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MAR 1 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Major Problems of the War Relocation Authority--Past, Present, and Future

Dear Mr. Ickes:

This memorandum is an attempt to outline for you some of the problems of the War Relocation Authority, a summary of the present status, and a brief outline of problems ahead as we now see them.

In general the problems with which we have had to deal in the past have been divided into six major groups:

- I. Recruitment, training, and maintenance of a staff for ten relocation centers, other field offices, and the Washington office.

It was a major task to locate personnel during the spring and summer of 1942 to administer ten cities ranging in size from 7,000 to 17,500. Each of these cities had most of the problems of any normal city of similar size with some additional ones which a normal city does not have. It was necessary to provide at each center a school system, sanitary facilities, fire department, police department, and other services. In addition it was necessary to supply medical service and hospitals for the total population, provide transportation, supplies, and facilities for feeding the total population in mess halls, which included problems with which the Army never had to deal because they handle only men whereas we had men, women, and children. Special provisions had to be worked out for the organization of community enterprises such as stores, barber shops, shoe shops, etc. because of the unusual situation existing in each center. A wholly new type of governmental structure was required, including provisions for courts, community representation in administration, and special arrangements for community activities, all of which had to be considered in the recruitment, selection, and training of personnel. This basic job was only well under way when it became necessary to establish property offices up and down the West Coast in order to render service to the evacuees in relation to both personal and real property, and immediately following that it became necessary

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to establish field offices at approximately fifty points throughout the country in order to facilitate the relocation program.

Living conditions in relocation centers have been primitive and highly undesirable, particularly during the early months of center existence. Because of the emotions involved it was necessary to select with care all the individuals employed, not only with respect to their professional competence but also their feelings about racial minorities and, particularly, any prejudices which might affect their ability to get along with evacuees.

II. The formulation of policies and procedures relating to the operation of the centers, and attendant problems.

Certain decisions had to be made very early in the program in order to present a budget to the Congress and to effect the framework of an organization. Because the job to be done was without precedent, many of the policies and procedures could not be established until a certain amount of experience had been gained by the Authority. Consequently, the major policies relating to administration were not drafted in detail until late August, 1942. It became essential then to take time out to draft policies needed to give guidance to the various centers. A major portion of these basic policies were put into effect during late August and early September of 1942. They have been continually revised and augmented since that time. They had to be drafted with care so that they would be acceptable to the public and the Congress and at the same time be acceptable to the evacuees so that orderly administration could be established within the relocation centers. Every step had to be reasoned through from the standpoint of both the general public and the evacuees, and reasons why each of the policies was established had to be sound and clear-cut.

III. The formulation and execution of relocation and segregation policies and procedures.

The formulation of policies relating to relocation outside the centers and the consideration of the segregation problem started almost immediately after the inception of the Authority. Seasonal leave policies were worked out with the War Department during May, 1942. The first indefinite leave regulation was issued on July 20, 1942. Leave procedures were reconsidered in August and September and were revised effective October 1, 1942. Here again it was necessary to keep in mind the problem of securing public and evacuee acceptance and to lay

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the ground work for more detailed procedures to be developed over a period of time providing for leave clearance or ultimate segregation of evacuees to a segregation center. These policies have had to be revised from time to time to meet new problems which have developed as relocation proceeded. Only recently we have revised the seasonal leave program in order to meet the present day problems.

The problem of securing information regarding each individual and family which would provide the background necessary for proper placement outside of relocation centers and employment within the centers, and provide basic information which would assist in the segregation process, was one of the most difficult ones we have had to handle. With the announcement by the Secretary of War of plans to organize a Japanese American combat team in January of 1943, procedures were worked out jointly by representatives of the Army, Navy, and the War Relocation Authority to register everyone in the centers 17 years of age and over, both citizens and aliens, using a questionnaire developed with the Office of Naval Intelligence and other agencies, and including the now famous questions 27 and 28 relating to willingness to serve in the United States Army and allegiance to the United States. Following the completion of the registration program steps were taken immediately in collaboration with the Japanese American Joint Board to complete the leave clearance procedures and determine which evacuees should be denied leave clearance. The information secured on these registration forms was supplemented by any information available in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and from any other source. On the basis of knowledge gained from all of these sources the actual segregation process got under way late in July of 1943 at which time the WRA center at Tule Lake was designated as the segregation center. The major movement was completed during September and October of 1943 and the bulk of the Manzanar group was moved during the third week of February, 1944. There will be approximately 1500 or 2000 people to be moved to Tule Lake during the next two or three months. This whole process has been complex, time consuming, and it is one of those jobs that may never be completely finished, since new developments may necessitate further denials of leave clearance.

- IV. The formulation and execution of policies which provide for services to evacuees in relation to their property problems, both personal and real property located within the evacuated area.

This problem has received little public attention but is nevertheless important. The Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security Administration in the beginning handled services to evacuees in connection

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with their property. The Federal Reserve Bank rendered service in the warehousing of personal property and aided in problems connected with urban property, while the Farm Security Administration handled problems connected with rural property. WRA took over the responsibility for these services in August, 1942. A property office was established in San Francisco and sub-offices have been set up in Los Angeles, Sacramento, Portland, and Seattle. Evacuees either owned or operated approximately \$200,000,000 worth of property. Much of this is being looked after by agents selected by the evacuees themselves. However, WRA has made provision for warehousing all personal property left on the Coast for those evacuees who wish to have such service. We also help in the sale and leasing of real property if such service is requested by the evacuees and if they provide power of attorney. The job of transporting household goods from local points to key warehouses and from these warehouses to other parts of the country as evacuees continue to relocate is a tremendous one.

V. Relations with other government agencies.

Our major contacts with other government agencies have been with the War and Justice Departments. Throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 1942 a close liaison with the War Department was necessary because of the movement of about 110,000 people from Army assembly centers to relocation centers. During this period Army engineers were responsible for the construction of the ten centers. An agreement has been in effect throughout the existence of the Authority whereby the War Department is responsible for the external guard at relocation centers and for having troops available should a show of force be needed within a center. The Army Quartermaster Corps has done most of the procurement of food, other than that which is produced on the projects themselves, and has also provided procurement service for medical equipment and supplies. Many other matters involve liaison with the Army, including continuous contact with the Western Defense Command relating to evacuee travel in and out of centers located within the evacuated areas.

We have had continuous relationships with the Alien Enemy Control Unit, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Justice. We have maintained liaison with the State Department in relation to the international aspect of the program, particularly the problem involving exchange of nationals with Japan, and contacts with the Spanish Consul who represents the protecting power for the Japanese government. Other contacts with government agencies involve relationship with the Office of War Information, Treasury Department, particularly the Alien Property Custodian,

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War Manpower Commission, Federal Security Agency, Civil Service Commission, National Youth Administration, Office of Education, Navy Department, Coast Guard, and others.

Policies controlled by some of these agencies have had a very important effect upon the program of the War Relocation Authority. The War Department, for example, has controlled the policy relating to the evacuated area, including movement of people in and out of that area, and the policy regarding Selective Service as it relates to Japanese Americans. These two matters are of tremendous importance to our program and have required continuous contact throughout. Many policies established by the War Department and other agencies have had a direct or indirect effect upon the morale of both the staff and the evacuees. We have made announcements of procedures that have been agreed upon and then have seen them changed from time to time by certain agencies following the attacks of the Dies Committee or for some other reason. This has had a serious effect on our relationships with evacuees as well as the public at large. While many of these actions did not directly affect a large number of evacuees, they served to prove to a great majority of them that the government intended to continue to discriminate against American citizens of Japanese ancestry. Specific examples are the revision by the War Department of Selective Service procedures in March, 1942, whereby Japanese Americans were reclassified into 4-F and later into 4-C, which procedures were not changed so as to permit their induction under Selective Service until January, 1944; a change in rules by the Civil Service Commission, after we had worked out definite procedures for examinations and entrance into government service, which set the evacuees apart from other American citizens; initiation of procedures which interfered with merchant ship service by sailors of Japanese ancestry on the East Coast, after we thought we had worked out provisions with the Coast Guard and intelligence agencies; and a reversal of policy by NYA, after we had entered into a training agreement which was running smoothly. This reversal came as a result of the Dies Committee campaign in May and June of 1943.

VI. The general problem of public relations.

The problem of acceptance by communities outside the West Coast area of evacuees interested in relocating has been a much simpler one than we had anticipated in the early part of the program. Generally speaking our public relations throughout the Midwest, South and East have been excellent. This is probably due to the fact that we concentrated on these areas, established offices, and developed a staff whose chief job was to secure understanding and acceptance by the public.

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After the evacuees were moved from the West Coast we assumed our major public relations problem would be in other portions of the country and did not make the provision on the West Coast that we perhaps should have in view of the campaign which has been carried on by the Hearst press, the Native Sons of the Golden West, the California Department of the American Legion, and certain labor groups along the Coast, particularly Dave Beck of the Teamsters Union. This campaign started almost immediately after WRA was established, with demands that the whole program be turned over to the War Department, that all people of Japanese ancestry be excluded from the West Coast for the duration and from the country after the war, that they be interned for the duration and not allowed to relocate in other parts of the country.

These organizations instigated an investigation by the Senate Military Affairs Committee under the leadership of Senator Chandler of Kentucky which began in January, 1943, and continued intermittently throughout the spring, summer, and fall. The results of that investigation did not satisfy certain West Coast interests; consequently, the Dies Committee was brought into the picture in early May, 1943, and has continued since then. Their most intensive drive was made during May, June, and July of 1943 but the investigation continued following the Tule Lake incident in November and I am sure they plan to continue to harass the Authority whenever an opportunity is presented. Our relationship with the West Coast Congressional Delegation has been very good for the most part when considered on an individual basis. A few individuals are quite antagonistic to our program and have carried the torch for the West Coast organizations mentioned above. The outstanding ones in this group are John Costello, Clair Engle, John Phillips, Morris Poulson, Alfred Elliott, and more recently Harry Sheppard. Senator Wallgren was quite antagonistic during 1942, but in recent months has been very quiet and reasonably friendly. Other members of Congress who have supplemented the campaign of West Coast critics are Congressman Rankin of Mississippi, Senator Stewart of Tennessee, and upon occasion Senator Chandler of Kentucky, Senator Reynolds of North Carolina, and Congressman J. Farnell Thomas of New Jersey, a member of the Dies Committee. I may have overlooked a few, but outside of this small group our general relationship with the Congress has been excellent.

We have had the support throughout the United States of hundreds of people of good will who have rendered real service in the relocation aspect of our program in particular, and in doing so have been very helpful in handling the public relations problems. The outstanding organizations that have supported the program are: Federal Council of Churches, Home Missions Council of North America, American Friends Service Committee, Committee on American Principles and Fair Play

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(which operates in California, Washington, and Oregon), the YMCA, YWCA, Japanese American Student Relocation Council, Committee on Resettlement of Japanese Americans, Protestant Church Committee for Japanese Service, Common Council for American Unity, Denver Council of Churches, Citizens Committee for Resettlement for Work with Japanese Evacuees, Japanese American Citizens League, American Civil Liberties Union, and others.

Among the members of Congress who have been friendly and helpful are Congressman Eberharter of Pennsylvania, a member of the Dies Committee, Congressman Judd of Minnesota, Senator Murdock and Senator Thomas of Utah, Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming, Senator Hayden of Arizona, Congressman Chenoweth of Colorado, Congressmen Outland, Holfield, Tolan, Will Rogers, Ford, Voorhis, all of California, Congressman Coffee of Washington, and many others who have been sympathetic but not particularly active.

SUMMARY OF PRESENT STATUS AND PROBLEMS AHEAD

At the present time we have nine relocation centers and one segregation center. The Jerome Relocation Center, Denson, Arkansas, will be closed in June, leaving eight relocation centers at the beginning of the next fiscal year. Approximately 92,000 people live in relocation centers and the segregation center. When segregation is completed there will be between 18,000 and 19,000 people at Tule Lake and approximately 70,000 in the other eight or nine centers. Over 18,000 are out on indefinite leave at the present time and about 2,000 on seasonal leave. Our major problems at the present time are the completion of leave clearance hearings and the segregation process, realigning and expediting our relocation program in order to secure family relocation, and public relations--a problem which is continually stirred up by the organizations mentioned in VI.


As relocation proceeds the character of the population within the centers changes and will continue to do so, leaving a residue of older issei and young children as compared with the mixed population we had in the beginning. This creates a real problem affecting the relocation program and the administration of the centers. It becomes harder to maintain the American institutions and avoid further Japanization of youngsters. This is a natural development resulting from the draining off of the American citizens in the age group from 18 to 35 or 40, who are most easily relocated. It will become more and more difficult to get families made up largely of very young and older people to relocate in normal communities for several reasons. There will be a smaller number of able-bodied workers, the older people

will have some language difficulties, the housing problem is more acute, and they are not sure they can find security in outside communities. We anticipate a continued campaign by West Coast organizations which have funds and personnel to devote to a campaign for the exclusion of people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast or at least for the prevention of their return during the war.

As the war proceeds and it becomes less essential from a military standpoint to maintain the evacuated area, we have the problem of working out a plan with the Army for an orderly reopening of the evacuated area step by step which will facilitate relocation, avoid violence, and at the same time get the job reasonably well done before the war is finally over, so that evacuees will not have to reestablish themselves during a period when there will be competition with a large number returning from the war.

Property problems on the Coast will continue to exist and will become more troublesome. As time goes on we will need to consider conducting our program in such a way as to have needed information in case post-war claims are presented, and at the same time render adequate service to evacuees who cannot return to the Coast in the meantime. There is, of course, the whole question of post-war relocation in case we don't get the job done during the war period, and that problem has not yet been seriously considered.

Sincerely,



Director

cc: Mr. Fortas

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

I should like to express my appreciation of your very thoughtful memorandum of March 31 incorporating the suggestions arising out of your visit to the centers in Arkansas. I am very glad you found the time to make the trip and hope you will soon be able to visit other centers, particularly the segregation center at Tule Lake. My comments on the specific points raised in your memorandum follow:

1. Our present regulations require that records be maintained showing all evacuees on leave, complete population figures and other information called for in your suggestion regarding such records. It is possible that an adequate system has not been provided in some of the centers and I am asking that this matter be reviewed and that more detailed instructions be provided in case our instructions are not now adequate. As far as I know, we have had no difficulty because of people overstaying their leave or because of inadequate records. Neither have we had any difficulty in getting people to return to the center if we have requested them to do so. We might have a difficult problem, however, if we tried to apprehend citizens on leave, if they cared to challenge the legality of the procedures.

2. Since the summer of 1942 we have required Project Directors to take a periodic census. In connection with a revised uniform statistical procedure announced the middle of March, we have required a census to be taken at each center once a quarter, the first to be made as of March 31, 1944. We intend to review in detail the methods used at each center, to approve those methods which appear to be adequate, and, out of the combined experience of the centers, select one or more methods for general use.

3. We have given a great deal of thought to the problem of organization at relocation centers. The Project Director of each center has three Assistant Directors, one in charge of administrative management, another in charge of operations, and a third in charge of community management. The Assistant Director in charge of community management has under his general supervision the medical service, schools, welfare work, community enterprises, community activities, and internal security. Because of the very large group of school children we have in the centers, particularly those of high school age, and because of the peculiar welfare problems, there is a very close relationship between the internal security problem and these other fields of activity. The Assistant Project Directors are administrative

people responsible for the general supervision of the activities covered in their sphere of responsibility. Each Project Director now has responsibility to him, in addition to these three Assistant Project Directors, the Reports Officer, the Project Attorney, and the Relocation Officer. I believe we have a peculiar situation at Rohwer which probably should be remedied by readjusting the Assistant Project Director to duties which more nearly fit his capacities, rather than by making a change in the organizational structure. I do not concur in your recommendation because I feel that it would open up the whole question of project organization again at a time when we have a good functioning organization which has been accepted generally at most projects. However, as I indicated to you in our conversation, it is not a matter on which I care to make an issue.

