COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT IN BOSTON

- an informal discussion -

by

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Many of the California Japanese who came to the war-emergency camp called Poston, in Arizona, seemed to have stepped out of some past epoch into a situation that exhibited modern stresses in a concentrated form. But the Postonese who went back to "modern" communities in 1945 reversed the process: they went back into disorganized, frustrated, cut-throat, insecure, mid-20th-century American culture from a community that represented a degree of social integration, of interpersonal security, of communal maturity, which surpassed any culture American cities will achieve within any forseeable span of development.

Poston went that distance in three years. The analysis of its development, and of the interplay of exceptional conditions that made it possible, would constitute one of the century's great contributions to the science of social organisms. That analysis will never be made. The documentary material surviving from Poston's files is too fragmentary and impersonal. The subjective interpretations underlying the personal reports of those who do write of their experiences in Poston will not escape from the banner of the Ax and Grindstone. Yet the obligation to document that story, as far as we can, remains upon each of us who were actors in it. This present memorandum, written from memory in the absence of the files, and written too hurriedly and at too near a remove from the events themselves, will not attempt even a beginning on that larger job. It will only recall the actions of some of the actors, and hint at some of the complications of the plot, and pass some critical commentaries on both.

In writing, I am relying on the reader's familiarity with the general chronology of Poston history, and with the names of some of the cast. I would advise the reading of Theodore Haas' weekly Reports of the Legal Division, and his summary History of Community Government up to the time of his leaving Poston, early in 1944.

Secondly, the emphasis in this memorandum is dictated somewhat by the prior appearance of Alexander Leighton's The Governing of Men, with its excellent description and unreliable analysis of Poston's first crisis. Leighton subscribed to the anthropological method of the non-participating observer. Despite himself, he was put into an active role in the events of the crisis. His book is too much a special plea on behalf of the role he played, and which he there projects upon the lay figure of the Project Director. My present writing, responding to his, will be too much concerned with destroying his myth of the Heroic Director and the Wise Decision. This is not my sole concern, of course; but I do believe that some answer to Leighton should lie in the record, if only within the forgotten archives of the Authority which existed briefly to handle a situation which America's uneasy conscience will quickly and conveniently forget.

Finally, I must point out that I had no direct or formal part in administrative dealings with Community Government until the onset of its Decline and Fall, from the fall of 1944 to the summer of 1945. From May, 1942,

when the advance contingent of "volunteer" evacuees who furnished the first organizational staff came to Poston, until June of the next year, my position was that of Recreation Director, nominally Assistant Chief of Community Services under Miss Nell Findley as Chief. When I succeeded her, in June 1943, first as Acting Chief and later, in January 1944, as Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management, my responsibilities were limited to Recreation, Education, Welfare, and Health. The functions of Community Government, Internal Security, and Community Analysis were still supervised by the Project Director and his Deputy Director until November, 1944. My account of most of the crucial period in the development of Government will therefore be that of an interested bystander and a friend of the chief actors.

I

Poston's administration, in relation to community self-government, falls into three periods. The first lasted until the departure of Wade Head and Ted Haas, early in 1944. The second covers Moris Burge's term as Deputy to Duncan Mills, Poston's second Project Director. The third period, of accelerating dissolution through relocation and center closure, I entered into more actively until my departure from Poston in August, 1945.

These are periods of Administration, however. The internal history of evacuee government itself was mostly accomplished before Haas left the Project. Its history after the Spring of 1944 is mostly a matter of maturation, and finally of accommodation to the approaching end of the camp.

The history of evacuee self-governing machinery is marked by certain formal dates: the election of the first Temporary (Nisei) Council for Camp One, in July of 1942; the election which adopted the all-Poston Charter of Government, in May of 1943; the election of the first regular Councils in the same month, and of the over-all Community Council in June. A secondary series would show the establishment of the Judicial Commission, Police Commission, the joint Manpower Commission. The date when Block Managers became elective is significant; and so is the date of the Council's attempt to destroy the Block Managers' power -- and the failure of that attempt. The withdrawal of hakujin Unit Administrators, and their replacement by evacuee "in-the-middle-men", as one of them called it, is another milestone. I shall try to indicate these in their places. But their significance depended on their context; and this is a more complex matter to elucidate. In general, I am assigning a "plus" significance to events which tend in the direction of greater self-responsibility for the evacuee community, a "minus" to those which seem to me anti-democratic in tendency. But there were these same plusses and minuses within the Administration's development toward full participation in the planning and realization of its goals; and these complicate the story as I try to tell it.

The first job of both the Administration and the evacuee community was to try to find themselves. This went on as two separate processes; but they interpenetrated inasmuch as the major focus the dominant goal of the self-realization of each was in its relation to the other. The Administration

had to become something that could identify and work with the leadership of the evacuees; and that leadership had to find and establish itself in a situation dominated by an Administration different from and imposed on the community. On both sides, the straightforward business of organization and adjustment was hampered by an incredible variety of frustrating complications.

a. The administration of a community of 18,000 can be carried on only through the mediating instrumentality of its own self-operating machineries. Poston's administration therefore had to make up its mind what kinds of machinery to encourage, what persons or parties to favor with recognition, what evacuee goals and methods to approve. Internally, these became matters of deep cleavage within the administrative personnel. Both personal and political frictions arose in the course of settling them.

Out of unknown persons from many backgrounds, the Project Director had to make a staff and an organization -- two somewhat different things, neither of which lay within his understanding or his abilities. He had to start doing this under an impossible load of dual responsibility, to two different Government agencies with different and often conflicting aims and methods. He had to do it in a situation without precedent, while thousands of alien people under emergency conditions poured into an unfinished camp whose living arrangements even when completed were on a distress level. Arrangements on the administrative level had to be made with several other, and mutually incompatible, agencies: directly with Army, with an Army-controlled civilian control agency, with Justice, with the State of Arizona; and each of these had separate and incoherent divisions and cliques within it. It was not only the ankle-deep talc-fine dust of Poston's alluvial plain that choked Administration; it was also the stifling dust of a thousand desks and files, and mountains of forms and papers in other people's offices.

Nor could the internal needs of the situation be the final guide. The support of administration was Government war powers; but so were its limits those of war necessity. The situation which created the camp created also the frustrations imposed upon its operation: fears of public opinion, which had to be fevered to hate the Jap while America's Japanese were sheltered from the domestic effects of that same hate; Army requirements for food and materials which were thus denied to the camp that an Army order had created; political caution on behalf of the national Administration which was belabored with charges of undue pacification by those opponents who hated it for getting into war -- these and other pressures were always parts of a situation whose most consistent character, from start to finish, was that of self-contradictoriness.

If the staff itself had shared a coherent philosophy of the situation, these external problems might have been faced down. But the "appointed personnel", who reached some 400 in the first year, and through whose ranks probably a thousand individuals passed in all, was not even united on the meaning and justification of evacuation itself much less on attitudes towards its victims. They came from Indian agencies, from California cities and mid-western towns, from the Hawaiian Islands; they represented every type of previous experience, present philosophy, and latent neurosis. Never in Head's regime in Poston, were they a coherent staff or an efficient organization. Yet whatever was done, they did; and they made their contribution to the

final adjustment which Poston achieved.

b. Political power in any community is the reward of proven ability to get things for people. In an administered community, things are gotten primarily through or from the Administration. The evacuees' first job therefore was to find out how to get what they needed -- in fact, how to find out what was going to happen to them so they would know what they did need; and this meant finding out who could get things: i.e., to whom the Administration would give its favors, or even its attention.

The evacuees began as strangers to each other, as well as to the procedures and the personnel of the Administration. They were divided not only by variety of origins (place and class in Japan) and experience (rural, urban, tenant, owner, migratory worker, college or hospital professional worker). They were divided in language, in loyalties, in hopes and fears, in personal belief and in group goals. They brought with them regional, occupational, and class jealousies and pride, while their settled family status-relationships were turned topsy-turvy by the homeless barrack-life and by the transfer of economic dependency in the young from their fathers to the Administration.

They began by assuming that the educated Nisei would be the most profitable agents in dealing with the Hakujin. When the Nisei failed to accomplish what even the then Administration could not have done under its circumstances -- namely, bring security, stability and plenty -- and when the Administration's contempt for Nisei representatives began to be perceived, the community let another group shout itself into power on the strength of its promises to bring the Administration to terms; and was as stunned as the staff when the Administration accepted them and gave them recognition. But since the second, or strike, group looked to be inside, the community let them lead. Then, as the evacuees felt surer of themselves and more used to the situation, they began retiring the strike group and putting forward older Nisei and younger Issei of more responsible, though no less aggressive, types. The freedom which the community felt to choose representatives who represented what it wanted instead of what it thought the Administration wanted: this was, as it must ever be, the test and measure of the community's confidence in Administration. The last stage, which reflected the highest mutual and self-confidence, was marked by the election of co-operative "moderates" of high personal character, and by the retirement of both anti-Administration persons and sentiments from the arena of politics: not from the mind of the group, but from the position of political criterion for power in the evacuee community.

The goal of self-government among the evacuees was one of learning how to get what they had to have, in ways that still gave them dignity and security as a community. When I say that by 1944 the community had attained both integration and maturity, I mean that that goal had been attained as nearly as possible.

c. In short, the two processes of self-education, or self-realization in the governing process had proceeded largely by interaction; and in two years it had reached a fairly stable and generally satisfactory level of procedures and relationships, with the maximum of interpersonal security,

friendliness, frankness, honesty, and dignity attainable under the conditions of a temporary, emergency, quasi-colonial, dependency-based relief shelter for a racially segregated group administered under a caste-differential by salaried appointees of the Government that was maintaining a war and a war-psychology against the homelend of the aliens whose "enemy" status defined the character of the community in the public mind; appointees of the Government that had caused the evacuation which the camp existed to relieve; and appointees whose ranks were closed to any but "white" (including black or Indian) persons throughout that war that was identified by the camp residents as one of Whites versus Orientals.

In view of the conditions, the wonder is that any stable forms of understanding, communication, or government were attained at all. They were never completed. But by the time they were to be discarded they had reached a stage from which permanent constitutional forms were beginning to grow. This is the fact; a fact for which credit belongs to both communities, the hakujin and the nihonjin, the Administration and the Evacuees, the White Buildings and the black barracks. For in some Relocation Centers, the thing just didn't happen. If people other than the Japanese had been the residents of Poston, I cannot say it would have happened. HOW it happened ought to be the subject of this, and of all reports on Poston's Government; for it would shed some light, not on The Governing of Men, but on the self-government of communities and on the ways of working sense out of a nonsensical situation.

d. Opposed to the obstacles I have mentioned, what conditions of the Relocation Center <u>favored</u> the development of stable community organization?

First to come to mind is homogeneity of the population. With all their internal differences of age, language, class belief, and opinion, they shared in being on one side of a more obvious difference: they were Japanese, as against the hakujin who tended them. If their children did not speak the same language, it was still Japanese that they did not speak. And even the children shared the familiarity with the objects, and some of the practices, inherited from the Japanese culture. There was a common body of familiar reference, reinforced by a common experience of evacuation, which lent powerful support to the plea of the anti-administration "radicals", "We are all Japanese here". Even the Nisei who had gone fartherest in revolt or escape from the parental culture had been reminded by their California neighbors that they were, after all, Japanese. And no second-generation escapes the character conditioning, the value-implanting, of its alien rearing. Nisei fought Issei, and both sides charged lack of understanding by the other; but they understood each other far more deeply, without need of explanation, than the hakujin generally understood either.

Second, and more fundamental as well as far more unique, is the equality which characterized the conditions of their life. Housed in Army field barracks, packed in to the numerical limit compatible with health and decency (if that), denied cars and other material symbols of wealth, they had in the first place equality of material condition. Denied kitchens of their own, every fourteen barracks assigned to eat together in a common mess

where block residents prepared the food and washed the dishes, there was almost no difference in food, or style and conditions of eating. In poston, where the practice of private payment to physicians did not grow up until late, and then not in very lavish proportions, medical treatment was the same for all -- its hazards as well as its offerings. Jobs were standardized at nearly equal levels of cash allowances; $16 and $19 were alike unequal to the month's demands for drugs, stamps, baby food, shoes, clothes, and the other necessities of family life not furnished by the Government.

Economic differences reappeared gradually, as those with resources outside the Project began to call upon them, to have furniture sent in, to send out for delicacies, liquor, clothes, or the paraphernalia of recreation and culture. Army allotments dreated new levels of intra-Project income; gambling earnings increased; relocated children sent money to their families. But there was almost no visible difference in living standards; there was almost no medium for conspicuous consumption. If some barracks grew neater or greener of fancier than others, it meant that the dwellers there had more energy or skill -- not more money. If every block had baseball and basketball equipment, it was usually by equal subscription among all the block families. Evaporative coolers appeared on more than a third of the barrack "apartments" by the third summer, and on most mess-halls even earlier; but these more often represented sacrifice than wealth. There was one man in Poston who was more than a millionaire; few knew who he was. Another had lands and money amounting to more than $600,000 in California; he washed dishes in the mess-hall, and refused office in the community government.

Again, what internal economic differences did appear were insignificant in contrast to the blatant privilege of the administrative caste: their cars, their white cottages and electric refrigerators and separate bedroom apartments, their freedom of travel in and out. There was some social visiting back and forth across the Firebreak; but it was limited by diffidence, constraint, fear of comment, on both sides. Above all, the hakujin were there from choice, the evacuees by force; the hakujin had nothing to fear except the general wartime insecurity, the evacuees were united by their common fear for their common future. Hakujin came and went, without achieving any community solidarity. Evacuees only went, leaving the balance of the community still growing in cohesion and stability.

Theirs was the unity of common disaster. There is no more powerful unity in human experience than that. Disaster which creates enforced equality of condition, through causes not within the power of the victims to prevent or to control -- the earthquake and fire in San Francisco, the blitz in London, the evacuation in California -- unites by violence; but it welds strongly. Old fences melt; new leaders appear; a common concern for all arises in each, and for each in all. At the greatest heat of human experience, the spirit of brotherhood and community blazes forth in manifestations that remain forever in the memories of those who shared in it; they part with sorrow, and look back with nostalgia for their misery. Alas for Man, that he finds himself by losing himself in the group only under such fire! Away from Poston, the Japanese are separate again, the children deserting the

parents, the parents finding again their different economic levels and closing their doors softly against the world. They tell me, "Poston now seems like a dream; I'm not even sure I had it." But one woman said, "After living in San Francisco for thirty years, I left it without sorrow. But when I left Camp, I cried."

Are we to conclude that it is necessary to create some condition of permanent equality in disaster, in order to realize the dream of Man?

II

Most of the factors I have mentioned were common to all the Relocation Centers. Yet they followed different paths of development; and I believe that none of them attained the degree of maturity and integration that was reached in Poston. The difference among centers was partly due to personalities, the most decisive being that of the Project Director: The Mussolini-efficiency caste organization at one, the aggressive and rather arbitrary paternalism of another, the social-worker bureaucratism of a third, the compartmentalized professionalism of a fourth, are identified with the characters of their Directors. The rather dogmatic rationalism of the central WRA staff in the community field, attempting to impose identical patterns upon all, was modified in practice by the interposition of the personnel and policy governance of the Project Director. To a lesser extent, personalities among the evacuees influenced these differences.

Poston, however, had another factor making for individuality and even for initial opposition to the character which WRA sought to impose. This was the factor of the Indian Service, which undertook to administer the largest of all the camps under a contract with the WRA. Its motives, including that of protecting its rights in the long-planned resettlement area watered by the Parker Dam, and that of securing cheap labor and Federal money for developing the area, need not concern this present study. The costly feud which arose between the Indian Service administrators on the Project and the WRA office in San Francisco, and which cost the camp heavily in equipment and initial assistance, is also beside our present point. The influence of the Indian Service on the growth of self-government in Poston was by means of the personnel it put in charge, and to a secondary degree by means of the philosophy which the Commissioner himself projected into the undertaking.

The philosophy of the Commissioner is best represented by a speech which he made in Poston when the camp was about six months old. He said that the war would last for seven years; that all its residents would stay there at least that long; that they might stay longer, and even settle permanently under leasehold on such land as they wanted to develop; and that they had an unparalleled opportunity to develop a co-operative community enriched by all that modern civilization could suggest. This philosophy was reinforced on the Project by the statements of other responsible officials: after we had, through the Adult Education Department, given a series of "orientation to Poston" talks by Project heads, the Department arranged a further series of

Quad (four-block) meetings at which the Project Director, Steward, Attorney, Engineer, and head of Industry and Agriculture explained their hopes and policies, and were questioned by the older men through Adult Education Department interpreters. Transcripts of some of these meetings show the Project Director promising leases, co-operative agricultural production, a Project income of up to $100. per capita to be distributed monthly out of profits. The head of Agriculture and Industry spoke in terms of limitless dreams of enterprises including date-culture along the canal banks, wartime manufacturing of machine parts, and the like. Visiting soil and development experts from the Indian Service office explained, with charts, a plan for rehousing the camp population in adobe villages all down the valley, with rich farm developments growing all along the River.

The other main factor in the Commissioner's approach is indicated in a letter to the Project Director, Wade Head, dated April 21, 1942 -- almost a month before the arrival of the earliest evacuees. In this letter he suggests an initial method of securing representative machinery from among the evacuees, to help in getting essential work done such as cleaning and settling; "and at the same time to provide for the participation of the evacuees in general program-making." He admits that this proposal, to have the evacuees select a representative from every four-compartment barrack to make a Block Council of 14, which would then select a representative to a larger District council, the District councils in turn selecting representatives to a Community Council, was "very arbitrary"; and he adds that it could soon "be replaced with something more nearly indigenous to Japanese social organization." It is these two themes -- representative democratic participation in policy, and recognition of the social tradition of the settlers themselves -- that are characteristic of the top philosophy in the Service.

At the field level, however, that philosophy -- if it was accepted at all, as most of the old-line employees found it uncongenial -- was watered down into an indulgent paternalism which meant, in practice, recognizing the tribal authority of the older Indians while continuing to act according to white administrative rules, and resenting on both accounts the drive of the younger people toward independence or rebellion.

This Indian Agency attitude characterized the top administrative nucleus in Poston. The Commissioner's philosophy of administrative democracy was radically represented in the Project Attorney, Ted Haas. The development of administrative policy toward evacuee self-government was mainly the result of interplay between these two approaches, personfied in Head and Haas. Two other levels of Indian Service attitude were also present: in the heads of Administrative (- business) Management and of Engineering, both of whom were highly conscientious and, initially, entirely aloof from the community; and in their workers, from the section heads driving to get their jobs done with little regard for the circumstances governing either the ends or the means, down to the bottom ranks, including Indians, where the obvious aptitude of many evacuees for doing the same work better created a sense of competitive insecurity that expressed itself in general hostility toward the community. These segments of the staff, however, had little effect on the development of governing policy. The segment that did contribute something, aside from

the Indian Service group, was the professional group recruited directly or indirectly by the Commissioner, and characterized by democratic or humanitarian attitudes that tended to line them up with the Attorney as against the Director. Very few were sent directly by WRA, and most of these had short and unhappy careers on the Project. My own position was anomalous: I was employed by one of the Indian Service people in the WRA office in San Francisco, lent to the Project, adopted by the non-Indian Service professional group, and finally accepted by the Project administration although I was generally hostile to its philosophy and methods.

