the National Park Service after Gary Everhart was fired.

Wayburn: The attitude of the department gradually changed, and the issues for which they stood and the amount of geography they thought they needed changed. We were able to work with Andrus particularly through Cynthia Wilson, Bill Whalen, Dick Curry, and some of the people farther down the line, in a better way than we could before. The Interior recommendations improved.

Whalen was pushing for larger parks. In one of my conversations with Chuck Clusen, who was on the spot there every day, he said, "Your work with Whalen paid off a thousand percent." Whalen had to work with his counterpart, Lynn Greenwalt, who was the director of the Fish and Wildlife Service.

In August, 1977, we learned that the department had upped its recommendations so that at that time the National Park Service was to have 51.6 million acres, wildlife refuges 48.8 million, wild and scenic rivers 2 million, for a total of 102.4 million acres, which was up almost 20 million from what the Ford administration had recommended.

This was a time of great flux. The House committee had held its hearings. The administration was trying to put out a new recommendation to the committee. It was listening throughout the course of the hearings and reworking its own recommendations, and we were getting new intelligence every week certainly, almost every day.

By the time the Sierra Club board meeting came around in September, 1977, I told them what was going on as far as I could, the importance of the Alaska campaign and its uniqueness, how it had taken ten years to build it up, and now we were in the midst of a two-year intensive campaign which was only one-third over. The club, which had thrown a lot of resources in before, decided that it would make Alaska the mega-campaign.

##

Wayburn: The result was that the directors increased the budget income for the Alaska campaign, which was most gratifying.

Lage: Did that take any heavy lobbying, or was it pretty well accepted when the facts were laid out?

Wayburn: Well, it took heavy lobbying, but it was pretty well accepted.

Lage: [laughter] After a little work.

Wayburn: Yes.

Lage: Okay. Were other things cut back as a result? I guess they had to be.

Wayburn: Some things had to be cut back because that was at a time when our financial people told us that we were running into the red and that the next year, '77-'78, looked worse.

I mentioned a little earlier that it was a time of great flux within the administration and they were working up proposals, among other things to get the Forest Service out of interior Alaska. I've talked about that earlier. The Forest Service, we felt, had no business in interior Alaska, and the new administration agreed.

In order to get them out, there had to be some compensation within the Departments of Interior and Agriculture, and between the bureaucracies of the Forest Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service. The deal was that in excluding them from interior Alaska, the Forest Service was to get the land which had been identified by both the administration and the conservationists for the Copper River Wildlife Refuge and the Admiralty Island National Park wilderness. Those were to stay with the Forest Service.

Lage: Was that a compromise that the conservationists accepted?

Wayburn: Very reluctantly. We knew it was going on; we didn't fight it. But also because this was a time of great confusion and debate and discussion within the congressional committees, within the administration, and within our own organizations, my feeling and counsel was that we shouldn't be too concerned about too many individual matters at this point; that there were going to be amendments offered, we knew, later; that we couldn't fight too hard for any one particular thing as long as we were getting the overall amount of territory and the establishment of general principles that we wanted.

In major congressional fights there can be turnarounds very late in the game, and the more of the total desired you have early in the game, the better it is. The more of a record you establish for a large area, the better you're going to come out in the long run. So we kept on establishing as much good congressional history as possible, and we knew that some things were not ideal. We hoped to remedy them either when the bill should pass the House or when it should get into the Senate, and we knew that, most importantly, we needed to get a bill passed.

Americans for Alaska

Wayburn: I should mention another large factor. In October of 1977, I had a phone call from a man named George Wills, whom I had met briefly here in San Francisco with Nat Reed. Reed had had another project going called the American Land Trust, in which he was able to persuade private industry to donate parcels of land which they had acquired for one purpose or another and which hadn't proved so useful--to donate that land to the United States government for a particular purpose, particularly for wildlife refuges. George Wills was the executive director of the American Land Trust.

They'd had a very good year or two, and they thought their work on that was dying down. Reed and Larry Rockefeller, Jr. had referred Wills to me to see whether or not they could help with the Alaska campaign. This was the beginning of the organization of Americans for Alaska, and Americans for Alaska during the next three years proved an extraordinarily helpful organization.

I helped them organize it. I deliberately stayed off of it and tried to keep all conservation activists off of it, although a few were in that category. There were businessmen and bankers and lawyers and, to the extent that we could get them, Alaskans, and particularly Alaskan native leaders. One notable one was Byron Malott.

Malott was at one time the president of the Alaska Federation of Natives, and he is the chairman of the board of the Sealaska Native Corporation. But it included Laurance Rockefeller, and we ought to get a list of those people because I think that their influence was great, and they were able to put out ads advocating HR 39 at critical times before a committee vote or a vote of the full House.

A Megacampaign in Congress, 1977-1978

Wayburn: Throughout the fall of 1977, the subcommittee staff, Seiberling's staff, was working on drafts of the bill, and Jack Hession and Chuck Clusen of the Sierra Club were working with them and were presenting our viewpoint very ably. There were fights within the subcommittee, of course, and Congressman Young was always pleading for delay, Congressman Meeds was trying to amend the legislation or substitute a complete bill, and Congressman Seiberling was trying to get a staff print adopted. The staff print had had a lot of input from us, particularly from Clusen and Hession.

Wayburn: The months kept rolling by and then for the first time, in December, Senator Jackson, chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, held special hearings. Those were by invitation. Governor Hammond represented the state, the opposition was represented (I don't remember by whom now), and I represented the conservationists. The administration presented a general position, a good package, although it wasn't as good as we'd like, and we understood from Secretary Andrus's staff that the administration would look favorably upon, would not fight too hard, friendly amendments, meaning amendments which improved HR 39 as proposed by the administration.

I had just come back from Washington when I had a phone call from Larry Rockefeller, who felt the time was right for a meeting with Senator Jackson and tried to get me to come back for a meeting on the 15th of December. Well, I was simply pooped out at the time, having just come back and having an obligation to my medical practice before the Christmas holidays interrupted it. I was complimented very much by the fact that Rockefeller, Jr. and Sr., and Reed, and others felt that I should come back in order to get the optimum reception from Senator Jackson, but I felt I couldn't.

Lage: Did somebody take your place?

Wayburn: Well, no one took my place, but they went on in. They got an appointment and had quite a long talk with him. It was related to me afterwards by George Wills.

The Board of Directors of the Sierra Club met in Washington in mid-January, 1978, and at this time they officially made Alaska the mega-campaign of the club and alerted all volunteers to this fact and sent out messages asking everyone to help out with it and agreed to a staff proposal. The staff proposal was that 25 percent of all the time of the conservation staff not working on Alaska, including the field representatives (who each had their own job to do separately) would be spent on Alaska until the campaign was over.

Lage: Was it thought at the time--it must have been thought at the time that it would be a one-year effort.

Wayburn: At that time it was hoped that it would be a one-session effort, two years.

Lage: Yes. Because it was supposed to be resolved at the end of '78.

Wayburn: That's correct, and it was hoped that it would be resolved by the end of '78.

Wayburn: I spent quite a bit of time with Congressman Seiberling when I was back in Washington this time, and he thought that HR 39 was being marked up satisfactorily. I urged him to hold fast and not give way in the subcommittee because I knew there'd be pressures afterwards even more marked than there were in the subcommittee.

Throughout January and February and March the subcommittee was swinging back and forth. Finally the subcommittee passed out a bill, and the full committee passed out much the same bill by a thirty-two to thirteen majority, and it went to the full House. It was not until this time that the Senate energy committee started talking, and they didn't take any action until April. At that time, the House committee bill was just under ninety-five million acres.

Lage: So it wasn't as strong as you'd hoped.

Wayburn: It did not have as much in it as we had hoped. It also did not have in it any of the National Petroleum Reserve, and this made a difference in total acreage; so the difference was not as significant as one might think.

HR 39 had to go by reference from the Interior Committee to the Merchant Marine Committee before it could go to the full House, and we started working with chairman Leggett, Robert Leggett, from the Mother Lode country, Sonoma and Yolo counties [in California].

At the same time, the Senate energy committee held another hearing in which Senator Stevens played a large and onimous role.

In May of 1978, we had fifty people lobbying. Thirty-five to forty of those were from the Sierra Club, the rest from other organizations in the coalition.

Lage: And these were paid people?

Wayburn: No, not by any means. There were a number of volunteers among them, and there were a number of people who were paid just subsistence.

Americans for Alaska put out a big ad on May 5. On May 15 the House voted to give a rule to HR 39. That meant that the legislation itself could come before the House. They did that by such an overwhelming majority, 354 to 42, that a couple of days later when the final vote on HR 39 came up in the House it passed 277 to 31.

Now the battle was transferred completely to the Senate. We met with Senator Jackson in June, and he thought at that time that six to eight meetings of the committee would be needed.

Wayburn: Cynthia Wilson said that the administration was becoming a little apprehensive at the slowness of the legislation and that Secretary Andrus was considering withdrawing a large amount of acreage under the Bureau of Land Management Act of 1976 if the Congress hadn't acted by the prescribed time. In the Alaska-Native Claims Settlement Act, the Congress had given itself until December 18, 1978, and if it hadn't acted by then, the land would revert to unreserved public land unless some action was taken by the executive branch. We, and particularly Chuck Clusen, had all been working with the administration on this and urging this fallback position.

Lage: Were they pretty receptive, do you know, to that idea from the beginning, or did that take some talking?

Wayburn: No. Cynthia Wilson had been the Audubon Society's lobbyist. She was aware of the fact. Different people in the Department of the Interior were very aware of what it would mean and were very alert as to what the Congress sometimes didn't get done, and there was a very definite time set on this. Certainly since the spring of '78 they had been working on contingency plans.

When we went up to Alaska this summer to see the Kenai Fjords and the Yukon Flats area and to float the Tatsenshini and Alsek Rivers--where there was a proposal to add acreage to Glacier Bay National Monument--we came back to hear of this great uncertainty going on and to get rumors that certain members of the coalition were preparing to compromise in order to get a bill through. I had some work to do with some of the people in the other organizations and was reassured that they would not weaken.

Lage: Which organizations were most willing to weaken?

Wayburn: I don't know of my own knowledge that any were going to, but it was reported to me that the Audubon Society was considering a compromise in order to get things through. I got in touch with Nat Reed, who was a director of the Audubon Society, who, in turn, spoke to Elvis Starr, their president. Starr reassured me that they were not going to weaken in any respect, and they didn't, but rumors keep you worried.

Defeat in the Senate; Rescue by the Carter Proclamations,
November, 1978##

Wayburn: Something--I don't yet know what--happened to Senator Jackson. At first he delayed holding hearings until the House should finish with its action. He kept putting us off. Then he held only a very few hearings. He had said he didn't need to hold many hearings; the House had held them all. Then, as he got started, he held more and more hearings, and in all he held forty-four hearings and markup sessions in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. We were very disappointed at what they decided on each matter. They took up each individual matter separately.

Lage: Were their hearings held around the country as well?

Wayburn: No, his were in Washington. Jackson let Senator Stevens, who was not a member of the committee, but who, as a senator from the state involved, was given the courtesy of attending the meetings--he let him dominate the hearings, and Stevens did. Our side lost many arguments. We did not have a majority on the energy committee. Senator [John A.] Durkin, who was carrying the lead for us in '78, was not knowledgeable enough and not strong enough and not present enough to carry the field against Stevens, an extremely clever and knowledgeable man.