4. I have reviewed Mr. Ryckman's memorandum and am submitting a separate memorandum covering our reactions to his recommendations.

5. In the initial construction of relocation centers the Army was unwilling to provide equipment storage sheds. In planning the first construction program conducted by the Authority, we concluded that because of the shortage of lumber and other materials, the difficulty of securing priorities, and the demands on our labor supply for more urgent tasks, we would not be justified in building equipment storage sheds. While I know that storage of trucks and other such equipment under cover makes for neatness and orderliness of appearance, I am told by our engineers it would not sufficiently prolong the life of our equipment to justify the construction in an agency considered to be temporary.

6. I feel quite sure that everything practicable is being done to assure the best possible use and maintenance of trucks and other equipment. This whole matter has been reviewed very recently and a sound set of regulations has been put into effect. Regular inspections are being made to be sure that the regulations are being carried out.

7. Nearly all centers have invited groups of local and state officials, farmers, and business people to visit the camps at different times throughout their existence, and many centers have arranged for entertainment of the type you suggest. This has proved very effective. We are in full agreement that these procedures should be encouraged in the future as they have been in the past.

8. We are in agreement that the segregation program should be completed as promptly as possible. This policy, however, is closely related to the problems involved in points 9 and 10. At the present time we do not have room at Tule Lake for all of the segregees in the other nine centers if we include all repatriates categorically. However, the task of completing the leave clearance procedures can be expedited and we are now doing everything in our power to finish up the review of these dockets within the next thirty or sixty days. Nine people have been assigned from the projects to the Washington office to assist in this.

9. Points presented under heading No. 9 in your memorandum bring into question the entire basic policy of the Authority. I have tried to present my views on these basic questions in a memorandum to the Secretary presenting a plan for bringing the relocation program to a conclusion. I attach for your consideration a copy of the memorandum. In summary, I believe (1) the exclusion orders should be revoked except as they apply to segregants and internees; (2) the Authority should empty the centers and bring its work to a close by the end of fiscal year 1946; and (3) the Tule Lake Center should be transferred to the Department of Justice as a part of this liquidation program. I do not think the Tule Lake Center should be transferred to the Justice Department except as part of a liquidation program.

On the proposal that a committee of lawyers be selected to review the leave clearance procedures, I have the following comments:

If you feel that the Secretary would like to have such a survey made in order to reassure himself as to the adequacy of our leave clearance procedures, we have no objection to the plan suggested and will be glad to cooperate in every possible way. If, however, you are satisfied with our procedures but feel that publication of the results of such a survey might strengthen public confidence in the leave clearance procedures of the Authority, then I should like to recommend against the naming of such a board.

My principal objection is merely that I do not believe we will gain any substantial benefit from the proposal. In turn, we shall be running some risks and may do ourselves more harm than good.

The general public does not have much interest in the details of our leave clearance procedure and will probably not pay much attention to reports that discuss those details. Official government agencies and others that do concern themselves with the details of our leave clearance procedures have recently had their questions answered.

The Attorney General reviewed and approved our leave regulations before they were first published. The Senate Committee on Military Affairs and the House Committee on Un-American Activities have both investigated our leave clearance procedures. The Senate Committee appeared to be reasonably well satisfied with what they found; the Dies Committee, of course, refused to be satisfied. In response to Senator Downey's Resolution the President recently submitted to the Senate a summary of our leave clearance procedures, and we have heard nothing further on that subject from the members of Congress or other official agencies since. (The President's Report on this subject has been published as Senate Document No. 96, 78th Congress, 1st Session.)

I believe that the public discussion of the adequacy of our leave regulations which was stirred up more than a year ago by the Dies Committee and the Hearst press has died down and that it will do us more harm than good to stir it up again.

Our leave clearance procedures are now opposed, I think it is fair to say, only by those who want to intern all Japanese Americans for the duration of the war and who will not be satisfied by any kind of leave clearance procedures that result in releasing large numbers of the evacuees from our centers. If, therefore, you should name such a board and they should endorse the substance of our procedures, our enemies will promptly charge the board itself with being biased and with engaging in "white-washing," while our friends do not need this strengthening of their confidence. Further, unless the members of the board should be willing to spend a lot of time in becoming thoroughly familiar with the history of the Japanese Americans in the United States, with the influences that led to the evacuation, the character of the Japanese American minority, the effects upon them of life in the relocation centers, the circumstances under which the intelligence agency reports have been prepared, and the rest of the complicated story, they will not be able to come to adequate conclusions that will be of much help to the public or to the administrators of the program.

It is my belief that our procedures are conservative, perhaps too conservative. We have had a Joint Board which has reviewed all citizen dockets. While we have not always agreed with the Joint Board's findings, since they had no direct contact with individuals, we have held hearings and reviewed all cases that they questioned. This group of people has been more carefully sifted than any group in the United States of similar size.

More than a year ago, at the height of the Dies and Hearst attacks on our leave clearance procedures, we considered the appointment of such a board and decided against it. I am more strongly convinced today that it is not desirable to name such a board because the adequacy of our leave clearance procedures is no longer being challenged and is not a matter of public discussion.

10. We are in full agreement that younger evacuees should be impressed with their responsibility for taking their families out of the centers, and have already taken the matter up with relocation officials urging that they get in touch with the younger people who have relocated to urge them to make plans for their families and to assist their families in relocating.

11. From the outset we have held the relocation supervisors responsible for the type of contact with state and local officials which you have suggested and for enlisting the support of churches, clubs, and special local relocation committees. I have brought your comments in this connection to the attention of Mr. E. G. Arnold, Chief of the Relocation Division, and have requested him to take appropriate steps in his field supervisory work.

D. S. Myer

Director

Attachment

DSMyer:vc

4-5-44

Ret to ^{clerk} ~~Burling~~
MAY 31 1945
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MEMORANDUM for the Under Secretary

I have carefully reviewed your memorandum of May 18th to the Secretary concerning the program of the War Relocation Authority. There are several comments which I would like to make concerning your conclusions and recommendations.

You indicate that you think it is true that the announcement concerning the closing of centers substantially increased the number of applications for renunciation of citizenship and for repatriation to Japan. I realize that Mr. Burling in his arguments against center closure has stressed this to be a fact. Consequently I should like to review my reasons for believing that there is little if any basis for this conclusion.

Attached to this memorandum are two tables together with an explanatory preface. One table sets forth by centers the net number of repatriation requests on file January 1, 1944, and the net number filed each month thereafter to May 1, 1945. The second table sets forth the number of formal applications for citizenship renunciation forwarded to applicants by the Department of Justice from November 1944 through May 1945. These tables reveal the following pertinent information:

1. The bulk of repatriation requests in 1944 were filed in the first seven months of the year. They dropped off sharply in August and still more sharply in the remaining months. There was no increase in volume following the revocation of the exclusion orders; on the contrary there was a sharp drop, and so far in 1945 practically the only repatriation requests being filed come from Tule Lake. Even these are fewer in number than the Tule Lake requests filed during the last four months of 1944.

2. Of 8,332 applications for renunciation of citizenship that have been forwarded to the applicants, 8,045 have been sent to Tule Lake. 269 were mailed in November, 2,693 in December, and 4,457 in January. There was a sharp drop thereafter. The figures for November and December are significant because they clearly indicate that the up-surge of renunciation requests from Tule Lake began prior to the revocation of the exclusion orders. It must be remembered that these figures represent the number of application forms mailed out by the Department of Justice during the particular month; the requests for the applications were actually made sometime earlier. It is probably safe to say that 90 per cent of the 2,693 cases handled in December represent requests made before December 17, the date of the Army's announcement. The much larger figure for January is in itself consistent, of course, with Mr. Burling's argument, but taken in conjunction with the December figures the January total more plausibly represents merely a continuation of a process already well begun. This seems particularly true in the light

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of the known fact that the pro-Japanese organizations (the moving force behind the renunciation campaign at Tule Lake) intensified all their activities when Mr. Burling's visit to Tule Lake early in December made it clear that the Department of Justice was taking prompt action on renunciation.

Even more significant in my mind is that no other center followed the Tule Lake pattern with respect to either repatriation requests or renunciation applications. Repatriation requests from other centers dropped almost to zero in 1945; the small scattering of renunciation applications from other centers is concentrated in the period of November through February, with very few in March, April and May. If as a matter of fact a feeling of insecurity was the primary motive underlying repatriation requests and renunciation applications, one would expect a much larger volume of them at the other centers, particularly in the light of the fact that a final closing date had been announced for those centers.

I, of course, agree with your statement that the closing announcement has had the desired effect of expediting relocation. Since the announcement has been made on December 18, 1944, there has been a substantial increase in relocation over preceding years. While there was very little relocation immediately after the announcement was made, there has been a steady increase in the rate since late January, until at present there are approximately 800 persons relocating per week. The actual relocation rate thus far is almost identical with the rate which we assumed would exist when we submitted our 1946 budget estimates. Reports from centers indicate that, with the closing of all schools by June 8th, the rate will be sharply increased. Most centers are estimating at least a doubling of the relocation rate within a few weeks after the closing of schools. In fact, one center is quite confident that 2,000 of the present center population of 5,200 will relocate during the next 30 days. I am quite certain this report is over optimistic. However, the center will be far ahead of schedule if even half this number relocates during that period.

I have seen nothing to date which would lead me to think that we cannot finish our program as scheduled. I am unable to agree with your conclusion that there will be a substantial residue of people in the centers in January 1946, provided that the Authority is permitted to carry on its present program without substantial modification. I do agree that there would be a very substantial residue of people in the centers in January 1946 if the announcement had not been made or if our program should be modified. There are at least three major groups of evacuees who I am sure wish to remain in relocation centers as long as relocation centers are operated.

First, there is a large number of dependent families remaining in the centers whose wage-earners have relocated. The wage-earners are by and large perfectly able to provide for their family members but are reluctant to have them relocate so long as the Government is willing to maintain them. With this group, it is strictly a matter of delaying the relocation of dependent family members because it is economically the wise thing to do. We have discussed relocation with hundreds of these wage-earners and have tried to influence them to relocate their dependents. Most of them are very frank in saying that they will relocate their dependents whenever relocation centers close, but not before,

because they are saving a great deal of money by not taking over financial responsibility for their dependents.

There is a second large group of center residents who simply do not wish to relocate, even though they are capable of self-support and could relocate successfully. These persons have either lost their initiative because of three long years of inertia in relocation centers, or do not have quite the courage to face the world until they actually must. The longer this group remains in relocation centers, the more difficult the task of relocation is going to be.

The third group is comprised of the totally dependent persons who are unable to earn a living because of age, illness, or other infirmities, and who do not have wage-earners to assume responsibility for them. The relocation of this comparatively small group is not an easy problem. We do feel, however, that we have a solution. Since adequate arrangements for the care of this group on the outside are of primary importance, I should like to discuss what we have done and are doing.

The War Relocation Authority in early 1943 entered into an agreement with the Social Security Board under which that agency assumed responsibility for assistance to persons of Japanese ancestry who were released from relocation centers and were either totally dependent or became temporarily dependent because of some emergency. Since the lifting of the exclusion orders, the agreement has been expanded to take care of the much larger problem created by acceleration of relocation and center closure, and the transfer of additional funds to the Social Security Board for the remainder of this fiscal year has been approved by Congress.

The Social Security Board has an agreement with all of the 48 states to provide this assistance through the local welfare agencies on a reimbursable basis. The agreements with Washington, Oregon, Arizona and California also provide that those States will resume their responsibilities for state assistance to returning dependent persons who were bona fide residents of those States prior to evacuation. There have been a number of difficulties in working out expeditious procedures under this program, but we feel that the difficulties are now pretty well overcome. These States are in the main accepting their totally dependent residents and providing assistance to them. Quite a few dependents have been successfully relocated to date under this procedure, although the movement is just getting well under way. One of the big problems which remains is to get the evacuees to leave the centers once they are accepted by the States. Some evacuees are indicating that they would rather wait until the center closes before accepting assistance on the outside. They take this position because they have become accustomed to center life and dislike to break up their group relationship for something new and untried.

Because a few local welfare agencies were objecting to rendering assistance to evacuees over and above the assistance normally given to other dependents in their own counties, we have revised our grant procedure so that the approximately one-tenth of our center residents who need temporary assistance in setting up households will get this assistance in the form of a cash grant from WRA before

leaving the center. We believe that this new development will greatly speed up the resettlement of families who simply need this initial assistance.

Our Welfare and Relocation people have just returned from the West Coast after very successful conferences with the Social Security Board and the State welfare agencies. From all reports, there should be no reason why the totally dependent persons cannot be relocated as fast as we can move their case summaries to the States for acceptance and as fast as we can convince the evacuees that the center is going to close and that it is to their advantage to move out early. Under this arrangement, I believe that we can assure the evacuees of as much security as any normal community residents have. I am certain that this program will provide more security than if we tried to keep one center open for the dependent alien group. While Congress might appropriate money during wartime to support a dependent enemy alien group, I am convinced that as soon as the war is ended there would be a big clamor to deport the entire group. At the very best it is doubtful whether Congress would appropriate money to support a camp program indefinitely. As a result this group might be left destitute at a time when the States would doubtless be much less inclined to re-assume responsibility because the Federal Government had assumed the burden.

You indicate that you think there will be others in the residue group in January 1946, who are not physically infirm or disabled, but who simply have not been willing to take jobs or for whom jobs or residences have not been found. As I indicated above, there are two large groups of persons who might fall in this category. I do want to point out, however, that in spite of some cutbacks in industry we still have more than enough offers of employment to place all evacuees remaining in relocation centers within the next few weeks time. The problem is not one of finding jobs, but one of getting evacuees to accept jobs and to move out of centers.

Housing is a major problem. However, it is being successfully overcome in virtually every community to which evacuees are willing to go. In most West Coast communities, where the housing situation is most acute, hostels have been established by cooperating groups. We have loaned equipment for these hostels, and most evacuees can find temporary accommodations while looking for more permanent housing. The West Coast offices are endeavoring to establish sufficient hostels so that a large number of evacuees can remain in them for months to come if need be in order to find permanent housing. While this is not a desirable situation it still provides better housing than we have at relocation centers.

I of course agree with your recommendation that it would be a mistake to rescind the announcement that centers will be closed in January 1946. I am confident that if we took such a step relocation would be drastically reduced for months to come. Many of the people who have relocated during the past four or five months would be very resentful and would ask for readmission. I do not think that this administration could successfully reinstitute a successful center program.

I am perfectly willing to follow the suggestion that the entire policy be reviewed in September. If it appears that we have been overly optimistic, naturally we shall need to revise our policy in some respects and to ask Congress for funds

to provide continued maintenance of a reduced center program. In this regard, however, I think it is absolutely essential that no mention of this proposal be made outside of the Secretary's office and my office. If such information were to filter back to relocation centers, our program would be seriously handicapped.