As the Project situation moved toward its first crisis, the November strike in Camp One, many divergent lines of cleavage within the staff began to merge into one major division between two parties. I have hesitated over how much weight to give to that early crisis, in this memorandum. The incident was brief. But there are several reasons for giving it careful study. For the long-timer in Poston, the history of self-government is measured both temporarily and analytically in terms of the "incident" and of the complex of elements in it -- elements which, if fully understood, would carry a full understanding of Poston and a partial understanding of "the governing of men." In some respects, it was a genuinely revolutionary effort. In others, it revealed what a revolutionary effort is <u>not</u>. Practically, it revealed staff and evacuee personalities to each other; its occurrence when it did occur probably conditioned Poston's successful integration later on. And, somewhere in the record, Leighton's disingenuous drama of the Heroic Project Director and the Wise Decision should be countered with at least an analysis from another angle. I shall, therefore, give some time to the incident even though it involves judgments of character and action that are not strictly germane to the story of the Community Council, the Block Managers, and the other agencies of Project self-government. First, then, I shall try to give a brief identity to some of the partisans of the two schools of staff thought; and second, I shall try briefly to set the evacuee stage.

III

Wade Head, Project Director, was Southern born and bred. He had been an Indian school teacher, a personnel man in the Philippines, and Superintendent of an Arizona Indian agency. He sharply illustrates the difference between personnel work and staff work. He responded immediately, and often warmly, to individuals and to their problems. But the relations between individuals -- particularly the relations among their functions as members of an organized group -- were a closed book to him. In dealing with individual problems he showed imagination and resourcefulness; but that the solution of one person's problem might create problems for other persons was seldom taken into account. The other persons could be taken care of in their turn. Thus, everyone initially felt in Head a friendly and fatherly helper and backer -- until his "opposite number" in a tangle saw Head and received the same assurances of understanding and support. Sufficient unto the interview was the problem thereof; and sufficient to the problem were charm and good intentions. But in dealing with a group that had a decision to make, where Head was of necessity the mediator, he was reduced to vague aphorisms about the need of everybody working together -- usually delivered with an undertone of warning.

One result of this trait was the absence of rules and principles; indeed, of any settled expectations. The evacuee community gradually came to understand this, and to make use of it. They understood both that precedent need not stand in the way of reversed decisions, and that promises did not imply performance. The establishment of official agencies or channels never prevented Head from dealing directly with unauthorized individuals or delegations. In consequence, no one knew where anything stood; and unless something stands, nothing moves.

Another result was the continual confusion in staff relations. Administrative functions would be assigned to one person and then to another, without conference and without any consistent basis or plan. A narrative report from the first Chief of Community Services, Nell Findley, recalls that "the Project Director was genuinely and emotionally interested in the problems of evacuees. He set up his own little Welfare Department to handle them . . . The Project Director's Private Family Welfare Department was in charge of his secretary and three fine but untrained young Nisei women. They took notes on the many 'complaints' that came in daily on hit and miss scraps of paper. The Director hurriedly made snap decisions on this type of information. Of course, at times he saw the client in person, made decisions which were never recorded and which came back later to haunt the Chief of Community Services.

"As the administrative problems became more and more involved, the Project Director . . . turned the bulk of the work of his private family agency over to the Associate Project Director. The Associate Project Director was not specially interested, so he transferred the job to the Assistant Project Director who was Unit Administrator of Camp I. The Unit Manager tried to accomplish the work by assigning the various complains for settlement to the Block Managers. . .

"One very hot day, the Unit Administrator came to the Chief of Community Services and said, "By the way, all family problems are to be handled by your Division as of today. I'm sending all the folders to you now! . . .

"The Directors of the Departments went to the Project Director at all times and the Project Director by-passed the Chief of Community Services whenever he wanted to do so and gave orders directly to the various heads. I remember the time that he called me to his office and told me that all requests, all letters, in fact everything pertaining to Community Services must go through my office before going to his. I asked him to send all things pertaining to Community Services through my office in exchange. This was agreed upon. The next day he sent that famous memo about placing Adult Education in the Department of Education, to Miles (Cary, Superintendent of Education)! I received no copy of it. Neither did (the Community Activities Director, who was then administering Adult Education)".

Another excerpt will suggest the further result of the staff situation exemplified in the quotations above: "Talk about struggle for Power among the evacuees. It was more child's play compared with the Struggle for Power

in the Administration." She also quotes evacuee comments that "they had lots of fun watching us struggle for power." "There are three different factions," her evacuee observers told her; "the reactionaries headed by Head, Gelvin, Evans -- the radicals headed by Powell, Kennedy, Haas -- and the middle-of-the-roaders headed by Findley and Cary."

While that identification is oversimplified, the fact remains that Head did not build a staff, and that like-minded employees drifted together into pressure-cliques or tried singly to force Head into one or another consistent pattern of action. In the face of this, the real meaning of Head's method became evident. It was defensive. He resisted commitments of any nature -- even to the extent of not allowing his apparent agreements to commit himself. (When he came out of the meeting at which he accepted "in principle" the strike committee's demands, he said to us who had gone with him, "You notice I didn't sign anything'!")

The policy-making group was small, and generally worked in secret until it was ready to announce its faits accomplis. Miss Findley's narrative multiplies examples of this. Her own actions created other examples, as when after unsuccessfully asking for staff meetings, she began calling her own, and including Haas, the Project Attorney, in them. Immediately, the Administration announced regular staff meetings -- regular in occurrence, at least, though they never had agenda and generally opened with "Well, anybody got anything he wants to bring up?"

These meetings, desultory as they were, served to bring out the individual alignment of staff leaders. In relation to our present concern, Administration attitudes toward the evacuee community, a few lines developed fairly clearly at the start, and served to identify their adherents throughout the difficult period ahead. These lines might be identified as personal attitudes toward the evacuees as people; administrative principles concerning the use of evacuees in administrative positions; and political attitudes toward the possible organization and leadership of the evacuee community.

Ted Haas, Project Attorney, as the most radical, most vocal, and most irritating advocate of constitutional democracy in administration and of forthright acceptance of evacuees as people, on their merits, became the leader of the "loyal opposition." A New Yorker who left corporate law practice for Indian Service to serve human rights in a less abstract way than ordinary law does, Haas combined a superior gift for organization with a radical conscience toward procedures and commitments as well as toward people and personal honesty. With a lively and humorous appreciation of persons and events he also combined a persistent loquacity in explanation and defense of his ideas, his practices, and his department.

Nell Findley, an experienced social worker and administrator, came to Poston on John Collier's invitation, from Honolulu, whence followed in her train Miles Cary to head the schools, and after him Harris, Principal in Camp I and later Superintendent, McLaren, Principal in Camp II, and several other school people. Miss Findley's persistent drive for constructive encouragements to a people shocked by their rejection from American society

took many forms of individual and family program planning which derived from sources rather different from Indian Service attitudes. Her belief in good staff organization and procedures as against what she calls the "bull session" method of secret administrative decisions brought her into opposition to such an extent that, for her first six months in Poston, she was resigning (and reconsidering) every few weeks. Like Haas, she was building her own staff out of evacuees; and she spoke in Project staff meetings as one who was working with, rather than merely on, the evacuees. Like Haas, she believed that more evacuees should be used in higher administrative positions; that more support and consideration should be given the people's own agencies of decision and expression; and she was the first and major champion of relocating the evacuees back into normal American channels of living. At all these points, she like Haas, found herself in opposition. She had little direct relation to evacuee politics or the growth of self-government; but her role in focusing staff sentiment around the pole of social democracy was known in the community; she herself was regarded with confidence and liking by the community, and in fact her attitudes were generalized by the evacuees into traits of the whole "Hawaiian group" as against the Indian Service group. Finally, she was one of the pioneers in setting the precedent of getting out into the community rather than talking about it within the Administrative enclosure.

Vernon Kennedy arrived late in the first summer, to head the Employment Division. Kennedy's background was labor relations; he had been a union organizer for the C.I.O., and came to Poston from a labor job in the California State government. He had a restless vision that conceived energetic programs of industrial action; and these were always seen in terms of worker control. The WRA worker was still, to Kennedy, a worker; the WRA-proposed machinery of grievance adjustment became, in his hands, a machinery of industrial unionism -- without being identified as such at any point. It was Kennedy, with Haas, who drove through the plan for Camouflage Net factories in Poston, and the community-dividend plan of wage sharing. He too worked closely and successfully with evacuees, chiefly Nisei.

This group, to which I also belonged, and to which Harris, Abraham Pressman as head of the hospital, Walter Balderston who became head of Community Activities, and others also were attached, is perhaps best described as professional, in distinction from the career administrator group which formed the nucleus of the Administration. By professional I mean that they operated in terms of ideas and standards not drawn from the pragmatic daily solving of immediate problems which conditions the habitual administration man. They were people who worked with people in terms of ideas; they were democratic both by experience and by conviction. And they were able people, with confidence in themselves.

The nature and methods of Head's group put them rather on the defensive against Haas, Findley, and Kennedy. Operating without consistent or declared policies, principles, or purposes, and generally by off-hand fiat, their major conception of staff virtue was acquiescence, or as they preferred to call it, "loyalty." This group was not undemocratic, in some important senses. Head's chief virtue as Director was his complete accessibility to everyone -- which was also a symptom of his chief weakness in the same role. But it is important and characteristic that his Division heads often had to

wait in his anteroom because some Issei with a worry about his daughter had gotten there first. Gelvin, the Associate Director, was a man of complete honesty and of great friendliness and good humor; though his job was largely that of trigger man and executor for Head's wishes. Evans, the Assistant Director, was an ideological democrat, but in practice a paternalistic conservative with an inherent fondness for old men in power and a considerable mistrust of young men with ideas. Sharing Head's instinct for "discretion," i.e., secrecy, he upheld the system of appointed Block Managers and distrusted the elective Council in both theory and fact. No administrator, Evans' primary strength was his ability to say "No" -- a muscle whose exercise paid off in a crisis. Nelson, who became and Administrative Officer attached to this group, was a soft-hearted pessimist with a tough line of talk and a real ability to get people to solve their own problems; but this ability was not called into play until much later. When the Administration was faced with a belated Army decision to put a personnel fence and a jeep patrol around each of the three Poston camps, and the Haas-Powell "Jacobin Club" was chairing open meetings of staff members wanting to frame protests, while the Administration was characteristically on the wire organizing pressures in Washington and Chicago, it was Nelson who called Haas and Powell into his office to warn them that unless they stopped their "disloyal attack on Wade Head" they would neither of them ever work in Government again.

Alexander Leighton, when he came to Poston on John Collier's invitation, established his orbit around the Administration group. Though a professional by training, he was an office man by timidity. Head, who perhaps shared the staff's initial suspicion that Leighton had been sent out to "spy on" the Project Administration, gave him every consideration, deferred to him in many matters of policy, and was probably guided by him in his policies toward the community. Had Leighton been the radical democrat that a later Community Analyst, David French, was, the influence on Poston's history might have been considerable. But it is improbable that, in that case, he would have been at all acceptable to Wade Head.

Moris Burge, first administrator of Camp III, and later Deputy Project Director succeeding Ralph Gelvin, was another paternalist. He seemed to regard the unit as a baronial estate; and, while he encouraged the people to express their individuality in high social and artistic levels of performance, he kept the reins of decision strictly in his own hands.

Between any two such groups as I have described, the issues can be securely predicted within the context of field administration of a human project. There will be the issue of what decisions can be entrusted outside the Front Office; of whether independent leaders with popular support will be given more confidence than "Administration" choices, with or without popular influence or scruple; of whether the people's agencies such as a Council will be given genuine recognition and power, or will be reserved for purposes of policy salesmenship while it is by-passed by dealings with irregular machines or ambitious advocates. Not only were these issues familiar in Poston. They were surrounded by appropriate differences of general attitude: most staff meetings somehow got off on either of two favorite complaints: one,

that the evacuees were stealing Government property, i.e., using Project lumber for personal purposes without authorization; long afternoons were spent analyzing the dishonesty of the evacuees, by people whose own rooms had shelves and closets that could not be accounted for, and whose use of Government cars was hardly limited by official regulations. The other was that evacuees wouldn't work the eight hours expected by the regulations -- at least, none did except the ones that held positions of trust and responsibility, and who worked far beyond their eight hours. In such cases, staff attitudes divided among three parties: the professionals evaluating the behavior problem in terms of the situation, including staff behavior; the operations and property people full of foreboding and resentment; and the Administration, in the middle, not expecting perfection but hoping for moderate control, suggesting stratagems for the restraint of practices at which it knew it had to wink. It was in these debates that the "strong medicine" group, built around a few fiscal and operations men who primarily wanted to punish the Japanese for being different from themselves, began to find itself; and it was over these displays of attitude, rather than over the vital issues of the distribution of responsibility and power, that the resentment and irritation against Haas, Findley, and Kennedy arose. In the crisis of Administration -- community relations in November 1942, all these preparatory developments bore fruit -- even if it was sour grapes.

IV

As evacuees poured into Poston by the hundreds and thousands, and were poured hastily into the blocks, each block was asked to select -- or rather to nominate for Administration appointment -- a Manager. The Block Manager kept the barrack keys, issued the soap, recruited workers for block duties, sent -- or ran -- for the ambulance in medical emergencies; and transmitted the Administration's rules to the Block residents, and their needs to the Unit Administrator or to the appropriate functionary if he could find out who that was. The first Block Managers were English-speaking, at least, and mostly Nisei; not all were Japanese-speaking. One was a Japanese-born Nisei Methodist minister, Masatane Mitani, who had arrived with the early "volunteers" in May and immediately attempted to establish and consolidate a position of community leadership. He also officiated at church services, and set up a Co-operative Study Group to prepare for co-operative enterprises, and started the first moving picture shows, and organized the Civic Planning Commission to draw up a plan for Poston's government.

Solon Kimball, WRA's expert on government, visited Poston in late May or June, and met with the Block Managers, pondering whether they might develop into the governing body or whether a legislative branch was also desirable, as he finally concluded. Haas, arriving in June, took over the "Legal Aid Bureau," which was part of Mitani's planning set-up; reduced his staff to three good lawyers; dissolved the Planning Board, but continued its functions through committee consultation. The Mitani Plan, as of May 1942, was to have the four rooms in each barrack elect a Barrack Head; the Barrack Heads to act as the Block Council; the Block Council to elect a representative to a Community Council. This was organization from below. Japanese village

style. As threesseparate camps were involved in Poston's case, however, there was the immediate issue whether there should be one Council, three or, a Federal system with an over-all Community Council arising by representation out of three local councils.

Haas, building on the Planning Board's beginnings, helped the community leaders and lawyers frame a constitution providing for an elective representative Council for Camp I. It was to be open to Issei and Nisei alike. Haas' attorneys, older Nisei themselves, recognized that to introduce political discrimination between the two generations would mean open conflict; and Haas, holding no brief for either generation as against the other, was concerned only to secure genuine representation in a community whose population was about 60% Nisei. However, just as Poston's government was ready to go into operation, there arrived a fiat from WRA Washington: A Council of block representatives was to be elected American style; everyone of working age (18 or over) should vote; but only Nisei could hold elective office. This paralyzed Poston's action while controversy went on between the Project, solidly united against such a division, and WRA. John Provinse, head of the WRA division that supervised Government, upheld the Nisei Only ruling on the ground that this exclusive political prerogative would restore to them some of the dignity which they, as citizens, had lost through being evacuated with the aliens. Provinse, as I have said, despite his experience and training in Anthropology, frequently held his administrative principles on purely rationalistic grounds, and always stubbornly, though events sometimes forced him to abandon them later (as indeed in this case, though too late). Poston had therefore to start again, and to find a way of integrating the real power of the Issei into government under a rule which forbade them to represent their blocks in the governing Council.

At the Administration's call, a Nisei Council -- purely temporary, since no permanent Charter yet existed -- was elected in July. Its average age was in the twenties; many of its members were still college undergraduates; most of them spoke relatively little Japanese. Its Chairman, Tep Ishimaru, was a man of nearly 40 who had been active in welfare promotions -- Boy Scouts, YMCA, the Children's Home -- in Los Agenles, where he had an optometry practice. He was too old to be patient with the Nisei, and too outspoken to appease the Issei. A fighter; he forced several investigations of the administration of steward's affairs, hospital affairs, and other matters. This is a familiar initial function of such a group; but it hardly endeared the Council or its Chairman to the Administration.

Camp II filled up in July, to the number of 4,000 against Camp I's 9,000. Camp III was filled with 4,000-odd in August. By Haas' efforts, Camp II formed a Temporary Council, of which one of his legal staff was chairman. James Crawford, Unit Administrator in II, was a generous, straightforward, honest, and industrious man who worked with the people far beyond the limits of most men's patience or energy; evacuee-Administrator co-operation was never in question there. In III, a Council was slower in forming; and after it was formed, it generally vetoed any connection with the other two camps on any score whatever, and had to be forced into union by economic and political means, like Maine and Vermont under the New Deal. While III maintained a peaceful surface for two years, Administration relations might be guessed at from the election of an outspoken anti-loyalty man as local Chairman.

The Nisei-Issei issue was met partially through the device of electing an Issei Advisory Board, with one member for each block, and with informal powers based on conference and agreement with the elected Council. But Nisei were still being appointed Block Managers; they held the great majority of responsible assistantships in Administration offices, where evacuees were employed at all. After the establishment of the $16 - $19 "wage" differential (another stubborn rationalist theory of John Provinse's, based on his experience with small pay differentials as motive-builders in the Navy), analysis would have shown that most of the $19 jobs were in Nisei hands. It must be remembered that Poston's was an artificial, and partially inverted, economy. The older men whose labor had accumulated the family properties and cash reserves had lost both, through evacuation and the freezing of alien funds. Poston itself produced no income, and when it was just about to was forbidden to by a change in WRA policy. With the exception of a few family incomes from "outside," all economic benefits in Poston were by direct Government grant, through Administrative devices. This resulted in the complete destruction of "dependency": everyone, even the small child, got his housing, his food, his education, his health care, by mere membership and residence in the Project. Cash allowances were of two kinds: the so-called "advances" against putative later earnings, which were finally called "wages" but which never amounted to more than a spending allowance used as a motivation toward useful work; and clothing allowances based on age and membership in the family of a Project worker. The wage was paid directly to the worker; the clothing allowance, which might have gone through the traditional "head" of the family, was restricted to families of workers (another tedious and costly motivating device), and so was paid through the eldest worker. The result was that an 18-year-old girl might be listed as the head of the family, which merely underlined the loss of economic headship in the father's relation.

Under this relief-shelter economy, status was determined by the holding (a) of $19 jobs, and (b) of jobs carrying administrative weight -- that is, carrying some power to hire and fire, to recommend policy and program, to determine Administration attitudes. Since no one knew how long they would have to live under this economy, the status-relation contained community dynamite; and the Nisei were sitting on it.

The crucial importance of these economic dynamics were revealed in the final strike demands. That we on the Project did not understand them in time is not relevant, since the ones we did fight were enforced on us anyway. That Washington underestimated them is unfortunate; but Washington was hampered by having to deal with Budget Bureaus and public opinion, as well as by its overweighting of formal and theoretical motivations and values. And the anthropologist who joined the Project staff remained, even in The Governing of Men, blissfully and fatally innocent of any understanding of economic dynamics in community administration. Any reader of Veblen should have been able to read the political implications of the economic status-machinery in Poston, Nevertheless, we all failed.