Lage: And what was Jackson's role in this?

Wayburn: Jackson was acting as the referee, if you will, and although his decisions would have been accepted, he often didn't make decisions, particularly when he could have made them in our favor; I don't do to this day know the reasons for that. I've talked it over with him, and his general answer was, "You know that I'll do what I think is best for the country" or "You know that I did what I thought was best."

Lage: But that's unsatisfying.

Wayburn: That has been one of the more unsatisfying experiences I've had, and with a man with whom I'd worked quite closely for a number of years.

At almost the end of the 1978 session of Congress, the Jackson committee finally reported out a bill. There was not time, really, for that bill to be discussed in the Senate, and we had a lot more strength in the full Senate than we had in the committee. We knew it, and the other side knew it, and this was one reason that Stevens,

Wayburn: particularly, had been holding up the sessions as long as possible. It was in October when they reported out the bill, obviously too late for a fair discussion in the Senate, and the House wanted to get the bill passed; the House leadership did, and Udall, the committee chairman, did.

Representatives of the two committees met together to see whether they could have an ad hoc conference and then send the results to the House and Senate to pass. The results of that conference were kept more or less secret, and we would learn about certain parts later, and they were bad.

Lage: The coalition and the conservation lobbyists weren't included in that conference?

Wayburn: [They] were not included. Chuck Clusen was on the edges of it but not really included.

One day the conferees apparently thought they were close to agreement, and it was still not clear who was in agreement with whom. But the bill was bad enough that we would have had to recommend that the president veto it if the Congress had passed it. Later discussions with Congressmen Udall and Seiberling led me to think that they, Seiberling particularly, did not approve of it all. They didn't actually have everything on paper; they had only part of it on paper.

However, the committees, the two houses of Congress, and the administration were all spared a good deal of trouble by Senator Gravel of Alaska, who had been invited to be on this ad hoc conference committee because he came from Alaska. Previously, he had also been invited along with Stevens to participate in the deliberations of the Senate Energy Committee, and he had declined. But he refused to accept the results of the conference committee, and then, a day later, when a motion was made to postpone action on the bill for one year, he vetoed that too.

He did this, apparently, because he thought that President Carter would not establish the national monuments as Carter had announced he would if the Congress didn't act in time. Seemingly, Gravel thought that the 17-d-2 provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act would no longer hold good since they expired on the 18th of December, 1978, and that President Carter didn't have the guts to establish national monuments on a massive scale.

Wayburn: But he was badly mistaken in his man. In early December, acting with Secretary Andrus, President Carter established 56 million acres of national monuments, which included some of the park lands, some of the refuge lands, and 3 million acres of national forest lands. Then, shortly after that, Secretary Andrus, acting under the new Organic Act of the Bureau of Land Management, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (called FLPMA), established another 44 million acres of land as national wildlife refuges, thus setting aside close to the 100 million acres that we had asked for.

Lage: Was that done with lobbying on the part of the conservationists?

Wayburn: Oh, yes. We had gone to the president and gone to Secretary Andrus and asked him to do this. They were in full accord with us.

So Carter kept his promise, and Andrus kept his promise, and the areas were saved for a minimum of another two years. The national monuments would be saved indefinitely until another president or the Congress reversed them. The FLPMA final withdrawals were good for twenty years, and unless Congress or the president acted, that would be indefinitely.

These actions upset our opponents greatly because the national monuments regulations were more restrictive than the congressional actions would have been. And it meant that the Congress had to go through the entire procedure of starting over with bills which began stronger than the previous bills, holding hearings again, and making decisions again.

##

Wayburn: There were many people who worked behind the scenes in the Alaska campaign whose roles weren't well known. Foremost, perhaps, among these was Larry Rockefeller, Jr., who gave greatly of his time and his work along with his money to the Alaska cause. Larry was an attorney with Natural Resources Defense Council. He also was a prime, if not the prime, angel in giving funds for Alaska. He did this through quiet, often anonymous gifts to different organizations and particularly to Americans for Alaska. When a donation of money was needed, Larry Rockefeller not only would give when asked, but often he initiated the gift when he saw a need. He worked with the coalition very quietly behind the scenes, and he worked with Americans for Alaska as a very active participant.

Lage: Did he have a policy-making role?

Wayburn: He had a policy-making role with Americans for Alaska, and I think that the advertisements that went out reflected his feelings particularly. He had a policy-urging role with the coalition, and this was through the different members of the steering committee, and with different organizations. We all appreciated how much he was doing.

Lage: How old a man is he?

Wayburn: Larry Rockefeller is now in his late thirties. When the campaign started, he was in his early thirties.

XXII CULMINATION OF THE ALASKA CAMPAIGN, 1979-1980

[Interview 19: December 11, 1981]##

The Opposition Organizes for the Ninety-Sixth Congress

Lage: Last time, I believe, we covered the Alaskan campaign up to Carter's withdrawal of Alaskan land. Today we want to talk about 1979 and '80. I'll let you choose how to begin.

Wayburn: Well, in thinking about it, we had two completely separate campaigns which were part of the larger campaign for the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. There was a vast difference in the two Congresses, the ninety-fifth and the ninety-sixth.

In the earlier Congress, we, the conservationists, had gained a great big advantage by preparing for years ahead for the struggle that we saw emerging. On the other hand, the other side did not seem to be prepared, and it was pretty evident as we went into the first House battle that we were the aggressors in a very positive campaign and that there wasn't much organization on the other side, as I think I've mentioned.

An organization known as CMAL, Committee for the Management of Alaska Lands, was a front of industry and the Chamber of Commerce.

Lage: That's one you haven't mentioned before. When did that come into play?

Wayburn: That was started in the ninety-fifth Congress, and it was the first organized opposition to ANILCA [Alaskan National Interest Lands Conservation Act] besides the state. The state's organization wasn't too good early in the game, but as they saw the first House bill pass by an overwhelming majority, they began to be increasingly worried, they appropriated more and more money, and they got more and more lobbyists. The job of the opposition's lobbyists in the first Congress was in considerable part to delay, although there were many things that they wanted, and many things that they got into the proposed legislation.

Wayburn: In the ninety-sixth Congress it was a brand new ball game. On the one hand, we had in place the national monuments, fifty-six million acres established by President Carter, and another forty-four or forty-five million acres of lands dedicated by Secretary of the Interior Andrus, under the new Bureau of Land Management Organic Act or FLPMA [Federal Land Policy and Management Act]; these were dedicated areas in place. It gave us a great advantage from the congressional viewpoint. We could feel that we didn't have to compromise on a large scale, and there was great danger of this happening in the first Congress.

There was the history of the Antiquities Act, under which the national monuments had been established, that there'd been no large-scale recession from these, and while the secretary's withdrawals were originally made on an emergency basis for three years there was the possibility, in case Congress didn't act, that he would extend these out to the twenty years which was permissible under FLPMA, and this in turn meant that they would be practically permanent.

On the other hand, the opposition now had its organization well in place and well financed. Millions of dollars were appropriated, seven million by the state alone, and more by industry for CMAL and other fronts which had the same objective, including one called the Real Alaska Coalition, to try to downgrade the conservation Alaska Coalition. So the opposition in the state and industry, among the hunting guides and the Teamsters and other special groups, was all in place and the Alaska delegation was much more ready to do something.

As far as the lobbying was concerned, some of the earlier conservation enthusiasm had burned out because many had been through the mill once and felt they couldn't do it again. Some of the organizations were hard pressed for funds as well as for skilled manpower.

Lage: Were these the professional lobbyists that were burned out?

Wayburn: These were mostly the professionals that I'm talking about now and the money behind them; some of the volunteers likewise.

I felt that we didn't need to compromise early, that we should go for the strongest possible bill and there were a number of us who felt that way. The new bill that the conservationists helped draft for Congressman Udall as HR 39 was stronger than the bill which had been passed by the House in the preceding Congress. Secretary Andrus, having stuck his neck way out with these withdrawals, had

Wayburn: repeatedly said that he would follow through with the Congress, and the Carter administration generally kept emphasizing the fact that these withdrawals were just there until the Congress should act.

There was a certain amount of apprehension within the conservation coalition, with the Sierra Club being very much on the hard-nosed side and some of the other organizations not feeling that way as much.

Lage: They were more willing to compromise at the beginning of the legislative session?

Wayburn: They were more willing to compromise.

On the other hand, within the coalition itself, the actual steering committee of the coalition, they had back the people that they had in the previous Congress, and Chuck Clusen was still the chairman. During this time, Chuck got an offer from the Wilderness Society to become their conservation director. He accepted it. This changed the intra-organizational structure a little bit. We felt that we actually strengthened it because Doug Scott now went to Washington as Sierra Club director of federal affairs. He and Clusen worked very closely together, and he was the de facto vice-chairman of the coalition steering committee, charged with liaison between the coalition and the House of Representatives.

The Sierra Club Board of Directors met at the beginning of February, 1979, and at that time I know I did quite a bit of lobbying and saw a number of different legislators and also Secretary Andrus, who at that time was very friendly and supportive of strong ANILCA legislation.

Victory for the Conservationist Udall-Anderson Bill in the House

Wayburn: It was with this background that HR 39 started through the House. There were no extensive hearings this time because such hearings had been held before. There were only very pro forma hearings.

In spite of what we thought was a good position, Congressman Udall stated his intention early of being willing to compromise, and Congress Lamar Gudger of North Carolina offered a compromise which was given a blessing by Udall, weaker than the original HR 39.

Lage: Were you aware of Udall's thinking on that?

Wayburn: Yes. Udall had sounded out his committee and found out that it was not going to support as strong legislation as he had originally hoped for. Within the Interior Committee, Representative Jerry Huckaby of Louisiana and John Breaux of Louisiana emerged as the strongest opponents of our proposed legislation.

In February there was a vote within the committee. The Gudger compromise failed, and the Hickaby substitute passed the Interior Committee by a vote of, I believe, twenty-two to twenty-one. This put Udall and our other supporters into a predicament which I'll talk about more a little bit later.

The Merchant Marine Committee then tried to get into the act fully. It had the right to have a vote on and to draft legislation on the wildlife refuges, but it really didn't have any right to work on the rest of the legislation, although it tried to, and this was under the leadership of Congressman Breaux.

In the meantime, some of us were pressing for the original HR 39 to be reintroduced into the full House of Representatives, as soon as the Merchant Marine Committee had rendered a report. Congressman Udall went to the speaker and made arrangements for introducing substitutes at the time the House heard the full bill. The procedure is that, first of all, the chairman of the committee has to get a rule that the House will entertain the legislation, and then get the legislation onto the floor.

In preparing for that, Mr. Udall had to have an alternative report to the report of his own committee, and he and Congressman Seiberling and Congressman Burton were very active in that, and we conservationists were helping in every way possible. Doug Scott was extremely busy working in the offices of the Interior Committee and the Subcommittee on Alaska every day and checking with me almost every day, so that I had a very close knowledge of what was going on.

In addition to Doug Scott, there were two other people in the Sierra Club I should mention who were working constantly on the bill and who were checking with me at frequent intervals. One was Jack Hession, the club's Alaska representative, who was the principal researcher for the bill for the conservationists, and was in very close touch with the congressional aides who were doing the congressional research and actually wrote a great deal of what was offered by the House in its bills.