Rumors of Mr. Burling's attitude towards center closure have been freely floating around relocation centers, and I can assure you that they have made our task much more difficult. Mr. Burling's and Assistant Secretary Chapman's visits to relocation centers created much uncertainty, and many evacuees have frankly told us that the Department of Justice was seriously opposed to our program and would probably operate centers for evacuees. We have also had difficulty with some of our own staff who are just about as institutionalized as evacuees and who would like to remain in their present jobs indefinitely. Some who were interviewed by Mr. Burling or who had other contacts with him have been extremely difficult to convince that we were going to close relocation centers.


While these difficulties have undoubtedly retarded relocation, I believe that we now have the majority of both appointed personnel and evacuees convinced that the job can and will be done on schedule. Nevertheless, it would take no more than a rumor that our program will be reviewed in September to cause a serious setback, for we can be sure that many evacuees would then wait until September to make their relocation plans.

You also state in your recommendation that you shared the feelings of Assistant Secretary Chapman and Mr. Burling that the States in all probability would not assume the burden of all the indigent, sick and otherwise dependent evacuees and that some shelter would have to be provided. As I indicated above, the States are accepting that responsibility. However, again I am sure that if the States knew that the Federal Government was making plans for a shelter to care for any evacuees who were rejected for State care, we would have most of the entire group on our hands.

We are carefully analyzing Assistant Secretary Chapman's report to determine where we can strengthen our relocation assistance. In some instances, action had been taken along his proposed recommendations prior to the time that he submitted them. In others, we have been unable to work out satisfactory solutions. I will submit a full report on his recommendations within the next few days. I have not seen Mr. Burling's report, so I cannot consider any additional recommendations which he might have proposed.

As you indicated in your memorandum, I am agreeable to the transfer of the Tule Lake Center to the Department of Justice and to the announcement of such a transfer on July 1st, with actual transfer to take place as soon thereafter as arrangements can be completed. I do believe that the transfer of Tule Lake detainees and family members to Department of Justice camps is much more desirable, and I recommend thorough investigation of this possibility before making a decision to transfer the Tule Lake Center to the Department of Justice. I should like to repeat that any transfer of Tule Lake should be expressly conditioned upon a commitment from the Department of Justice not to institute any major changes of policy which would hamper our relocation program. Most important, I think that

the Department of Justice should agree not to adopt any policy under which Tule Lake, or any other center, might be available as a refuge for persons requesting repatriation or renunciation of citizenship. My reasons for this have been fully developed elsewhere. Such a policy would cause many of our center residents to reconsider their relocation plans and take action that would seriously jeopardize their own futures just to insure continued residence in a center for a longer period.



Director

Attachments

Application for Repatriation and for Renunciation of Citizenship

Applications for repatriation (exchange to Japan via the Gripsholm or other exchange ship) have been received in several separate waves. The first group of applications followed a series of inquiries originating with the Spanish Embassy and the Japanese Government and transmitted through the State Department. A majority of the persons whose names were submitted in these queries declined the offer of exchange, but a good many others sent in applications. This wave brought in around 3,500 applications and was fairly well completed by the Spring of 1943. The second wave of applications came after the military registration and brought the total number of applications as of July 1, 1943 to about 6,400. Following segregation, further applications were received, mostly at Tule Lake, bringing the total as of January 1, 1944 to 8,133.

During 1944, several thousand persons at Tule Lake "consolidated" their position by sending in applications for repatriation. Some applications came from other centers, mostly in the first few months of 1944. The attached table shows the net number of applications by center of origin as of January 1, 1944, the number of applications and the number of cancellations by months through 1944 and the first four months of 1945, and the net number outstanding as of May 1, 1945. It is clear that the number of applications in the last three months of 1944 was far less than for any other month of 1944 and the number of applications received during the first four months of 1945 was on the whole at an even lower level, and reflects results of queries as explained below, rather than new applications. Since June, 1944 the preponderant mass of applications has come from Tule Lake, and in the first four months of 1945 only 9 applications have been received from any center other than Tule Lake. On the other hand, a number of cancellations have been received, particularly from Colorado River.

One point needs to be recognized in interpreting the 1945 data. At the time the mass exclusion orders were rescinded for the West Coast, the War Relocation Authority stopped accepting applications and cancellations for repatriation except for those cases in which the State Department had submitted names received from the Spanish Embassy to verify the wishes of the individuals concerned. (This was necessary since individuals frequently sent applications to the Embassy listing not only their own names but also names of relatives. To avoid confusion, it has been necessary to ascertain the wishes of each individual from the individual himself.) Obviously, some time elapses between an application to the Embassy, its reference to the State Department, then to WRA, and finally to the Project for verification. Consequently, cases listed as applying in the Spring of 1945 usually reflect an application to the Embassy some time earlier.

Persons other than those being queried who desire to cancel an application or to request exchange have been advised to write to the State Department directly. The State Department has maintained no statistical record of the number of applications or cancellations received. Informal conversations, however, disclose that the number of applications other than those transmitted by the War Relocation Authority have been fairly small and aggregate probably less than 100 and perhaps less than 50. The conversations indicate there have been more cancellations than applications, and that cancellations may run as high as 100. The conversations disclosed that some of the cancellations, at least, were coming from persons just

coming of age who were attempting to clear their records because their parents had sent in an application for them, or, since they were no longer being detained in centers, they wished to cancel their applications for exchange.

It seems clear, therefore, that the wave of mass applications for repatriation during the last year has been confined almost wholly to Tule Lake and that this wave has largely subsided. One further remark needs to be made. The dates indicated in the attached table relate to the date in which the applications were received at the Washington office of the WRA, and not the date on which the application was signed. At Tule Lake, there has been considerable delay in handling these applications so that, particularly in 1944, the date of application substantially precedes the date of receipt in Washington.

Unfortunately some confusion of terms has arisen. The term "repatriation" refers to the return to Japan by exchange of a citizen of Japan (that is an alien to the United States). The term "expatriation" came to be applied to the corresponding action on the part of a child of such an alien. Unfortunately the term "expatriation" is properly applied to renunciation of citizenship. Consequently, when applications for exchange to Japan by citizens of the United States are referred to as requests for "expatriation", they may be confused with requests to renounce American citizenship under the recently enacted law permitting such renunciations during time of war, the latter being the correct use of the term.

Accordingly the attached table is presented showing the month in which the Department of Justice sent applications to individuals for renunciation of citizenship. The table is based upon lists supplied to the War Relocation Authority by the Department of Justice. The bulk of the applications, of course, went to Tule Lake, but at least one went to every Project and a few to persons outside. Three hundred were sent out in November, 2700 in December, 4500 in January, nearly 600 in February, and after that the number dropped sharply.

NET NUMBER OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY REQUESTING REPATRIATION OR EXPATRIATION 1-1-44,
APPLICATIONS AND CANCELLATIONS RECEIVED BY MONTHS FROM JANUARY 1944 THROUGH APRIL 1945
AND NET NUMBER AS OF MAY 1, 1945, BY CENTER

Note: Column caption date refers to date document received in Washington. Center designation refers to residence at time document signed; does not necessarily imply evacuee is still there.

CENTER	NET 1-1-44	1 9 4 4												1 9 4 5				NET/ 5-1-45
		JAN.	FEB.	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	JAN.	FEB.	MARCH	APRIL	
A P P L I C A T I O N S																		
TOTAL	8,133	368	766	1,331	2,031	1,903	1,315	2,661	803	453	124	159	167	10	95	143	56	19,229
Central Utah	935	14	8	6	24	8	3	8	0	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	970
Colorado River	880	54	153	343	198	56	0	41	33	20	54	20	35	5	0	0	0	1,680
Gila River	1,317	51	187	52	104	2	15	10	0	19	9	4	6	0	0	0	0	1,690
Granada	121	0	94	75	16	14	6	11	0	0	2	11	9	0	0	0	0	309
Heart Mountain	744	200	24	14	7	4	2	7	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	926
Jerome	1,690	24	41	86	10	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,729
Manzanar	684	0	6	141	151	114	42	18	11	24	4	0	48	0	0	0	0	1,105
Minidoka	280	9	21	91	48	8	0	0	18	1	2	0	11	0	4	0	0	426
Rohwer	1,062	16 ^{1/2}	74	71	39	0	1	14	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,193
Tule Lake	2/420	0	158	452	1,434	1,695	1,246	2,552	728	388	47	124	58	5	91	143	56	2/9,201
C A N C E L L A T I O N S																		
TOTAL		116	30	38	49	77	50	61	47	47	47	45	44	11	15	18	12	
Central Utah		13	0	1	1	0	4	3	1	4	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	
Colorado River		22	12	5	1	16	14	3	14	15	9	5	5	7	3	17	12	
Gila River		6	2	8	5	0	3	3	3	3	11	5	0	0	0	0	0	
Granada		3	0	1	3	16	5	1	0	1	5	0	1	0	5	1	0	
Heart Mountain		22	1	3	8	0	0	2	12	1	0	7	7	0	0	0	0	
Jerome		12	8	1	0	31	2	18	0	0	7	0	1	0	0	0	0	
Manzanar		14	2	1	8	3	15	6	2	17	11	15	17	0	0	0	0	
Minidoka		7	1	11	5	0	4	6	2	1	1	2	4	0	1	0	0	
Rohwer		16	4	5	18	7	2	13	4	2	0	0	1	0	6	0	0	
Tule Lake		1	0	2	0	4	1	6	9	3	3	10	8	3	0	0	0	

^{1/} Reflects 582 deductions due to deaths, internment, etc.
^{2/} Includes 2 applications signed at Leupp, Arizona.

Source: Forms WRA-230 and -152

War Relocation Authority
Statistics Section
Washington, D.C.
5-23-45

NUMBER OF FORMS FOR APPLICATION FOR RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP SENT TO APPLICANTS
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BY CENTER AND BY MONTH SENT
MAY 24, 1945

MONTH	Total	Cent. U.	Colo. R.	Gila R.	Gran.	Ht. Mt.	Manz.	Mini.	Rohw.	Tule	Other/1
TOTAL	8332	12	131	42	33	1	12	22	2	8045	32
<u>1944</u>											
November	319	3	26	2	8	0	0	7	0	269	4
December	2740	0	37	0	0	1	1	1	2	2693	5
<u>1945</u>											
January	4509	1	32	3	4	0	3	5	0	4457	4
February	580	6	26	23	10	0	5	6	0	499	5
March	133	1	6	7	5	0	3	3	0	106	2
April	46	1	4	6	4	0	0	0	0	19	12
May	5	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	0

1/ 1 in U.S. Army
1 in State Hospital
3 in Jail
27 Relocated

Source: Lists received from Department of Justice

War Relocation Authority
Statistics Section
Washington, D. C.
5/24/45

WRA-DInt

JUN 6 1945

MEMORANDUM for the Under Secretary

We were glad to receive Assistant Secretary Chapman's report on his recent field trip and have carefully considered all his recommendations. Some of the recommendations had been put into effect before the report was submitted. Others have subsequently been adopted. There are others which we would like to adopt but which present substantial difficulties of a practical nature. There are still others with which we do not agree. I shall discuss Mr. Chapman's recommendations in the order in which they were outlined in his report.

RELOCATION ASSISTANCE

Soon after the relocation program was adopted in mid-summer of 1942, the War Relocation Authority recognized the necessity of working out some kind of long-time assistance program for evacuees leaving relocation centers. We first considered the advisability of taking back into centers those persons who ran into dependency problems after relocating. However, we soon abandoned this idea because we were looking even then toward eventual liquidation of relocation centers and deemed it necessary to work out a long-time program for assistance outside of centers. Consequently, we entered into an agreement with the Social Security Board under which that agency would administer assistance to evacuees who became dependent after relocation. This program has worked out very well. With the lifting of the exclusion order we carefully reconsidered our entire assistance program. In doing so we kept in mind certain basic principles which had guided us in our earliest negotiations with the Social Security Board. These principles are: (1) any program initiated should be one that could be carried on beyond the life of our agency; (2) the War Relocation Authority could not obtain enough qualified welfare workers to take care of evacuee assistance problems which might spring up in counties throughout the entire United States; (3) the states in which the evacuees had residence should accept their responsibilities towards these residents; and (4) any assistance program which we set up should be aimed at evacuees in actual need and should not be considered as compensation for the losses which evacuees incurred through evacuation. No assistance program could equitably distribute assistance on the basis of losses. We were certain that Congress would not appropriate funds for this purpose at present. Furthermore, we felt that any acceptance on the part of evacuees of assistance which might partially off-set their losses would endanger their chances of collecting indemnity at a later date. With the above factors in mind, we set up a program which we thought would be adequate to get the evacuees re-established in outside communities and one for which we thought we could get an appropriation.

We felt that the local public assistance agencies, who were cooperating with the Social Security Board on this program, were in much better

position to determine the immediate needs of the evacuees than were our welfare people at the centers or our relocation people who were thinly scattered in the field. It took several months after the lifting of the exclusion order to get this policy completely understood by all the local public assistance agencies. In general, the agency in most counties was very glad to provide this assistance and did so without any question. However, there were a few counties in which the County Supervisors hesitated to provide household equipment and other such assistance to relocating evacuees because they were unable to provide such assistance to their local welfare clients. The number of counties refusing to cooperate in giving such assistance was narrowed down to six or eight throughout the entire United States. We soon found, however, that while some counties were reluctant to give assistance, most counties were very glad to give it and were giving it so liberally that there was serious danger our budget would be exceeded. It became clear that we would have to establish more direct budgetary control over this phase of operations. A further complication was that many evacuees who did not need assistance were obtaining it while others who actually needed the assistance were reluctant to leave the centers because they were not absolutely sure they would receive the assistance in the field. As a result of a conference which we had with the Social Security Board on this problem, both agencies agreed that the temporary assistance program should be divorced from the long-time or emergency assistance programs of the Social Security Board and that the War Relocation Authority would provide temporary assistance for getting established to both the dependent and the non-dependent families who required it.

I will not describe our present assistance program in detail here, but I am attaching a separate memorandum which sets it forth rather fully. Briefly, that program includes the following types of assistance:

1. Transportation for all to the point of relocation.
2. Transportation of household goods.
3. Twenty-five dollars per person plus subsistence while en route to all those persons remaining at the center who do not have sufficient cash resources to pay initial expenses at the point of relocation.
4. Limited grants to all continuing dependency cases and also to the non-dependent group who needs initial assistance to establish their household.
5. Social Security Board assistance for all those persons needing continuing assistance and also for those relocatees who run into difficulty at a later date because of some emergency and need either temporary or long time assistance.

At the time when we considered our post exclusion policy, we debated whether or not to increase the \$25 grant to \$50--as Mr. Chapman has subsequently suggested. This matter was discussed with many evacuee leaders. In general, our conclusion was that there was no chance of obtaining sufficient funds to make grants in an amount which would be considered adequate by the evacuees. Many suggested sums up to \$10,000 per person. In other words, they were asking for partial retribution of their financial losses. Another factor which deterred us from changing the amount per person was that there were large numbers of people at the centers who

were saying, "Sit tight and WRA will keep increasing its grant until in the end they will give us a large sum per person to get us to move." Any increase at the time the exclusion order was lifted would have encouraged this attitude. If we did increase our grant procedure, the approximately 40,000 evacuees who have already relocated would ask for additional money. When we first established a grant procedure some already relocated evacuees returned to centers and refused to leave without a grant. Any increase in the present grant would certainly create a great deal of ill will among those already relocated and would probably encourage the "sit tighters" to postpone relocation indefinitely in anticipation of still further increases. Moreover, we do not have the money in either this year's or next year's budget to increase this grant.