Meanwhile, all three camps were trying to learn their political ropes. Political power, I repeat, is measured by the ability to get things for people. The Nisei claim to power, and the community's initial acceptance of their claim, rested on the assumption that the English-speaking, American-

acting young people would command the quickest understanding and co-operation, and would know how to get business done in the American way. There was one initial fallacy in this assumption: namely, that no one in America was used to the ways and patterns of an administered community; not even the members of the administrative staff knew how to get things from each other. Second, what turned out at first to be the successful technique of getting things was that of playing individual administrators off against each other, as children learn to pit their parents against each other in order to get concessions for themselves. At this game, the more experienced hands proved the more skillful. In a situation where not even the Project Director knew how to observe "channels," or cared to keep them clear, the Nisei reliance on chartered responsibilities and administrative formalism was self-defeating.

But the great source of the defeat of this first attempt lay in the social position of the Nisei within the California Japanese community. As I used to remark in Poston, if the war and evacuation had occurred five or ten years later, the entire pattern of intra-camp problems would have been different. As it was, the age of the Nisei at evacuation averaged under 20 years; the largest single age-group was approaching its senior year in high school. Because of the circumstances of Japanese immigration -- working men coming first, later sending back for wives, then having all immigration stopped -- the age-pattern of Japanese in America was peculiar, with a heavy concentration of Issei men whose age averaged over sixty, and Issei women around fifty; a small group of young Issei and older Nisei from twenty-five to thirty-five; and an expanding number of Nisei from year to year down the age ladder*. In California, the Nisei were not yet ready to take over the leadership from the older men, who themselves were just a few years short of being willing to give it up. In Poston, when the first power was given to Nisei, even though the lead was generally taken by the older Nisei, the general effect was too violent and premature a revolution in the distribution of power. A Community Council of college boys could not hold the reins in a town full of still vigorous old men. The Nisei, already in California in flight from Japanese into American culture-status, were forced in Poston into a fight for power. This fight dominated the first year, almost, of Poston's community history. And the Nisei lost.

If they had had clear backing in the Administration, they might have held on longer. I question whether this would have made for earlier or more complete integration of the community pattern. But if they did not occupy the center of gravity of the community's own culture, neither did they have the leverage of unequivocal support from the staff. Amid all the other frustrations, physical and spiritual, of camp life, the political quest for self-organization crystalized into two dominant sets of frustrated initiatives. The Issei, encouraged by Head's administration, were estopped by Washington. The Nisei, encouraged by the WRA, were ignored and by-passed by the camp Administration. The compromise "Issei Advisory Board" gave the older men neither the satisfaction of real power nor the dignity of real recognition. And the employing of Nisei in positions which gave them power to make community policies, decisions, and appointments -- and, also, to "interpret" the community to the Hakujin, and influence the staff's evaluation of individuals and of situations -- was intolerable.

*Lessening in the fifteen down to seven or eight levels, but expanding again below that with the Sansei.

The response differed in different Projects. In one, the Issei who despaired of political power seized the economic controls, through the Co-op. In another, the Issei themselves divided into collaborators and non-cooperators. In Poston, even the three camp communities found different patterns of response. In Camp III, our Deep South, there was a quiet secession from political controls, and a peaceful collaboration with the Administrator -- until two years later, when all hell broke loose and Repatriation became the keynote. In Camp II there was division and rebellion and an attempted secession -- typified by the "trial" of a Nisei girl from a disaffected block on charges of being "openly pro-American" -- until the deportation of the leaders and segregation of most of their followers brought peace. In Camp I, the answer that first reached the surface was -- Revolution.

To be precise, the gift of power to the Nisei was the revolution. The answer was in the form of Counter-revolution. This syndrome is characterized, historically, by certain familiar factors. First, it is the work of those who have had power, and whose power has been invaded or supplanted, and who act to get it back. (To cite only one "control" case, the rebellion of the American colonies against England, this is represented on both sides: in the attempt of British merchants to reestablish monopoly control over American commerce, and the outbreak of Hancock and his merchant, shipper, and landed colleagues against this dimunution of the independent power that they had already succeeded once in establishing.) Second, its overt or public ideology and verbiage are directed against the ostensible usurper, against whom it appeals to general ideas; while its actual strategy is directed against the immediate usurping class, and turns every dissatisfaction of the populace to account against this real enemy. (As the Declaration of Independence was directed against the King, but the war measures against the merchant class.) Third, it has to carry a large measure of the doubtful or timid populace along by a combination of persuasion and violence (as the Continentals did in promising rewards, and punishing Tories.)

The first mutterings of this in Poston were the night beatings. The victims were first insulated against community sympathy by whispered rumors that they were "inu", dogs, informers. After each beating, a list of names of (administratively) prominent Nisei was circulated along the grapevine as the next intended victims. Those actually beaten had given some sort of color to the charges, in most cases, by their actions. Those threatened were usually only "collaborators". As the shadow of character-assassination widened, insecurity grew. More reasonable Issei withdrew from any part in either side of the quarrel. So did the more prudent Nisei. I suspect that a closer examination would have shown that those threatened were not only close to the Administration, but were building an undue claim to authority upon their administrative position: they were throwing their weight about a little. As the beatings went on, however, the quiet word went around that the course of safety was to select workers and lieutenants from among ~~xxxx~~ those acceptable to the Issei intransigenants and their Kibei tools. The effect was a tendency toward (a) de-identification with the Administration, (b) cultivation of Issei support, and (c) fearfulness in making any choices or decisions at all. Thus a successful wedge was driven between the Nisei and their source of power; and the first goal, demoralization, was in sight.

I do not mean to imply that there was a well-thought-out plan of campaign by a closely knit group of conspirators. Poston was assembled from many counties and towns in California, and from more than one section of the urban Japanese. The groups that settled there were mostly strangers to one another; each had its own familiar leaders, but no leader yet had the following of all the camp. The equalizing effects of disaster did not at once melt them into one population. But the fact that their disasters were the same, and their grievances cut from one pattern, made concerted action possible much sooner than would normally be the case. Nisei report picked out twelve Issei as Chief instigators. Nearly all of these were arrogant men, who had had old trouble with their own neighbors, and not usually in good standing with the quiet Issei of high standing and character. But Issei who opposed or denounced the troublemakers were apt, as in Block 6, to have their flowers cut down, their charcoal pits dug up, by night gangs of Kibei who spent their evenings around the bonfire of some Issei leader. The leaders themselves did not come together, I think, until after the beatings and other troubles had begun, and they had so to speak recognized each other by these common signs. The Kibei who lent themselves as tools were those whose sojourn in Japan had alienated them from American ways sufficiently to exclude them from social acceptance in their own age group of Nisei, and whose youth and American birth prevented their full acceptance into the ranks of the Issei. In Camp I, they centered politically around the Judo school; in Camp II, around the Sumo group.

The administration had no way of controlling these violences. Its evacuee advisers were likely to be themselves proscribed. Its evacuee police, pleading "law and order", exercised themselves chiefly in seeing that Nisei opposition never crystallized through meetings or by organized violation of the "picket line" that was later established. The administration fed the fire, and alienated Nisei support, by its own actions. As threats drifted like smoke ahead of a forest fire, men close to the administration were given privileged occasions for escaping from Poston. Others, like the Nisei waiting to join American armed forces, were hidden until they could be sneaked out of camp.

And everywhere the word went, "We are all Japanese here. The Nisei are ukuzhimashi, spineless yellowbellies licking favor. The Council had no power. The American government has imprisoned us here; Poston is a Japanese camp, and should be run Japanese style. We are all Japanese, taking our pride in an ancestry for which some Issei are bold enough to speak."

This warcry is significant; for, like the hatred of "inu", it united all Issei, moderates too, around a shared core of feeling that went back into pre-evacuation complexes and strains. The parent community in California had made prodigious sacrifices to educate its children for American independence -- even while it maintained Japanese schools and sent its children to Japan for education; but, like all parents, it was uneasy and resentful when the children tried to pull away from the old ways and assert the independence by flight from the parent culture instead of by taking, as the parents had hoped, a more effective and indigenous leadership of the culture group and strengthening its economic position by American methods and by their acceptance in the American business community. Evacuation frightened the Nisei by throwing them back into a Japanese community of unprecedented concentration: "I never saw so many Japs before in my life"; "I never knew many Japanese people before."

Parents also were frightened, by the conditions that threatened to destroy the family pattern -- the common messhall, the lack of family privacy and family kitchens and family-based economic activities. Actually, the weight of cultural solidarity proved the victor, and Nisei found they had to learn Japanese to live adequately in Poston; those who would not make that adjustment, and the others implied by it, generally left camp as early as possible. But this is said in retrospect. In the first Poston summer and fall, the old strain between the generations was set seething by many new factors: the parents' resentment of Nisei discharge from the Army and exclusion from the draft was far higher than that of many Nisei themselves; parental fear that Poston schooling would, if it ever appeared, not be up to outside standards was shared by the Nisei, while Nisei fears that they were being groomed for "reservation Indians" mingled oddly with parental charges that the English-compelling curriculum was "driving a wedge between children and parents". Issei accepted evacuation as their lot inwartime; it did not threaten their identity, whatever it did to their fortunes, and they survived it with stronger spirit than most of the Nisei, who had no fortunes and looked now to have no identity -- "like mules", as Art Harris said in a speech, the Nisei had "neither pride of ancestry nor hope of posterity." The Issei, in sum, retaining their spiritual vigor, were resentful of America's rejection of the children who had been seeking to reject their parents to become Americans; and their protective attempt to draw the Nisei back into their own fold was abetted by their resentment at WRA attempts to put the Nisei into a position of power they had never wanted and could not sustain. So, whether in anger or in sorrow, the phrase "We are all Japanese here," set almost all the Issei heads nodding.

Finally, the administration in trying to reconcile the residents to Poston, as a home had dreamed up promises and plans that held out real stakes to those Issei who cared to fight for their control. The adult education group, after a preliminary series on "orientation" to Poston, had organized on its own a team of Interpreters who called neighborhood meetings of Issei and invited department heads to talk to, and with, the residents. In a series of such meetings, some of which were transcribed for the record, Wade Head outlined a plan of co-operative farming and industry that would realize every worker in Poston an income, from profits, of at least a hundred dollars a month. It would become a million-dollar enterprise. Soil surveys led to plans for rehousing the farmers on strip-farms along the river. Kennedy set off to bring back a million dollars worth of war-industry contracts. John Collier came and said the war would last for seven years, and that leaseholds on Colorado River land would be awaiting families that cared to stay thereafter. Buoyed by the additional belief that Japan was winning the war (even the most confident Nisei were convinced that she would win a negotiated peace "in which nobody would be the loser", as several of them told me), the Poston community looked like a good field for the exercise of power. And when Dillon Myer came to say that Poston would be empty in a few months, and that no industries or permanent farming would be permitted -- even the gardens and improvements on barracks he denounced -- it must have looked like the crisis: act now or accept defeat. It was time for counter-revolution.

Once more, I mean no Board of Strategy that names the house and the nature of the occasion. But none was needed: the fissionable material was ready; and when the damper was withdrawn with the going of Haas to Manzanar,

Kennedy to San Francisco, Ishimaru to Salt Lake, the unstable elements began to act. Someone beat up a notorious JACKaL. An inexperienced Internal Security Chief and a Reports Officer with a pathological Dick Tracy complex called in several Kibei for questioning, and held three without charge. And Wade Head, releasing one at once and another after a couple of days, unerringly hit the nucleus of the Japanese community -- with a characteristically neutral missile: he held the Kibei fourth-rank Judoist from the strongly disaffected Orange County blocks for FBI investigations; and then left town without having either charged him, explained his grounds, or recommended any policy.

The organizing of the demonstration, the bivouac around the jail, and the picket line between the community and the administration, have been clearly and succinctly described by Edward Spicer in a report headed Self-Government in Poston, and written in March 1943 (pages 102 to 110, which I hope can be appended to this paper as Appendix A). To that account, which I shall assume the reader has read, I shall add only a few remarks.

a. The major characteristic of a general strike is the transfer of the decision and management of affairs to the hands of the strike generalship instead of those of the normal directorate of the community. I saw the pattern in San Francisco, and recognized it again in Poston. The strikers decided what services were to be maintained: food deliveries, hospital services, utilities, of course. In Poston, it was significant (to some of us) that schools, recreation, and adult education activities were not interrupted throughout the strike: the Nisei study Seminar continued to meet, which was not important except in one particular: that it was a major channel of communication and discussion between resident Nisei and administration; of its fifteen members, more than half were Community Councilmen; and after the strike, it called three of the Executive Committee (two Nisei and Mitani, the vocal chord of the negotiating committee) in for a series of probing "hearings" on the intentions and beliefs of the strike leadership, with the American Nisei as audience and panel. Haas and, of course, Walter Balderston also took part in these meetings, in which the "Honor Court" proposal was cross-examined and, I think, Mitani's faith in it withered.

In general, relations between the "professionals" and the community went on, despite the strike against the administration. Nell Findley had to send her workers home and tell them not to jeopardize their standing in the community by defying the picketline. Miles Cary met Nisei teachers in the mesquite for discussions of their grievances against the strike leadership -- and the chief of police, who broke up a teachers' protest meeting by intimidation. Haas mingled in all manner of groups around the bonfire bivouac, and talked freely with the watchers about the situation. Kennedy, back from San Francisco with several valuable industrial contracts blown out of his hands by Dillon Myer, joined him there. Various of the Community Activities staff came to me at my house, or even at the office, with information, ahead of the Administration's receipt of the same facts -- or such as it got.

b. The resolution of the Community Council, demanding that the prisoners be either released or charged, was a clear and dignified document, whatever the impression given by the actual behavior of the Council in

resigning. John Evans, refusing the request, was undoubtedly dignified; but it was not characteristic in him to be clear. To say "no" was reflex with him. Whether his "no" in regard to calling in the MP detachment was accompanied by all the rationalization with which Leighton credits it (pp. 174-76) is of course matter of speculation; but I have wondered whether the story of the incident might have been different if the strike leaders had reached Evans first with a demand that the soldiers be kept out of camp.

c. After Head and Haas returned to Poston, I was present at a conversation between them in Head's office, concerning the detention of Uchida without charges. At this time the FBI, whose expected intervention was the Administration's first excuse for holding Uchida, had already washed its hands of the affair. Nothing was keeping Uchida in jail except the Administration's fear of losing face. Haas took the position that his detention was in violation of civil liberties. Head's query was how seriously he should take that. "What I mean is", he said, "How will it look on my record?" "Could some son of a bitch throw it up at me ten years from Now?"

This illustrated what seemed to me Head's major concern throughout the incident. This was a crisis in his career, not in the life of a community of people. WRA Washington, which had a stake in the latter, was never given a clear account of the strike until after it was settled. There was no communication with them; they had to read what the newspapers said, including Head's authorized statement that the strike was led by "pro-Japanese elements". The communication was with Chicago: with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs; and much of it was entrusted, over the telephone, to Leighton -- Collier's agent in Head's camp.

Vis-a-vis his staff, Head's attitude was that of tough talk about the "ringleaders" whom he "had spotted" and had "a plan" to "get". In one plenary staff meeting, Head said "There's a CIO man in this camp that had a lot to do with this strike. I know who he is, too. We'll take care of him." What the pro-Japanese elements were doing in the CIO he never explained. "CIO" meant to Head something vaguely subversive and Satanic; he often used the term to identify "dangerous thoughts". When Miles Cary was explaining his methods of teacher recruitment to an early staff meeting, Head asked, "Are there any of those union people among them?" " I don't know," Cary answered calmly, "I didn't ask about their religion."

Long after the strike was over, Head was still talking in staff meeting about his "plan" to "get" the ringleaders. The consistent impression was that a trap had been laid into which they were already toppling. Finally, according to Vernon Kennedy, he asked Ralph Gelvin directly about this plan: what it was, and when it was coming off. Gelvin smoothed the dust with his toe, in the perennial Poston gesture, and answered, "Well, Vernon, to tell the truth, Wade hasn't got any plan."

d. Head's inexperience in negotation was shown also by his failure to learn the names of the Committee of 72 that he was supposed to be negotiating with. Haas himself noticed this lack, and went in person to the police station and got the names. He also got a clear impression that the committee was shaky, both in its own confidence and in its public support. The bivouac and

picket lines were being supported by threats of violence, not by popular enthusiasm. Nisei voices were rising in defiance of the leadership: Michio Kunitani saw that his block was represented by a flag clearly identified with the Japanese flag, and refused to take his watch until the flag came down. It came down. George Kita, Joe Shiomichi, and some others were talking of a Nisei organization to end the strike. Some of the Issei to whom I talked in a non-Orange County block during the strike said quietly that the Administration should not pay too much attention to the "men" with bad records" who were in charge them. All in all, the Haas-Kennedy-Powell axis operated on the evidence that the strike leadership was not representative, either technically or in terms of actual power. In staff meeting, Haas argued that there should be no negotiation with them; that if they were ignored a few days longer, they would fall, and a leadership would replace them with which the administration could deal with more security and dignity. The professionals generally supported this position. I had earlier urged, in a personal memorandum, that the leaders were anti-American, anti-White, and that the administration should take measures to preserve its own dignity and the respect of the loyal Nisei and Issei who were being intimidated; I was not averse to using the MP's if necessary to do this. But if the community itself would repudiate the strike gang, that was even better -- provided the administration kept its position clear and strong. If it negotiated with the committee, that would force the community to leave them in power; and it would also betray the people who wanted to be loyal.

Head, however, was following other advice. He had a Maryknoll priest , Father Clement, who spoke Japanese, circulating in the camp and bringing him information. Clement's advices, according to Head, were that the strike leadership was representative and had full support. Chement, incidentally, was living in Poston contrary to WRA regulations, at Head's pleasure; I had to appeal to Washington to get him removed to Parker later, and I never regarded his testimony as either expert or impartial in the strike. Secondly, Head was listening to Leighton. Leighton, by his statements in staff meetings, was taking the long anthropological view. He remarked in one meeting that perhaps we should turn the whole camp over to the leaders and just keep records of what happened; after all, Poston was just a Japanese village in essence. This attitude seemed to the "Jacobins" -- Haas, Kennedy, and me -- the height of academic irresponsibility, since we knew of and believed in the elements in Poston that did not want it to become a Japanese village, and that were not at all represented by the committee. Finally, Head was relying on his own clique, the "loyalty" group: whatever they would accept, he felt safe in doing; and whatever he decided to do, they would support. His fear was not of the Jacobins but of the Engineers and finance people who, if they holted en masse, could severely injure his record. As a matter of fact, the professional party was afraid of them too, since at that time they represented a simple anti-evacuee or Rap the Jap philosophy. Curiously, it was Nell Findley who toward the end of the strike introduced in staff meeting a resolution of confidence in the administration -- a resolution based on her fear of a right-wing bolt, and on her recognition of the importance of the unity which Head constantly plead for, but the resolution did not carry by a unanimous vote.

e. One morning, a Nisei brought me the wording of the demands on which the committee had decided to rest its case. They were accurately reported, but they also included Nisei comment: "Establish a Public Relations Committee

to mediate with and settle all problems affecting personal reputations and damages out of court." Nisei comment: "Gestapo". "The Poston residents be given the right to nominate, select or appoint all evacuees for administrative personnel and other important positions." Nisie comment: "The spoils system."