The other was Barbara Blake, a young woman who originally had taken time off from college to come down to Washington as a volunteer and had done so well that she was hired on for the Alaska campaign

Wayburn: and who worked her heart out day after day. She became very close to certain key congressmen, one of whom was Congressman Tsongas in the previous Congress, and he had now become Senator Tsongas in this Congress so that she was the principal liaison with him, as I've already told you.

I have notes which tell me some of what was going on in the attempt to reverse the committees. The bill that the Merchant Marine Committee actually reported was somewhat similar to the bill the Interior Committee reported. In our efforts to turn this around in the House, our lobbyist made the rounds of the House of Representatives to find how many people would go along with us, and on March 23 he reported that there were 148 cosponsors of the bill that we were proposing for the House; the Sierra Club was organizing in a big way to get this through.

Lage: Did that bill have a name or names at that point?

Wayburn: At that point, it didn't have a name. Later it became the Udall-Anderson bill when Congressman John Anderson of Illinois agreed to become the cosponsor. It was just a few days later, on March 28, that Doug reported to me that Udall had gotten Anderson to agree to a Udall-Anderson bill to be introduced on the House floor. That, of course, was very useful in getting bi-partisan support for the bill. The White House was being very helpful to us in these developments. The number of cosponsors gradually increased through March and April, and on April 3 we had 151 cosponsors.

The club got out a mailing to 500,000 people to support the Udall-Anderson bill; that bill was actually introduced on April 4 or 10. Throughout April the conservationists, I think, achieved the greatest lobbying effort in the history of conservation. At one time in late April, there were over twenty lobbyists working out of the Sierra Club, and this is in addition to lobbyists working for other conservation organizations. We had not only all of our half dozen Washington people, plus Doug from San Francisco; we had all of our regional representatives and some of the people who ordinarily work in San Francisco. At that time I don't know whether Winky Miller or Ceil Dickinson was working as my assistant, but whichever one was was back in Washington. There were an increasing number of volunteers who were going back.

Lage: What about letters? Do you have any way of judging? Was there a strong letter-writing campaign?

Wayburn: Oh, there was a tremendous letter-writing campaign going on. The 500,000 letters that went out were stimulating that, and the congressmen got more letters than they had with any other conservation campaign.

The build-up was something like a symphony. There had been the first movement and the second movement and the third movement, and now we were in the fourth movement and building up to a crescendo before the coda.

That momentum continued to build up until May 16 when the Udall-Anderson prevailed by an initial vote of 268 to 157, and then in the final vote, with many people switching sides, it passed by 360 to 63, which was an extraordinarily impressive victory. We pulled out all the stops on that. I remember personally I got up that morning at a little after five to phone Congressman Pete McCloskey, who was on the doubtful list, and to say that he had to vote for it. He later reported that he was impressed enough so that that changed his vote, and he tried to introduce some strong amendments which he had talked about before.

Lage: Some amendments to strengthen it?

Wayburn: Some of his amendments were actually to strengthen it. McCloskey was a maverick, and you could never tell just where he was, and he was sometimes on one side of the fence and sometimes on the other. He has pursued that to advantage and sometimes not to advantage for a number of years, ever since he first defeated Shirley [Temple] Black for the Republican nomination for Congress a number of years ago. Now he's out for the Senate. I don't know how he's going to do.

Delay and Compromise in the Senate

Wayburn: At that point, the bill was finished in the House of Representatives and was referred over to the Senate. The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, you will remember, had in the previous Congress passed through a bill introduced by Senator Jackson called S 9. There had been attempts made to compromise S 9 with the previous House-passed bill, attempts which had failed entirely when Senator Gravel refused to accept anything. Now the bill went back to the Senate, and Jackson said from the start he was going to get a bill out of the Senate in short order, but first the weeks went by and then the months went by, and he did not.

Wayburn: A great deal of this may have been the influence of Senator Stevens, but I don't yet know why Senator Jackson, with the great influence he had in the Senate, didn't get a bill out sooner. I'll go into that a little more later.

##

Wayburn: I was in Washington from June 15 to 18 for a seminar on land acquisition conducted by Congressman Burton, who was then chairman of the Subcommittee on Public Lands, and I interviewed Senator Jackson. He was very friendly, as he always has been. He was promising to get out a bill just as fast as he could, but there were no commitments made.

In July Peggy and I went back up to Alaska once more with Jim Roush, who was now our son-in-law. We stopped in Ketchikan and looked through the Misty Fjords National Monument, which was under the administration of the Forest Service. We went on the ferryboat Aurora with Jim Kirshenman, who was the manager of the monument. I felt that he was a good man for the job, and that the Forest Service was doing its best to show that it could manage national monuments very well.

Lage: That's an unusual job for the Forest Service, isn't it?

Wayburn: This was the first time that the Forest Service was in the business of managing national monuments in a long while. They were given national monuments in the early years of the twentieth century by, I think, Presidents Roosevelt and Wilson. But in the twenties there began a movement to transfer all national monuments to the National Park Service, and that was pretty well completed in the thirties. So the Forest Service wanted to prove that they could manage them just as well as the Park Service, and they were doing it here and also on Admiralty Island, and later I'll tell about the visit we made to Admiralty Island this past year.

Throughout the summer of 1979, Jackson's committee worked on S 9, their version of the Alaska Lands Bill, and it was informed opinion in the Congress that Jackson was trying to push it through and wanted to get a time agreement from Senator Harry Byrd, the majority leader, to present it to the full Senate. [interruption from telephone call]

The rumor was also that Senator Stevens, who was masterminding the opposition, did not want to risk a vote in an election year, which would be the following year. Now, all of this informed opinion seemed to be wrong because Stevens pursued a policy of delay, although

Wayburn: he also was proposing many things that he wanted from his viewpoint. He also, in his position as the acting chairman of the Interior Appropriations Subcommittee--Senator Byrd was the chairman, but Byrd was busy with his administrative duties and left this to Stevens-- he was able to hold up all the money that was needed for the administration of the national monuments in the national parks and forests. He allowed no money to go through, so that the Park Service wasn't even able to prevent trespass on the parks.

Throughout September there was much talk of many amendments, but nothing happened. Finally, in October, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee began its mark-up of the Alaska Lands Bill. It became apparent through that mark-up that the good features were being eroded.

Senator Tsongas, who was a freshman senator, was our champion in the committee. Senator Durkin from New Hampshire was not taking the interest that he did during the previous Congress. Tsongas was so dissatisfied with what he was able to get out of the committee that he stated that he would introduce an amendment into the full Senate.

The bill was finally reported out of committee on October 30, and S 9 was then renamed HR 39 for the purpose of going before the full Senate.

Lage: Renamed with an HR number?

Wayburn: Yes. That is not uncommonly done.

Lage: But it didn't correspond to--

Wayburn: It did not correspond to the House-passed version.

There was a great deal of discussion back and forth, but the bill was not brought up on the Senate floor before the Congress recessed for Christmas. By this time, we knew we were in trouble and that it was going to be a hard fight to get what we wanted. It was the opinion of the Sierra Club, it was my personal opinion, that we must have a strong bill and that we would prefer the existing state of national monuments and long-term FLPMA withdrawals to a very poor bill.

The conservation organizations were again at variance. Some of them felt that they must have a bill at any price, and this feeling was not only among the organizations, some of the organizations,

Wayburn: but also in the Congress. That was a very unfortunate thing because the other side needed a bill much worse than we did. We had something; they didn't. The State of Alaska, official Alaska, was in a state of rebellion and even was talking about pulling out of the United States. But they didn't have what they wanted, and we should have stuck by our guns. We could have done it, but, well, the opposition was very clever, and particularly in Senator Stevens, as events showed later on.

But we kept working. In mid-January, Doug Scott and I met with Senator Alan Cranston, the majority whip, who had never taken a real part in this bill before, although he had promised me on several occasions that when the time came he would stand up. On January 18, he agreed to help actively, although he would not introduce any of the amendments that we wanted.

Lage: Did you get a sense of why he was reluctant?

Wayburn: Well, he had many other things to do. He had bills that he was introducing on California wilderness and other conservation issues. He was extremely busy as the majority whip.

Lage: It wasn't lack of sympathy?

Wayburn: It wasn't lack of sympathy. It was just that he felt he didn't have the time to master the details of introducing any of the specific amendments that we wanted to be introduced to the Senate version of HR 39.

In February, Secretary Andrus said that if the Senate didn't take any action by early March, he would proceed to these twenty-year withdrawals under FLPMA. Thus, we were left with the situation that we had a very satisfactory House bill and a very unsatisfactory Senate committee bill, which needed a number of major amendments. We had proposed some five amendments, were trying to get sponsors for these amendments in the Senate, and in addition had the Tsongas-Roth substitute. This was Senate amendment number 626, which was a substitute of almost the complete House-passed bill for the committee-passed bill.

Lage: And that was before the Senate?

Wayburn: It was before the Senate.

In the meantime, we in the club had the problem of keeping all of the coalition members strong.

Wayburn: Andrus actually began his withdrawals in mid-February. Then, later in February, there was a surprise meeting of Senators Byrd, Jackson, Stevens, Gravel, and Tsongas, in which they, representing the two sides and the majority leadership, agreed to what is known as a time agreement--it was agreed by them and by the parliamentarian of the Senate that this bill would be taken up by June and that so many hours would be granted to it.

We were not happy about this, and there was no doubt that Senators Stevens and Gravel had pulled off a coup. Particularly, Gravel was chortling about this. Stevens had always said he wanted to bring the issue to the floor as soon as possible because he didn't want to take any chances of having a national conservation issue come up at the time of the general elections. We had been pretty successful previously under those circumstances.

Well, June came. I was back in Washington again and saw Senator Jackson. He confirmed July 21 as the date of the Senate debate, and we had to wait until then. We began to gather our volunteer lobbyists for that time. When I went back to Washington once again in July, July 19 actually, we had our first gathering on July 20, which was a Sunday, and there was a tremendous group of people there in a hall that had been lent to us by Ralph Nader's group. We had people from all over the country. From some states--I remember Minnesota had a contingent of six to ten people, South Carolina had five or six people, all up for this one purpose, all full of enthusiasm.

Lage: Now, were these Sierra Club people?

Wayburn: These were in considerable part Sierra Club people, but also from other conservation organizations. The volunteers were predominantly Sierra Club. On the 21st, these people spread all over the Senate to do their lobbying. They previously on the 20th had been given assignments by the Washington lobbyist of the Alaska Coalition.

I remember going out with Marlon Perkins, who puts on the "Wild Kingdom" TV show, to see Senator William Cohen of Maine. The way senators act is shown by what Senator Cohen said. He said he favored the House bill, and he was a new senator too. I think he'd voted for the House bill before, but he felt obligated to give something to Senator Stevens, who was the minority whip, and Cohen was a Republican.

Then we went to see Senator John Warner of Virginia, and he said he would support us all the way through, and he in turn asked Perkins to give a part to Elizabeth Taylor, who had married him. [chuckles]

Lage: [laughter] Was this a serious request?

Wayburn: Well, it was said with a smile, but I think that Elizabeth Taylor did appear later in "The Wild Kingdom." [chuckles]

Lage: That's a wonderful sidelight.

Wayburn: We saw Senator Hayakawa in the Senate anteroom, and we briefed him in vain. He listened sagely and observed (and I quote), "Senator Stevens has a good bill. A rational stand."