The Assistant Secretary recommends that small loans of not to exceed \$1,000 per family should be made by the War Relocation Authority to qualified evacuees for the purpose of purchasing equipment necessary to conduct small businesses or for the operation of small farms as well as other projects. In preparing our post exclusion program, we discussed the matter of loans with the Farm Security Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. We obtained assurances from all these agencies that they would provide loans for evacuees on the same basis that they provide loans to any other citizens or law abiding aliens. However, in view of the fact that we did not think these loan facilities were adequate, we drew up a complete loan procedure of our own. After discussing it with the three credit agencies, we decided that it would be impossible to establish a successful loan policy and get it through Congress in time to do any good, especially in view of the fact that the established credit agencies had signified their willingness to cooperate with us in our program. In general, most evacuees who have attempted to obtain loans from private sources have been successful provided they had a good credit rating prior to evacuation. Those evacuees who did not have a good credit rating prior to evacuation could not, in general, get private loans and would certainly not be considered as proper recipients of any kind of Federal loan even though it might have been administered by the War Relocation Authority.

In the early part of this year we heard a great deal about loans and the need for them. However, during the past two months we have heard virtually nothing about the need for loans. We know that a great many evacuees have obtained loans from private sources and that a great many others have been offered financial backing by farm owners or business operators who offered to take the evacuees in on short crop or partnership arrangements. I believe that, in general, the loan problem is a very minor one.

HOUSING

We agree with the Assistant Secretary that housing is a very critical problem in most areas. This is especially true on the West Coast. I believe that by now we have explored every really practical approach to the housing problem. In the early days of our relocation program we recognized the need for temporary accommodations and encouraged the establishment of private hostels to be operated in key cities by cooperating groups. With the opening of the West Coast we tried to expand this idea there. At first, we had very little success because of the extreme difficulty the local cooperating groups had in finding adequate equipment.

Consequently, two weeks prior to Mr. Chapman's visit to our centers and the West Coast, I advised Mr. Lee, Chief of the Relocation Division, that if it proved impossible to set up sufficient hostels without WRA assistance, I felt we should lend equipment surplus to our needs at the centers to any hostel-sponsoring group which had responsible leadership. It was then decided that Mr. Lee would go to the coast to check on this matter prior to meeting Mr. Chapman and Mr. Burling in Phoenix. During his visit to Los Angeles, he determined that it was essential for us to lend equipment and he telephoned me to that effect. Such loans were immediately authorized and the first equipment was made available to a Los Angeles hostel the day after Mr. Chapman visited Los Angeles. We have expanded this idea and are now loaning equipment throughout the entire United States. In the Los Angeles Area we now have more temporary accommodations than are currently needed. However, we are trying to increase these accommodations and within the next few weeks hope to have sufficient room for over 1,000 people. Additional hostels are being opened in the San Francisco and Seattle Areas. It is possible that we will not be able to obtain sufficient temporary housing through cooperating groups. Consequently, we are now considering the possibility of moving some of our demountable barracks to acute areas to be turned over to Federal Housing for administration. This is only in the planning stage and we are not sure that it will be necessary or feasible. We are also attempting to locate abandoned Army camps or other types of temporary housing which might be adapted to our needs. We will not carry out these two programs unless it becomes apparent that cooperating groups cannot supply the need for temporary quarters.

While permanent housing has been extremely difficult to find in all parts of the United States where there has been substantial relocation, we have been able to locate sufficient housing in the mid-western and eastern relocation areas. The permanent housing situation is doubtless even more acute on the Pacific Coast--especially in the San Francisco Area. We have organized special housing committees to assist evacuees in finding temporary and permanent housing in each of the larger cities and are trying to expand on this organization daily. We have also added to the staff in each of the Area offices and in the larger cities an expert on housing to coordinate the efforts of the cooperating groups and of our own staff members.

Prior to the lifting of the exclusion order, I went over the housing situation with Mr. Blandford of the Federal Housing Administration and we completely explored the possibility of obtaining the assistance of his agency in setting up new public housing for the evacuee group. In view of the fact that his agency was being besieged by many other groups--including the Army and the Navy--for additional public housing which he had been unable to obtain funds or priorities to build, he did not think that he could give any assistance in the way of building new public housing exclusively for the evacuee group. He did, however, promise to accept evacuees into the available public housing on the same basis as other persons. He also agreed that evacuees would be eligible for building priorities in case they wished to build their own homes. This assistance has been advertised to evacuees. We have a housing expert on the staff of the Relocation Division in Washington who was formerly in public housing and is working very closely with the housing officials. We are continuing to exploit every possibility for Federal housing assistance. Contrary to some beliefs, a great many evacuees who go to the

West Coast Areas are finding permanent housing. There were a number of evacuees who owned their own homes and we are assisting these people in cancelling their leases and getting their homes back. Many of these people have taken additional boarders into their homes. Another important factor in the housing situation is that many of the evacuees were domestics prior to the war and that they have been offered housing by their employers if they will return. The number of evacuees wishing to return to the West Coast is very insignificant in comparison to the number of in-migrants, including minority groups, who are searching for and finding housing each month on the West Coast.

There is one further comment I would like to make on the housing situation. Many of these people had very poor housing prior to the evacuation. When they were moved into relocation centers many people complained about the "terrible" housing available. I certainly will agree that the very small one-room apartments without running water and toilet facilities at the centers are not good. I have yet to see housing which has been accepted by relocated evacuees in any section of the country which is more sub-standard than that provided at relocation centers. In spite of this, many people are now criticizing this agency because we have been unable to find housing which the evacuees regard as adequate in areas where they relocate. I cannot help but remark again that almost any housing which the evacuees find on the outside is better than that which they have in relocation centers.

DEPENDENCY ASSISTANCE

Mr. Chapman states that our counselling program has developed the fact that a large number of the evacuees are dependency cases. When we started to make dependency surveys, the potential case load appeared to be much greater than we had thought possible. However, as time has passed many of the persons who classed themselves as dependents have been found to have resources or have relocated with friends and relatives so that they no longer present dependency problems. A number of cases have been referred to the field for social security assistance and it has been found on field investigation that the people involved had adequate resources; in fact, many have been quite well off. Our dependency estimates have been reduced each month as persons who claimed that they were dependents during the counselling period have gone back on their own resources. It now appears that while we will have a considerably larger number of dependents than there were before the evacuation, the load is not going to be too great. The West Coast states are accepting the long-time dependency cases where residence can be established. I see very little reason for thinking that a good share of the dependents will not be taken care of under these procedures. The Social Security Board has agreements with the state and county agencies to care for those whom the states will not accept, on a reimbursable basis. I am confident that this manner of taking care of the dependency cases is not only the most humane but is also more economical than trying to maintain a welfare shelter for an enemy alien group which would be at the mercy of hostile individuals in Congress each time an appropriation was requested. One of the big problems, of course, in setting up a shelter would be the determination of who was eligible to enter such a shelter. We have been unable to work out any formula for limiting such a shelter to the strictly dependent group. We are confident that if one were established, practically all of the younger group who are relocating would insist that any dependent members of their family should live in the shelter at government expense. Aside from the fact that there would

be no way of really weeding out the non-dependent group, there is the problem of family ties which has made it almost impossible to relocate thousands of young people from our relocation centers. If someone could give me a solution to this separation process as well as reassure me on how to obtain the necessary appropriation, I would be much more inclined to consider a welfare shelter.

EMPLOYMENT

Mr. Chapman recommends that we take a more active part in assisting the evacuees to obtain desirable employment through more effective liaison with the United States Employment Service. From Mr. Chapman's recommendation it would appear that he does not think the evacuees have been given adequate employment opportunities. Since the early days of our program, we have tried to use the existing governmental agencies in every manner possible. We concluded an agreement with the United States Employment Service early in the program and we have had splendid cooperation from that agency in all but a few places. However, in most cities we have found it necessary to supplement the services of the Employment Service through our own efforts. Relocation officers have forwarded literally hundreds of thousands of employment offers for evacuees at the centers. These employment offers have covered virtually every occupation and have been up to the standards of the communities in which the jobs were offered.

During the first month or two after the West Coast was opened, it is true that some evacuees did not find the exact types of jobs they wished but I believe this is primarily because we had just gotten started and the referral techniques were not as well developed as those which the evacuees were accustomed to in other relocation areas. I believe that these initial difficulties have now been eliminated. While there have been outbreaks in some of the popular relocation areas such as Detroit, Chicago, and Cleveland, we are still satisfactorily placing evacuees. Right now I do not think there is any area where employment for evacuees is a genuine problem.

CIVIL RIGHTS

I certainly agree with Mr. Chapman's recommendations that every step possible should be taken by the Department of Justice to protect the rights of persons of Japanese ancestry. We have referred a number of specific cases to the Department of Justice and have recently prepared, for the signature of the Secretary, a letter to the Attorney General which outlines the whole problem and makes a number of detailed recommendations.

WAR DEPARTMENT AND SELECTIVE SERVICE

We agree in general with Mr. Chapman's recommendations concerning the questions of relationships with the War Department. These questions have been outlined for you in a separate memorandum. I have been unable to find any instances where the Selective Service boards in California have refused to classify some of the evacuees. We have asked our field offices to check on any such cases that they run into so that we can take appropriate action with the national headquarters of selective service. I do realize that the drafting of Japanese Americans is making the relocation of their parents more difficult in certain instances. However, in view of the dependency allotments and the additional assistance which can be obtained through our agreement with the Social Security Board, I do not consider this a major problem.

ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES

Mr. Chapman indicates that while the area and district relocation officers appeared to be capable, he found them handicapped in their work by insufficient assistance and insufficient decentralization of authority and responsibility. I assume that these recommendations were based solely upon Mr. Chapman's visit to the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas and not on what he found in Denver and Chicago. At the time when Mr. Chapman was on the coast, we were still in the early stages of gearing up an organization and were having a great deal of difficulty in recruiting sufficient personnel to do the job. In order to get our West Coast organization established, I placed Mr. E. H. Conness, Assistant Director in San Francisco, in charge of the entire West Coast relocation program. For the first three months after the exclusion order was lifted, he devoted his full time to recruiting and organizing three full area staffs on the West Coast. Once the organization was completed, however, it became evident to me that it would be better to place these three West Coast areas on a semi-independent basis responsible to the Chief of the Relocation Division in Washington the same as the other area offices throughout the United States. The week prior to Mr. Chapman's visit to the West Coast, I advised Mr. Conness that we were going ahead with such an administrative realignment. This reorganization was in the process at the time Mr. Chapman was in Los Angeles and San Francisco and naturally there was some confusion in connection with new procedures and lines of authority. I believe that our organization on the West Coast is now equipped to do the job. While we are finding difficulty in recruiting additional personnel because of the short-term employment which we have to offer, we have a good basic organization and will transfer center personnel to the West Coast field offices as rapidly as they can be made available.

There are several comments that I would like to make about statements in Mr. Chapman's report which are separate from his recommendations and conclusions. In the first paragraph of Mr. Chapman's report, he indicates that immediately following the announcement that all WRA centers, including Tule Lake, would be closed by the end of 1945, thousands of requests for renunciation of citizenship were received by the Department of Justice. He goes on to state that the policy of center closure will undoubtedly lead to wholesale renunciation of citizenship. As I indicated in my memorandum of May 31, I believe that this is an erroneous assumption and that there is very little relationship between the announcement of the closing of centers and the renunciations of citizenship and the requests for repatriation. It is worth repeating that at all centers other than Tule Lake the number of requests for renunciation after the announcement of closure were negligible and that actually the number of cancellations of repatriation requests exceeded the number of new requests. I should also like to point out that the War Relocation Authority has never announced that Tule Lake would be closed by the end of 1945.

A great deal of stress is laid in Mr. Chapman's report on the fact that the group of people remaining in relocation centers will be much more difficult to relocate than the group which has already relocated. To a certain extent this conclusion is true. However, it should be remembered that most members of this older alien group remaining in the relocation centers have one or more wage-earning

supporters already satisfactorily relocated in outside communities. The fact that these wage-earners are out and well established will certainly facilitate the resettlement by the centers of the dependent family members. Aside from some of the older bachelors, and a few other dependent persons who have no relatives, the group remaining in the centers consists of people who have definite ties to the outside and who will not be as difficult to relocate as one would naturally be led to believe by simply reviewing the center composition as it exists at the present time.

I am quite convinced that a great deal of Mr. Chapman's skepticism concerning the workability of our social security agreement came from the session of Welfare Supervisors and the Executive Council of the State Welfare Committee which he attended in Los Angeles. This meeting was called without the knowledge of the Social Security Board or our welfare people. The matter of relocation assistance was discussed before the procedures had been outlined to either the county or the state people by the Social Security Board. I do not think that the confusion which existed in this meeting concerning the procedures and the workability of the relocation assistance program can be taken as a final conclusion that the program will not work. These procedures were completely explained and clarified shortly after this Los Angeles conference. They were again reviewed two weeks ago and I am confident that the program as now set up will operate efficiently.

Mr. Chapman states in his report that he was impressed in his interviews with the officials of the War Relocation Authority by the fact that only a small number agreed with the closing order and that the great majority of them thought that setting a definite deadline for closing the centers was a mistake. I can see why the Assistant Secretary obtained this impression. He visited two camps--Gila and Poston--which at the time of his visit rated second and third respectively from the bottom of the list as far as relocation is concerned. He also visited with Ralph Merritt, Project Director of Manzanar--a center which at that time was at the bottom of the list as far as relocation is concerned but which since that time has climbed into fifth place. Gila and Manzanar are the most attractive of the relocation centers from a physical standpoint. In fact, they are called the "country clubs" of the War Relocation Authority. It has been exceedingly difficult to make the appointed personnel, as well as the evacuees, in these centers relocation minded. I do not think that the majority of the personnel at these two centers disagree with the closing order. I am confident that the great majority of WRA personnel throughout the country are convinced that a definite closing order is the only solution to the evacuees' problem.

The following is a summary of the action taken on Assistant Secretary Chapman's recommendations:

1. We have modified our system of handling relocation assistance through non-federal agencies by making direct grants to persons in need of help to re-establish their household.

2. We are providing for temporary housing through cooperating groups and will provide such facilities ourselves if the facilities prove inadequate. We are taking direct responsibility for directing the permanent housing program.

3. We believe that the War Relocation Authority now has an effective employment policy in all areas.

4. We have encouraged the Justice Department to take effective steps in protecting the civil rights of evacuees.

5. We agree with the recommendation that the War Department should simplify its detention policy and have recommended this on many occasions.

6. We believe we have cleared up practically all the administrative obstacles which the Assistant Secretary observed on his field trip.


Recommended action not taken:

1. The \$25 per person grant has not been increased to \$50 per person nor has it been made independent of a means test, or considered as partial retribution for losses as suggested by Mr. Chapman. We do not have sufficient funds to increase this grant. Also, we do not think it should be considered as partial retribution for losses in that this might jeopardize the evacuees' chances for indemnities where they are justified.

2. We do not have the funds to make small loans and do not think they could be obtained and the machinery set up in time to do any good.

3. No action has been taken on the recommendation that a welfare shelter be established. We believe our present welfare policy is much more sound.

I do not wish to minimize the problems which we have ahead during the next seven months. On the other hand, I feel definitely that the program which we have already outlined is more feasible, both from an administrative and a fiscal standpoint, and more beneficial to the long-range interests of the Japanese American people and of the nation than any alternative plan which has been proposed.