"The present Emergency Council shall establish within the framework of the WRA a City Planning Board which shall create the necessary administrative legislative, and economic organizations." Nisei comment: "The distatorship."

When these were shown to the administration, they were brushed off as unofficial -- as of course they were. Kennedy and Haas, however, sat in Cottage Eleven (the Jacobin Club; the phrase is Walter Balderston's) while the Corona Portable on which the "fence" petitions had been written (and on which the present paper is being written also) put down a series of counter-proposals for submission to the staff. They dealt with the same points: control of employment, law and order, planning; but on somewhat different assumptions:

"The assumption of responsibility by the people of Poston for law and order and the ending of gang activities and beatings.

"The complete firing and rehiring of all evacuee employees with a view to a better distribution of labor within the camp and the elimination of unessential positions.

"The setting up of joint temporary committees composed of both Government personnel and evacuees to co-operate in the re-employment program and the re-establishment of self-government."

It was Kennedy who remarked, as quoted anonymously by Leighton (206) "the only difference is that in the plan proposed by the evacuees they are boss, and in ours we are boss." The clean-slate re-employment plan was also Kennedy's; and he and Haas carried the main burden of presentation and explanation when this program was submitted to the staff meeting as a clear and firm basis for the administration's hitherto nebulous position. The staff meeting voted unanimously that these demands should be adopted and presented to the Committee. It was also pretty well agreed that the Director should stall the present blocks more adequately; if possible, a new elected Council.

The next day, Head casually invited me to go along with him and Gelvin, Haas and Kennedy, to a meeting with the committee. Leighton may have been there too; but if this is the meeting he describes in his book (204-7), one of us is overlooking a magnificent career in fiction. In the meeting I attended, Head, after an hour of meaningless conversation, said he thought the committee's demands were "all right, in principle"; discussed the election of block managers; had Kennedy explain, with the help of the Red Cross blackboard (we were in the Red Cross office, as neutral ground), the re-employment plan. When Haas protested some remark of Head's, Ralph Gelvin shushed him; "Let Wade handle this." Finally, to the undisguised shock and horror of the Jacobins at least, Head accepted the committee points "in principle" promised to release the prisoner and to attend the celebration in person when he was

released -- not, as Haas asked, into the custody of his attorney, but into that of the committee itself. And not once during the meeting were the administration demands mentioned except in the request that Kennedy "explain the way we have to reorganize the employment system." It was on the way out of this meeting that Head said, "You notice I didn't sign anything"; that Kennedy said, "God, I never saw such a lousy job of negotiating"; that Haas said, "Good Lord, he's going to make a personal appearance at the strike victory jubilee"; and that I said, "Tomorrow I resign". It was later that same evening (the meeting broke up after seven o'clock) that Kennedy laid out children's block, candles, and paper flowers on the Powells' livingroom floor with a sign, "R.I.P. Poston"; and that Evans, a neighbor but never before a visitor, came in to urge the wisdom of Head's course -- rather, the unwisdom of ours. First he talked about loyalty; then about unity, and the danger of a break by the engineers, against which Wade needed help. Finally he asked his test question in defense of Wade's policy: "It can all be expressed in just one question. What do you think of the Allies hiring Admiral Darlan?" When we told him, he left.

The next morning the entire staff was called together to hear the report of the settlement. In the same hospital ward 7 where the committee had taken over, where the council had resigned, where Evans has refused to release the prisoner, Head took the floor -- and read off the administration demands which the executive staff had agreed to two days before, and which had been left out of the negotiations. These, he said, are the terms on which he forced the strikers to settle. Again Kennedy explained the clean-sweep policy of re-employment. The engineers were suspicious of what Lyle Warnock, in a question from the floor, had the courage to call "a Munich"; but the meeting broke up without controversy. It was Nell Findley who urged that the disappointed Jacobins stand together behind the administration, because "we're needed more than ever now." It was Haas who agreed, with the statement, "Whatever you think of what he did, Wade is still the best and most democratic Project Director of any of the centers."

The incident was over. The next stage was set for two struggles; that of the administration to get the camp back to work; and that of the camp to get rid of the strike leadership with which the administration had saddled them.

V

"It appeared by early January that the Central Executive Board had no clear lines of support reaching anywhere into the community. They had been rejected by a large number of Issei, by the Temporary Community Council, by Nisei and Kibei outside the council, by at least four prominent members of the administrative staff, and a split had developed within their own group." (Spicer, Post Strike Politics, August 24, 1943; restricted Community Analysis report.)

"In spite of this" -- the resignation of the Executive Board when both the council and the Issei Advisory Board rejected its formula for its own existence -- "The Director was still not sure that the usefulness of the Central Executive Board was at an end, and he still wanted to secure help rather than opposition from its members." (Leighton, p.221.)

"I felt that the failure of the administration to effectuate self-government had been one of the causes of the incident." (Haas, quoted by Leighton, page 202, n.)

These citations may help explain some things that appear in the records. The retiring strike committee of 12 called an election the day after the settlement. One Nisei and one Issei from each block made up the City Planning Board, which in turn set up the negotiating committee as a Central Executive Board, along with a Labor Relations Board to which Mitani was relegated -- and on which he further demonstrated his disposition to "give away anything in words," as Leighton quotes on Issei as complaining of him. The City Planning Board disappeared leaving the other two boards as the joint problem of the community and the administration. Wade Head adopted the Executive Board, met with them at frequent length, and assured his staff that he was "keeping them close to keep an eye on them" until his "trap" for them was sprung. Kennedy offered the Labor Relations Board jobs as employment advisers under him, an offer which they declined. It was obvious that nobody wanted the Boards; and their rejection by the newly-arising leaders is hardly explained by Leighton's repeated innuendo of jealousy on the part of those who ran for strike leadership and got defeated. More than grapes was sour in Poston One.

Haas took as his next job the re-establishment of formal government. The last public document typed on the Jacobin Corona in Cottage Eleven was a statement that there was no recognized official governing body in Poston except a council elected under WRA rules, though the Project Director might create special committees advisory to himself. This statement duly appeared over Wade Head's signature; a new council and Issei Advisory Board were duly elected, and a new Chairman proceeded to raise new kinds of hell with the administration. But the Project Director's spiritual signature kept appearing in the assurance of Mitani and the Executive Board that they had his backing in taking over the direction of community life where they chose to be interested. When the Labor Relations Board asked to go over the Community Activities set-up with me, I invited the Nisei Coordinator to sit in also, as did Balderston; and I remember with amusement and pleasure the series of early mornings when we all took chairs out of the unheated office and sat in a circle in the winter sunshine while Mitani meandered around the bush and Matsumoto (who had worked in Community Activities before, and who later worked with me as a respected colleague) grew impatient with both Mitani and me. It was Matsumoto who said their authority came from Mr. Head, that he had told them he would see that I cooperated, and that I should go to him for orders before meeting the committee again. Instead, I went before the Council to explain the organization, and to explain that I thought recreation was the community's business, not for either me or politicians to kick around at our own will. Kennedy similarly cultivated the Council; and he and Haas took the chairman and other evacuees with them when they went to the Gila River project to look into the business of setting up camouflage net plants.

Of the personnel of the strike leadership, a few survived in local politics: Matsumoto, Minoru Okamoto; the latter became local chairman and "city manager" because he was, though not bright, an "honest politician," in Lincoln Steffens' sense: a consistent plugger for those he wanted to help, accommodating realist who escaped identification with any distinct party. Withal, he had a wry sense of humor, and no hypocrisy. Yahiro grumbled

his way through one or two political positions, finally retired to the police force. Matsubara concentrated on poetry and the Co-op. The rest were definitely retired: first not elected, then not nominated. All of them had to make new careers, new positions, on the basis of their activities after the strike. No one rode on into community position because he had been in the strike group. Everyone wanted to forget that whole episode.

VII

In attempting to analyze the political history of Poston I, the other two camps must be regarded as, in some measure, "control cases". The same kinds of people were there under the same kinds of pressure. Their backgrounds, culture, history, frustration, hardships, were the same as those of Camp I. Yet a look at their history in the summer and fall of 1942 (see Haas, Narrative Report, Community Government, December 31, 1942; Barbara Washler, Final Report on Community Government, Poston) shows sharp divergencies of response to the circumstances. Their omission from Leighton's account limits somewhat the putative generality of the administrative principles he ostensibly derives from the experience of Poston I.

Camp II, with something over 4,000 residents, was located about three miles down river from Poston I. Its hard-working administrator, James Crawford, was almost the sole representative of hakujin administration in the whole village. As was suggested earlier, Crawford was an instinctive democrat with something like a genius for dealing with all people as human beings, as individuals with personalities; and he also showed the correlative weakness in dealing with abstract generalities. In Poston II, this was an additional virtue. Crawford created a relationship in which the residents felt encouraged to put forward their own ablest leaders, who were accepted by Crawford as full working partners. The strongest of the early leaders to arise was also a member of Haas' legal staff, John Maeno. When the Camp I crisis approached, and pressure began to be put on Camp II by the strike organizers from I, CampII's latent division into cooperative and "radical" factions began to appear on the surface. Maeno responded by calling the temporary Council, the block managers, the labor Fair Practice Committee, and the evacuee departmental executives together into one all-representative body. This body constituted itself into a Congress, and continued to sit almost daily throughout the period of crisis and reorganization. Maeno himself voluntarily appeared as a mediator between the Camp I Council and the administration. When this effort failed, he concentrated on holding II together against the divisive efforts of the rebel organizers from Camp I. A few blocks in Camp II were strongly sympathetic to the strike leadership, and tried to force the issue in II. The result was that these blocks were forced into a conspicuous isolation within their own camp. This was emphasized by a "trial" held in one block on charges against a Legal Division secretary that she was "openly pro-American". (Legal Division files contain transcripts and affidavits on part of this episode, the subject of which was S. Kinoshita. The record should be studied not for the history, but for the verbatim revelation of personal attitudes and relations existing in Poston blocks in 1942, and for a study of the manners and behavior of block political leaders

in this early stage.) Most of the leaders in these blocks were taken to internment not long afterward, and a heavy proportion of their residents chose segregation in the Tule Lake Center. The pattern of Council-Block Manager-Department Head collaboration survived throughout the history of Camp II, giving it a unique personality and method of community decision which was recognized by the other two camps and by the administration.

Poston III, slightly larger than II, and another three miles down the road from I, also established and maintained a distinct political personality. Moris Burge, the Administrator, reflected a life which had been both sheltered and managed, perhaps in the rather proprietary way in which sheltering managers deal with their protegees. In this, his first major independent administrative assignment, he displayed a somewhat manorial proprietary air toward "his" people; sought to protect them from themselves, and from the responsibility of possible errors which they might commit if they had full access to facts and to the control of policy; and retained firmly in his own hands the reins of management, generally in the form of a veto on their proposals. He imported from Camp I an administrative assistant whose past business dealings and present moral behavior toward both other peoples' money and other people's wives were under heavy adverse criticism through the camp, but who retained his power after Burge moved to Camp I. (He relocated rather abruptly after information from many sources, hakujin as well as evacuee, had brought me to the point of warning Burge that an investigation would have to be made; and after his departure, curious revelations and unexpected bills for unauthorized expenditures of community funds kept turning up.) The community of Camp III took pride in being distinctive in its manner of performance in social affairs. But it elected to Council chairmanship a man who was in marked opposition to the American position in the war, to the WRA policies, and to the Army draft; who later applied for expatriation, and transfer to a family internment camp; and whom, despite a favorable recommendation from Haas and me, the WRA Director refused to recommend for clearance for relocation. Camp III ignored the strike. It also voted against the later Charter of community government on the ground that the over-all community council had too much power over the local units. It further refused to enter the camouflage net production scheme on the basis of profit-sharing with the communities by the cash-wage workers. Its representatives helped wreck the first proposal for a Manpower Planning Conference. Its cooperative repeatedly pressed for secession from the over-all Co-op, while fighting local council control of business affairs until police raids (near the end of Poston's history) uncovered private black market operations by some of its Directors, who hastily relocated. Camp III consistently employed more workers in each category of project employment than either of the other camps -- not only in proportion to population, but sometimes absolutely. Even its juveniles outdid those of the other camps in the magnitude and costliness of their predatory delinquencies, while the magnificance of its adult gambling establishments put I and II to shame. In each of the camps, the public outdoor theatres (Shibai stages) were erected without administrative sanction for most of the construction, while the labor was apparently performed by the Gnomes, Elves, Leprechauns, and Little Men's Chowder and Marching Society. Camp III, however, calmly appropriated several thousand adobe school bricks, a few hundred unauthorized sacks of cement, and the paid labor of two or three hundred men drafted as "volunteers" to erect its well planned swimming pool, wading pool and fountain, Shibai stage, and ball park.

Unlike, then, the other two camps, III maintained its aloofness from their politics on grounds different from those that kept II from becoming involved in I's strike. But the fact remains that III had no part in the strike, either; and this fact constitutes a further check on the factors which produced the strike in the single camp.

In historical analysis, where circumstances are equivalent as between two divergent response-events, one lookd for differentia of personal leadership; where personal factors are taken as roughly equivalent, the differentia are sought for among the circumstances. Edward Spicer has suggested that, most conditions being equal among all relocation centers, the differentia which account for the incidents at Manzanar and Poston can be found only in the one eccentric action which took place at those two camps; namely, the arrest and detention without charge of members of the evacuee community by the Project Administration. This action, which concentrated into one unjust action the whole set of fears, anxieties, and symbols created by the series of FBI arrests and detentions without charge or explanation, before evacuation, would obviously carry a high shock-potential when it was committed against Nisei, by the administrations of "protective" camps, and under an Authority which threw all its favorable legal weight on the Nisei side of the community power-balance. It may be suggested that Leighton's list of desirable traits in an administrator should be augmented, in the light of these incidents, by at least one more; namely, that he would be well advised to observe the elementary demands of civil liberty and constitutional guarantee in dealing with his charges. But, as a principle of explanation, the violation of community security by highhanded police action may not quite suffice to explain the strike. Certainly it precipitated it. Certainly, too, the Project's ignoring of the dignified and forceful memorandum of the first Community Council calling for the release or formal charging of the Camp I prisoners dramatized the Administration's general policy of ignoring and belittling the legally organized agencies of community self-government. But would Camps II and III not have been expected to respond to the invasion in a way at least sympathetic to Camp I? I recognize that Camp I was a single community, equivalent in size to Manzanar as a single camp; and that II and III were in effect separate though neighboring villages. But the administration was the same for I, II, and III; the threat implied by the arrests in I was the same for the other two camps.

A curious control case appears in the handling of a beating in Camp II, at about the same period. That time, Haas was in Poston; in the strike case he was absent. Apprised by telephone of the beating, and of the fact that the victim had held on to one of his assailants until he could be captured and turned over to the police, Haas made a quick trip to Camp II. There he supervised the questioning which led to the picking up of other participants; he secured written statements confessing participation; he arranged for orderly procedures of legal process, as a result of which the boys were tried and jailed outside of Poston. The offense was the same; the mood of the community was similar to that of Camp I; but the arrest and removal occasioned a feeling of relief rather than of resentment. In Camp I, the arrested Judoist held court for scores of adoring young boys. In Camp II, the leading boy's mother expressed relief thatthe suspense was ended.

One obvious difference appears, then, in the personnel involved. The entire community had confidence in the honesty, the fairness, the friendliness and disinterestedness, of Haas and Crawford. Due process was fairly followed and evacuee police and legal personnel were allowed to do most of the actual handling of the case. In Camp I, the round-up of suspects was made by white peronnel, one of whom had already earned a poor reputation by his boasting about FBI and other Intelligence Service connections. The administration, by its usual secrecy and its actual appeal to the FBI, aroused the most alarming kind of rumors. And, far from handling the problem promptly, the two top administrators left Camp on a trip, leaving the detainees still in jail.

Another set of personality differences appears in the cases of the three Camps as they met the crisis of the Camp I strike. With Head and Gelvin away, the Unit administrator of Camp I was in charge of the administration, so that all three Camps were actually in the personal hands of their own administrators. In II, the position of Crawford and Maeno had been mentioned. In III, those of Burge, his assistant Uumino, and the council chariman Takeshima, have been suggested. In Camp I, John Evans represented very much the same policies and attitudes as Burge in III: rule by appointment, decision by veto, together with a real though superiority-tainted personal kindliness. In his case, however, he had no evacuee body to work with him. The council, which was supposed to, he had always distrusted and now rejected outright.

What would have been the event if (a) Head had stayed in Poston? (b) Haas had been in Poston? (c) Head and Haas had both been there? It must be added that Head was there during the two or three days in which the strike action gathered organization and momentum; and that, according to Spicer, he had been seen by committees (which he referred to the FBI) and by at least one worried resident who foresaw the strike and warned him of it. Head left the day the crowd began to form.

The bivouac and strike, therefore, were developed during Head's presence, before Evans was left in charge. They were planned and led by Poston I men. It is not safe, then, to conclude that the personal actions of the Unit heads were decisive; or that Head's, since he stood in the same relation to all three camps, was decisive either. As to evacuee leadership, the resentment of Nisei power by ill-mannered old crowd baiters was not confined to Camp I; II certainly had its share. Camp III, in view of its whole history of isolationism, I am inclined to leave out of comparison; III would have struck only if I and II had declared a no-strike policy and tried to make it binding on III. The question then reduces to this: With similar provocation (only more personally immediate in I), why did II pull itself together into a solidarity that could not be stampeded, while I fell apart into leaderless milling which a group of loudspeakers (human and mechanical) could control against the privately expressed disapproval of even the Issei themselves?

The factor that looms largest in my mind is the presence of the administration -- its physical and personal presence, in all its ramified complexity -- in Camp I, as against the fact that II (and III) had in effect only one administrator to deal with. They had to unify; Camp I could not. I noticed the effect first in trying to organize the Community Activities staffs in the three camps: II and III, left perforce pretty much to themselved, pulled

together (not without hard internal struggles) into organizations that handled most of their own problems, organizations with which, and through which, I could deal as a whole. In camp I, everyone in "C.A." came to me directly; activity heads came with plans they had not discussed with their supervisors; individuals came to dispute the actions of their activity heads; people came from their blocks to plead for or complain about items involved in the recreation program. In a memorandum (cited by Haas, p. 62) on Community Activities organization, I announced that the local councils were the source of the real authority for recreational programs, and directed C.A. personnel to work with the appropriate committees of their councils. I repeatedly directed the workers to work through their leaders. I organized a top Cabinet of activity-heads representing all three units and all major types of activity; and I added local coordinators and Issei coordinators. And, to the end, every individual with a problem, a proposal, or a grievance came directly to me with it, around or over the others in his organization. Or, if it were a question of playing fields, for instance, each block would go from one to another of the Engineers, the Property people, the warehouses, the shops, or wherever they thought they could get what they wanted. Most of the basketball courts were built by the blocks separately, without plan, and before I knew of it -- indeed, before the Engineers knew what was happening to the materials out of which they were built. To act through channels was of course to get action slowly. To be told "No" by one administrator meant only that you went to others until someone said "Yes" -- or until opportunity presented itself outside of authority. The Section never did achieve in Camp I anything like the self-governing organization, the use of integrated local means of action and authority, which came quite early to characterize the other two camps.