I spent a lot of time in the gallery watching the Senate in action during the next two days. There was a big party that night given by Americans for Alaska and featuring Marlon Perkins and John Denver and a talk by the Angoon chief, Matthew Fred. Over a thousand people were there in the room.

In the gallery on the 22nd we listened to the first amendment being introduced. Senator Gary Hart of Colorado and Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island introduced the wildlife refuge amendment. We had selected it first because we thought it had the best chance of passage and had bipartisan support. There was a long debate in which Senator Randolph tried to help and Senator Stevens kept interrupting. Senator Gravel kept commenting. We found that Jackson supported Stevens, while Tsongas supported the amendment.

Finally, either Jackson or Stevens--I think it was Jackson--moved to table the amendment, and there was a roll-call vote, with few answers at the time. Then there was a quorum call, and the Senate chamber filled up gradually with senators milling around the desk. When their name was called, they would call back their vote or they'd hold up a hand with a gesture that amounted to their vote. This went on for over fifteen minutes. The result of that was thirty-three voted to table and sixty-four voted against tabling. Well, that showed us that we were in very good position at the time. There were only three absent senators (Eagleton of Missouri, Kennedy of Massachusetts, and McGovern of South Dakota), and we felt all of those would have voted with us.

Jackson and Stevens were very taken aback by the vote. We knew that this was our strongest amendment, but we didn't anticipate this much strength. Of the members of the energy committee, ten out of eighteen had voted with us, and there were seventeen Republicans who voted against Stevens.

Wayburn: Then Senator Melcher of Montana moved to establish a Porcupine National Forest of 5.4 million acres (which we opposed). There was a half-hour debate on that, and it was defeated by thirty to sixty-six.

By now Senator Jackson was very chastened, and he was trying to restore some of the committee decisions. He and Senator Hatfield were trying to compromise on the amendment that Hart had introduced. Once again, the Senate went against the chairman of the committee. He lost, thirty-three to sixty-two.

Stevens lost his cool, and he accused Hart and Chafee of bad faith, of, he put it, "reneging on promises made to the state two years ago." He conjured up all sorts of arguments, made a variety of statements which were partial truths, and began to shout to such an extent that you couldn't understand what he was saying. He stated that he was going to introduce eighteen amendments and have a half-hour debate on each one and a fifteen-minute vote on each one--to show that he was going to filibuster the whole thing.

Well, a little after six o'clock that evening, Senator Jackson, as the floor manager for the bill, called for a recess. Tsongas, Hart, and Chafee all stood their ground very politely, gaining confidence as they went on. We had people in the anteroom receiving information and giving information. I was in and out of the room and, in one of those meetings, urged Senator Jackson to change and not be "Stonewall Jackson." He said, "I'm not going to stonewall. I've seen the way the wind blows, and I'm willing to compromise."

Well, the next day he had reconsidered the problem and decided that he had best take the bill off the floor, and he did. The staffs of the principals--that is, Senators Jackson and Stevens and Tsongas and Hart and Chafee and Roth--were asked to draft a compromise of some sort. There were all sorts of rumors as to what would happen, and the rumors went on, the staffs continued to meet, the days passed, and I had to come back to San Francisco.

I went to one more big gathering that the Alaska natives gave where everybody came from both sides, including Governor Hammond, who was given a plaque and who told us that the state must have a bill; it couldn't exist with the monuments.

But we didn't get a bill at that time, and the staffs couldn't agree and their principals couldn't agree until sometime in August.

##

Wayburn: There were swings going back and forth and rumors. By early August we'd gotten the impression that Tsongas had agreed to a compromise with Jackson and that that was the best we could do because Tsongas

Wayburn: was our number-one champion in the Senate. Why Tsongas agreed to this after the votes on the 22nd to the 24th of July had shown that we had the votes, that we had the strength, I don't know.

But the game plan then became that a new bill would be introduced jointly by Senators Jackson, Tsongas--[pauses to remember names of other senators]

Lage: Roth?

Wayburn: Roth and someone else.

Lage: Hatfield, I think.

Wayburn: Yes. Hatfield. You are correct. And that that would be the vehicle that would go through the Senate.

Lage: Now, was this compromise opposed then by the conservationists?

Wayburn: No, because at that time we were sure that the House would then have another chance and could modify that Senate bill.

Lage: I see.

Wayburn: That became our objective. But the compromise bill, in order to be passed, first had to have a motion of cloture because Senator Gravel had announced that he would oppose it and would filibuster it. Senator Stevens wanted a cloture so that Senator Gravel couldn't take over.

Lage: [laughter] The intrigue is amazing!

Wayburn: It was also necessary from the point of view of everyone that cloture first be involved in order not to tie up the Senate indefinitely. That would mean no Senate bill, and that in turn meant that the House bill wouldn't have a chance. It was August 18 before this cloture bill was passed, and immediately the substitute bill was voted on August 19.

The problem then became how to reconcile the Senate and the House bills, both with the same name, the same number. We were strongly dissatisfied with the Senate bill. There were all sorts of things wrong with it. We went to our champions in the House--to Udall, to Seiberling, and also we tried to get Phil Burton into this as much as possible--to get the Senate bill to the House and make changes in it, although some members of the Senate had said that they would not agree to compromise or to have a conference between the House and the Senate.

Wayburn: There was a great deal of discussion among the House leaders and the administration and with the Alaska Coalition of whether or not there should be a new House bill. Seiberling was introducing a new House bill, one which was not as strong as we liked, but was as strong as he thought would pass. He made the mistake of telling a group of Alaskan natives who had come to interview him about this, and they in turn went back to Stevens, and Stevens blew his top and said that he would not have any of this and demanded to see the bill. He was shown the bill and said he opposed it. He introduced amendments to it. But anyway, it never got anywhere. There were offers and counter offers.

This was the situation throughout October, and we began to lose strength. Some of us held strong, and others weren't so strong. The trouble was we didn't have enough firm leadership in the House or in the Senate.

Lage: When you say "some of us," are you talking about the conservationists?

Wayburn: "Some of us" is the conservationists.

Lage: You must have also been looking forward to the election with certain predictions.

Wayburn: We were looking forward to the election. Everybody by this time was looking forward to the election, and we were looking forward to it with apprehension because Carter didn't seem as strong as he should have been, and Reagan was coming on more and more strong. I think that our opponents, notably Stevens, were counting on that with their delaying. They felt that they couldn't do any worse with this administration than they had done, and they were hoping for a new administration and, what I had not believed was possible, a takeover of the Senate by the Republicans.

Reagan's Election and the Passage of a Compromise ANILCA

Wayburn: Well, as we all know, on November the fourth Reagan was elected. November the third I had remained hard-nosed: we wanted a strong bill; we would not compromise.

Lage: Were there conservationists who wanted to go ahead and take the compromise before the election?

Wayburn: Yes. But the election had taken the place of everything, and there was not much doing in the Senate in those last few days.

As soon as Reagan was elected and there was a Republican majority in the Senate, we knew that the jig was up. As I say, on November the third I was hard-nosed. On November the fourth I was ready to agree to something less.

We held a meeting: Doug Scott; Jack Hession, our Alaska representative; Paul Lowe, who was the chairman of the Alaska Chapter; and a man named Pete Brabeck, who was representing the Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, held this meeting over in Bolinas. We had a full day all to ourselves, and we discussed every aspect of what had happened and what we could do.

It was perfectly obvious that we had now best pass the Senate bill as quickly as possible, get it passed through the House, because otherwise the new president would have the power to modify the national monuments and new bills could be introduced into the new Senate which would be much worse than the one which was passed with the aid of good conservationists. So we passed the word on. Doug went back to Washington and talked to Udall and Seiberling and other House leaders. There was just no question that we should get this bill passed as soon as possible before the other side could get weakening amendments into the House version. So on November 12 the Senate bill passed the House, and we had our great victory, which wasn't as great as we had hoped.

Lage: Was the Alaska Chapter accepting the compromise, and the Southeast Alaska Conservation Council?

Wayburn: Yes. Paul Lowe represented the chapter, and Pete Brabeck represented the Southeast Alaskan conservationists.

Lage: How about the rest of the coalition?

Wayburn: The strongest opposition had come from our Southeast people because if there is any one respect in which ANILCA is delinquent, it is in the Southeast. The rest of the coalition was all ready to accept this. As I mentioned, Sierra Club was the hardest holdout.

Wayburn: On December 1 and 2, I went back to Washington for the signing ceremony at the White House, and there was a tremendous group of people there at the White House. The East Room was crowded full with old friends, new friends, strangers, and opponents. I was

Wayburn: surprised to see how many I knew, including my old friend Lloyd Tupling, who had been the Sierra Club representative for years by himself. He was our first full-time representative. He slipped into the next chair.

I thought the president made a very touching address. He got prolonged cheers. The other speakers were Udall, Seiberling, Jackson, and Stevens, two from the House and two from the Senate. All of them made very acceptable, nice speeches except Stevens, who was quite nasty in stating he was going to correct some of the bad things in the bill, and he wanted mining in the wildlife refuges, and so forth. Finally Andrus came to the podium, and he got a big hand. It was a very heartwarming affair.

I went around to see our various friends afterwards. I saw Phil Burton, who was having much more success with his current omnibus bill, and he took me along as he personally got the signatures of absent conferees, people who were not at the Senate-House conference on that bill. He was very pessimistic about what would happen to the California wilderness bill in the Senate.

I talked to Senator Jackson, who interrupted a discussion with his staff about what was going to happen to them. He advised me to go slow in approaching the new majority. He didn't think that much would happen at first in the new session. I saw Roy Greenaway, who is Senator Alan Cranston's alter ego, and he gave much the same impression. They both seemed very depressed, and Cranston, whom we'd seen the night before, seemed depressed.

Lage: Did they seem to view the election as a mandate against environmentalism at all?

Wayburn: No. No one that I talked to did. I feel very strongly it wasn't, and everything that has happened since confirms my feeling that this election was in no way a mandate against the environment or the environmentalists. It was a reaction to the Carter administration and Carter's failure to influence either the Congress or the American people, and the peoples' perception of Carter as a failure, and the wonderful TV personality of Ronald Reagan, who I've always contended was the most underrated politician of our time, and he's still proving that. He's still getting things either his way or mostly his way.

But as far as the environment is concerned--although he's succeeded (particularly through his principal aides, James Watt in Interior and Anne Gorsuch at the Environmental Protection Agency) in cutting down funds for the protection of the environment and for the

Wayburn: protection of the national parks and the forests--the administration has been thrown back repeatedly by the Congress and by the courts. There are some very bad things happening now, but there's not as much permanent damage as there would be if the people had turned against the environment.

This has been illustrated time and again. Just one notable illustration: at the hearings on the Clean Air Act, the pollster Lou Harris, who has been taking national polls for, I think, twenty years, was called on to testify. He said, "Some 80 percent of the people are in favor of keeping their air clean, and if you go monkeying with this by causing degradation of the air, you're going to be in trouble." He told this to the hearing committee.

I think we're up against a very tough proposition in an unfavorable administration, one that's been much more unfavorable than I had hoped and which continues to be. But, as they used to say in the civil rights movement years ago, "we shall prevail."

Lage: I like your optimism.