Director

Attachment

JUN 6 1945

Types of Financial Assistance to Japanese American Evacuees by the War Relocation Authority

1. Evacuee Travel

The War Relocation Authority provides railroad fare (or its equivalent in reimbursement for travel in a privately owned automobile) for two groups of evacuees: (1) those now residing in relocation centers, and (2) those who relocated prior to rescinding of the exclusion orders on January 2, 1945, and who now desire to return to their former homes. For members of the first group we provide transportation to any point of their choosing within the United States. For members of the second group, we furnish travel assistance only from their present locations to a designated point within the State or portion of State (e.g. western Washington or Oregon) from which they were evacuated.

2. Transportation of Goods

The War Relocation Authority provides assistance to evacuees in connection with the transportation and storage of household and personal effects. This includes the establishment and operation of warehouses at convenient points for free storage of evacuee property. The Authority will transport the household and personal effects of an evacuee, without expense to the evacuee, from place of private or government storage in the evacuated area or from a relocation center to the common carrier depot nearest the destination designated by the evacuee. Transportation from government or private storage of household and personal effects at government expense includes packing and crating but does not include unpacking and uncrating or door delivery at destination. In addition, tools and equipment or fixtures of an evacuee's trade, business or profession (including farm machinery and equipment) sufficient only for a family-size venture, and not more than 5,000 pounds shipping weight per family may be packed, crated and shipped at the expense of the Authority to the point of the evacuee's relocation. Shipments of more than 5,000 pounds are made at government expense only in exceptional cases and with the approval of the National Director.

3. Subsistence Grants

Center residents who qualify on the basis of need may be provided a subsistence grant consisting of \$3.00 per person per day of travel for meals enroute to point of relocation, plus a maximum of \$25.00 for each member of the family for the purpose of meeting initial subsistence expenses at the place of destination. This subsistence grant may be given to center residents in all cases in which the family's resources in cash amount to \$100 or less per family member.

4. Temporary Assistance in Reestablishment of Households

There are some center residents whose household furnishings were destroyed, sold, or otherwise disposed of at the time of evacuation and whose limited resources have been depleted during more than two years of residence in relocation centers. Of these families, some need only temporary assistance in reestablishing themselves and their households, while others, classed as "dependent" families, will need continuing public assistance. In the case of "non-dependent" families, the War Relocation Authority makes grants at the centers, in advance of relocation, to cover such needs as household furnishings and equipment, transportation of household goods and personal effects from railway station to residence, and one month's food and rent. In the case of "dependent" families, the Authority also

provides funds for household furnishings but their other or continuing needs are cared for by the Social Security Board through State and local departments of public welfare (See #5 below).

Eligibility for such temporary assistance grants is determined at the centers prior to the relocation of the family and the check is mailed to the family at its destination. The determination of eligibility includes consideration of assets and cash resources of the family, the number of potential wage earners and the amount of household furnishings owned by the family. No grants for household furnishings and equipment are made to unattached individuals and married couples without children since it is assumed that they will be able to find furnished housing. The maximum grant for this purpose is \$300 per family. It is estimated that 2,703 dependent families will need household furnishings and that an additional 2,088 families (one-tenth of the non-dependent families in the centers) will require this assistance.

5. Resettlement Assistance

The Social Security Board through State and local departments of public welfare supplies assistance to those families who need continuing financial assistance beyond the initial adjustment period and also to meet unforeseen or emergency needs of non-dependent families occurring after the family's resettlement as a result of illness, unemployment, or similar adversities. Funds for this purpose are transferred to the Social Security Board from the War Relocation Authority.

We estimate that \$7,680,788 will be required during the 1946 fiscal year to carry out our direct financial assistance program as now set up. Of this amount, \$4,150,788 will be given evacuees to establish themselves at the point of relocation, while \$3,530,000 will be spent for evacuee travel and the transportation of their household goods. Of the \$4,150,788, approximately \$2,000,000 will be spent by the Social Security Board. Our budget as reported to the "House" calls for \$7,232,375. We expect to be able to save the additional \$448,413 needed from other items in our appropriation.

[Jun .6, 1945]

MEMORANDUM for the Secretary

I am glad to be able to comment on Mrs. Kingman's memorandum to you of April 30. Since Mrs. Kingman's organization has been of invaluable assistance to our program on the West Coast, and since her memorandum suggests a very basic departure from the present policies of the War Relocation Authority, I should like to discuss in some detail the pertinent points which I see raised by it.

Before the announcement of our liquidation program, we gave careful consideration to all the difficulties which Mrs. Kingman has outlined, as well as to many others, before making a final decision. I believe that practically all of the considerations upon which we originally based our policy are still sound today, and that if the decision were to be made now, there would be no radical departure from the announced policy.

In checking over the progress made since the announcement of our liquidation program, I find that we are exactly on the schedule projected in submitting our budget plans to the Bureau of the Budget. All reports from relocation centers indicate that most evacuees are busy making plans or completing final preparations for resettlement. The rate of relocation has climbed steadily since the first of the year. While it was not expected that large-scale relocation would take place prior to the closure of schools, the rate has now reached about 800 per week. Center reports indicate that the movement will at least double immediately following the closing of schools about June 1, and that the increased rate will be maintained throughout the summer and autumn months. This would complete the program on schedule.

Since we are on schedule and the program is steadily gathering momentum, I think that this is a particularly ill-advised time for us to slacken our efforts or even talk about plans for keeping centers open. Ever since the first of the year, the exclusionist groups on the West Coast have been using every conceivable device to fight the return movement and keep the evacuees "safely" confined in centers. All the recent evidence, however, indicates that these groups are now rapidly losing prestige, enthusiasm and membership precisely because we have held firm on our original plans and because the return movement has shown no signs of retardation. If we were to reverse ourselves in the near future by admitting that the problem of liquidation was too difficult and announcing plans for keeping centers open, I feel certain that the whole opposition movement would be enormously encouraged and revived. Leaders and organizers of the exclusionist groups would be able to point to our announcement as tangible evidence that their efforts have been effective and that the forces favoring justice for

the Japanese Americans are in retreat. With this much ground gained, I have no doubt that the opposition groups would push vigorously forward in a campaign to set aside the December decision of the War Department and place new restrictions on the evacuated people.

The effects of a "postponement" announcement in the relocation centers would be scarcely less disastrous. Unfortunately it is true that a great many of the people still remaining in the centers would prefer not to relocate as long as they have any reason to believe that the centers will be kept open. After three years of isolated, institutionalized life, it is natural perhaps that some of the older people and a few of the younger ones have developed inordinate feelings of timidity, insecurity, and reluctance to face normal living. This is natural, as I say, but that does not mean that it is desirable or even defensible from the long-range point of view. I believe that Mrs. Kingman would agree with me that the evacuees should not be permitted to remain in centers indefinitely and that they must eventually make the transition back to something approaching their pre-war status. My main point, which I cannot repeat too often, is that the longer this transition is delayed, the more difficult it will become. If the momentum of the relocation movement should be broken now, I have the gravest doubts that it could ever be restored or that our ultimate objective of total relocation could ever be reached.

There are today approximately 52,000 evacuees remaining in the relocation centers, who will have to be relocated before December 31. Since present relocation trends are still strongly in favor of mid-western and eastern relocation, it now seems likely that not more than 25,000 or, at the very maximum, more than 35,000 of the remaining population will relocate in communities on the West Coast. Although this is a substantial number taken as a whole, the number to be relocated in any one community on the Coast will not be very large. I believe that our recently completed organization on the West Coast, with the continuing assistance of groups such as Mrs. Kingman's, will be adequate to handle the relocation of 35,000 people in case that many should decide to return, even with the housing shortage and other difficulties mentioned.

Mrs. Kingman suggests that the announcement of center closing is likely to result at the centers in increased distrust of WRA and in greater influence of pro-Japanese leaders over the residents, with resulting "increase in ammunition for opposition press", "unfavorable reaction against persons already relocated," unfavorable international repercussions, and the like.

We originally expected that there would be a great deal of resentment on the part of evacuees against the policy of closing centers. While we have heard considerable criticism, all of our recent reports have indicated that the amount of resentment is much less than expected, that it is not increasing, and that most of the reactions are rationalizations because of immediate frustration or just healthy "gripes." Although activities such as education and

organized recreation will of course decrease at the centers as we approach the closing date, all indications so far are that the evacuees are too busy preparing for their future outside to devote additional time to Japanese schools or recreation. In any case, such activities are far more likely to gain ground in centers than they are among persons living in normal American communities. The statement that a sharp increase in requests for repatriation or expatriation is certain to follow has not been borne out by the facts so far. The rate of requests since the announcement has been no greater than previously. Practically all the requests have been from residents of the Tule Lake Segregation Center.

I believe that the mere existence of relocation centers affords all the "ammunition" which the opposition press needs even without an increase in pro-Japanese activity and an increase in repatriation and expatriation demands. I am sure that Mrs. Kingman is aware that as long as the centers exist, they provide a perfect target for all anti-Japanese American groups to shoot at, regardless of the good conduct or Americanism of their residents. The international implications of the existence of relocation centers are also at least as bad as those of their dissolution. Their very establishment has provided the Tokyo radio with propaganda material, and I believe that their maintenance after the emergency has ceased to exist would provide a source of international criticism on the ground that our democracy was not big enough to re-absorb these people into normal life.

Mrs. Kingman suggests (1) that the WRA "recognize the impossibility of emptying the centers by January 1, 1946, and that concrete and specific plans for the maintenance of satisfactory relocation center life after January 1, 1946, be on paper by September 1, 1945, at latest, and released to the residents of the centers."

As indicated earlier, our program for center closing is proceeding according to schedule, and all indications are that it will continue to do so. We do not believe that it is at all an "impossibility" to empty the relocation centers by January 1. In fact, I have very serious doubts about the possibility of keeping centers open even if we should desire to do so. Each time that we have submitted an appropriation request to Congress, serious questions have been raised as to why it was necessary to maintain centers for persons free to relocate. Our answer in the past -- that these people were not free to return to their homes, and that therefore the government must provide for their maintenance -- no longer applies. Many Congressmen have even asked why it was necessary to have any appropriation for the fiscal year July 1, 1945, to July 1, 1946. I do not believe for a moment that it would be possible (even if it were desirable) to gain Congressional support for an appropriation to operate centers beyond the turn of the year.

Mrs. Kingman suggests (2) that "the high intelligence of many of the evacuees, particularly of their leaders, be recognized by providing something concrete in the way of thinking for the future of those who will not have left the centers by the end of the year."

I think that a careful study of our operations over the past three years would indicate that we have at all times recognized the "high intelligence" of many evacuee leaders. But I cannot agree that there is a future for anyone in the relocation centers. Our efforts in working with the evacuee leaders have been directed toward persuading them to think about their future in normal communities. And it is significant, I believe, that some of the most widely respected of these leaders -- some who have been most outspokenly critical of WRA in the past -- have recently come to recognize the necessity of our proceeding with plans for closing centers. Professor Ichihashi, formerly of the Stanford University faculty, is one such leader, and there are many others. I am confident that their numbers will increase as the war in the Pacific moves forward and further progress is made against the race-baiters on the West Coast.

The suggestion is also made (3) "that the War Relocation Authority frankly admit that large scale return to the West Coast this year is impractical, (due to lack of housing, to antagonism, and to pending unemployment) and lay primary emphasis upon eastern and midwestern relocation."

We do not believe, as already indicated, that the number of persons returning to any one community on the West Coast will be great. It is true that housing is a severe problem in most West Coast cities, and it is quite likely that most evacuees will not be able to find exactly the type of housing which they would prefer. In this respect, they are in the same situation as millions of other displaced persons. Almost any of the available housing, however, is superior to the barracks relocation centers, and I am confident that adequate housing can be found for all the evacuees who choose to return. We are constantly exploring new possibilities in the field of housing, and I hope that with the assistance of local groups, even more can be done in this field than has been done so far.

I do not consider that antagonism to the returning evacuees at this time is a valid reason for admitting that return to the West Coast is impractical. If such is the case, then we may as well forget the possibility of ever having the evacuees return. Our experience in the past has shown that such antagonism, while at first intensified by the settlement of evacuees in the areas of prejudice, is finally eliminated only by having evacuees come in and take their places in the community. This is just what is now happening, and I do not think for a moment that we should play into the hands of the enemies of democracy by declaring that return to the Coast is an "impossibility."

Moreover, I do not believe that potential unemployment is a valid reason for admitting the impracticability of return to the West Coast. I am informed that there are still plenty of job offers for evacuees wishing to return, and I can see no future date when chances for employment, either on the West Coast or elsewhere, will be greater than they are today.

Mrs. Kingman suggests (4) "that the War Relocation Authority marshall all possible support from the heads of the Departments of Interior, State, and Justice to press the War Department for a demand

for (a) adequate housing for dispossessed (on account of the war) families of men and women in the services, (b) adequate security for these families, wherever they may relocate, and (c) public assumption of responsibility for such security."

We fully agree with this point of view, and are exploring every avenue for obtaining such assistance, consistent with what we think other agencies can reasonably be asked to do. We have to bear in mind, of course, that special services rendered to evacuees and not available to other servicemen's families or other displaced persons would meet immediately with widespread opposition both from the Congress that controls appropriations and from the general public that must assist these people to relocate.

Mrs. Kingman suggests, finally (5) "that War Relocation Authority recognize that its friends in local communities on the West Coast have no intention of developing a program for permanent relocation of the returnees." She adds: "We are urging church and welfare groups to provide hostels only where permanent housing is available, and where we know that work opportunities on pre-evacuation levels are available."

The War Relocation Authority has a planned program for the return of evacuees to the West Coast. Although we feel that the assistance of private groups is vital to its success, we do not expect and never have expected such groups to assume the overall responsibility for planning and carrying it out. From surveys we have made, it appears that work opportunities offered evacuees on the West Coast are generally equivalent to those which they engaged in before evacuation, and that in other sections of the country, the opportunities offered evacuees are on a much higher level than those which these people enjoyed before evacuation. Even if this were not true, I know of no way of improving these opportunities by having the evacuees remain in relocation centers.

I recognize that our program does not completely satisfy everyone and that it will inevitably bring about inconvenience, and perhaps even a minor degree of hardship, in individual cases. But the only alternative I can see to carrying out that program is a retreat from all our announced objectives and a tacit admission that Japanese Americans will have to occupy a permanently inferior and subsidized position in our national life. This is an alternative which I have been striving for nearly three years to avoid and which I certainly cannot accept now.

Director

JUN 6 1945

MEMORANDUM for the Under Secretary

We were glad to receive Assistant Secretary Chapman's report on his recent field trip and have carefully considered all his recommendations. Some of the recommendations had been put into effect before the report was submitted. Others have subsequently been adopted. There are others which we would like to adopt but which present substantial difficulties of a practical nature. There are still others with which we do not agree. I shall discuss Mr. Chapman's recommendations in the order in which they were outlined in his report.