In Government itself, in Poston I, the Project Director had the same trouble; I have implied thus far that he created it by his ignoring of legal channels, by his encouragement of random individuals to seek him separately and arrange affairs not known to or understood by the community and its regular authorities. But in part this practice arose not from his will, but from the situation. In fact, it was Wade Head himself who used to exclaim in despair that he wished the Administration buildings had been placed at least ten miles outside the camp.

The presence of administration, accessible in all its ramifications to individuals with all their desires and conflicts, inhibits the growth of coherent local machinery for self-government. This moral stands out more clearly than perhaps any other from Poston's experience. I think it was not merely coincidence that placed the strike, with the local disorganization that made it possible, in Poston I. There was not only the seat of power, and hence the incentive to bid for control. There was the administration, with its five hundred members, and hence the practical inhibition of community coherence. I do not mean to be paradoxical: the strike did not measure the organization, the solidarity, of that community. It measured precisely their opposite. It was the <u>organized</u> communities that resisted it successfully.

This factor does not explain why Poston and Manzanar had incidents while other one-unit centers did not. It bears only on the difference between Poston's three camps. But it suggests that Manzanar, which has had three Directors in quick succession, must have suffered from disorganization in order

to have a riot at all; and that the projects which avoided such incidents may had been blessed with administrations which (1) were smaller and more compact than ours, (2) maintained more remoteness from the community and hence forced it to organize earlier; (3) were more formal in following one set of instructions, and less torn by inter-Authority and intra-staff conflicts of democratic and authoritatian factions. These are guesses but they arise out of my conviction that both the presence, and the disorganized insecurity, of the Project Administration contributed as much to the strike as did its eccentric actions or its inefficiency in meeting material requirements of the residents. Despite Leighton, I hold that the incident was not well handled. It was not necessary, it xxx left needless bitterness and shame on both sides of the firebreak. If the aftermath was healthy, it was through the recuperative powers of a healthy body of people -- again, on both sides. And the period of community-administration maturity, be it noted, did not set in until most of the key actors in the strike period had relocated or retired from the scene; among them, Leighton's heroic Assistant Project Director, and his wise Director.

VII

Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1831, found the stability of Anglo-American divilization in one institution, whose tradition rendered the Anglo-Americans superior to all contemporary nationalities as colonizers. This was the institution of the township, with its legislative, administrative, and judicial autonomy serenely secure at the bottom of the ladder of county, state, and federal powers. In poston, the roots of stability, autonomy, and political security developed at the level of the block. Community machinery, administrative relations, personal political fortunes, were superstructures which could be understood only superficially until they were traced back, bark, sap and pith, into the blocks. I started by suggesting that no other town of my knowledge had so secure a community life as Poston: and this is correlate with the fact that no other American town ever had so firm a basis in block organization.

Blocks, as such, achieved personalities as distinct as those of persons. One could predict "where Block XX would stand" on many new proposals. If there was a fight among school boys, one asked "What blocks were they from?" in order to understand the causes. If there was a blockage in the development of a work program, one could predict what block led the opposition. The eccentricities of Block 35 would have been surprising only if they had occurred in Block 42. One made jokes with someone from 220 that would have been insults to anyone from 204. If a boy asked to renounce citizenship one asked "From 307, I suppose?" and if he went out to college people asked, "What's your block -- 329?" Relocation proceeded rapidly from Blocks 5, 6, 11, 12; the Relocation and Welfare staffs assumed they'd have a lot of last-minute people to look after in 37 and 38. To know Poston, any camp, you had to know the blocks as you would know people.

In past, this was because each block, settled by assignment as the long trains or the crowded strings of busses rolled in from one assembly center or evacuation office after another, was made up of people from some single area. Thirty was always regarded as an unfortunate and rather apathetic block because it had a few people from each of many areas. But most of the block personality

was achieved after settlement, rather than inherited from before. It was built on months of argument over inter-personal and inter-family controversy that it took the whole block to adjudicate. It was built on months of eating together, of helping neighbors with hard problems, of chipping in to common pools to buy coolers for the steaming messhall, to buy baseball equipment for the boys, to decorate the recreation hall for now a wedding, now a funeral. It was built on dealing with everyday problems through the same Block manager's office, on nominating and electing councilmen, on fighting with or over the chef, on having to make collective decisions on matters that affected everybody in the block, with every family having a little different idea or interest at first but under the clear necessity of accepting one solution for all the block residents.

Three steges of block integration can be illustrated from the experience of those dealing with evacuee housing; i.e., the assignment of families to quarters; an apparently routine task, given on the WRA chart to the welfare profession but very early relinquished in Poston to the evacuee community itself. Housing was the first focus of evacuees' anxieties,, on arrival in camp; health and food, the major enduring strains of fear-psychology, developed soon afterward, but the housing assignment always offered the first ground of challenge and dispute. None of us who were charged with authority for "intake" housing, or later with responsibility for straightening out tangles in housing policy, will ever outlive the lessons of that experience. (I append to this paper one written in the spring of 1943 (America's Refugees); and call the reader's attention especially to pages 3-6 and 9-11.) (Appendix)

The easy part of housing was the first assignment of families, as they moved down the intake line; four to seven into one 20x25-foot room; relatives together if possible; younger children at least with their own parents; common-law mates accepted as families, on their own request. The troubles began the next day. The line at the housing desk would be almost as long as at intake. The family assigned to the end barrack wanted to be in the middle. Those nearest the messhall wanted to be away from the noise; those fartherest always had some reason for moving next to the mess. Each 100-foot barrack had four "apartments"; and always those at the front, on the street, were urgent to move to the rear, near the latrines; and vice versa. People wanted to change blocks, to be near people they knew; they wanted to change, to get away from people who knew them. In an intolerable situation, everyone wanted to test the limits of tolerance within the permissive situation. In the initial climax of the insecurity-series that had begun with the evacuation order, people accepted change of place as the urgent substitute for rebellion. The housing aides were wise in their generation, and gently resisted all demands. Within a few months, circumstances sometimes occasioned requests for some of these families to move from the room in which they had landed; and their resistance to being moved compared with their earlier efforts to change as granite to shale. As with young children, and all insecure beings, place is a major factor in identity. Where everything was alike, one's place still carried the full inertia of gravitation. Later on, families left Poston in preference to being moved out of their block.

The first illustration to which I refer was the problem of placing the bachelors in Camp III. That camp caught in the evacuation a large proportion of migratory farm laborers from Valley camps: men without families (at least in this country), whose life was generally understood to consist of labor, gambling, drinking, and whoring: men of no substance and rough speech. The housing aides had distributed them on a rough basis of eight or ten to a block. In each block, they were housed together in one of the long barracks. But in every block, the mothers became agitated by their presence: their daughters would be molested on their way to the latrines, to the messhall, to the washhouse; no one would be safe. Move them to some other block! One by one, the Block managers came to Mita Kaneko, in charge of housing. Move the bachelors to some other block. Mita came to me, and a meeting was held. It was obviously undesirable to put all the bachelors into one block (as was done in at least one other project, with unhappy results). It was clearly unfair, indeed impossible, to put them all into "other" blocks. Mita argued that they would be under the beneficient influence of the good family people who outnumbered them in every block. In the end, they stayed where they had been assigned. The point is that this was the first stage of coalescence of the blocks. Most of us against a few of us; and put the problem over on to the other blocks. The method was appeal to Authority; and grumbling resignation when the appeal was denied.

The second illustration concerned a block in Camp I. Two boys out on seasonal work leave asked permission to come back to live in their mother's block. Housing granted the permission. The day after the boys arrived, housing was on the spot: the Block Manager had not been consulted, and would not give his permission: the boys must live elsewhere. The boys had authority from above, and refused to move. The block leaders countered with a threat to evict their mother; but she would not move. Housing was now in charge of a JACL secretary from one of the interior valleys; he was extremely nervous and unable to argue, much less to enforce, his authority. In a meeting in the Block manager's office, he was scolded, even gently threatened and, in the characteristic move which perhaps justified the having of an administration in the project, gracefully passed the responsibility back to me. On that first day, I held that the family unity had a claim prior to that of the Manager's dignity. The second day the personnel of the meeting was smaller, the talk in lower voices, it appeared that there were certain problems of venereal disease involved. A series of such go-rounds resulted in the boys' volunteering to move to Camp II, which they did; and then, in post-operative consultation, it developed (and oh! how often this same theme appeared in retrospect on every type of interpersonal conflict in Poston!) that the whole dispute went back to a lettuce deal in Salinas, where the mother's relatives and her opponents in the block had fallen on opposite sides of the profit, and the bad blood among them kept breaking out in such little community boils as this one. The point is that, in this second stage of block integration, Authority gots its knuckles rapped for stepping into the midst of a "family" quarrel which the Block Manager understood and would have handled; and that, amid bitter feuds which resulted in certain changes of apartments within the block, the heads or elders of the block community succeeded in making a solution by their own forms of pressure.

The third illustration, occurring in the third year of the project, resulted in evicting an entire family not only from its block but from Poston

itself, by the force of block pressures and the support which that type of pressure received from the whole community, against the attempts of administration to intervene and mediate. The feud in this case did not go back before evacuation, but arose within the block during the strike period. Some of the block's residents became prominent over the loudspeaker system at the jail. The evictee, an Issei and an editorial writer for the project newspaper, had been outspoken in behalf of American loyalty, in written editorials in both English and Japanese. He had also, it seemed, been somewhat short with some of his neighbors. In a block fight over the chef and kitchen crew, he had asserted that the crew was hijacking some of the food issued to the block. He had been outspoken in his scorn because the block raised money for a lavish farewell party for the few who had gone to segregation in Tule Lake, while it had let boys (including his) go off to service in the American army without even gathering to say goodbye. His children were accused of having thrown other block children into the swimming pool; stories were circulated about his wife. When the block meeting passed sentence of eviction, he appealed to the administration. We could only refer the appeal to the Block Managers, as an organized body. Many of them sympathized with him in the dispute; but they held that they could not refuse to recognize the will of a block, enacted in its own meeting. They therefore sanctioned the eviction, and added that he would not be welcome in their blocks if his own could not live with him. The point which block solidarity and the philosophy of block autonomy had reached does not need to be specified. The impossibility of administration's imposing a counter-decree is also sufficiently obvious.

I should add that the "loyalty" factor was not paramount. Some of the victim's opponents were high in Administration office by now; one was the highest evacuee officer in the school system. The feud had started during a loyalty crisis; it had been fed since by other fuels. The only point in the loyalty factor is that even it, and the attendant esteem in which the journalist was held by the administration, carried no weight. And thereby hangs the true moral of this whole discussion of block solidarity and block identity, as it bears on administration-evacuee relations. We naturally tended to give ear, and weight, and position, to individuals who were of our own mind; or, even if they were openly in opposition, we tended to recognize them on the basis of their over-all ability and force, in detachment from their functional locus in the community. We were dealing with people as though they were floating individuals; and they were. They either had, or did not have, identity and force and weight in the community; and these were rooted in the block where the person lived and had, quite really, his being. If we selected an able and intelligent man to carry out some program, it might be that nothing would happen. He had no leverage, because he had no solid fulcrum under him. Wade Head's attempt to keep the strike leaders in power through his own personal attention to them failed; they were retired by non-election or non-nomination -- <u>in their blocks</u>, which was where their votes were cast. In only one election -- for delegates to an all-center conference in 1945 -- could candidates be voted for at large, all of Camp I voting for two out of seven nominees. And that election was managed by the Block Managers' Supervisor, an Issei, so adroitly that he told us before the votes were cast how he wanted the candidates to rank in the voting, and how he thought they would rank. He was nearly as close in his prediction -- and hence in his control -- as was Jim Farley in 1936. That result was achieved through the Block Managers.

The first and final stages of administration politics, then, could be easily defined. In the first, we selected people we thought capable. In the last we accepted people the blocks sent to us. But, by then the blocks had grown to the point of working together, through their leaders; of trading interests and benefits, and standing together where strength was needed. So we were dealing not with the blocks directly; we were dealing with The Machine.

VIII

In every block, there were three major functions, three main offices. First, the chef, who headed a kitchen crew of up to forty workers, mostly drawn from within the block, and who dispensed not only the food that was issued to the block, but the favors of the messhall itself; and who thus had considerable patronage under his own control. Second, the Block Manager, who began as a steward and clerk, errand runner and janitor, and who accumulated assistants, secretaries, janitors, and other workers, as he himself rose to be the practical head of the block community. Third, the Councilman, the block's elected representative on the camp council which (a) exercised powers of investigation and recommendation to the Project Director, (b) created and sustained such community bodies as the Judicial Commission, Police Commission, Labor Relations Board, and several standing committees on important community areas of interest.

The chef had obvious and immediate power inside his block. The Manager was the block's president, and its ambassador to other blocks and to the operating department heads in administration. The Councilman was the block's ambassador to administration at large and at the top; its plenipotentiary in combining with other blocks to form and announce policies, ordinances, common grievances and interests. Each of the three had certain kinds of patronage at his disposal; each office or function was indispensable. Each function, at least, since toward the end Block Managers began to hold Council seats.

It need hardly be said that every block went through a long and sometimes sharp series of contests for power among these three officers. The chef, as the most immediate czar, was in almost every block the first dictator. It took time for a block to consolidate behind a leader strong enough to challenge his own mess crew. Perhaps curiously, the Councilman was the next heir to importance -- though this may have been from administration angles chiefly. The Managers were slowly increasing in their own domestic power, and tending pretty much to their own business, while the great controversies over local and over-all strength was being built, while the councils were making policy on cotton picking, camouflage net production, and other matters affecting the whole camp. The prevailing culture of 1943 and early 1944 was shot through with the threads of mutual recrimination between council ("the Managers stay in their blocks too much, they don't get the bigger picture") and Managers ("Councilmen? They can't do anything but talk. WE do all the work in this camp.")

There are qualifications that must be added, however, to the statement that the Council held first place in the second phase. In Camp II, for example, from the time of I's strike, council and managers were in the habit of meeting jointly and discussing their problems together. The centralizing of the office of Block Managers' Supervisor in each camp led to the managers becoming more

politically conscious. In I, for example, it was the Supervisor and two other managers who took the initiative in 1943 in establishing a Youth Counseling Board, which pulled in school, police, Judicial Commission, and administration people to help with a very important job. The lead here came from a manager with Juvenile Court experience in California; but it was eagerly followed by the rest, without jealousy.

Another important step in weighting the executive side of camp leadership came in January, 1944 when Head and his colleagues decided to withdraw the WRA administrators from each unit, and replace them with evacuee unit administrators. The unit administrator naturally gravitated toward the orbit of the managers rather than of the council, though he was partly responsible for and to the latter also. The administrator chosen in Camp I had been a councilman and a member of the Judicial Commission, he was generally called "Judge". I believe those in II and III had been block managers. They had certainly been in executive, rather than legislative, positions in their camps. During 1944 and 1945, the tendency grew rapidly for the administration to deal with actual community problems through the supervisor-administrator partnership, calling the councils in when policy had to be explained or discussed.

The first -- and last, in the short-lived camp -- test of power between managers and councils came in 1944, in the spring, when the council, restive under the growing importance and decisiveness of the managers, and themselves limited to six-month terms in the local councils and a year on the over-all community council chosen from the local ones, broached a proposal to limit block managers to six-month terms also. The issue arose over actions of an eccentric manager (who was later institutionalized with paresis). It generated several violent joint committee sessions in the Director's office. It ended in a complete defeat for the council; after all, its members had to live in their own blocks, and block disapproval of the measure was too strong for the council to override. It was a fair issue, fairly joined on the ground of block support, which by then was solid ground; and the issue was a real measure of the growth of power of the block executive against the block legislator. From that time on, one more and more frequently found that the block manager had been elected to replace a retiring councilman. At one time, about a fourth of the 36 council members from Camp I were Block Managers. The managers proceeded to get other block representatives to replace them on the council; but they did this in the security of their paramount political position. In another year the council position would have been, in effect, part of the patronage in the power of the manager.

In all this, the WRA played its characteristic role of defining from Washington functions which did not correspond to actual project offices, and weighing them according to tis definitions instead of according to project facts. In 1944, WRA still defined a block manager as a clerk, and proposed cutting his staff to the bone. After a long fight, including the threat of another strike, Poston managed a compromise which saved face for both the managers and the Authority. The point is that a fight was needed. It may be significant that Manzanar managed to get along with a pseudo-council made up of block managers, but that the projects that tried to unite the managership with the official council office were defeated in the attempt.

I do not mean that the managers were unusually powerful and astute people. I mean that the blocks were unusually solid and powerful social units. They first generated power and then conferred it. John Collier's first instinct

was profoundly right; only that it was not a "Japanese" institution, but a human configuration. If the war had conferred on the Block Wardens of Civilian Defense memory powers comparable to those which the block managers developed in Poston, American urban civilization would be a far more stable and humane thing than it will ever be in fact. American politics is defined, and betrayed, by Blocs. Poston politics was built of blocks; and no community's political life was ever built more solidly, more securely, more coherently, or with more voluntary, democratic, progressive, considered sanity. The basis of democratic politics is identity instead of anonymity; and in Poston, both individuals and blocks had it.

IX

After the hubbub of the incident had faded, after employment had been reestablished on even more opulent and irrational levels than before, the community of Poston began to meet its problems. In terms of Government, a problem can be recognized, identified, only in terms of agencies created to deal with it. It is with a few of those that we now deal in this rather arbitrary summary and commentary.

In weighing the various boards and commissions as to their significance, it must be remembered that an administration man tends to look only through his own end of the telescope. Bodies are important, to him, which are able to take off administration shoulders the job of getting the community to do voluntarily what the administration would otherwise have had to made it do. This is, for example, the sense in which, "student self-government" is regarded as successful by school administrators; it acts as a student committee to enforce administration rules.

A Poston illustration of this point is offered by two judgments of competent observers of community interests. In one and the same week, people were grumbling about messhall issues, and the Judicial Commission ousted the Chief of Police (Camp I) for alleged connection with the gambling ring. The anthropological Bureau of Sociological Research had a staff sampling public opinion throughout the blocks; it kept a calendar of major interests, a sort of thermometer of public concerns. The Bureau's calendar recorded that that week the major interest in Poston I was "food". An observant and managerial block manager, asked what made that week important, said "The action of the Judicial Commission. In that week, Poston grew up." The case appears paradoxical, in that an administration bureau found for the general public concern, while an Issei resident found for the establishment of managerial authority, as the most significant item. The selective biases in their observations are sufficiently indicated, however, by their positions. For management, in general, the achievement of orderly authority is always most significant. That may be, then, why I choose two of the Commissions as most worthy of discussion in connection with the maturing of Poston's community government: the Judicial Commission, and the Manpower Commission.