Phase II: Interpretation and Implementation of the Alaska Act

Wayburn: The Alaska National Interest Conservation Act was signed by President Carter; that was phase one. We are now in phase two, which is in a way more difficult and much less understood, even in the Sierra Club. The Alaska Task Force and the Alaska lobbyists and the Alaska Coalition, of which the club was a member, were given every support by our board of directors and by the club as a whole during the campaign. But the amount of money available and the number of people available to us at the present time is much less. There are many other things that the club has on its agenda which are necessary, but we have let Alaska matters slip a little more than we should.

I have been trying to get outside funds to help the Alaska office. The Alaskans themselves, the Alaska conservationists, have taken a more active part than they ever have before. The Alaska Chapter of the Sierra Club now has over a thousand members. There is still a dearth of leaders who are necessary to put over our objectives.

We have a number of things to deal with. There's primarily the implementation of the act, and how the act should be interpreted. In this regard the administration is interpreting the act in an

Wayburn: adverse way, and we are having a number of administrative appeals and lawsuits. As one illustration, Secretary Watt made the U.S. Geological Survey the lead agency in the investigation of oil potential on the Arctic slope, whereas the Congress has said that the Fish and Wildlife Service would be. It is a Fish and Wildlife Service refuge.

Lage: Is that something challengeable in the courts?

Wayburn: There was a challenge in the courts. Trustees for Alaska, which is a public interest law firm in Alaska, took the case, and Judge Vonderheydt, the federal judge, ruled that the secretary had no authority to do what he did and that the Fish and Wildlife Service should continue to be the lead agency. I don't know whether the Department of Interior is appealing that or not, but meanwhile time is passing and the investigation is going on.

Lage: So you're hopeful that the club will continue to allot enough money and manpower to sort of serve as a watchdog over what's going on?

Wayburn: Yes. Other national conservation organizations likewise are realizing their responsibilities in Alaska. The Wilderness Society for the first time has a full-time Alaska representative in Southeast. The National Wildlife Federation has two or three people in Alaska, and the Audubon Society has two or three people working full time. The Friends of the Earth have one full-time representative. But a great deal of the burden will fall on the Sierra Club.

Club Growth and Changes, Post-Reagan

Wayburn: The club's spurt in growth this past year has been amazing. It started before the election, and this is another reason that I think that the election was not against the environment. The club's growth in the late seventies had been down as low as 2 percent per year. By the summer of 1980 it had started up again, and I think it was up over 5 percent in September of '80. At the end of the fiscal year, September 30, we had 180,000 members. Between then and the next year we gained, I think, over 50,000 members, had 230,000, and at the present time I believe we're somewhere between 260,000 and 270,000.

Lage: I hadn't realized that it continued at that rate.

Wayburn: It's predicted by our membership department that sometime early in 1982 we will pass 300,000 members. This, in turn, creates a fair amount of problems inside the club. I think the leadership is handling that as well as it can, to date at least.

Lage: That's as dramatic as took place in the sixties, right?

Wayburn: This is a replay of what happened in the sixties. We were much smaller, but our membership in the '61-'69 period, or even extending a little past that, grew as much some years as 25 percent per year. This year we've grown 35 percent.

Lage: That's incredible. I hope it doesn't bring the same administrative problems and internal dissension as it did then.

Wayburn: No, it hasn't yet. We've got a very sound staff leadership. We haven't got a staff leadership that tries to interfere with the volunteer leadership. Our volunteer leadership at present is drawn from a strong inside base. It lacks the outside national leadership that some conservation organizations have, but it has very strong grass roots, and the people who are elected are people who not only are well known by the club, but who know the club. It's possible that this may change.

It's very interesting that this year, for the first time in many years, the nominating committee nominated a nationally known conservationist who happens to be the recently resigned associate director of the Sierra Club, now vice-president of the Audubon Society, Brock Evans. This is unusual, and I think it has started a new line of thought, because one can nominate people very easily by petition in the Sierra Club, and I believe that Dave Brower may run as a petition candidate.

Lage: That would be interesting too.

Wayburn: Dave is, of all people, a nationally known conservationist; he has continued to be very active and has been restored to grace in the Sierra Club with the giving of the Muir Award to him and his election as an honorary vice-president. It may be significant that he attended practically all of the last board meeting. He started by standing around in the rear, but in the later stages he was sitting in the front row.

I am very fond of Dave. He was once a board member and a very strong board member. I don't know what will happen should this be the outcome now.

Lage: Well, both those men on the board would bring a new perspective, I would say.

Wayburn: Both of those men on the board would certainly add a new perspective, and it'll be interesting.

Lage: But it's not as if they were outside figures.

Wayburn: No, they're very much inside figures.

##

Wayburn: Previously when national figures had been elected they did not know the club. I can mention William O. Douglas, Paul Brooks, Luna Leopold, Eliot Porter. They all learned the club in one way or another, but that's an entirely different story from having two people with the very long association as paid executives of the club that these two people have.

Lage: You didn't mention Brock Evans in connection with the Alaska campaign. Did he take an active role?

Wayburn: Brock did not take an active role in the Alaska campaign. We brought him into it occasionally, and during the hurly-burly of the debates and votes on the floor he was quite helpful in talking to senators and congressmen. His later role in working for the club, you know, was as associate director, making contacts with the VIP's, with the administration, with other organizations from business organizations to labor unions. He was kept very busy, and yet he did come in periodically.

When Chuck Clusen transferred to the Wilderness Society, I thought that Brock could be our representative on the steering committee to give strong authority to what our representative said, but Brock wasn't able to attend those meetings, and Brock was not able to keep up with the details of the Alaska campaign. So he helped out where he could, but he wasn't able to do too much.

Recent Visits and Current Issues in Alaska

Wayburn: I think this covers the Alaska campaign. As I said a little earlier, there are many more things that need to be covered in Alaska. I might mention, because I talked about it earlier, Admiralty Island National Monument. On our Sierra Club trip to the Alaska Task Force meeting in Fairbanks this year, I chose three places to visit in the field. One was Admiralty Island.

Wayburn: Peggy and I spent three days there with K.J. Metcalf, the manager of the Admiralty Island National Monument. He is as close to the ideal person the Forest Service could have gotten. He is a strong believer in Forest Service traditions but also a very strong environmentalist; he has had some difficulty in reconciling his points of view with his job, but so far he has performed very well. I think he's kept the Forest Service happy and kept the local people happy. He has been a good man with the local people and has been as even-handed as possible with them and with the natives and with the mining companies that he's had to deal with.

We spent two nights at Kathleen Lake, which is in the middle of the Shee-Atika land withdrawal that they got from the Congress in the Senate bill. If you remember that Admiralty Island is now a wilderness monument and that Shee-Atika's sole purpose in asking for that land was to log it, you see that there's a great conflict going on.

Their entitlement was 23,600 acres, and I think the boundary lines that they've got take in over 25,000 acres, but the conveyance is drawn so that it takes in the valleys of three lakes and one more canyon, and it will impact almost 100,000 acres of a 900,000-acre national monument, and the effect of clear-cut logging would be devastating.

We saw the Noranda mine prospect, which is at the northern end of Admiralty near Hawk Inlet, and we went to visit Cube Cove, which is the only good place for transfer of logs that Shee-Atika would have, and we talked to the people of Angoon.

Just this past week Secretary Watt signed the conveyance for the Shee-Atika Corporation, in spite of our appeal administratively, and we are going to press for legal action to stop this. With this legal action, if we can't stop it, we're going to hold the logging up as long as possible because it would be one of the greatest desecrations of one of the greatest treasures we have--all for the sake of a few, quite a few, logs to be shipped out.

Lage: Isn't there any kind of land exchange that could be made?

Wayburn: Yes, they could make a land exchange.

Lage: They're native to that area, though, the natives?

Wayburn: No.

Lage: Or they are not?

Wayburn: They are not native to that area. The people of Angoon are the ones who are native to that area. Their village corporation, Kootznawoo, opposes Shee-Atika's selection.

Lage: Oh, I see.

Wayburn: Kootznawoo did not take selections on Admiralty except for immediately around Angoon, so that they would not have to log on Admiralty. Shee-Atika is the native corporation of Sitka, which is over fifty miles away.

Well, there is a lot of speculation, and there are some known reasons why Shee-Atika has been so insistent in selecting on Admiralty. A part of this certainly has to do with Alaska Lumber and Pulp, located in Sitka, and where some of the leaders of Shee-Atika have been employed. A part of it has to do with the fact that Alaska Lumber and Pulp financed Shee-Atika and its hotel in Sitka. A part of it has to do with the fact that this is a very convenient area for Alaska Lumber and Pulp to get logs from, and Shee-Atika has agreed to sell the first twenty million board-feet or so to ALP, so that there's a very close connection there. But this would be a real desecration.

We are hoping that Kootznawoo, which was already with us in a lawsuit against Shee-Atika from before the passage of ANILCA, will join us in a lawsuit against this conveyance, which would be against the secretary of the Interior.

The second place that we visited was the Stikine River, which empties into the Inside Passage close to the town of Wrangell. The Stikine is largely in Canada, and British Columbia Hydropower is trying to get permission to put two large dams on the Stikine, one of which would flood out the grand canyon of the Stikine and the other of which would flood a large section of its principal tributary, the Iskut.

We had heard a great deal about this from our Western Canada Chapter, and I wanted to see firsthand what it was like, so Jack Hession and Peggy and I took Jack's raft up to Telegraph Creek, 150 miles from the outlet, and we rafted down the Stikine, a very fast-flowing river, in four days' time. It's a beautiful country. It should not be dammed. This is another issue that we have on our hands.

Lage: It's such a huge area that it's like all the issues in the United States are duplicated up there. You need another Sierra Club.

Wayburn: That's right. Well, fortunately we're getting a big one.

The third place that we visited was the haul road to the north slope, which the state of Alaska has now made a recreational road, and it is open almost to Atigun Pass. It's closed the rest of the way because the North Slope Borough--that is, the natives--has said they don't want it open, and they refused to allow it. We can thank them for that.

The Bureau of Land Management kindly took Peggy and Joe Fontaine and me on this trip. We drove up across the Yukon River and camped for the night at Seven Mile Camp; then the next day were picked up in an airplane and shown the rest of it.

This issue has all the ingredients for a very sad outcome. I'm afraid that the wildlife and the countryside are going to suffer as a result of people driving up in all-terrain vehicles and then driving off the road, although they're not supposed to. BLM states that it has no police powers up there and that the state is supposed to enforce police powers.

But there are national parks and national wildlife refuges just outside the pipeline withdrawal zone. The huge trucks speed north and south. They don't want recreational travel. In order for recreational travel not to be extremely dangerous (and it may be anyway because the weather can change there very fast and does), the BLM is going to have to put in service stations and areas for residences. This is in a part of the world where it was completely wild a few years ago--and is still not too far from that state. Allowing recreational travel will make things much worse than they would be otherwise.

We took those trips to try to get more knowledge, more experience on the issues of the future.

Lage: That's a good place to end, with our thoughts on the future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Wayburn: As I review this oral history, I realize that I have not given as much credit to my wife Peggy as she deserves. From the time that we were married she was completely supportive of my efforts in conservation. She was with me on most of the trips I made in the field and on a number of those which I made to Washington. In fact she was with me "all the way."

She helped write many of the articles that I published. At times when I had other deadlines to meet, she would write the article and I would simply edit it. Her role is very large in whatever I've done.