RELOCATION ASSISTANCE

Soon after the relocation program was adopted in mid-summer of 1942, the War Relocation Authority recognized the necessity of working out some kind of long-time assistance program for evacuees leaving relocation centers. We first considered the advisability of taking back into centers those persons who ran into dependency problems after relocating. However, we soon abandoned this idea because we were looking even then toward eventual liquidation of relocation centers and deemed it necessary to work out a long-time program for assistance outside of centers. Consequently, we entered into an agreement with the Social Security Board under which that agency would administer assistance to evacuees who became dependent after relocation. This program has worked out very well. With the lifting of the exclusion order we carefully reconsidered our entire assistance program. In doing so we kept in mind certain basic principles which had guided us in our earliest negotiations with the Social Security Board. These principles are: (1) any program initiated should be one that could be carried on beyond the life of our agency; (2) the War Relocation Authority could not obtain enough qualified welfare workers to take care of evacuee assistance problems which might spring up in counties throughout the entire United States; (3) the states in which the evacuees had residence should accept their responsibilities towards these residents; and (4) any assistance program which we set up should be aimed at evacuees in actual need and should not be considered as compensation for the losses which evacuees incurred through evacuation. No assistance program could equitably distribute assistance on the basis of losses. We were certain that Congress would not appropriate funds for this purpose at present. Furthermore, we felt that any acceptance on the part of evacuees of assistance which might partially off-set their losses would endanger their chances of collecting indemnity at a later date. With the above factors in mind, we set up a program which we thought would be adequate to get the evacuees re-established in outside communities and one for which we thought we could get an appropriation.

We felt that the local public assistance agencies, who were cooperating with the Social Security Board on this program, were in much better

position to determine the immediate needs of the evacuees than were our welfare people at the centers or our relocation people who were thinly scattered in the field. It took several months after the lifting of the exclusion order to get this policy completely understood by all the local public assistance agencies. In general, the agency in most counties was very glad to provide this assistance and did so without any question. However, there were a few counties in which the County Supervisors hesitated to provide household equipment and other such assistance to relocating evacuees because they were unable to provide such assistance to their local welfare clients. The number of counties refusing to cooperate in giving such assistance was narrowed down to six or eight throughout the entire United States. We soon found, however, that while some counties were reluctant to give assistance, most counties were very glad to give it and were giving it so liberally that there was serious danger our budget would be exceeded. It became clear that we would have to establish more direct budgetary control over this phase of operations. A further complication was that many evacuees who did not need assistance were obtaining it while others who actually needed the assistance were reluctant to leave the centers because they were not absolutely sure they would receive the assistance in the field. As a result of a conference which we had with the Social Security Board on this problem, both agencies agreed that the temporary assistance program should be divorced from the long-time or emergency assistance programs of the Social Security Board and that the War Relocation Authority would provide temporary assistance for getting established to both the dependent and the non-dependent families who required it.

I will not describe our present assistance program in detail here, but I am attaching a separate memorandum which sets it forth rather fully. Briefly, that program includes the following types of assistance:

1. Transportation for all to the point of relocation.
2. Transportation of household goods.
3. Twenty-five dollars per person plus subsistence while en route to all those persons remaining at the center who do not have sufficient cash resources to pay initial expenses at the point of relocation.
4. Limited grants to all continuing dependency cases and also to the non-dependent group who needs initial assistance to establish their household.
5. Social Security Board assistance for all those persons needing continuing assistance and also for those relocatees who run into difficulty at a later date because of some emergency and need either temporary or long time assistance.

At the time when we considered our post exclusion policy, we debated whether or not to increase the \$25 grant to \$50--as Mr. Chapman has subsequently suggested. This matter was discussed with many evacuee leaders. In general, our conclusion was that there was no chance of obtaining sufficient funds to make grants in an amount which would be considered adequate by the evacuees. Many suggested sums up to \$10,000 per person. In other words, they were asking for partial retribution of their financial losses. Another factor which deterred us from changing the amount per person was that there were large numbers of people at the centers who

were saying, "Sit tight and WRA will keep increasing its grant until in the end they will give us a large sum per person to get us to move." Any increase at the time the exclusion order was lifted would have encouraged this attitude. If we did increase our grant procedure, the approximately 40,000 evacuees who have already relocated would ask for additional money. When we first established a grant procedure some already relocated evacuees returned to centers and refused to leave without a grant. Any increase in the present grant would certainly create a great deal of ill will among those already relocated and would probably encourage the "sit tighters" to postpone relocation indefinitely in anticipation of still further increases. Moreover, we do not have the money in either this year's or next year's budget to increase this grant.

The Assistant Secretary recommends that small loans of not to exceed \$1,000 per family should be made by the War Relocation Authority to qualified evacuees for the purpose of purchasing equipment necessary to conduct small businesses or for the operation of small farms as well as other projects. In preparing our post exclusion program, we discussed the matter of loans with the Farm Security Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. We obtained assurances from all these agencies that they would provide loans for evacuees on the same basis that they provide loans to any other citizens or law abiding aliens. However, in view of the fact that we did not think these loan facilities were adequate, we drew up a complete loan procedure of our own. After discussing it with the three credit agencies, we decided that it would be impossible to establish a successful loan policy and get it through Congress in time to do any good, especially in view of the fact that the established credit agencies had signified their willingness to cooperate with us in our program. In general, most evacuees who have attempted to obtain loans from private sources have been successful provided they had a good credit rating prior to evacuation. Those evacuees who did not have a good credit rating prior to evacuation could not, in general, get private loans and would certainly not be considered as proper recipients of any kind of Federal loan even though it might have been administered by the War Relocation Authority.

In the early part of this year we heard a great deal about loans and the need for them. However, during the past two months we have heard virtually nothing about the need for loans. We know that a great many evacuees have obtained loans from private sources and that a great many others have been offered financial backing by farm owners or business operators who offered to take the evacuees in on short crop or partnership arrangements. I believe that, in general, the loan problem is a very minor one.

HOUSING

We agree with the Assistant Secretary that housing is a very critical problem in most areas. This is especially true on the West Coast. I believe that by now we have explored every really practical approach to the housing problem. In the early days of our relocation program we recognized the need for temporary accommodations and encouraged the establishment of private hostels to be operated in key cities by cooperating groups. With the opening of the West Coast we tried to expand this idea there. At first, we had very little success because of the extreme difficulty the local cooperating groups had in finding adequate equipment.

Consequently, two weeks prior to Mr. Chapman's visit to our centers and the West Coast, I advised Mr. Lee, Chief of the Relocation Division, that if it proved impossible to set up sufficient hostels without WRA assistance, I felt we should lend equipment surplus to our needs at the centers to any hostel-sponsoring group which had responsible leadership. It was then decided that Mr. Lee would go to the coast to check on this matter prior to meeting Mr. Chapman and Mr. Darling in Phoenix. During his visit to Los Angeles, he determined that it was essential for us to lend equipment and he telephoned me to that effect. Such loans were immediately authorized and the first equipment was made available to a Los Angeles hostel the day after Mr. Chapman visited Los Angeles. We have expanded this idea and are now loaning equipment throughout the entire United States. In the Los Angeles Area we now have more temporary accommodations than are currently needed. However, we are trying to increase these accommodations and within the next few weeks hope to have sufficient rooms for over 1,000 people. Additional hostels are being opened in the San Francisco and Seattle Areas. It is possible that we will not be able to obtain sufficient temporary housing through cooperating groups. Consequently, we are now considering the possibility of moving some of our demountable barracks to some areas to be turned over to Federal Housing for administration. This is only in the planning stage and we are not sure that it will be necessary or feasible. We are also attempting to locate abandoned Army camps or other types of temporary housing which might be adapted to our needs. We will not carry out these two programs unless it becomes apparent that cooperating groups cannot supply the need for temporary quarters.

While permanent housing has been extremely difficult to find in all parts of the United States where there has been substantial relocation, we have been able to locate sufficient housing in the mid-western and eastern relocation areas. The permanent housing situation is doubtless even more acute on the Pacific Coast--especially in the San Francisco Area. We have organized special housing committees to assist evacuees in finding temporary and permanent housing in each of the larger cities and are trying to expand on this organization daily. We have also added to the staff in each of the Area offices and in the larger cities an expert on housing to coordinate the efforts of the cooperating groups and of our own staff members.

Prior to the lifting of the exclusion order, I went over the housing situation with Mr. Blandford of the Federal Housing Administration and we completely explored the possibility of obtaining the assistance of his agency in setting up new public housing for the evacuee group. In view of the fact that his agency was being besieged by many other groups--including the Army and the Navy--for additional public housing which he had been unable to obtain funds or priorities to build, he did not think that he could give any assistance in the way of building new public housing exclusively for the evacuee group. He did, however, promise to accept evacuees into the available public housing on the same basis as other persons. He also agreed that evacuees would be eligible for building priorities in case they wished to build their own homes. This assistance has been advertised to evacuees. We have a housing expert on the staff of the Relocation Division in Washington who was formerly in public housing and is working very closely with the housing officials. We are continuing to exploit every possibility for Federal housing assistance. Contrary to some beliefs, a great many evacuees who go to the

West Coast Areas are finding permanent housing. There were a number of evacuees who owned their own homes and we are assisting these people in cancelling their leases and getting their homes back. Many of these people have taken additional boarders into their homes. Another important factor in the housing situation is that many of the evacuees were domestics prior to the war and that they have been offered housing by their employers if they will return. The number of evacuees wishing to return to the West Coast is very insignificant in comparison to the number of in-migrants, including minority groups, who are searching for and finding housing each month on the West Coast.

There is one further comment I would like to make on the housing situation. Many of these people had very poor housing prior to the evacuation. When they were moved into relocation centers many people complained about the "terrible" housing available. I certainly will agree that the very small one-room apartments without running water and toilet facilities at the centers are not good. I have yet to see housing which has been accepted by relocated evacuees in any section of the country which is more sub-standard than that provided at relocation centers. In spite of this, many people are now criticizing this agency because we have been unable to find housing which the evacuees regard as adequate in areas where they relocate. I cannot help but remark again that almost any housing which the evacuees find on the outside is better than that which they have in relocation centers.

DEPENDENCY ASSISTANCE

Mr. Chapman states that our counselling program has developed the fact that a large number of the evacuees are dependency cases. When we started to make dependency surveys, the potential case load appeared to be much greater than we had thought possible. However, as time has passed many of the persons who classed themselves as dependents have been found to have resources or have relocated with friends and relatives so that they no longer present dependency problems. A number of cases have been referred to the field for social security assistance and it has been found on field investigation that the people involved had adequate resources; in fact, many have been quite well off. Our dependency estimates have been reduced each month as persons who claimed that they were dependents during the counselling period have gone back on their own resources. It now appears that while we will have a considerably larger number of dependents than there were before the evacuation, the load is not going to be too great. The West Coast states are accepting the long-time dependency cases where residence can be established. I see very little reason for thinking that a good share of the dependents will not be taken care of under these procedures. The Social Security Board has agreements with the state and county agencies to care for those whom the states will not accept on a reimbursable basis. I am confident that this manner of taking care of the dependency cases is not only the most humane but is also more economic than trying to maintain a welfare shelter for an enemy alien group which would be the mercy of hostile individuals in Congress each time an appropriation is requested. One of the big problems, of course, in setting up a shelter is the determination of who was eligible to enter such a shelter. We are working out any formula for limiting such a shelter to the states. We are confident that if one were established, practical people who are relocating would insist that any dependent not live in the shelter at government expense. Aside from

be no way of really weeding out the non-dependent group, there is the problem of family ties which has made it almost impossible to relocate thousands of young people from our relocation centers. If someone could give me a solution to this separation process as well as reassure me on how to obtain the necessary appropriation, I would be much more inclined to consider a welfare shelter.

EMPLOYMENT

Mr. Chapman recommends that we take a more active part in assisting the evacuees to obtain desirable employment through more effective liaison with the United States Employment Service. From Mr. Chapman's recommendation it would appear that he does not think the evacuees have been given adequate employment opportunities. Since the early days of our program, we have tried to use the existing governmental agencies in every manner possible. We concluded an agreement with the United States Employment Service early in the program and we have had splendid cooperation from that agency in all but a few places. However, in most cities we have found it necessary to supplement the services of the Employment Service through our own efforts. Relocation officers have forwarded literally hundreds of thousands of employment offers for evacuees at the centers. These employment offers have covered virtually every occupation and have been up to the standards of the communities in which the jobs were offered.

During the first month or two after the West Coast was opened, it is true that some evacuees did not find the exact types of jobs they wished but I believe this is primarily because we had just gotten started and the referral techniques were not as well developed as those which the evacuees were accustomed to in other relocation areas. I believe that these initial difficulties have now been eliminated. While there have been outbreaks in some of the popular relocation areas such as Detroit, Chicago, and Cleveland, we are still satisfactorily placing evacuees. Right now I do not think there is any area where employment for evacuees is a genuine problem.

CIVIL RIGHTS

I certainly agree with Mr. Chapman's recommendations that every step possible should be taken by the Department of Justice to protect the rights of persons of Japanese ancestry. We have referred a number of specific cases to the Department of Justice and have recently prepared, for the signature of the Secretary, a letter to the Attorney General which outlined the whole problem and makes a number of detailed recommendations.

WAR DEPARTMENT AND SELECTIVE SERVICE

We agree in general with Mr. Chapman's recommendations concerning the questions of relationships with the War Department. These questions have been outlined for you in a separate memorandum. I have been unable to find any instances where the Selective Service boards in California have refused to classify some of the evacuees. We have asked our field offices to check on any such cases that they run into so that we can take appropriate action with the national headquarters of Selective Service. I do realize that the drafting of Japanese Americans is making the relocation of their parents more difficult in certain instances. However, in view of the dependency allotments and the additional assistance which can be obtained through our agreement with the Social Security Board, I do not consider this a major problem.

ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES

Mr. Chapman indicates that while the area and district relocation officers appeared to be capable, he found them handicapped in their work by insufficient assistance and insufficient decentralization of authority and responsibility. I assume that these recommendations were based solely upon Mr. Chapman's visit to the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas and not on what he found in Denver and Chicago. At the time when Mr. Chapman was on the coast, we were still in the early stages of gearing up an organization and were having a great deal of difficulty in recruiting sufficient personnel to do the job. In order to get our West Coast organization established, I placed Mr. H. B. Gossens, Assistant Director in San Francisco, in charge of the entire West Coast relocation program. For the first three months after the exclusion order was lifted, he devoted his full time to recruiting and organizing three full area staffs on the West Coast. Once the organization was completed, however, it became evident to me that it would be better to place these three West Coast areas on a semi-independent basis responsible to the Chief of the Relocation Division in Washington the same as the other area offices throughout the United States. The week prior to Mr. Chapman's visit to the West Coast, I advised Mr. Gossens that we were going ahead with such an administrative realignment. This reorganization was in the process at the time Mr. Chapman was in Los Angeles and San Francisco and naturally there was some confusion in connection with new procedures and lines of authority. I believe that our organization on the West Coast is now equipped to do the job. While we are finding difficulty in recruiting additional personnel because of the short-term employment which we have to offer, we have a good basic organization and will transfer center personnel to the West Coast field offices as rapidly as they can be made available.

There are several comments that I would like to make about statements in Mr. Chapman's report which are separate from his recommendations and conclusions. In the first paragraph of Mr. Chapman's report, he indicates that immediately following the announcement that all WRA centers, including Tule Lake, would be closed by the end of 1945, thousands of requests for renunciation of citizenship were received by the Department of Justice. He goes on to state that the policy of center closure will undoubtedly lead to wholesale renunciation of citizenship. As I indicated in my memorandum of May 31, I believe that this is an erroneous assumption and that there is very little relationship between the announcement of the closing of centers and the renunciations of citizenship and the requests for repatriation. It is worth repeating that at all centers other than Tule Lake the number of requests for renunciation after the announcement of closure were negligible and that actually the number of cancellations of repatriation requests exceeded the number of new requests. I should also like to point out that the War Relocation Authority has never announced that Tule Lake would be closed by the end of 1945.