The nomenclature of Poston agencies is interesting, in that bodies having the same titles tended to suffer the same fates. "Boards," for instance, never fared very well. The Executive Board was adopted by Wade Head, but its members tended to drop out of political repute; and the abstract definition of the Board

as such never was established to anyone's satisfaction. The title did last on the Project; it was the only Project that did have such a job title, and Washington was always uneasy at seeing some twelve jobs maintained there that had no counterparts on other organization charts. The last Chairman, an extremely able and conscientious Issei, refused to accept the office until after a series of conferences on what the job meant; it clearly did not mean "executive" in our constitutional sense, as opposed to legislative; it was uneasily related to the council, and might easily be just a stooge for the Unit Administrator. We finally agreed that the Administrator, Block Manager Supervisor, and E.B. Chairman were a sort of triumvirate, in which the latter was chief mediator between Unit administration, council, and the WRA administration. Actually, we agreed, the job was whatever the man in it was. He took it, and did well; the council entrusted to him an increasing number of committee-supervisory functions; made him head of the Finance Committee, which was potentially quite powerful; and recognized him as head of the joint Manpower Commission on the evacuee side. He was also head of Poston's delegation to the All-center conference on center closing, in the spring of 1945. But that was George Katow, himself. The rest of the board positions were held by poets, translators, unemployed priests; in II and III, the board was the ward boss organization or, in part, the odd job department for worthy politicians otherwise unusable. When we proposed cutting down the number on the boards, there was no objection. In another year, only the chairmen would have remained, with some title indicating their relation to the unit administration. The Labor Board lasted quick. The Youth Counseling Board did a good job for one season, and fell apart.

"Committees," while they tended to be more permanent than some of the boards, were not conspicuous by their activities. Having no authority, they could register only in terms of nuisance value; and that again was an individual matter. The "hospital committee" consisted chiefly of one old scapegrace who kept the TB wards and kitchen in an uproar by unorthodox, unauthorized, and highly unilateral methods of backdoor agitation. He sought the removal of the Chief Medical Officer, almost caused the resignation of one Issei physician, and kept a segment of the community always agitated by gossip playing on their natural but neurotically-exaggerated fears of medical failure. Even after the block retired him from the council, he continued to talk and to write letters to various Washington authorities, signing himself, "Medical Commissioner of Poston." But that was Mr. Kawasaki, the genial dispenser of Bourbon, the affable instigator, who cultivated a white beard and cropped his dark hair to earn an elder's respect. In retrospect, he is as indispensable aspart of the rich flavor of Poston as the heat, the tarantulas, the supper entertainments. But as part of the pattern of government, he was an accident of personality. The council could not ignore him, but it scarcely sanctioned him either.

Dozens of standing committees were formed by the councils, and continued to sit. In the formative days, they were important in voicing resident dissatisfaction through investigations of administration actions. Later on, they were (at least for administration) something one tried to remember to include in appropriate meetings..

The bodies that got called "commissions" had power. Like those in Federal government, they had some legislative authority, some judicial discretion, some executive autonomy. The Judicial Commission operated as a police court for

minor offenses committed on the project. Set up originally on the initiative of the Project Attorney, it was recreated by Wade Head's fiat after the strike, again by the first council elected in Unit I after the Community Charter (itself, again, largely a product of the Legal Division) was adopted. If the Legal Division's perception shaped the character of the commission, the community's recognition of the need determined its continued existence. The secretary of the first commission became the chairman of the second council in Unit I. The chief judge of the first commission became the first evacuee administrator of Unit I. It was during the second council's term that the Police Chief was forced out, and a Police Commission appointed which had power over appointments to the force. When the Police Commission also undertook to establish some power over punishment of offenders, it was reminded that that was Judicial Commission territory; and the Police Commission withdrew on the issue. Both these Commissions were entirely evacuee in membership, and most of their advising from the Legal Division was by the evacuee lawyers. At the same time, they performed functions clearly as necessary to the administration as to the community; and it was, one supposes, this dual justification that sustained their strength.

This was true also of the Manpower Commission, which not only served both masters but had joint membership. It was, I believe, the most successful experiment in joint administration that was tried in Poston. Some reports of this commission were filed with the Personnel Management Section in WRA, Washington, and should be consulted.

In the spring of 1943, Poston had more than 17,000 residents, divided roughly 9.0, 3.5, 4.5 among the three units. Employment ran about 50% of the population -- appreciably above the normal American average. The largest single category was that of messhall workers, numbering up to 40 per block for some 70 messhalls. Agriculture employed hundreds of men in the fields. Engineering had dozens of road utility maintenance, adobe making and school building workers. Administrative Management, which included Mess Operations, also employed the workers in warehousing and a score of fiscal operations. Community Services included teachers, nurses and nurse aides, recreation staffs, social workers, doctors, housing workers -- the bulk of the professional and subprofessional positions, plus school janitors, clothing allowance clerks, and secretaries. Add motor maintenance, including drivers; assorted administration-office jobs; and the community employments such as block offices, police, press, firemen and the like, and you see the interminable range of varieties of service that Poston workers could, and did, experiment in. One's avocation outside became his vocation in Poston: lifelong cooks took up gardening, tailors became cooks, farmers became Shibai actors (a census of 18 Issei Shibai actors at the peak of that activity returned 16 of them as former farmers). The surface informality and irresponsibility of camp employment, plus the unfamiliarity of most people in their jobs, reinforced the old Japanese habit of working in gangs: you had to hire the whole gang to get the leader to work. The result was that the administration, at least, was painfully aware that 9,000 people were employed to do the work that half that number might have done. From the evacuee side, the fact that administration was getting the work for under $25 a month (including clothing allowance) mitigated their sympathy with the administration's pangs. Turnover was rapid in many sections; and the daily hours of work ranged from about four in outdoor summer labor to a high of well over eight on the part of trusted assistants who identified themselves with their jobs.

In 1942, a number of men had been allowed -- and encouraged -- to go out to Utah and such states for seasonal harvesting. In 1943, this became stabilized in WRA policy as a regular provision for seasonal jobs outside of camp, on contract with the employers. "Indefinite" leave also became part of WRA activities by 1943. In addition, the Army began recruiting volunteers for the 442nd Combat Battalion. Finally, negotiations were under way for camouflage net factories to be erected in Poston, operated for the Signal Corps under a commercial contract. Poston having rejected the $16 wage in these factories, a prevailing wage policy was broached. As this would have meant that some Nisei were earning ten times what others got on the Project, a plan was evolved jointly by Kennedy and the council leaders to have the community sponsor the factories on condition that the workers pay a stated proportion of their earnings into a community fund. After agonizing ups and downs, this plan went into effect; and some scores of Nisei withdrew from project employment to work on the nets.

All these factors made it seem as though hundreds of Nisei were about to be withdrawn from project jobs. The community instantly concluded that its needs would go unmet if these things befell. The first reaction was a demand that all work-leave outside the project be withdrawn, and that Nisei be discouraged from joining the Army or working for it. The lead in this argument was taken by the strike proponents, by and large; more accurately, by those who held the "Issei point of view" which Spicer defines, and which tended to try to hold the Poston community together under Issei control.

Kennedy, Powell, and Haas in February, 1943 proposed a tri-unit conference on the manpower problem. This grew out of the disemployment-reemployment program which Kennedy had put through after the strike in an attempt to regularize the job picture, but which had not resulted in much improvement over the old picture. The proposal, considered at a meeting with representatives of the three councils, was rejected as containing some sort of administration joker. A month later, the Unit I Council, the second "temporary" or pre-charter council, under the chairmanship of Franklyn Sugiyama, issued an invitation to the administration and the other councils to a manpower conference in mid-March. Sugiyama had been everything from a truckdriver in Chicago to a law student in Seattle; a union man, he was eccentric in the Poston population, but respected by them. Intimate with Kennedy and Haas, he yet was independent, astute, aggressive, honest, and politically wise. (Witness that within six months of leaving Poston for work in a Utah mine, we was secretary-treasurer of his union local, and had forced the owners to make several concessions which had long lain on the books but had never appeared in practice.)

The conference, when it was held, was chiefly a Unit I affair. Various speakers told of the necessity for reduction in force; various others told of their need for more workers. Sugiyama, as chairman, was cagy toward the first, ironic toward the second. On the last day of the conference, the Reverend Masutane Mitani, spokesman of the strike committee and of the subsequent Labor Relations Board, rose to present a motion. He moved that the Labor Board be given full power to act as a project work-planning board, to govern quotas in all employments, and to have power to forbid departure from the project for outside work. The chairman for that day, Powell, hastily adjourned for lunch. After the recess, he left the chair to propose an impromptu motion for the creation of a Manpower Commission composed of a joint representation, ex officio: the heads of the administration's branches (later called Divisions) plus the

chief of Employment and Relocation; and, for the residents, the chairmen of the council, Labor Board, Executive Board, Issei Advisory Committee, the shop committee of the camouflage project, and the unit administrator. This made a 5-5 division, with the council chairman as commission chairman. The motion was adopted after Mitani, with his customary unexpectedness and gift for spectacular non-sequitur, seconded it with the statement that that was exactly what he had intended by his motion.

With the enthusiastic blessing of the administration, the commission began a series of frequent meetings. Its first task was to segregate project employments by grade of indispensibility, into "A", "B", and "C" classifications; to forecast losses of employable workers; and if necessary to establish quota proportions for different types of work.

Haas (p. 36) quotes Sugiyama on the first few meetings: "During the course of the meetings it has revealed the difference of viewpoints. The evacuees seem to have the labor angle while the appointed personnel attempt the capitalistic stand. It is amusing to note that sometimes during the meetings the appointed staff and evacuees take diametrically opposite views; the staff defending the working evacuees' position while the evacuee representatives attack from what normally would be the employers' stand. Because labor is the key that unlocks the future plans of the project, the manpower commission is indirectly a policy forming group. It is the first time that evacuees have had a hand in this field. However, since the aims of the appointed personnel and the evacuees are for the welfare of the project, the last meetings were harmonious and the work seems to be progressing nicely." I commend attention to the successive points in that penetrating comment.

The Commission called on all departments for statements of their then employment, their justification, and their absolute minimum. Totaling up the results after a series of meetings with department heads, the commission discovered that its efforts to reduce employment quotas had netted requests for an increase of exactly one thousand workers. However, the group went ahead and classified all project jobs under the headings of "essential," "necessary", and "desitable." When Director Myer's wire arrived in May, ordering project employment cut to a new quota level, the commission already had the information and the habit of consultation and discussion. All it had to do was to cut project employment from 9,000-orr to something under 8,000. Groaning loudly, it set to work. In 1945, faced with the problem of cutting jobs from some 5,000 to around 4,400, its hold-over members looked back and laughed ruefully at their earlier dismay.

Actually, relocation in all forms kept pace with the quota cuts dictated on prediction from Washington, and the necessity of keeping the work going inspired the managers and crews to find ways of doing it. The commission, empowered only to recommend ways and means, quotas and proportions, to the Project Director, did not establish a dictatorship over jobs, did not fulfill its planning and policy-making potentialities, did not determine what was to happen. But it did do several kinds of things which I think are of interest.

Above all, it created a group context, representative of evacuee and administration interests, in which conflict situations were good-naturedly argues, with individuals taking sides not by position but by their own view of the facts and weighing of the merits of the situation. The weight of this

context was felt by department heads who were called in and found themselves justifying their operations not to a WRA superior, not to an accountant, but to a joint intelligence representing, as Sugiyama said, the general will for the general welfare of that camp. Often, the department head in that kind of discussion would make concessions he would not have made to pressure. Evacuees too responded to the context. One illustration will indicate what I mean.

By the time the commission was formed, the earlier controversy roused by the discrimination of project jobs into $16. and $19. categories (there had been one of $12, but almost no one was affected by it) had been resolved by the gradual increase in allotment of $19 jobs. By this time, more than half of all project jobs paid $19. One of the commission's first recommendations was that all jobs in the "A", or essential classification, be paid $19; and the administration accepted this. My Myer's wire directed that only 10% of project jobs could pay $19; and the resulting chaos need not be described. It was resolved by one of the commission, Frank Fukuda of Agriculture, who proposed that all $19 payments be suspended until July 1, while final determination was being made. In practice, this accustomed everyone to the $16 level (in the beginning, the $19 people had protested their elevation and had petitioned for a standard allowance for all workers). When the $19 awards were made, on the 10% basis, it was like a new raise, and was accepted calmly by everyone. Fukuda's motion was greeted with general acclaim; but it could not have been made by anyone from administration -- probably by anyone getting only $16.

Like the Judicial Commission, the Manpower Commission recessed in its first incarnation, and was reanimated by the Project Director (now Duncan Mills)-- I believe at my request. The three local councils, this time, selected representatives from their units; the administration had representatives from all Divisions. I acted as chairman. The new Commission's first concern was to define its own duties and powers; and out of this attempt came yet a third basis of organization, which recreated the commission on a membership of division heads, as before, plus the head of the Personnel Management Section, and for the evacuees, the new Manpower Commissions of the three units plus the head of the Executive Boards, ex officio. I retained the chair, but jointly with Katow, the Executive Board Chief in Unit I. On this basis, the commission faced the last crisis of Poston: the order to close, and the problem of keeping essential services going while essential workers relocated, hundreds at a clip.

The best illustration of the conduct of the Commission in this final phase is given by the matter of the messhall closings. Minor problems had been occupying it: whether to restrict administration gardening to men over 60; whether to close out the fish-breeding project, and whether to reopen the burned out tofu factory. Now, in the spring of 1945, new orders came: reduce messhall employment on a strict minimum quota basis; and "whenever a block's population falls below 125, it is mandatory to close the messhall in that block and assign the residents to eat in other messhalls." Closing was recommended, but not mandatory, when population fell below 150.

The messhall was the heart of a block. Far more than its recreation hall, which had been long lost to schools or to activity centers open to all the camp

(Scout headquarters, music schools, sewing schools, beauty shops, churches, canteens, Libraries), the messhall was the place of block meetings, dances, wedding suppers, farewell parties -- not to mention its original function. Messhall closing was unwelcome notice of the psychologically unacceptable fact of final dissolution. With the closing of that building, not only the workers were disemployed; the block had losts its identity; its people were Acadians; exiled to strange dining rooms; marked with the stigmata of approaching eviction.

The chefs and the steward's department were sufficiently bemused with the necessity of cutting their block staffs from over thirty to nearly twenty; the resulting disemployment promised to be a genuine problem, since opportunities for reemployment were closed by quota limits in all the other available lines of activity, and since most messhall workers were perennial block-employees, never leaving their own premises, not having English or other needed skills, and usually serving in a broken time schedule to permit them to look after children or other duties at home. Overcome with this wave, the chef's organization could not tackle the greater one to come. The block managers were skilfully guided into a hands off policy by their Supervisor in Unit I, who knew in his own heart that they would unite against messhall closings, and who saved them from that crisis by reminding them that the chefs had always kept the managers out of kitchen affairs; now let the chefs handle this one themselves. This removed the managers' group from the list of those who might have mediated this blow to the people. With chefs and managers out, the council might have been expected to take over; but this was too hot for council prestige to handle. They ignored the issue. Who, then, was to take charge of working out the problems, mediating the conflicts, involved in the closing of messhalls?

The Manpower Commission took it; took it in full view of the other parties, and with their sardonic commiseration; and in full view of the difficulties. The Commission included 14 men, four from the administration, the Executive Board chairman and 3 other evacuees from I; the EBC and two others from II and from III. Some of its members were, incidently to this function, block managers. One in each unit delegation was a council member, also incidentally. The Project Steward was co-opted for this period, and various representatives of the chef's department were called in to help. The other staff representatives, beside myself, were Cassilly, head of Personnel Management (including both appointed and evacuee), whose chief evacuee assistant was also co-opted by the commission at this time; and Tupke, the Chief of the Operations Division which included Engineering, Agriculture, Maintenance, Construction, Roads, Motor Operation, and the other finally essential services. Rupke was a veteran of the first and all succeeding Manpower Commissions; a gentle, generous, scrupulous, wise, lean man of around 50, always cooperative and sympathetic, he had once stirred Nell Findley to the assertion, "I'll make a social worker out of him yet." She did not, but one of the pleasanter minor miracles of Poston was to see Bob Rupke emerging as the Henry Clay of that issue-torn camp. Again and again, when diametric forces threatened deadlock, Rupke saw and suggested the angle that would lead out of the parallelogram of forces.

Throughout this period, in dealing with the dual problem of mess quota reduction and messhall closure, the Manpower Commission played two roles. First, after testing the WRA orders against project facts, it suggested modifications, cited factual instances, and sometimes predicted failure of the directives as issued, in reports back to the Project Director and to Washington. Second, it

sent its unit teams back home to hold unit-wide meetings to discuss--not the orders as issued, but the problems out of which they grew. When the unit sentiments came back to the commission, it rediscussed them; extreme suggestions from III would be rejected or modified by II or I; and a workable solution would gradually appear. A resolution from III for the outright rejection of the quotas was rejected by the other units in the commission; but a strongly worded protest was felt to be needed, and the chairman sent it on to the administration. The commission was not just stooging for either side; its strength lay in everyone's confidence that it would consider and report the facts and values as they were presented to it.

The quota reduction was worked out, as it so often was, with a minimum of hardship, and not far off the actual figures of loss by relocation; though the commission did recommend, and the Director establish, certain procedures and priorities in the disemployment of workers. The sticker was still the closure issue. Most of the blocks were set off in fours, separated by wide firebreaks; in III, they were in sixes, called "roku" from the Japanese word, where the other camps called their four block squares "quads." One quad in Unit I had three blocks about to fall below 125; closings by directive would have thrown 500 people into one messhall. In II, one low block was surrounded by very populous ones, and its residents would have had to walk half a mile to breakfast, lunch and supper. This situation, repeated in various places on the project map, inspired one of Rupke's happiest compromises. He proposed changing the wording from "close the messhall in any block that falls below 125" to "wherever two adjacent blocks have a population below 250, their messhalls shall be consolidated." With the addition by other members of qualifications to ensure that the surviving messhall would be chosen with regard to convenience and the convening of the whole squad into one surviving messhall, the proposal was adopted, rushed to the Project Director, accepted by Washington and welcomed by the three units. A petition from the first block to be closed, the one that happened to be represented by the Unit I Councilman on the Commission, pleading that they could not bear to "beg food from people in another block," was resolved with the commission's reformulation of the directive to explain that "5 isn't going to eat in 6; 6 has no messhall either. A new messhall, consolidated 5-6, will be opened where 6 used to be"; and this face saving solecism brought solace to the schism. Added to the delay in effecting the order, which all this necessitated and which Duncan Mills granted, the actual closures took place gracefully; indeed, joint block picnics became the order of the day for blocks being joined in this new wedlock. After the quotas were in effect, and the closings were peacefully under way, the commission met once more to face the increasingly rapid dissolution of the community; and adjourned, or recessed, sine die.

It was recognized, by both the commission and the Project Director that in many of these actions the commission was acting outside of its appointed sphere. With that fact recognized, for the record, the commission still performed its function; primarily, that of a vehicle of communication and adjustment between the demans laid on administration and the necessities faced by the community. It was doing what a Joint Policy and Planning Board would have done if one had ever existed, as the Jacobin group had hoped and urged.