Transcriber: Marilyn White
Final Typist: Keiko Sugimoto

TAPE GUIDE -- Edgar Wayburn

Interview 1: July 30, 1976	
tape 1, side A	1
tape 1, side B	7
insert from tape 2, side A	10
resume tape 1, side B	12
tape 2, side A	15
tape 2, side B	19
insert from tape 2, side A	22
resume tape 2, side B	25
tape 3, side A	31
insert from tape 10, side B [6/14/78]	38
tape 3, side B	39
insert from tape 10, side B [6/14/78]	45
resume tape 3, side B	49
tape 4, side B [side A not recorded]	51
Interview 2: July 31, 1976	
insert from tape 7, side A [6/6/78]	63
insert from tape 40, side A [2/17/84]	66
tape 5, side A	67
insert from tape 40, side A [2/17/84]	75
resume tape 5, side A	76
tape 5, side B	79
tape 6, side A [side B not recorded]	90
Interview 3: June 6, 1978	
tape 7, side A	98
tape 7, side B	101
Interview 4: June 7, 1978	
tape 8, side A	112
tape 8, side B	122
insert from tape 8, side A	123
resume tape 8, side B	125
Interview 5: June 13, 1978	
tape 9, side A	133
tape 9, side B	146
tape 10, side A	155

Interview 6: June 14, 1978	164
tape 10, side B	164
insert from tape 10, side A [6/13/78]	166
resume tape 10, side B	166
Interview 7: October 31, 1980	174
tape 11, side A	174
tape 11, side B	181
tape 12, side A	189
tape 12, side B	195
Interview 8: November 7, 1980	199
tape 13, side A	199
tape 13, side B	206
Interview 9: January 9, 1981	212
tape 14, side A	212
tape 14, side B	217
tape 15, side A	224
tape 15, side B	230
tape 16, side A	237
tape 16, side B	244
Interview 10: February 20, 1981	252
tape 17, side A	252
tape 17, side B	258
tape 18, side A	265
Interview 11: February 27, 1981	273
tape 18, side B	273
insert from tape 20, side A	277
resume tape 18, side B	279
tape 19, side A	281
tape 19, side B [in sealed portion]	288B
tape 20, side A [in sealed portion]	288H
tape 20, side B [not recorded]	
Interview 12: March 6, 1981	289
tape 21, side A	289
tape 21, side B	295
tape 22, side A	301
tape 22, side B	311
tape 23, side A	318
tape 23, side B	325

Interview 13: May 22, 1981	332
tape 24, side A	332
tape 24, side B	338
tape 25, side A	345
tape 25, side B	351
tape 26, side A [side B not recorded]	359
Interview 14: July 31, 1981	360
tape 27, side A	360
tape 27, side B	367
Interview 15: August 21, 1981	374
tape 28, side A	374
tape 28, side B	381
tape 29, side A	389
tape 29, side B	396
tape 30, side A [side B not recorded]	403
Interview 16: August 28, 1981	412
tape 31, side A	412
tape 31, side B	419
insert from tape 32, side A	422
resume tape 31, side B	423
tape 32, side A	427
tape 32, side B	434
Interview 17: November 6, 1981	438
tape 34, side A	438
insert from tape 32, side B [8/28/81]	439
resume tape 34, side A	440
tape 34, side B	445
tape 35, side A [side B not recorded]	452
Interview 18: November 13, 1981	456
tape 36, side A	456
tape 36, side B	462
insert from tape 33, side A [8/28/81]	468
tape 37, side A [side B not recorded]	471
Interview 19: December 11, 1981	472
tape 38, side A	472
tape 38, side B	478
tape 39, side A	483
tape 39, side B	491

INDEX -- Edgar Wayburn

- Abourezk, James, 122
- Adams, Ansel, 126, 169-70, 182,
191-92, 214, 215-16, 239, 245,
259, 289
- Admiralty Island, Alaska, 364-66,
463, 478, 491-93
- Alaska
- campaign for protection of,
435-88. See also Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act;
Alaska Coalition
 - as club priority, 269-70, 351,
442, 462-63, 465
 - conservationists in, 352-53,
412-16, 432, 488
 - development of conservationist's
plan for, 351-53, 360, 403-04,
413-16, 445-46
 - gas pipeline, 433-35
 - legal actions, 375-83, 388-89,
400, 419
 - local attitudes, 390-92, 413-16,
458-59
 - native peoples, 390, 409-10,
423-27, 429-32, 444-45, 454,
458-59, 483, 492-94
 - oil industry in, 342, 354, 366,
373-74, 387-90, 395, 399, 409-10,
432-33
 - personal experiences in, 1960s,
334-51, 354-83, 386-87
 - personal experiences in, 1970s,
392-407
 - Sierra Club organization in, 260,
333, 345-46, 383-85, 387
 - Southeast, 347, 375, 379, 381-83,
445-46, 486. See also U.S. Forest
Service, and Alaska
 - State of, 381, 409, 419, 455,
472-73, 480
 - timber management, 346-50, 364-66,
375-83
 - wilderness, 48-49, 342, 347-48
- Alaska (continued)
- wildlife, 356-59, 362, 426-31,
444-45, 459
 - See also Admiralty Island;
Arctic National Wildlife Range;
Gates of the Arctic National
Park; Glacier Bay National
Monument; Kenai Moose Range;
Mount McKinley National Park;
Sierra Club, Alaska Task Force;
Sierra Club, chapters, Alaska;
West Chicagof Wilderness; Wood
River Tikchik State Park;
Wrangells Mountains
 - Alaska Coalition, 439, 442-53,
456-57, 479-81, 485, 486
 - Alaska Conservation Conference
(1971), 412
 - Alaska Conservation Society, 346,
355-56, 383, 391, 414, 443-44,
454
 - Alaska, The Great Land, 404, 415
 - Alaska Environmental Center, 412-13
 - Alaska Lumber and Pulp Company,
493
 - Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act [ANILCA]
campaign for passage of, 450-52,
464-70, 472-85
drafting coalition bill, 443-47,
452-54
hearings on, 316, 454-61
implementation of, 488-89
initial bills, 322, 435-38
opposition to, 472-74
 - Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
381, 390, 400, 408-11, 416,
418-19, 425, 438, 442, 445, 458
 - Alaska Science Conference, 375,
386
 - Alaska Task Force. See Sierra Club,
Alaska Task Force
 - Alaska Wilderness Council, 403-04,
414-15

- Albright, Horace, 67
Alderson, George, 245
Allen, George, 444
Americans for Alaska, 464, 466,
470-71, 482
Amodio, John, 122
Anderson, John, 476
Anderson, Nils, 423-24
Andrus, Cecil, 110, 121, 461-62,
467, 470, 473-74, 480-81, 487
Arcata Redwood Company, 69, 79, 81,
97, 103, 105-06, 116, 118-20, 124
Arctic National Wildlife Range, 334
Ashe, Britt, 23
Aspinall, Wayne, 55, 68, 69-72, 84,
115, 206-07, 318-20
- Baade, Dixie, 333, 404
Bachman, Earl, 153-54, 161
Barnes, Cecil, 458
Barnett, Jim, 441, 450
Barnum, Millard, 153, 155
Beckmann, Jon, 263
Bedayn, Raffi, 180
Behr, Peter, 147
Berry, Phillip, 59, 110, 189, 229,
232, 241, 265-66, 268, 269, 276,
290, 326, 422
as club president, 252-54, 378, 417
Bible, Alan, 331, 404-07
Billings, Linda, 121-22
Blake, Arthur, 42, 49, 174-75, 181
Blake, Barbara, 450-51, 475-76
Bodega Bay, proposed nuclear power
plant, 58-59
Boden, Wayne, 399
Bohlen, Buff, 461
Borgmann, Ernest, 398, 404
Bradley, Harold, 42, 49-50, 53, 58,
161, 178, 181, 182, 200, 214
Brandborg, Stewart, 408
Brandt, Robert, 38-39
Breux, John, 475
Bristol Bay Native Corporation, 424
Brooks, Paul, 189, 233
Brower, David, 9, 42, 422,
490-91
- Brower, David (continued)
as executive director, 34-35,
50, 53-54, 159, 169, 179-80,
183-89, 191-250 passim, 290,
292, 295, 318
personal qualities, 191, 193,
221-22, 227, 249
Brown, Chet, 64-66
Brown, Edmund G., Sr., 164
Brown, Edmund G., Jr., 97, 110-12,
135
Bumpers, Dale, 453
Burton, John, 149
Burton, Phillip, 99-100, 108-10,
112, 121-22, 129, 130, 149,
150, 312-17, 319, 323, 421,
453, 475, 484, 487
Busterud, John, 422-23
Byrd, Harry F. Jr., 481
- Cain, Stanley, 375-76, 382-83
California Medical Association,
60, 281-82
California State
Board of Forestry, 110-11
Division of Beaches and Parks,
14, 126, 230
Division of Highways, 164-65
Park Bond Act, 1964, 18, 87-88
Park Commission, 14, 15, 17-18,
88
Redwood Parks, 64, 69, 70, 76,
88, 92, 112-14, 164-68
Resources Agency, 85-86, 97, 110
Calista Corporation, 444
Calvin, Jack, 360-62, 446
Cannon, Ding, 22
Carter, Jimmy, 109-10, 121, 155,
453, 469-70, 485, 487
Carver, John, 63, 324
Chafee, John, 482-83
Chafee, Kay and Keith, 75
Champion Plywood Company, 375-77,
379-80, 382-83
Chaney, Ralph, 115
Chugach Native Corporation, 458-59
Clark, Lewis, 43, 53, 169, 180,
182, 204, 214, 299
Clark, Nathan, 43, 54, 169, 180,
182-83, 201, 214, 299

- Clausen, Don, 69-70, 146, 319
 Clinch, Nicholas, 245, 246, 301, 303, 306, 309
 Cline, David, 443
 Clusen, Chuck, 270, 443, 447, 449, 450-52, 455, 462, 464, 469, 474
 coastal issues, 286-87
 Cohelan, Jeffrey, 68, 71, 84, 315
 Cohen, William, 481
 Colby, William E., 43-44, 180, 311
 Collins, George, 57, 91, 126, 333-34, 352, 375
 Committee for the Management of Alaska Lands (CMAL), 472-73
 Conservation Associates, 57-58, 91-92, 157
 Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 458
 Cooley, Richard, 455
 Crafts, Edward C., 72
 Cranston, Alan, 480, 487
 Crowe, Harold, 43, 169, 182, 214
 Curry, Richard, 98-99, 326, 418, 452, 462
 Cutter, Robert, 227
- Dayton, Wallace, 299
 Deadman Summit, 25-26
 Dedrick, Claire, 97, 124
 Defenders of Wildlife, 444, 445
 Democratic Party, and conservation, 85, 163-64, 421-23
 DeTurk, Charles, 126
 DeWitt, John, 94, 113, 116, 123
 Diablo Canyon, 56-58, 229-36, 284
 Dickenson, Ceil (Giudici), 441
 Dienema, Jack, 37, 162, 171-72
 Diercks, Ken, 230-31
 Dinosaur National Monument, 49-50, 52-55
 Disney, Walt, and Mineral King development, 38-40, 87
 Drury, Newton, 14-16, 67, 68, 88, 116, 126, 131, 165
 Duddleson, William, 147
 Durkin, John, 468, 479
 Dyer, Polly, 51, 178, 244
- Egan, William A., 401-02
 Eissler, Fred, 189, 231, 245
 El Paso Natural Gas Company, 433-34
 energy policy
 coal, 61
 See also nuclear power; Alaska, oil industry; Alaska, gas pipeline
 environmental protection
 campaign tactics and strategy, 49-50, 55-56, 87-88, 185, 217, 221, 235-36, 456, 463. See also Alaska, campaign for protection of
 coalitions, 287-88. See also Alaska Coalition
 personal motives for, 1-4, 6, 9-10, 19-21, 45-47, 343-45
 philosophy, 48-49, 60, 136-41, 144-45, 279-80
 Evans, Brock, 270-72, 361-62, 366-67, 432, 434, 490-91
 Evans, Charles, 340
 Everhart, William, 132, 357-58
 Evers, Sabrina, 19, 20
Explorer, 243
- Farquhar, Francis, 10, 91, 180, 184, 215, 311
 Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, 22-24, 25, 33, 50-51, 175-78
 Fischer, Verlis, 51, 178
 Fisher, Fred, 229, 377, 378
 Flannery, John, 198, 218, 229, 240
 Fontaine, Joe, 254, 450
 Fort Mason Foundation, 136
 Fowler, Marcia, 440-41
 Frankforth, Dee, 452
 Friday, David, 444
 Friends of the Earth, 221, 251, 389, 442-44, 448
 Fritz, Paul, 64-66
 Frontera del Norte Fund, 297
 Frugé, August, 205, 227, 245
 Futrell, William, 254, 277