A great deal of stress is laid in Mr. Chapman's report on the fact that the group of people remaining in relocation centers will be much more difficult to relocate than the group which has already relocated. To a certain extent this conclusion is true. However, it should be remembered that most members of this older alien group remaining in the relocation centers have one or more wage-earning

supporters already satisfactorily relocated in outside communities. The fact that these wage-earners are out and well established will certainly facilitate the resettlement by the centers of the dependent family members. Aside from some of the older bachelors, and a few other dependent persons who have no relatives, the group remaining in the centers consists of people who have definite ties to the outside and who will not be as difficult to relocate as one would naturally be led to believe by simply reviewing the center composition as it exists at the present time.

I am quite convinced that a great deal of Mr. Chapman's skepticism concerning the workability of our Social Security agreement came from the session of Welfare Supervisors and the Executive Council of the State Welfare Committee which he attended in Los Angeles. This meeting was called without the knowledge of the Social Security Board or our welfare people. The matter of relocation assistance was discussed before the procedures had been outlined to either the county or the state people by the Social Security Board. I do not think that the confusion which existed in this meeting concerning the procedures and the workability of the relocation assistance program can be taken as a final conclusion that the program will not work. These procedures were completely explained and clarified shortly after this Los Angeles conference. They were again reviewed two weeks ago and I am confident that the program as now set up will operate efficiently.

Mr. Chapman states in his report that he was impressed in his interviews with the officials of the War Relocation Authority by the fact that only a small number agreed with the closing order and that the great majority of them thought that setting a definite deadline for closing the centers was a mistake. I can see why the Assistant Secretary obtained this impression. He visited two camps--Gila and Poston--which at the time of his visit rated second and third respectively from the bottom of the list as far as relocation is concerned. He also visited with Ralph Merritt, Project Director of Manzanar--a center which at that time was at the bottom of the list as far as relocation is concerned but which since that time has climbed into fifth place. Gila and Manzanar are the most attractive of the relocation centers from a physical standpoint. In fact, they are called the "country clubs" of the War Relocation Authority. It has been exceedingly difficult to make the appointed personnel, as well as the evacuees, in these centers relocation minded. I do not think that the majority of the personnel at these two centers disagree with the closing order. I am confident that the great majority of WRA personnel throughout the country are convinced that a definite closing order is the only solution to the evacuees' problem.

The following is a summary of the action taken on Assistant Secretary Chapman's recommendations:

1. We have modified our system of handling relocation assistance through non-federal agencies by making direct grants to persons in need of help to re-establish their household.
2. We are providing for temporary housing through cooperating groups and will provide such facilities ourselves if the facilities prove inadequate. We are taking direct responsibility for directing the permanent housing program.

3. We believe that the War Relocation Authority now has an effective employment policy in all areas.

4. We have encouraged the Justice Department to take effective steps in protecting the civil rights of evacuees.

5. We agree with the recommendation that the War Department should simplify its detention policy and have recommended this on many occasions.

6. We believe we have cleared up practically all the administrative obstacles which the Assistant Secretary observed on his field trip.

Recommended action not taken:

1. The \$25 per person grant has not been increased to \$50 per person nor has it been made independent of a means test, or considered as partial retribution for losses as suggested by Mr. Chapman. We do not have sufficient funds to increase this grant. Also, we do not think it should be considered as partial retribution for losses in that this might jeopardize the evacuees' chances for indemnities where they are justified.

2. We do not have the funds to make small loans and do not think they could be obtained and the machinery set up in time to do any good.

3. No action has been taken on the recommendation that a welfare shelter be established. We believe our present welfare policy is much more sound.

I do not wish to minimize the problems which we have ahead during the next seven months. On the other hand, I feel definitely that the program which we have already outlined is more feasible, both from an administrative and a fiscal standpoint, and more beneficial to the long-range interests of the Japanese American people and of the nation than any alternative plan which has been proposed.

D. S. Myer

Director

Attachment

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Washington, D. C.

COPY

WRA-DWT

E 2.07

18 June, 1945

Honorable Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of Interior
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harold:

As a result of the changed military situation and under the impetus of your comprehensive letter to the Secretary dated May 3, 1945, which has been referred to me, and your note to me of June 1, 1945, I have reviewed the entire question of War Department policy toward persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States. In this, I have had the benefit of some very helpful discussions with Abe Fortas, Herb Wechsler, and General Pratt in San Francisco. These discussions covered several of the points mentioned in your letters and resulted in what appeared to be a very general agreement on the main objectives and courses of procedure.

Your letter of May 3, 1945, suggests three modifications in the exclusion and segregation program. Two of these were discussed in San Francisco. I think that you will find General Pratt sympathetic with the suggestion that Buddhist priests and former language school teachers should be made the subject of a special inquiry with a view to a possible relaxation. I suggest that Mr. Cozzens of the War Relocation Authority take this up directly with the Western Defense Command. I am confident from my discussions with General Pratt that the Western Defense Command will give full consideration to suggestions along this line.

The Western Defense Command realizes the difficulties that are caused to the War Relocation Authority by the addition of new names to the exclusion or segregation lists, and in our San Francisco discussions it was agreed that the adding of new names should be kept to an absolute minimum. But General Pratt said, and I agreed with him, that as long as his responsibilities as military commander continued under the present executive order, he could not fix an absolute deadline beyond which no further names would be added. Similarly, he could not agree to remove from the exclusion list all persons who had been granted leave clearance by the War Relocation Authority.

Although I recognize the importance of your suggestions, I do not believe that they are basic to a solution of the exclusion problem. After a good deal of thought on the future of exclusion, I have come to the conclusion that we should attempt to bring about, as rapidly as possible, the War Department's retirement from the segregation phase of the program (in line with the Inter-Departmental Understanding) and when that is done, we should consider a modification of the exclusion program which will be in consonance with the improved military situation and will result in a substantial progressive reduction in the number of excludees. When the Department of Justice has assumed responsibility for

renunciants, applicants for renunciation, aliens, and such other persons recommended for segregation as it may consider itself legally authorized to deal with, I hope that the War Department's responsibility in regard to segregation will cease. I understand informally from Wechsler that such a program is in accordance with his views.

The prerequisites for such a program, it seems to me, are as follows: First, the Justice Department must advise us as to its policies. This Wechsler has agreed to do promptly. This will enable the Western Defense Command to estimate the dimensions of the military problem that will remain after the Justice Department has taken over. Second, War Relocation Authority must remove from Tule Lake all persons who are not recommended for detention and who do not desire to remain there on a voluntary basis with their families, and must also move into Tule Lake (or any other camp that may be considered preferable as a segregation center) all persons in other centers who are recommended for detention, together with such members of their families as desire to accompany them. The Army will be glad to cooperate fully, including furnishing guards and assisting in handling movements of personnel. When these movements are completed, the Army will withdraw its guards from all centers other than Tule Lake (or any other place that may be selected as the segregation center). We are very anxious to avoid having the returning soldiers find their parents in guarded camps and I think you will agree that the removal of the guards is very much to be desired.

At the time of the Inter-Departmental Understanding it was contemplated, at least by me, that the segregation program would be accomplished within a few months after the termination of mass exclusion. I am aware that several parts of the program called for by the Understanding have been unavoidably delayed, in some cases by the Army, but I do believe that the fact that the segregation has not been completed has been, and still is, the principal source of difficulty and friction. Once this program is completed, I believe we will be able to inaugurate a program to accomplish a substantial progressive reduction in the number of excludées, and I hope you will agree that our present efforts should be directed along these lines.

With respect to employment clearance by the Provost Marshal General's Office, this matter has been discussed in several recent letters to you from the Secretary. I inquired into this subject on my recent visit to San Francisco. I am informed that there is no discrimination in substance in this field. There is only a very limited category of jobs (involving work in plants where highly-classified projects are being carried out) for which this clearance is required, and for those jobs, clearance is required equally for Japanese-Americans and others, including discharged veterans. The only distinction between Japanese-Americans and others is that, in the case of the Japanese-Americans, the clearance is centralized in the agency which has access to the available information, which happens to be collected in one place. I am confident that

the recent transfer of Provost Marshal General records to the Presidio will greatly reduce the time required to obtain clearances and also will tend to remove any inconsistency between actions of the Western Defense Command and the Provost Marshal General's Office. I know that sincere efforts are being made in this direction.

As to the question of using Japanese-American soldiers in the Pacific and publicizing the records of such of them as have been in the Pacific, I have asked the staff to give me a study on this matter and shall write you further on the subject.

Your letter of June 1 refers to the distribution of a statement by the Western Defense Command on the return of evacuees to the West Coast. I have not much faith in statements of this kind and I think that the events that have taken place in spite of the vigorous statements made by you and Mr. Stimson tend to confirm my view. Moreover, the War Department's position was clearly and carefully stated at the time of the rescission of mass exclusion, and that statement has been referred to since on a number of occasions. I think that mere repetition of the same ideas tends to defeat itself. However, in view of the importance which the matter has in your eyes, I am having a statement prepared for release, and I hope that my pessimistic views as to the good that can be accomplished by it will prove to be mistaken.

Sincerely,

/s/ John J. McCloy

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

~~E3708~~
E2107

April 24, 1946

My dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the adjudication of claims of persons of Japanese ancestry against the United States for losses arising out of the evacuation or exclusion of such persons by the War Department from the West Coast, Alaska, and Hawaii during World War II.

In 1942, the War Department, acting under Executive Order No. 9066, ordered the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast of the continental United States, Alaska and a portion of Arizona. Most of them were removed to relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority. They were joined later by over 1000 persons evacuated from Hawaii. For approximately two and one-half years, these American citizens and their alien parents, more than 100,000 in number, were exiled from their homes. After January 2, 1945, the majority of them were allowed to return to the evacuated areas and to pick up the raveled ends of the life they knew before the forced evacuation. By the end of 1945, about half of these people had so returned. The remainder have been scattered throughout the country or, in the case of the thousands who are in the Armed Forces of the United States, are serving with the Army of Occupation in Europe or Asia. It is too early as yet to make a final estimate of actual financial and property losses sustained by the Japanese-Americans because of the evacuation, but it is well established that the losses have been heavy. Some lost everything they had; many lost most of what they had.

The chief military justification for the removal of those 110,000 persons was the possibility of the existence of a disloyal element in their midst, the critical military situation in the Pacific which increased uneasiness over the possibility of espionage or sabotage, and the lack of time and facilities for individual loyalty screening. The persons evacuated were not individually charged with any crime or with disloyalty, and subsequent experience has clearly demonstrated that the vast majority of them were and are good Americans. This is convincingly indicated by the outstanding record of our 23,000 Japanese-Americans who served in the armed forces in both the European and Pacific theatres, and by the fact that the records of the intelligence agencies show no case of sabotage or espionage by Americans of Japanese ancestry during the entire war.

The evacuation orders gave the persons affected desperately little time in which to settle their affairs. The governmental safeguards that were designed to prevent undue loss in these circumstances were somewhat tardily instituted, were not at once effectively publicized among the evacuees, and were never entirely successful. Merchants had to dispose of their stocks and businesses at sacrifice prices. In a setting of confusion and hysteria, many evacuees sold personal possessions for a small fraction of their value. A large number had to accept totally inadequate arrangements for protection and management of property. Valuable leasehold interests had to be abandoned.

Continued exclusion increased the losses. Private buildings in which evacuees stored their property were broken into and vandalized. Mysterious fires destroyed vacant buildings. Property left with "friends" unaccountably disappeared; goods stored with the Government sometimes were damaged or lost. Persons entrusted with the management of evacuee real property mulcted the owners in diverse ways. Tenants failed to pay rent, converted property to their own use, and committed waste. Prohibited from returning to the evacuated areas even temporarily to handle property matters, the evacuees were unable to protect themselves adequately. Property management assistance given by the War Relocation Authority on the West Coast, although it often mitigated and sometimes prevented loss, could not completely solve the problem there, complicated as it was by difficulties in communication with absent owners and local prejudice.

In relocation centers the only income opportunities for evacuees lay in center employment at wage rates of \$12 to \$19 per month, plus small clothing allowances. Many felt compelled to discontinue payment of life insurance premiums. Some found themselves unable to make mortgage or tax payments and lost substantial equities.

All of the foregoing examples of tangible loss to the evacuees are directly attributable to the evacuation and continued exclusion of these persons from their homes. Unlike our fighting men and their families, who also made financial and personal sacrifices in this war, this group was given no statutory right to ameliorating benefits. These persons have had to bear the losses occasioned by the evacuation in addition to the war-time deprivations they have shared with the rest of the American people. For the first time in our history, persons of Japanese ancestry are appearing in substantial numbers on the relief rolls. The least that this country can do, in simple justice, is to afford some degree of compensation for the measurable special losses that the evacuees have suffered.

The only clear recourse which the evacuees now have, through the passage of private relief bills, is totally impracticable. The potential volume of evacuee claims, if added to the load under which the Congressional claims committees are already laboring, might well produce a virtually unmanageable burden. The obvious result would be to postpone the settlement of most evacuee claims for an indefinitely protracted period. To provide for adjudication of the claims by the Court of Claims would be an imposition on that Court, because of the small individual amounts involved and the potential

volume of claims, and unfair to the claimants, because of the expense of prosecuting a claim before the Court of Claims and the probable delay in adjudication. The most economical and practical solution -- one which Congress has adopted on numerous occasions in the past for the handling of case claims arising out of a special subject matter -- is the creation of a special tribunal to hear and determine the claims.

The enclosed bill would establish an Evacuation Claims Commission as such a tribunal. In order to avoid increasing the number of independent agencies and to benefit by the experience which this Department has had with the entire evacuation and relocation problem, the bill would establish the Commission within this Department rather than as a separate Federal agency.

The Commission would have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims by persons of Japanese ancestry for damage to or loss of real or personal property, or other impairment of assets, that arose from or as a natural and reasonable consequence of the evacuation and exclusion program. This standard is sufficiently flexible to permit the Commission to consider claims involving "property" losses only in the broad sense, such as the impairment of going-concern values. At the same time the standard excludes claims that are largely speculative and less definitely appraisable, such as claims for anticipated wages or profits that might have accrued had not the evacuation occurred, for deterioration of skills and earning capacity, and for physical hardships or mental suffering.

In determining the amount of relief to be granted, the Commission would be required to consider other existing or intervening factors that affected the loss. Thus some losses, as in the case of businesses specializing in import or sale of Japanese goods, would have occurred even if there had been no evacuation. Likewise, damage may have been aggravated in some cases by failure of the evacuees to take steps which they reasonably should have taken, even in the abnormal circumstances, to protect themselves. On the other hand, there are numerous instances in which intervening factors immediately causing the loss, such as arson, theft, mortgage foreclosure, loss of goods while in Government possession, or breach of trust, should not affect recovery, because the situation giving rise to the loss would not have occurred had the owners been permitted to remain in possession.

Among the types of claims excluded by the bill from consideration by the Commission are claims of persons who were voluntarily or involuntarily deported to Japan after December 7, 1941, or who are resident in a foreign country. Several hundred evacuees voluntarily repatriated to Japan during the war. Since termination of hostilities approximately 7500 persons, most of them evacuees, have at Government expense voluntarily gone to Japan, chiefly from internment camps and the Tule Lake Segregation Center. In addition, the Department of Justice has been determining who among the aliens (including persons who renounced their American citizenship) should be deported to Japan. This processing is the culmination of the loyalty screening procedures to which the evacuees have been subjected since the evacuation. I do not believe that those repatriates and deportees have any moral claim upon this Government. Similarly, I believe that persons who before the war went to Japan or elsewhere to establish residence have no claim for compensation that we need recognize.