The groundsof the commission's functioning should be recognized. It had no political power; it was generally said to talk and talk and do nothing. But its function was not that of political action. It was an agency of mutual education and mediation; and to do that job, it relied on certain principles:

continuity of membership, regularity of meeting, wide and regular distribution of frank and complete reports of its discussions, regular provision for unit discussion of the role of unit representatives in the commission, early and regular reporting by the staff representatives to the Project Director and to staff meetings. Such a body as the commission cannot rest with the mutual education of its members, though that was valuable. It must seek to carry back into the general arena of discussion the thinking that is generated within its camera. Too many groups in Poston acted like wells, down which problems and facts were dropped to give back only a hollow echo. The commission tried to act as a cortex of communication, integrating it but not interruping its free flow in both directions. In terms of administration-community relations, it should be compared with two other complexes; that of the council with the Chief of Community Management; and that of the evacuee Administrator with the Project Administration.

X

During Wade Head's regime, all matters pertaining to councils -- their formation, election, powers, and conduct -- were almost wholly in the hands of the Project Attorney, Haas, and his legal staff. Community Government was held under the Project Director, as were police matters, with the Attorney as his adviser and agent. On the official WRA chart, Community Government was placed in charge of the Chief of Community Management, who transmitted such matters as were necessary to the Project Director. Head and Haas disagreed with the WRA at this point, as at two other related ones; they held that government and police matters, and the anthropoligal diagnostic and advisory service known as Community Analysis, should be together under the Project Director rather than mediated through the head of any one Division. A cogently argued memorandum, devised by Haas and signed by Head, lies in WRA files and should be given thoughtful study by anyone concerned with this organizational problem.

However, both Head and Haas left Poston early in 1944. Evans had left in 1943; and on January 1, 1944 the hakujin Unit Administrators had been replaced by evacuees, Crawford coming up to I to take over Employment and Relocation and Burge coming up to replace Ralph Gelvin as Deputy Project Director and general administration handyman. As Chief of Community Management, I had discussed the matter of the chart with Head, but the matter was still unresolved when Duncan Mills came to be Project Director.

The change in staff atmosphere with Mills' inauguration is an eloquent commentary on the importance of the administrator's personality. Mills, who came from the personnel headship in WRA Washington, was a staff or organization man, rather than a politician or, as I defined Head earlier, a personnel man. From the start, he consulted his staff on matters that pertained to them; he called frequent small meetings in his office of those concerned with any problem he was deciding. He was modest without being unsure of himself, and relaxed without diminishing his personal dignity. Personal pressures sometimes made him act arbitrarily; but his utter personal and intellectual honesty held the complete respect of all his staff. At the same time, he was not a man to get out and mix into the community. Few evacuees knew him by sight, and he seldom appeared in public. The emphasis seemed to shift, after he came, from problems

directly involving the community to those directly involving his staff as it dealt with the community. In part, this was because the community had fought its way to relative maturity and stability, while the staff had yet to settle down into any stable configuration. Wade Head told Mills when he came that he would "have more trouble with his staff than he ever would with the evacuees." Trouble there was, and many of us were fairly constantly preoccupied with it. The main emphasis in my own job became one of interpseronal adjudication rather than community contact. But the residents were still there; and the administration's job was still that of running the project.

During the first months of Mills' regime, Moris Burge had personal charge of matters affecting government and police, though the new community analyst, David French, worked with me. I thus had at least a second hand knowledge of some of what was transpiring in the field of government; and through the Manpower Commission and other relationships, the council had some acquaintance with me. When Burge left, in October, the responsibility for council relations fell to me; I shared with Mills the relations with unit administrators; and he himself took carge of the Block Managers.

Mills was devoting a series of staff meetings to reports and problems of the several departments of administration. This gave me the opportunity to invite council, unit Administration, Executive Board, Block Manager, and Manpower Commission representatives to sit in the staff meeting on Community Government, which took place while Solon Kimball, WRA's consultant on government, was visiting the project. This extension of the joint-discussion principle was vigorously reinforced by Mills' inauguration of a new kind of meeting; regular weekly meetings in his office of staff chiefs and Unit Administrators and Block Manager Supervisors from the three units. More than any step yet taken by a Project Director, those meetings of a joint cabinet expressed and dramatized the maturing of a genuinely cooperative relation and policy. It was that group which received the first impact of Dillon Myer's announcement that California would be reopened and the projects closed; it was that group that planned the strategy of breaking this two-edged news to the community. In several of its members, both staff and evacuee, this group of course overlapped with the Manpower Commission. It could easily have replaced it; it did, of course, outlive the Commission.

During this period, the Council was having both ups and downs. It will be noted that the council was not included in Mills' cabinet. Twice in those months the administration needed additional office space, which it secured by a series of complicated moves; and each time, the council's office in the Administration Building was requisitioned and the council forced to move to whatever office no one else desired. On one of these occasions, no one had remembered to tell the council that it was being moved, and the officers arrived one morning to find carpenters remodeling an empty room. The administration was obviously weighing the executive offices of evacuee government more heavily than the legislative, and the council even discussed in the early summer of 1945 whether to hold another election and continue its own existence until the project closed in December.

At the same time, however, the council was acquiring new powers over certain phases of community life. After a long and fruitless controversy within the staff as to the destiny of the numerous evacuee funds accumulated by school,

club, and entertainment activities, I suggested that the Council assume responsibility for authorizing, supervising, and auditing these funds. A Finance Committee was created, with the Executive Board Chairman as its head. On the other hand, a tendency became apparent for the council to take over the operation of some of the activities which produced funds, or on which funds were spent, such as community movies in Japanese; and here I submitted to them a protest suggesting that the council not become an operating body. This all led to a series of meetings, in which there appeared the relationship which I think of as contrasting with that developed in the Manpower Commission and the joint cabinet. I can describe it only as a sardonic and somewhat bitter resignation by the council to the fact that its powers were granted, and could always be limited, by administration fiat. There was a sense of separation, two-ness, in a relationship of authority and subordination. It was not quite a sense of futility; but with that particular group at least, there was no sense of security, of the dignity of an independent and indispensable function, of autonomy based on the solid support of a free community. As the LaFollette Committee reported of the Federal Government in 1946, a revolution had taken place behind the scenes of the WRA chart and the Poston charter: the administrative arm had usurped the real authority, and the recommendatory legislature had dwindled in importance through lack of concrete support and professional assistance. In neither the commission nor the cabinet did one feel this ironic, reproachful undercurrent of non-partnership.

The second comparison is with the position of the evacuee administrator as he stood between the resident community and the project administration, "in the middle" and "on the spot." The most adequate account in official records is the report on Evacuee Unit Administration by Kenji Uyeno, of Unit II, prepared in June 1945. This brief paper, included under "Exhibits" in Barbara Washler's "Final Report: Community Government," bears repeated reading. Parts of it, however, I cannot leave to the chance that the reader will take the trouble to look up the original; I therefore repeat them here:

"In the late fall of 1943, the Office of Indian Affairs had formally withdrawn their control of this center and transferred the sole authority to the War Relocation Authority. The Organizational Chart of the WRA did not provide for the appointed personnel position as Unit Administrator; however, the need for the responsible position was evident. It must be noted that it was through this reorganization on the project that this position was thrown into the hands of the evacuee.

"In reviewing the psychological aspect of the community residents, such evacuee position, in serving in capacity of administration, is a position to be easily suspected by the evacuee to be 'pro-administration'. Such temperament reflects greatly upon the affect of the indiscriminate mass evacuation from California of Japanese ancestry regardless of citizenship added by the extreme adverse conditions encountered in camp in regards to poor housing, dust, extreme heat, depressing camp location, shattering of ideals, sacrifices, and hardships. It called upon a full cooperation by the residents as a whole in order that evacuees may fulfill the position. The project employment provided the maximum salary of $19 for the position. One must be a fool in accepting this responsible job when it is possible to receive the equal cash advance in less responsible positions.

"In recognizing the essentiality of the position in the operation of the project, the Block Managers' organization and the council group voiced the

combined support towards the appointment of evacuees to the position. This position is to much extent different than position serving on council body representing the residents. This position required a sense of cautiousness in carrying out the administrative procedures to the residents since the misunderstanding as to the service is readily possible, resulting in non-cooperation or project disorder.

". . .the Unit Administration is directly responsible to the Project Director. The basic responsibility would be to serve the detailed functions of Project Director in observance to the War Relocation Authority's procedures and regulations; however, on occasions, the evacuee administrators are in a 'pinch' in carrying out the responsibility. Numerous WRA or project policy is not altogether appealing to the evacuee residents; the responsibility on part of the administrator is to proceed with the program; but heavy pressure is reversed from the evacuee populace to the evacuee Administrator's office. . .

"In viewing the disadvantage of the evacuee administration, in terms of project management, it is the authority of the commanding power. The evacuee administrator must always work on the basis of understanding without reflection to authority. The WRA appointed personnel, at times, are privileged to use the official authority to execute the policies and procedures; but this is the contrary on part of the evacuee personnel. The evacuee administrator is a fellow evacuee resident; the wage scales of the official is equivalent to countless other workers. It is unwise to lay down the iron rule to measure functions of administration with the application of authority. At times there are occasions whereby a firm command of authority will readily solve the community problem; yet, this cannot be satisfactorily accomplished by the evacuee administrator without bringing about the misunderstanding and resentment.

". . .The Evacuee official is very likely to be misunderstood by the populace if the duty is assumed with the attitude of being WRA official; but if the duty is carried out to the satisfaction of the residents, the evacuee position will greatly enhance the atmosphere of confidence and security to the residents. The residents will carry faith and trust upon the fellow evacuee -- they will be eased to the understanding of facts relative to Project and WRA policy. It gives the residents a thought of comfort in making frank expressions of local community problems which results to the understanding and amicable solution of difficulties. The burden of responsibility for the Administrator as compared with some other positions on the project is immense, but the advantage to the residents is fruitful."

As compared to a joint body, both the council and executive functions subordinated in an administered community tend to appear, to those who wield them, functions merely of receiver and transmitter. These same functions, inevitably, are performed by the joint body too. The line is hard to draw, it is one of preferential degree. But the give and take in the two types of arrangement are different. In separation, the administration gives, the community takes; in joint bodies, both give and take are mutual. In separation, orders may be resisted, or returned with a plea for moderation. In the joint body, the order is thought over in relation to both sides' sets of pressures, and new means may be created by joint effort and with joint satisfaction, for reaching the given end.

WRA Solicitor Philip Glick outlines clearly in Opinion #32 (October 12, 1942) the legal derivation of authority within the projects. The President's Executive Order 9102 (March 18, 1942) gave the WRA director instructions, and power, to set up relocation communities, "supervise their activities," "prescribe regulations," and "make such delegations of authority as he may deem necessary." (p. 11) Such authority, common to administrative agencies, includes some of both legislative and judicial power (p. 7), which presumably may be delegated under supervision along with the administrative authority, which is often delegated "to the representatives of the very persons upon whom the authority is exercised," as in school systems of student self-government (p. 16; and cf. my page 37 supra). "Smooth working efficiency is undoubtedly a worthy end in an administrative agency, particularly when it can best be achieved by a traditionally democratic method. The best way to regulate the activities of people will often be to invite their sympathetic acceptance of and participation in the regulative process. Community self-government among the evacuees is not being instituted as an end in means to the larger end of effective administration." (p. 20) And, in any case, "any appropriate administrator can make any needed rule at any time, superseding any action taken by the Council"; and "the system set up . . . is such that no regulation can finally be enforced . . . except after approval by the Project Director." (p. 21).

The Congress, under the Constitution, and agreeably to the voters and the common law, enacts executive powers which the President may distribute among administrators who fraction their own power among scattered deputies who, in their discretion, may invite their human charges to help them exercise the limited regulative powers which they enjoy within the framework of their instructions. Everyone in the location situation understands (finally) that theirs is self-government without sovereignty, that it is an administrative device tending to the greater ease and comfort of all concerned, that it is merely a permissive extension of the Project Director's disciplinary power, and that any decision or act of the governed may be abrogated with or without explanation by the man in authority. My present point isthat within this context the device works even more effectively when the process of making policy decisions is fully shared than when it is merely passed down the ladder from Director to Division Chief to Council, or Unit Administrator, and so to the people in the blocks. Within the WRA itself, policy decisions were frequently made by group action among those most responsible: Project Directors, Division Chiefs, and so on. It is also true that, on occasion, the unanimous judgment of the Project Directors would be vetoed and overruled by the WRA Director. But participation on a partnershi basis was one of WRA's major achievements in staff work. At the evacuee level, it began to be achieved in Poston, but late in the game.

XI

This rambling commentary has, unhappily, omitted what is usually the real substance of self-government: "Along with these . . . kinds of law goes a fourth, most important of all, which is not graven on tablets of marble or brass, but on the hearts of the citizens. This forms the real constitution of the State; takes on every day new powers;. . . keeps a people in the way it was meant to go; and insensibly replaces authority by the force of habit. I am speaking of morality, of custom, above all, of public opinion, on which . . .

success in everything else depends," said Rousseau (Social Contract, II, 12). "Particular regulations . . . are only the arc of the arch, while manners and morals, slower to arise, form in the end its immovable keystone."

The reliance of all that I have been describing on more granitic habits of gentleness, personal loyalty, individual sacrifice to group ends, and the other mores of Poston's culture, would have been more clearly illustrated by less official kinds of self-government: the united ministry of the United Christian Church; the solemn but energetic organization of the Poston Red Cross; the P-T A's; even more by the self-organization that got volunteers out of the blocks to build the schools; that disciplined the crowds at shibai and movies; that created fairs, bazaars, and exhibitions.

At bottom, the success of self-government in Poston lay in the group restraints to which most individuals were accustomed, and the self-restraint by which their own manners were characterized. It was only as the administration came to understand and respect the residents that it opened its counsels to be understood and respected by them. The evacuee community solidified first, and the administration community only partly became integrated into the general one. To the end, the staff community failed of self-integration, self-government. But Poston, began, grew, faced its own death, and quietly departed, in a manner on the whole orderly and as reasonably as could be in the circumstances. And, in the end, the achievement of an orderly biography is a fair test of the self-government of any organism, individual or social.

APPENDIX A

The Strike

(from Edward Spicer, Self-government in Poston)

March, 1943

The Location of Social Sanctions. The social sanctions which were beginning to receive effective expression in the community began necessarily in small social groups within the whole. The total community did not know where they came from; they might only guess. These sanctions were negative ones, such as the threats which have been mentioned, and they were backed up by social action. In the two months preceding the strike in Poston I and II there were five beatings and one attempted beating. In Poston I the individuals responsible for these actions were never discovered, despite determined efforts by Caucasian administrators and FBI agents.

It is important to note against what sort of individuals and actions these sanctions were directed. They were all against Nisei, specifically, the National President of the JACL, two individuals prominent in the Poston Recreation Department, a self appointed "social investigator," and a member of the Poston I Community Council. The term "informer" was applied to each. Reports were widely spread that these individuals had acted against Japanese persons, that they had cooperated in one way or another with Caucasians to work harm to Japanese. Specifically, the council member (and the others, also) were charged with having given information to the FBI which had resulted in the internment of innocent men. He had betrayed his own people. The

council member had in fact cooperated with the FBI and in addition had been involved in unscrupulous business deals in Imperial Valley before entering the relocation center. No proof that the others had engaged in such activities was ever presented. Rumors developed that there was a long list of persons who "Were on the list" to be beaten. The charges were "informing", and the definition of informing became infinitely widened to include anything from reporting names to the FBI to mentioning casual dissatisfactions with conditions in a kitchen. Every organization in Poston had at one time or another a wave of fear in regard to its personnel: block managers, councilmen, social workers, steward's department workers, bureau of sociological research, etc. The incidence of these sanctions was thus unlimited insofar as Nisei were concerned. (They were applied to Issei, but the record as to how many felt themselves liable to their operation is scanty, perhaps 2 or 3.) Those who had in the past or were now in Poston maintaining some sort of relationship with Caucasians fell under the sanction. This necessarily eliminated all Issei who knew little or no English.

With the perpetration of the beatings, and the broadcast of the stories about the "list," social insecurity reached a maximum. Not only were persons uncertain as to what kind of people were their neighbors, but in addition they had the expectation of violence at the hands of their neighbors. Neighbors were not only unpredictable, but they might be actually vicious. Above all anyone who had relations with the administration had to be careful that they could not be construed by anyone as too intimate. This made one liable to being placed on the list.

What had happened in Poston? How had this sort of social force come to be turned loose? This was the type of social sanction which comes into operation in socially disorganized portions of modern cities, in slum or Bohemia areas. When the family is in an extreme state of disorganization and when no over-all community groups have come into operation, in other words, when there exist no general moral sanctions, then the segment of society finds itself between two types of forces, namely, the legal sanctions of the police which are ministered from outside and not supported by the people of the area and gang sanctions from within. Small groups with special interests, often predatory and vicious, keep each other and the general populace in line (their line) by precisely the techniques which were developed in Poston. The mechanism is not mysterious; it was merely a product of almost complete social disorganization. What needs explanation are the motives, the interests which this particular gang rule served.

There was emphasis on two things in the behavior negatively sanctioned by the groups who had resorted to gang sanctions. The first was cooperation with the FBI in the past and the second was cooperation with any Caucasian in the present. A third feature was the disillusion with any ordinary legal agency to gain the ends, and the promotion of actions in defiance of any such legal agency. A fourth important feature was the singling out of the National President of the JACL and the general intimidation of Nissei groups like the council. All of these points indicate probable relationship between the gang sanctions and the extreme Issei point of view which was voiced so

clearly in the Poston Issei Informal Representative Council. They would at least be compatible with them. The specific sources should be looked for not among the Issei as a whole but among individuals who had been personally affected by the FBI reign of Terror and who had been influenced by the Issei sentiments described above.

The community as a while, it will be noted, did not rise up against this gang rule. There was instead a good deal of talk justifying it, pointing out that it had been applied to the right persons. Any ordinary socially healthy community would have taken action, applied legal sanctions immediately against this sort of thing, but Poston did not. It had on the whole more sympathy with the gang motivations than with the specific individuals who suffered from them. Little attention was paid to the techniques employed. The community was only weakly sensitive to legal forms, having had them suspended for some months so far as their own lives were concerned. The gang sanctions were more positively sanctioned by the whole community than were the legal forces of the Department of Internal Security which was headed by a Caucasian.

<u>The Social Structure of the Strike.</u> The immediate cause of the strike was an event reminiscent of the FBI raids in the pre-evacuation period. Two evacuees, both popular in the community and regarded as respectable men, were held on suspicion of being involved in a beating case. The FBI had been called in by the Department of Internal Security and the belief spread in that community that the two men--F (council member) and U (Judo leader)--were going to be removed.

Committees sought to find out what the charges were against them. They were unsuccessful and in fact no formal charges had been made. The men had merely been placed in the Poston jail to await the completion of the investigation being carried out by the FBI officers. On the two days preceding the outbreak of the strike, committees of residents of the blocks in which the men lived (and adjoining) visited the Project Director and were referred by him to the FBI agents. They became angered when the FBI men attempted to question them.