- Gaffney, Rose, 58
 Gallagher, Leo, 33
 Ganapole, Mark. See Hickok, Mark
 Gas Arctic Company, 433-35
 Gates of the Arctic National Park,
 372, 405-06
 Georgia, environmental conditions,
 1-2, 4, 46
 Georgia-Pacific Lumber Company, 69,
 79, 118. See also, Louisiana-
 Pacific
 Gerbode Preserve, 144
 Gerdes, Robert, 230, 236
 Gibert, Sally, 440
 Gill, Kent, 229, 248, 254
 Glacier Bay National Monument, 348-49
 Glacier Peak wilderness, 32-35. See
also North Cascades
 Glen Canyon, 54-55
 Golden Gate National Recreation Area,
 19, 285
 campaign for, 125-152, 313-16, 325,
 327
 enlargement of, 147-50
 genesis of idea, 125-28
 management of, 137-41
 opposition, 130, 133-36
 ranchers in, 132-33
 Golden Trout Wilderness, 171-72
 Goldstein, Neil, 261
 Goldsworthy, Patrick, 35, 51, 189
 Goodwin, Willy, 444
 Gordon, Richard, 404, 415, 435, 450,
 454
 Gore Range-Eagle Nest Wilderness Area,
 29-30
 Gossage, Howard, 197-98
 Grand Canyon dams, 197, 217-18, 293
 Gravel, Mike, 363, 469, 477, 481-82,
 484
 Gruening, Ernest, 361, 363
 Gudger, Lamar, 474
 Gulf Oil Company, 143-44
 Gustafson, Joel, 146
- Haber, Gordon, 357
 Hagood, Jean, 67, 75
- Haley, James, 437-38
 Hammond, Jay, 455, 456, 465, 483
 Hansel, Richard, 430-32
 Harris, Donald, 377, 378
 Harris, Lou, 488
 Hart, Gary, 482
 Hartzog, George, 93-94, 131-32,
 314, 330-31, 338, 404-07, 409
 Hatfield, Mark, 483, 484
 Heimbucher, Clifford, 201, 203-04,
 291, 292
 Helmericks, Bud, 372-73
 Hendee, Clair, 24, 153, 156, 159
 Henjum, Claire, 440
 Henning, John, 100-01
 Hession, Jack, 260, 384-85, 393,
 404, 408, 415, 424, 430, 435,
 441, 447, 450, 454, 457, 464,
 475, 486, 493
 Hickel, Walter, 73, 127-28, 325
 Hickok, Mark (Ganapole), 352, 404
 415, 441
 High Trip. See Sierra Club,
 outings
 Hildebrand, Alex, 169, 182, 292,
 299
 Hildebrand, Milton, 7-8
 Hobson, Ruth, 22, 23
 Horton, Allison, 451-52
 Huckaby, Jerry, 475
 Huestis, Charles, 227, 245, 299
 Humphrey, Hubert, 32-33
 Hundorff, Roy, 458
 Hunter, Celia, 335-36, 355, 404,
 455
 hunting, 35, 428, 444-45, 447-48
 454. See also national parks,
 hunting in
- Izaak Walton League, 428, 444
 448
- Jackson, Henry
 and Alaska campaign, 322, 400
 407-11, 436-38, 453, 465-66,
 468, 477, 478, 481-84, 487

- Jackson, Henry (continued)
 and Redwood National Park, 68, 70,
 74, 78, 83, 85, 199, 317-18
 and Sierra Club issues, 321
 Jackson, Kathy, 209, 230, 231
 Janda, Richard, 99
 Jarvis, Destry, 448, 451
 John Muir Wilderness, 158, 161
 Johnson, Arthur, 14-15
 Johnson, Howard, 346-48, 364-65,
 375, 381
 Johnson, Lyndon, 84, 86
 Jukes, Thomas, 181, 247-48
- Kabisch, Sally, 385
 Kasch, Charles, 17
 Kehrlein, Oliver, 33, 42
 Kelley, Thomas, 401
 Kenai Moose Range, 340-43
 Kent, William, Jr., 15-16, 20
 Kern Plateau, Sierra Nevada, 36-37,
 170-71
 Kimball, Thomas, 448
 King Range, California, 91-92
 Kirshenman, Jim, 478
 Knowland, Joseph, 17
 Krumm, Robert, 395
 Kuchel, Thomas, 68, 70, 78, 85, 87
- labor and the environment, 315. See
also, Redwood National Park, and
 labor
 labor unions
 and Redwood National Park, 84
 La Boyteaux, Duff and Mary Em, 286
 Land and Water Conservation Fund,
 74-75, 207
 Lane, Melvin, 298-99
 Lee, Ru Flo Harper, 75
 legislative lobbying, 421-23,
 450-52. See also Alaska National
 Interest Lands Conservation Act;
 Sierra Club, lobbying activities
 Lemmon, Warren, 227
- Leonard, Doris, 57, 91, 233, 236,
 375
 Leonard, Richard, 9, 41-43, 53, 169,
 253, 273-74, 375-76
 and Brower affair, 180, 182, 214,
 233, 239
 and redwood park, 89, 91, 116
 and Sierra Club Foundation, 291,
 293-96, 299, 301
 Leopold, A. Starker, 375-76, 380,
 382-83
 Leopold, Luna, 99, 189, 232
 Levine, David, 451
 Libbey, Howard, 81, 106
 Litton, Martin, 189, 231-32
 Livermore, Caroline, 19, 20
 Livermore, Norman B. Jr., 85-86,
 162-63
 Losh, William J., 13-14, 289
 Louisiana Pacific Lumber Company,
 103-04, 116, 117, 120. See also
 Georgia Pacific Lumber Company
 Lowe, Paul, 441, 486
- McArdle, Richard, 29
 McCloskey, Michael, 178, 434
 as executive director, 264-67,
 271-72, 443
 and redwood park campaign, 80,
 83-84, 116, 121, 198-99
 McCloskey, Paul, 477
 McComb, John, 271-72
 McConnell, Grant, 34
 Mailliard, William, 129, 149, 150,
 314-15
 Malott, Byron, 464
 Marin County, CA, parklands, 12-21,
 125-52, 141-44. See also
 Golden Gate National Recreation
 Area; Point Reyes National
 Seashore
 Marin Headlands, Inc., 127
 Marshall, George, 189, 196, 213-14,
 219, 299
 Marshall, Robert, 218, 238
 Maryatt, 201

- Matanuska Valley, Alaska, 363-64
 Matthews, Warren, 377, 379
 Mauk, Charlotte, 53
 Mazamas, 51, 176
 Meany, George, 101
 Meeds, Lloyd, 458
 Metcalf, K.J., 492
 Metcalf, Lee, 78, 85, 453
 Meyer, Amy, 128, 130, 325
 Miller, Clem, 69, 146-47, 151
 Miller, Keith, 401-02
 Miller-Rellim Company, 79-80, 90,
 113, 116-20
 Miller, Winky, 441
 Minaret Summit Road, 162-63
 Mineral King, proposed ski area,
 37-40, 41, 45, 55, 86-87
 Mitchell, John, 263
 Montgomery, Parker, 299
 Moorman, James, 73, 329, 389
 Morton, Rogers, C.B., 73, 109, 129-30,
 326-29, 416-21, 435-36
 Moss, Laurence I., 189, 233, 254, 297
 Mountaineers, the, 33, 51, 176, 178
 Mount McKinley National Park, 335-40,
 396-98
 Mount Pinos Recreation Area, 27
 Mount Rainier National Park, 33
 Mount Tamalpais State Park, 13, 15,
 17-18, 125, 134
 Mudd, Harvey, 297
 Muir, John, 44, 281, 311, 332-33
 Muir Woods National Monument, 15, 133
 Multiple Use Act, 28, 30
 MX missile, 282
- Nash, Hugh, 236
 National Audubon Society, 156-57,
 442-43, 448, 450, 461, 467, 489
 national parks
 concessions in, 136-37
 hunting in, 35, 138, 339-40, 427-29
 roads in, 337
See also United States National Park
 Service
- National Parks Advisory Board,
 420-21
 National Parks and Conservation
 Association, 443-44, 448
 National Wildlife Federation,
 156-57, 428, 448, 489
 Nichols, Charlie, 101
 Nilsson, Einar, 180
 Nipomo Dunes, California, 56-58,
 230
 Nixon, Richard, 87, 127, 129,
 325-26, 422-23
 North Cascades Conservation Council,
 35
 North Cascades National Park and
 Recreation Area, 35-36
 North Cascades, Washington, 32-37
 Northwest Arctic Native Association
 (NANA), 444
 nuclear power, 57, 59-62, 231,
 282-85
 nuclear war. See war and the
 environment
- Oakes, John, 189
 Olson, Sigurd, Jr., 358, 364
 O'Neill, Tip, 108
 Onthank, Karl, 178, 198
- Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
 56-59, 230-36, 284
 park acquisition. See Marin County,
 parkland, and other specific
 areas
 People for a Golden Gate National
 Recreation Area, 128-29
 Perkins, Marlin, 481-82
 Pesonen, David, 58-59, 267
 Pinsley, Alice, 306
 Point Reyes Foundation, 146, 147
 Point Reyes National Seashore,
 92-93, 131, 134-36, 140, 146-51,
 407, 428-29. See also Golden
 Gate National Recreation Area