The remaining provisions of the bill are largely self-explanatory and I shall merely mention the more important. All claims would have to be filed within 18 months following enactment, and the Commission would be required to complete its work within three and one-half years thereafter. The Commission would have broad investigatory authority, including the power of subpoena, and each claimant would be entitled to a hearing. Assistance in preparing claims for filing could be extended by the Commission to needy claimants. The Commission's adjudications would be conclusive and a bar to further recovery. Awards would be paid in the same manner as are final judgments of the Court of Claims, except that the Commission would be authorized to pay small awards, not exceeding \$2500 in amount, in order to afford more expeditious relief to those whose need may be acute.

As a matter of fairness and good conscience, and because these particular American citizens and law-abiding aliens have borne with patience and undefeated loyalty the unique burdens which this Government has thrown upon them, I strongly urge that the proposed legislation be enacted into law.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised me that there is no objection to the presentation of this proposed legislation to the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. A. Krug

Secretary of the Interior

Hon. Sam Rayburn,
Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

Enclosure 506

[An identical letter has been sent to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.]

A B I L L

To Create an Evacuation Claims Commission under the General Supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, and to Provide for the Powers, Duties and Functions Thereof, and for Other Purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That there is hereby established in the Department of the Interior, under the general supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, the Evacuation Claims Commission, with authority as hereinafter defined to adjudicate claims arising out of the evacuation or exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from West Coast military areas, Alaska, and Hawaii subsequent to December 7, 1941. The Commission shall consist of a chairman and two other members who shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. Two members shall constitute a quorum and the agreement of two members shall be sufficient for the transaction of any business of the Commission.

Jurisdiction

Sec. 2. The Commission shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate any claim by a person of Japanese ancestry against the United States arising on or after December 7, 1941, when such claim is not compensated for by insurance or otherwise and is substantiated in such manner as the Commission may prescribe, for damage to or loss or destruction of real or personal property (including without limitation damage to or loss or destruction of personal property bailed to or in the custody of the Government or any agent thereof), or other impairment of assets, that fairly arises out of or is a reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation or exclusion of such person by the appropriate military commander from a military area in Arizona, California, Oregon or Washington or from Alaska or Hawaii, under authority of Executive Order No. 9066 dated February 19, 1942 (3 CFR, Cum. Supp., 1092), Section 67 of the Act of April 30, 1900 (48 U.S.C. 532), or Executive Order No. 9489 dated October 18, 1944 (3 CFR, 1944 Supp., 45). As used herein "evacuation" shall include voluntary departure from a military area prior to but in anticipation of an order of exclusion therefrom. Existence or intervention of other causes affecting the damage or loss, including action or non-action by the claimant or his representatives, shall be considered by the Commission in determining the amount of relief that will be fair and equitable according to the facts as they appear in each case.

Limitations; Claims Not to be Considered

Sec. 3. (a) The Commission shall receive claims for a period of 18 months from the date of approval of this Act. All claims not presented within that time shall be forever barred.

(b) The Commission shall not consider any claim:

(1) by or on behalf of any person who after December 7, 1941 was voluntarily or involuntarily deported from the United States to Japan or who is otherwise resident in a foreign country.

(2) for damage or loss arising out of action taken by any Federal agency pursuant to sections 4067, 4068, 4069 and 4070 (relating to alien enemies) of the Revised Statutes, as amended (50 U.S.C. 21-24), or pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. App., and Supp., 1-31, 616).

(3) for damage or loss to any property, or interest therein, vested in the United States pursuant to said Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended.

(4) for damage or loss on account of death or personal injury, personal inconvenience, physical hardship, or mental suffering.

Hearing; Evidence; Records

Sec. 4. (a) The Commission shall give reasonable notice to the interested parties and an opportunity for them to be heard and to present evidence before making a final determination upon any claim.

(b) Any relevant evidence having probative value shall be considered by the Commission in its inquiries. For the purpose of any hearing or investigation authorized under this Act, the provisions of sections 9 and 10 (relating to examination of documentary evidence, attendance of witnesses, and production of books, papers and documents) of the Federal Trade Commission Act of September 26, 1914, as amended (15 U.S.C. 49, 50) are hereby made applicable to the jurisdiction, powers and duties of the Commission. Any person appointed to examine witnesses may be authorized by the Commission to issue subpoenas to procure attendance of witnesses or production of documents and to appoint an officer to serve the same. Subpoenas may be served personally, by registered mail, by telegraph, or by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or principal place of business of the person required to be served. A verified return by the individual so serving the same, setting forth the manner of service, shall be proof of service, as shall be the return receipt or telegraph receipt when service is by registered mail or telegraph respectively. On request the United States Marshals or their deputies shall serve such process in their respective districts.

(c) The Commission shall have a seal, which shall be judicially noticed.

(d) A written record shall be kept of all hearings and proceedings of the Commission and shall be open to public inspection.

Adjudications; Payment of Awards; Effect of Adjudications.

Sec. 5. (a) The Commission shall dispose of all claims filed with it by award or order of dismissal, as the case may be, upon written findings of fact and reasons for the decision. A copy of each such adjudication shall be mailed to the claimant or his attorney.

(b) The Commission may make payment of any award not exceeding \$2500 in amount out of such funds as may be made available for this purpose by Congress.

(c) On the first day of each regular session of Congress the Secretary of the Interior shall transmit to Congress a full and complete statement of all adjudications rendered by the Commission during the previous year, stating the name of each claimant, the amount claimed, the amount awarded, the amount paid, and a brief synopsis of the facts in the case. All awards not paid by the Commission under subsection (b) hereof shall be paid in like manner as are final judgments of the Court of Claims.

(d) The payment of an award shall be final and conclusive for all purposes, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, and shall be a full discharge of the United States and all of its officers, agents, servants, and employees with respect to all claims arising out of the same subject matter. An order of dismissal against a claimant, unless set aside by the Commission, shall thereafter bar any further claim against the United States or any officer, agent, servant, or employee thereof arising out of the same subject matter.

Attorneys Fees

Sec. 6. The Commission, in rendering an award in favor of any claimant, may as a part of the award determine and allow reasonable attorneys' fees, which shall not exceed twenty percentum of the amount allowed, to be paid directly to the attorneys representing the claimant out of, but not in addition to, the amount of such award.

Any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for services rendered in connection with such claim any amount in excess of that allowed under this section, if recovery be had, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than \$2000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

No former Member or Employee to Practice before Commission

Sec. 7. No member of the Commission or employee thereof shall, after termination of his appointment to or services with the Commission, be permitted directly or indirectly to represent any claimant before the Commission.

Administration

Sec. 8. For the purposes of this Act the Commission may ---

(a) Appoint a Clerk and such attorneys, examiners, interpreters, appraisers, and other employees as may be necessary to conduct the business of the Commission.

(b) Call upon any Federal department or agency for any information or records necessary in the prosecution of the Commission's business.

(c) Secure the cooperation of State and local agencies, governmental or otherwise, and reimburse such agencies for services rendered.

(d) Utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services as may from time to time be needed and available.

(e) Assist needy claimants in the preparation of claims for filing with the Commission.

(f) Make such investigations as may be necessary for the performance of its functions.

(g) Exercise any and all of its powers at any place within the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii.

(h) Make expenditures for personal services and rent in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, for the purchase of law books and books of reference, for printing and binding, for the purchase, exchange, and maintenance of passenger-carrying vehicles, for supplies and equipment, for traveling expenses (including per diem in lieu of subsistence), for witness fees and mileage, for other administrative expenses, and for the payment of awards under section 5 (b) of this Act.

(i) Prescribe such rules and regulations, perform such acts not inconsistent with law, and delegate such authority as the Commission may deem proper in carrying out the provisions of this Act.

Termination

Sec. 9. The existence of the Commission shall terminate at the end of five years from the date of approval of this Act: Provided, however, that if the Commission shall have earlier finished its business its existence shall be terminated forthwith by direction of the Secretary of the Interior.

Appropriations

Sec. 10. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the purposes of this Act such sums as Congress may from time to time determine to be necessary.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Office of the Solicitor

WASHINGTON

February 26, 1944

Air Mail

Mr. Morton Grodzins
Evacuation and Resettlement Study
207 Giannini Hall
University of California
Berkeley 4, California

Dear Morton:

This is in reply to your letter of February 18.

If I could, I certainly would send you a copy of the Attorney General's letter to the President recommending transfer of WRA to the Interior Department. Unfortunately, I can't. Your contacts at the Justice Department may, however, be sufficient to raise you over this hump.

My own "candid analysis" of the reason for the shift I can give you quite simply. Also, I have every reason to believe that my analysis is pretty close to the truth. When Mr. Myer first learned of the proposal, he went directly to all the principal movers in order to learn precisely whether the reorganization was a friendly move designed to improve the general position of the Authority or was a move born of lack of confidence in the policies or personnel of WRA. He was very clearly and emphatically told that the reorganization was entirely friendly.

WRA has always had a certain special vulnerability because of its exposed position, without a cabinet member to speak for it. That exposed position becomes even more vulnerable in a campaign year. Even if 1944 were not a campaign year, however, the mere accumulation of pressures tends to make such an exposed position increasingly difficult. The transfer to the Interior Department contemplates that the policies and personnel of WRA will continue and that it will be able even more effectively to carry out its purposes. We are certainly going ahead on that basis. I think all of this is made really very clear in the press releases issued by the President, the Secretary of the Interior, and by Mr. Myer. Copies of these three are attached just in case you don't already have them. In these cases I think the releases tell the literal truth, although they may emphasize a little too much the virtue of reducing the number of agencies that report to the President. That virtue becomes easier to recognize when other considerations point in the


same direction.

I am also attaching a copy of Administrative Notice No. 38, which Mr. Myer issued immediately after the transfer, which quotes the full text of the Executive Order effecting the transfer and of the Secretary of Interior's order promptly re delegating all functions to the Director. The sweeping language of the Secretary's delegation order is quite significant, I believe. You will also notice that paragraph 3 of the Administrative Notice made clear the continuance of all policies and procedures.

Our "Memorandum on the Validity of Detention under the Leave Regulations of WRA" is being sent to you under separate cover.

My best to you; please remember me to Mrs. Thomas; and I have made a mental note about the top of Grizzly Peak.

Sincerely,



Philip M. Glick
Solicitor

Enclosures (4)

President Roosevelt announced today that he had ordered the transfer of the War Relocation Authority to the Department of the Interior. WRA has responsibility for maintenance and relocation of persons of Japanese descent evacuated from the Pacific Coast early in 1942. The transfer is being made, according to the Presidential statement, for reasons of administrative simplification and to bring the work of the agency under supervision of a Cabinet officer. The agency, of which Dillon S. Myer is Director, will be moved in its entirety into the Department of the Interior, in accordance with the President's previously announced belief that the number of independent agencies should, when practicable, be reduced. The transfer will not result in a change of personnel or program.

In announcing the transfer, the President stated that he considered the program of the War Relocation Authority sound in principle, and the work already accomplished by the agency highly satisfactory.

The War Relocation Authority operates nine relocation centers, for those of the evacuees who have been found to be loyal citizens or law abiding aliens; and a segregation center for those whose loyalties are to Japan rather than to the United States. A total of 92,000 evacuees are in the ten centers. Approximately 20,000 of the evacuees have resettled in ordinary communities outside the evacuated zone, through the relocation program of the agency.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

INFORMATION SERVICE

For Release THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1944.

Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes today issued the following statement:

The President has directed that the War Relocation Authority be transferred to the Department of the Interior. I am glad to welcome the Director and his staff into this Department. The Authority was established nearly two years ago as a result of the Army's evacuation of West Coast residents of Japanese ancestry. Since that time, it has worked closely with this Department. Five relocation centers are situated on Interior Department land; one center was directly administered by this Department until January 1, 1944. As a consequence, I know something of the problems with which the War Relocation Authority has been confronted and have come to appreciate the effectiveness with which these problems have been dealt.

The War Relocation Authority has been confronted with the difficult task of caring for a minority group of enemy ancestry in time of war. To handle this problem with proper regard for the national security and in accord with sound principles of American democracy, it has developed a three-fold program: (1) The maintenance of all evacuees who require support in properly administered relocation centers; (2) the segregation of evacuees, whose sympathies do not lie with the United States, into a special segregation center; and (3) the relocation of loyal evacuees as rapidly as possible in normal, productive American life. This program will be continued and I hope will be made even more effective in the Department of the Interior.

In carrying out my responsibilities under the order, I intend to keep in mind the need for recognition of the rights of United States citizens regardless of ancestry, the internal security of the United States during war time, and the international implications which are involved, particularly the effect of this program on the treatment of war prisoners and civilians in Japanese hands.

The Department of the Interior will, I am sure, be able to make an effective contribution to the relocation program. I should be reluctant, however, to assume the responsibilities involved in bringing the War Relocation Authority into the Department of the Interior if I did not know the ability and devotion of its staff and were not assured that Billen Myer and the organization that he has built up and directed were coming under my direction as a unit.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
INFORMATION SERVICE

For Release THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1944.

In commenting today on the transfer of the War Relocation Authority to the Department of the Interior, Milton S. Eyer, WRA Director, said:

"The War Relocation Authority was created by the President almost two years ago to perform a necessary wartime task aimed at preserving our American democratic principles and at the same time protecting the national security. The program which we have developed to meet the needs of 110,000 American residents, 2/3 of them citizens by right of birth, has had the endorsement of the Congress as well as the Executive Branch of the Government. The primary objective is to see that it is carried out in the most effective manner. We welcome the resources and facilities available in the Department of the Interior to help us do our job and do it better.

"I know that Secretary Ickes and I can depend upon the continued loyalty of the War Relocation Authority staff and the continuation of the good relations between residents of the centers and the staff which have been enjoyed in the past."

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

FEB 19 1944

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE No. 38

Subject: Transfer of the War Relocation Authority to the
Department of the Interior

Distribution: A

1. On February 16, 1944, the President issued Executive Order No. 9423 entitled "Transfer of the War Relocation Authority to the Department of the Interior", which reads in full as follows:

"By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes, including the First War Powers Act, 1941, as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

"The War Relocation Authority in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President and its functions, together with its records, property, personnel, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds, are transferred to the Department of the Interior and shall be administered as an organizational entity within the said Department. The functions of the Director of the War Relocation Authority are transferred to the Secretary of the Interior. The War Relocation Authority and the functions transferred by this order shall be administered by the said Secretary or under his supervision and direction through such officers, agents, and employees, of the War Relocation Authority, as he shall designate. All prior Executive orders in conflict with this order are amended accordingly. This order shall take effect immediately."

2. On February 16, 1944, the Secretary of the Interior issued Administrative Order No. 1922 entitled "Delegation of Authority to the Director of the War Relocation Authority" which reads in full as follows:

"The Director of the War Relocation Authority is hereby authorized, under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of the Interior, to perform the functions transferred to the Secretary of the Interior in Executive Order No. 9423, of February 16, 1944, until the further order of the Secretary."

3. All policies, procedures, regulations, and delegations of authority heretofore established shall continue in effect until further order.

(s) D.S. Meyer
Director