- Pope, Carl, 260
 Porter, Eliot, 189, 192, 194, 216
- Ragan, William, 119
 Reagan, Ronald, 85-86, 127, 150, 162-64, 422, 485-88
 redwood lumber companies, 78-82, 102-08, 116-20, 166
- Redwood National Park
 campaign for, 63-97, 114-15, 118-19, 149-50, 167-68, 197-99, 295, 323-25
 campaign for expansion of, 74, 99-114, 119-23, 312-13
 costs of, 104-08, 122-23
 and labor, 100-02
 local attitudes, 75-77, 100-02, 120, 391
 and Mineral King road, 86-87
 protection for, 71-74, 97, 98-99, 107, 114, 123-24
 Redwood Creek site, 64-66, 89, 94
See also Save-the-Redwoods League;
 California State redwood parks
 redwoods, highways in, 164-68
- Reed, Nathaniel, 73, 75, 94, 98-99, 109, 132, 327-30, 417, 452, 461, 464, 467
- Republican Party, and conservation, 85, 163-64, 421-23
- Robinson, Bestor, 43, 47, 53, 159, 168-71, 180, 187, 291, 301
- Robinson, Gordon, 377, 382
- Rockefeller, Laurance, 66-68, 77-78, 80
- Rockefeller, Laurance, Jr., 464, 465, 470-71
- Rother, James E., 44
- Roush, James, 299, 378-79, 400, 401, 450, 478
- Ruckel, Tony, 30
- Rudden, Clifford, 202-03
- Rural Community Action Program (Ruralcap), 423, 444
- Ryan, William, F., 71
- Salmon-Trinity wilderness, 168
- San Francisco Medical Society, 212
- San Geronio wilderness area, 41, 55
- Santa Clara County, California, 19-21
- Save-the-Redwoods League, 21, 295
 acquisition policy, 16, 95-96, 117
 on Redwood National Park, 64-65, 88-91, 94-95, 112-16, 118, 324
- Schmidt, Lee, 446
- Schmitz, Al, 33, 51, 178
- Scholes, Peter, 451-52
- Schultz, Ted, 404
- Scott, Douglas, 271-72, 449, 474, 475, 480, 486
- Seiberling, John, 316-17, 452-58, 460-61, 464, 466, 469, 475, 487
- Shee-Atika Corporation, 492-93
- Sherwin, Raymond, 245, 254, 266
- Sibley, Shermer, 230, 236
- Sierra Club
 1930s-1940s, 6, 10-11, 41-45, 162
 Alaska Task Force, 414, 426, 438-41, 449-50
 Board of Directors, 41-45, 168-70, 179-82, 186-89, 199-204, 208, 213-55 passim, 273-80, 449, 462-63, 465
 chapters
 Alaska, 355, 388-89, 413-14, 426, 450, 486, 488
 Atlantic, 51-52
 growth of, 255-57
 Pacific Northwest, 50-52
 Redwood, 59
 relations with national club, 48
 San Francisco Bay, 10-11, 46, 54, 128, 174-76
 committees
 conservation, 49-50, 53-55, 174-77, 181-82
 publication, 204-06
 regional conservation, 257-61
 wildlife, 426-28
 Council, 208-09, 238
 executive director. See Brower, David; McCloskey, Michael

Sierra Club (continued)

growth and change in, 41-45, 47-53,
 122, 291-92, 489-90
 internal affairs, 1960s, 195,
 197-98, 201-06, 220, 222-28,
 237-38, 240-41, 244-48
 internal affairs, 1970s, 252-279,
 300-10
 legal actions, 253-54, 375-83
 lobbying, 199, 202, 206-08, 256,
 259-60, 269-72, 287-88, 291-92,
 301-02, 311-331. See also Alaska
 National Interest Lands
 Conservation Act; Redwood
 National Park; Trustees for
 Conservation
 membership, 5, 45, 194-95, 220,
 262-63, 489-90
 outings, 5-7, 34-35, 44, 45
 presidency, 182-85, 213-14,
 252-55, 275
 publications program, 190-95,
 204-06, 220, 222-29, 238
 purposes and goals, 269-70,
 47-48, 254-55, 279-83
 relations with corporations, 235
 relations with federal agencies,
 28, 153-58, 168-72, 341, 371
 staff, 257-61, 268-72, 277,
 383-85. See also individual names
See also specific conservation
 campaigns and issues
Sierra Club Bulletin, 234, 236, 239,
 245
 Sierra Club Foundation, 278
 board of trustees, 292-94, 298-300
 founding, 290-93
 operations, 295-304
 relations with Sierra Club,
 294-300, 305-10
 Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, 29,
 73, 98, 308-09
 Sierra Nevada
 personal experiences in, 3-10
 post-war changes, 8-10
 roads in, 161-63

Sierra Nevada (continued)

wilderness in. See John Muir
 Wilderness, Kern Plateau, Golden
 Trout wilderness
See also Kern Plateau, Mineral King
 Silcock, Burton, 343, 371-72,
 393-95, 399
 Sill, Richard, 209-10, 214, 221,
 228, 239
 Simpson Lumber Company, 103-04, 120,
 124
 Siri, William, 38-39, 43, 56, 196,
 213, 227, 228, 231-32, 252
 Sive, David, 189, 244
 skiing, 37-40, 45-46
 Sonnenberg, Lin, 441, 450
 Southeast Alaska Conservation Council
 (SEACC), 413, 446, 486
 Spark, Harold, 430, 454
 Spencer, Dave, 340-43
 Starr, Elvis, 467
 Stegner, Wallace, 191
 Stevens, Ted, 446, 451, 468, 478-85,
 487
 Stewart, Boyd, 147, 407
 Stikine River, 493
 Stinson Beach State Park, 16
 Stone, J. Herbert, 32
 Stonorov, Tina, 443-44
 Sumner, Lowell, 333-34, 352
Sunset magazine, 298-99
 Swatek, Paul, 271-72, 297
 Sweigart, Judge William, 98-99
 Swem, Theodore, 357-60

 Tamalpais Conservation Club, 13, 14,
 125, 135
 Taylor, Elizabeth, 481-82
 Taylor, Pat, 24, 153
 Taylor, Roy, 315
 Taylor, Shirley, 286
This is the American Earth, 191-92,
 195
 Three Sisters Wilderness, Oregon,
 22-23, 32

- Tileston, Peg, 441
 Tongass National Forest. See
 Alaska, Southeast; United States
 Forest Service, Alaska
 Torre, Gary, 41, 227-28, 242, 294,
 301
 Train, Russell, 73, 387
 Troyer, Will, 340-43
 Trustees for Alaska, 489
 Trustees for Conservation, 289-91
 Tryner, James, 126
 Tsongas, Paul, 450-51, 476, 479-84
 Tupling, Lloyd, 207, 270, 389, 487
- Udall, Morris, 293, 322-23, 410,
 437, 452-54, 469, 475, 487
 Udall, Stewart, 63-64, 66-68, 71-73,
 77-79, 86-87, 93, 323-25, 409
 United States
 Bureau of Land Management, 343,
 370-72, 393-96, 397, 399, 494
 Congress
 and Alaska. See Alaska National
 Interest Conservation Act
 and Golden Gate NRA, 128-29
 and Redwood National Park, 68-75,
 82-85, 87, 99-101, 108-09, 121-22
 and wilderness, 160
 Department of the Interior, 98
 Fish and Wildlife Service, 340-43,
 371-72, 389-90, 397, 430-32, 489
 Forest Service, 2, 185, 188
 and Alaska, 30, 333, 346-48,
 349-50, 364-66, 375-83, 401,
 420, 445-46, 463, 478, 492
 multiple use, 30, 397
 timber management, 25-27, 153-54
 wilderness policy, 23-25, 27-32,
 35-37, 152-62, 170-73
 Internal Revenue Service, 18, 242,
 291, 293-94
 National Park Service, 35, 131-32,
 191
 and Alaska, 334, 337-38, 340,
 396-98, 404-07, 461-63
 and Golden Gate National Recreation
 Area, 126-29, 131, 149, 327, 429
- United States (continued)
 National Park Service (continued)
 and redwoods, 64-66, 73-74, 90,
 93-94, 97, 124
 and wilderness, 160
 Office of Management and Budget, 87
 urban environmental issues, 285-86
 urban parks, 127. See also Golden
 Gate National Recreation Area
- Van de Mark, David, 75
 Varian, Dorothy, 57
 Vinyard, Bill and Lucille, 75
- Walker, Ardis, 37, 170
 Walker, Ronald, 94, 132
 war and the environment, 280-282
 Warner, John, 481-82
 Watt, James, 487, 489, 492
 Wayburn, Cynthia, 457-58
 Wayburn, Peggy, 63, 81, 146, 170,
 192-93, 196, 198, 218, 233, 324,
 335, 350, 357-59, 393, 398, 404-07,
 424, 430-32, 478, 492-95
 Weeden, Robert, 355, 383-84, 387-88
 Wein Airways, 367-69
 West Chicagof Wilderness, 360-62
 Weyerhaeuser Company, 81-82
 Whalen, William, 132, 461-62
 Whitsell, Ted, 446
 Wilbur, Colburn, 296-98, 309, 423
 Wilbur, Richard, 423
 Wilcher, Denny, 299, 309
 wilderness, 12, 158, 454. See also
 US Forest Service, wilderness
 policy; Alaska, wilderness in
 Wilderness Act, 28-32, 36, 158-60,
 172-73
 wilderness conferences, 28, 63, 159,
 323, 333, 423
 Wilderness Society, 28, 156-57, 159,
 301, 383, 389, 408, 442-43, 448,
 474, 489
 wildlife. See Alaska, wildlife;
 Sierra Club, committee, wildlife.
 Wills, George, 464

Wilson, Cynthia, 461-62, 467
Wirth, Conrad, 67, 93, 131
Wood, Ginny Hill, 335-36
Wood River Tikchik State Park,
359-60, 367-69
World War II, 8-9, 61-62
Wrangell Mountains, Alaska,
370, 372, 407
Wright, Gordon, 391
Wright, Sam, 395

Young, Donald, 458
Younquist, Clifford, 42-43
Young, Steve, 443, 451

Zahniser, Howard, 28, 32, 159, 290
Zellerbach, Harold, 18, 88
Zimmerman, William, 206, 270, 290,
318

Susan R. Schrepfer

Graduated from University of California, Santa Barbara, with an A.B. in history, 1963. U.C. Riverside, M.A. in history; 1964-1965 teaching assistant in Western Civilization. 1965-1966 instructor in U.S. History, Mount San Antonio College, Walnut, California. 1967-1969, U.C. Riverside, teaching assistant.

1969, researcher for the Save-the-Redwoods League in San Francisco; employed by the Regional Oral History Office to work on the Newton Drury interview. 1970-1973, researcher and interviewer under cooperative agreement between the United States Forest Service and the Forest History Society, Santa Cruz, California. Special projects include multiple use of forest lands and the U.S. Forest Service's forest and range experiment stations. Historical consultant to the Sierra Club History Committee, 1970-1974.

1971, received doctorate in American history from the University of California, Riverside. 1974 to present, on faculty of Rutgers University, State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey. Currently associate professor of history.

1983 published The Fight to Save the Redwoods: A History of Environmental Reform, 1917-1978 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press).

ANN LAGE

B.A., University of California, Berkeley, with major
in history, 1963

M.A., University of California, Berkeley, history, 1965

Post-graduate studies, University of California, Berkeley,
1965-66, in American history and education; Junior
College teaching credential

Interviewer/member, Sierra Club History Committee, 1970-1974

Coordinator/Editor, Sierra Club Oral History Project,
1974-present

Cochairman, Sierra Club History Committee, 1978-present

Interviewer/Editor, conservation and natural resources,
Regional Oral History Office, 1976-present

Codirector, Sierra Club Documentation Project, Regional Oral
History Office, 1980-present