Members of the committees returned to their blocks and in the evening of November 17 began to organize a group for the purpose of resisting any attempt to remove E and U.Meetings were held in Quads 5 and 7. At least six of the blocks in these quads --- 27, 28, 37, 38, 43, 44 --- held such meetings. Out of these meetings grew the demonstration which on November 18 developed into the Poston general strike. It was determined that each of the blocks mentioned would send a group in the early morning to stand guard at the police station, surrounding the jail. If any effort to remove the prisoners should be made, the signal of ringing the messhall bells would bring reinforcements. This plan was adhered to and the question of how to proceed with the demonstration on behalf of the prisoners was also brought up and suggestions of some sort of strike were made. This constituted the organization back of the strike. It cannot be said that it was spontaneous. It was set in motion by a small group of people in a few blocks who had a very definite purpose and instructed persons to act in certain definite way. It did not begin as an undirected mob, reacting suddenly to a specific

event. The primary demonstration was planned out over the course of at least two, and probably, three days before the actual incident. Moreover, a number of responsible persons understood what was impending at least as early as Monday. (One at least made efforts to head off the demonstration by contacting the administration.)

The groupswho gathered in the early morning of November 18 around the police station in Block 28 immediately became a focus of community interest. They were addressed by the vice-chariman of the Issei Advisory Board, who spoke on the specific issue of civil liberties, that is, the lack of justice in holding the two prisoners beyond the legal time of 72 hours (in California) on suspicion. He pointed out that charges had not been made. Petitions were circulated during the morning in several blocks (one of these certainly was Block 35) asking councilmen to request the release of the prisoners at the meeting of the council scheduled for 1 o'clock that afternoon. During the morning, naturally, many people joined the police station crowd to find out what it was all about and stayed to listen to miscellaneous discussions of the issue. During the morning also word was passed to the blocks that a demonstration was in progress and sometime before noon, workers in administration offices were told to leave their work. This again was evidence of lack of spontaneity in the strike. The idea of including a strike as part of the demonstration had already been formulated and this strike had its organizers.

By the time the council was ready to meet in the afternoon, the crowd at the police station had reached several thousand and the people in the blocks had been stirred throughout the community by informal

statements in the messhalls that a strike was going to take place. Councilmen had in some cases received hastily written petitions. They were talking somewhat excitedly among themselves, asking questions of each other in regard to the charges aginst the prisoners, before the council meeting opened. The Issei advisers had gathered before hand in Ward 7 where they had already spent some minutes discussing the matter when the TCC members joined them.

The chairman of the TCC was absent in Salt Lake City at JACL convention. The vice-chairman had already been contacted by members of the IAB and as the meeting opened seemed more than usually nervous. He immediately brought up the subject of the petitions and was in the midst of this when interrupted by the acting Project Director, JGE, who had come from the crowd at the police station after an unsuccessful attempt to get them to disperse.

The resignation of the council took place in an atmosphere of emotion running high. Both the Acting Project Director and the vice-chairman of the Council were tense and profoundly serious. There were alarms and excursions in the council room, as people came from the crows, unannounced visitors walked in and took up seats among the councilmen, and unidentified individuals got up and made emotional hharangues from the council floor. The sense of the angry mob exerting pressure from its place out by the police station was brought into the council room and was reflected in most of the speeches made by the councilmen. The vice-chairman yielded by proposing resignation almost at the beginning. The Acting Project Director pleaded rather than discussed. Moves by councilmen to hold off for time to consider, or

to return to their blocks with the matter, were not seconded or taken up after the first few minutes by the vice-chairman. The council moved steadily, in this atmosphere which was charged increasingly with expressions in the Japanese language, towards a breakdown. It paused only long enough to frame a formal resolution and to cease business for an interval during which its members only came into closer contact with the spirit of the crowd at the police station. With the rejection of the resolution came the resignation, held up only momentarily by a further plea from the Acting Project Director. The council had been unable to withstand the pressures let loose by the mob and its organized backers. It appeared also that the administration had yeilded to these pressures in the hasty tempo of its action.

With the council defunct as a mediating body with the administration, the organization of the strike proceeded rapidly. Almost immediately on the dissolution of the council, organization of the community by blocks was begun. Members of the Issei Advisory Board and members of the committee which had first visited the Project Director and developed the nucleus of the demonstration the night before were active. A leading figure was the chairman of the Issei Advisory Board, but equally active was the vice-chairman of the IAB. Rapidly also a formerly obscure member of the TCC came into prominence as a result of his ability to speak well in Japanese, as shown in his presentation to the crowd of the events which had taken place in the council meeting during the afternoon. These leaders, together with other Issei who had been active in the Cooperative Movement, proceeded to organize an emergency committee of

72, two from a block, by having those who happened to be present from each of the blocks name two persons from their blocks. Some effort was made to include an Issei and a Nisei from each block, but this was not carried out by about eight of the blocks, which selected two Issei each with no Nisei representative. The majority of this committee when finally selected were former members of the IAB (20), block managers (5), and former TCC members (12). By 10 o'clock that night, the group had been further organized by the election of a chairman (former chairman of the IAB) and a vice-chairman (the TCC member mentioned above.) The strike now had a structural framework which reached into each block in the community and included former leaders sanctioned by the project political organization.

This framework, however, it was evident, remained so in name only. The government of community was undertaken the next morning by a group of twelve. These again were selected with reference to complete territorial representation in the community, but this time by quads. Each of the nine quads was represented. However, seven of the number were former members of recognized political institutions and all of these seven, except one were former IAB members; the one was Sugimoto the former TCC member. The others had not formerly held office, although one had been prominent in the cooperative movement (Mitani). None of these others were Nisei. Thus eleven out of the twelve were Issei and it was apparent that the government of the community ~~xxx~~ under the strike had fallen into Issei hands exclusively, for the single Nisei was not even a quad representative, but merely the vice-chairman of the 72 and therefore in an unimportant position. The dominant group in this

governing body was the former IAB. The formation of this Emergency Executive Council, therefore, represented the emergance of the Issei Advisory Board was the most powerful political group in the community. It remained in this position of power throughout the period of negotiations with the administration. There were changes in the personnel, but no alteration of the balance of power in IAB hands, but rather in its favor. At the end, two more Nisei were brought into the group, but obviously merely in response to pressure from the administration negotiating group, and there were not strong figures.

The centralization of power in the hands of this IAB dominated group placed the community in their hands. Before this took place in formal organizations, it had no doubt already been there. They had seen to it the night before that the Block Managers were eliminated (by resignation) from the political scene. The machinery of government was placed by the council, not in the hands of the block representatives on the committee of 72, but in other hands in the blocks. Their actual working representatives were nameless so far as the organization went, although in some instances the CT's of 72 members did operate as block organizers.

The organization of the blocks for action in the demonstration and support of the strike took place early Thursday morning, immediately after the formal organization of the Emergency Executive Council. The block representatives worked out shifts of the block residents for occupying the block stations at the scene of the demonstration. They either posted written lists of these shift groups or made speeches at

breakfast time in the messhalls or did both. One method was to assign all of a certain age group to one of three shifts at the block station, for example, all young men on the night shift, middle aged men and women on one of the two day shifts, or perhaps women in the kitchen, etc. In this way every individual in Poston who was able-bodied was aware on Thursday morning that he was expected to take part in the demonstration in a very definite and clear cut way. If he had a protest, he went to the block representative and discussed it with him. In some cases persons who protested were assigned to work in the messhalls. Thus sympathizers and non-sympathizers became a part of the strike organization. The whole community was so organized within a space of about twelve hours after the old community government had broken down.

The Symbols of the Strike. The symbols of the strike were three-fold. Through examination of these symbols, it is possible to see the major forces which produced the strike and to understand something of its meaning to the community. The symbols were a dog, a martyred man, and Japan. These symbols appeared in the midst of the crowd and like totems at a corroboree stood up in concrete reality above it, giving the members of the crowd a focus for their emotions.

Early in the development of the crowd at the police station the dog appeared. A picture of a dog devouring money was painted on the police station, with the legend "No Dogs Allowed Except on Chain." The meaning of the dog was perfectly clear to every resident of Poston. In Japanese the word for dog is inu. It was synonomous with "informer." It had become familiar to every Japanese in the period since Pearl Harbor. It had been applied from the first to the Japanese suspected of

cooperating with the FBI in removing Japanese to internment camps. It had been a source of extreme anxiety in Poston for the months preceding the strike. The widespread fear of being branded as an informer or dog has been mentioned. To be called a dog was to be made liable to the beating list and the sanctions of the gangs who were operating in the disorganized social life of Poston. New effigies and pictures of dogs appeared at the block stations before the jail. They ranged from large cut-out cardboard figures dressed in Government Issue clothing to cartoon pictures drawn on flags which waved above the block stations. Some were shown hanged, others being beaten. The word dog recurred in speeches. One night a whole speech was devoted to a discussion and classification of dogs. As a symbol in the strike, the dog had become a scapegoat. The animus of the crowd was directed against this easily understandable, concrete thing. It was the cause of the insecurity, the personal misery, which had permeated Poston. To hate it and destroy it meant social solidarity again. Unity against the traitor in the midst meant harmony for the people in the relocation center. They were not able to control the evil outside the group--the Caucasian world had opperessed them, but the evil in their midst was a different matter. Action could be taken against it and there could be unity once it was eliminated. The dog thus became a symbol of social solidarity, of a restoration of social harmony for the group. It was a primary basis for unity.

Whatever the differences in intensity of feeling in regard to the dog may have been, it seems that it could have been a focus of

emotion for almost anyone in the atmosphere of the crowd. It undoubtedly had somewhat different meanings for everyone, but the common denominator of meaning lay in the simple moral situation symbolized by the dog eating money.

The other major symbol was the martyr U. The scapegoat was not a positive sumbol. The martyr became the positive focus of emotions. This symbol in order to be effective also had to be something within the group, which could be acted on directly by the group. Here again was something which had some meaning for every resident, from the progressive liberal who thought in terms of "civil liberties" to the uneducated Issei filled with resentment against an unseen "government," U and U family, his father and mother--were being injured by the relentless forces of evil outside the group. To hold him and save him was action against these forces. It was possible, through saving him, to feel some power against the outside forces. The martyr rose as a symbol for the crowd in place of a leader. It had had no effective leaders and could not therefore unite behind any particular leader. But just as a leader is the symbol of the power of a group, so is the martyr, and people may unite behind him. In the dog and the martyr, the people of Poston had symbols for an effective social movement. Together they stood for unity against outside oppressors and for harmony and esprit de corps within, in the face of disrupting external forces.

It remained for the social movement to have some symbol of hope towards which they could move. Neither the scapegoat nor the martyr are that in themselves. The New Testament Jews raised the symbol of

heaven through their martyr, hope for the future. In Poston the crowd was not successful in bringing their social movement to such unity. However, the third element of the trinity almost came to birth. In the system of Issei sentiments was the hope of Japan. Through Japan, never through the United States, a hope for the future could be entertained. The Issei sentiments in the crowd did not go unexpressed. Their hope broke forth in symbols of Japan. Flags were made to be flown over the block stations which were clearly suggestive of the Japanese flag--block numbers in red surrounded by a red circle or a circular monogram of numerals in red on a white background. No one could mistake the intention of these flags. Japanese martial music and recorded speeches of Japanese political leaders--models of Japanese oratory--added meaning to the symbol of the flag. But in this breaking forth of the Issei hope also broke forth the fundamental conflict of the evacuees. While this symbol in the Issei system of sentiments meant hope for the future, it did not have that meaning for the Nisei. Instead of unifying the community in a final integration of sentiments, it split it apart again and the meaning of the strike became confused. The social movement had not been able to carry the crowd quite to the point of new birth in a new social solidarity.

(Alternative interpretation of flags is, of course, "Aggression", defiance of administrative authority. But this is merely an auxiliary meaning of the flags, and of course, the only aspect of the meaning comprehended by many Nisei.) EHS

(I think "Japan as heaven," there is fundamental, but I wonder to what extent the flags represented it? Why weren't they real flags?

The fact that they were doctored numbers suggest more than this.) AHL

The Settlement. The strike was, of course, not a simple industrial or economic conflict. It was called "strike" in retrospect by some evacuees, but it was generally referred to by the evacuees as the indident and by the administrative staff as "The distrubance." Thoreau would have called it a case of civil disobedience, Ghandi would have said passive non-cooperation. It was a weapon conceived, as we have seen, as early as July by the Issei extremists in Poston II. No doubt it had been thought of in similar fashion by many in Poston I during the summer and fall. It was conceived of as a means to a very specific end on November 18, the day when it was put into operation. It was designed to demonstrate general community disapproval of an administrative act. The leaders of it were prepared to carry it out for some time before the established machinery of contact between administration and evacuees broke down. Yet they were also willing to have an effort made through that machinery for the realization of their demand before they actually called the general strike. They stood by while the council presented their request for release of the prisoners. When the request was denied they went ahead immediately with their plans for the strike.

Simple and clear-cut at first, the purpose of the strike expanded steadily the longer the original demand remained unsettled. While the crowd was going through its emotional debauch under the aegis of sumbols of its own, the leaders became aware of the complexity of the social movement they had set in motion. At the first meeting of the committee of 72 in the messhall of the Police Station block, the discussion was of dogs. By the second night the Emergency Council was discussing the

character of the self-government which had existed in Poston. Young Nisei who listened, among them a former councilman, heard the TCC spoken of as the child council and he felt himself in agreement when he heard statements to the effect that "they were treated like children." The leaders were thinking and talking about a desirable system of self-government. They were Issei now who were doing the talking, but Nisei were listening. The administration was described as having deliberately put government in the hands of young men whom they could tell what to do or ignore, as they pleased. As Issei leaders talked, they began to see a new regime in Poston, one which gave more power to the evacuees and in which some of them might find themselves in the positions of power. The administration by this time had made one concession--the release of one of the prisoners--and there had been proposed the possibility of a compromise--the trail of the other prisoner in Poston. It was clear that the administration was not planning to settle the incident by force, such as bringing in the company of Military Police. It was a situation for negotiation. Other things might be brought into the settlement besides the original demand.

The fact that a great deal more than the release of the prisoners was on the minds of the community was indicated also in the attitudes adopted by members of the administrative staff who were thinking about a settlement. To them, too, as to the leaders of the strike other issues appeared to be involved. To a few the whole thing was a simple matter of insubordination and should be put down immediately by force. However, the members of the administrative staff who believed this were

not in power. To others of the staff who talked and thought during the six days before a settlement was reached, the causes of the strike appeared to be manifold, ranging from dissatisfaction over the failure of stoves to arrive before the cold November nights had set in to resentment over the differences in privilege between evacuees and Caucasian personnel on the project. Long lists of the "causes of the distrubance" were drawn up by various members of the staff and the immediate cause--the U civil liberty issue--was pushed to the background. To the few at the top of the staff who were responsible for policy during the first four days of the strike, it appeared as a complex social movement which might be the means for settling many administrative problems. There was the feeling, justified at first by the facts, that the community had for the first time attained some sort of unity. Perhaps it would be possible to discover what the community really wanted. Also the policy makers themselves wanted certain things. In the first conference with evacuee leaders two members of the staff suggested in a general way what they wanted to come out of the settlement. There were two major suggestions: (1) community responsibility for law and order (reflecting the administration's frustrations in dealing with the beating cases) and (2) reorganization for efficiency in the work that had to be done on the project (reflecting the bafflement of engineers and foreman, etc. in getting evacuees to work on necessary jobs).

These suggestions went back to the leaders of the strike, where they were discussed in committee meetings for three days before the settlement was finally reached. The Emergency Council ultimately framed

their objectives in the form of three points which somewhat resembled statement of three points formulated during the same period by members of the administrative staff. The Emergency Council's points were as follows:

> In order to establish peaceful and unified self-government the present Emergency Council submits the following three proposals:
>
> 1. Eastblish a Public Relations Committee to mediate with and settle all problems affecting personal reputations and damages out of court.
>
> 2. The Poston residents to be given the right to nominate, select or appoint all evacuees for administrative personnel and other important positions.
>
> 3. The present Emergency Council shall establish within the framework of the WRA a City Planning Board which shall create the necessary administrative, legislative, and economic organization.

The administration's points were variously stated, but the essentials of them might be indicated as follows: (1) the assumption of community responsibility for law and order and the ending of the gang activities in regard to beatings, (2) the hiring anew of all through the employment office evacuee workers, and (3) the setting up of temporary committees of evacuees and Caucasians to cooperate in the reemployment program and the reestablishment of local government.

The first two points on each of the lists indicate what administration and evacuees alike felt were the gravest social problems of Poston: namely, the uncontrolled operation of gang sanctions against "informers" and the low level of economic efficiency in the center as a whole. Both of these were aspects of the social disorganization which had been discussed. Both were tied up with the so-called Issei-

Nisei conflict, that is, with the conflict between the system of sentiments favoring Japanese solidarity and that favoring the JACL type of cooperation with government agencies. The elaboration of the first point by the evacuee strike leaders indicated their awareness of one of the basic causes of Poston social disorganization. Out of this point grew the proposed institution of the Honor Court, which was conceived as a group of respectable residents from each of the California localities represented among the population. The members of the court would be familiar with the past history of any individual from their locality proposed for any positions, political or economic, and thus no one could take advantage of the ignorance of the community at large of his character and past record. The Honor Court was designed to be a substitute for that intimate knowledge of leaders which normal communities necessarily have. To the Issei leaders, the Honor Court appeared to be a means for eliminating the gang sanctions by providing formal channels for the suspicion and character assassination which was accumulating in uncontrolled fashion around individuals who assumed responsibilities in the community. It was a plan for dealing with the peculiar situation of not knowing ones neighbor and yet having to elect him to office.

The second point, although it indicated similar feeling on the part of administration and evacuees, indicated also a fundamental difference between them, namely, that each felt they must control the job organization in order to produce efficiency. The administration wished to put it in the hands of the employment division and thereby produce "a new deal" in Poston economic life. The strike leaders on the other hand wished to control the personnel of the various departments, and it came out in discussions that they believed that work was not being

carried out well in Poston largely because evacuees in "key positions" had not been selected with reference to the attitudes towards them of those who must work under them. They felt in other words that more community control of the departments would result in better social relations, if not in more technical knowledge, in the departments.

Although there was indicated thus a coincidence of conception between administration and strike leaders in regard to the nature of Poston's social problems, the means for solving them was not agreed on. The Honor Court appeared to the staff as a dangerous institution and they were not ready, for various reasons, to permit evacuee control of jobs. Nevertheless, the aims of the negotiating groups being substantially the same, even if means were not, the Project Director and the Emergency Council finally reached a settlement. U was released to the Committee of 72 for trial in the community and the evacuees were to undertake, as they announced to the crowd, the fulfillment of their three points and, as the Project Director announced to his staff, the fulfillment of the administration's three points. The crowd dismantled the block stations by the jail and went home. A new political struggle began, which revealed more clearly than the strike itself the conflict of sentiments in the community, the origins of social disorganization, and the struggle of the evacuees to find some basis for harmony.

Imagine, first a flat brown plain, from which the flood-fattened mesquite has been torn up by the roots, leaving gritty brown talcum-powder dust a foot deep over all the baking treeless miles, shimmering under the 120-degree heat of Arizona. Now, project upon that desolation a square mile of black tarpaper barracks, a hundred feet long by twenty wide, placed row on row in mathematical monotony.

Into a roped-off area roll the enormous busses, filled with people exhausted by the relentless drive through the baked valleys of inland California. Out of the busses, down the lines of tables, showing papers and signing papers and receiving papers, slowly move the families: the old farmer, head of the family, and the son or daughter who does the talking for him, while mother and grandparents shepherd the round-eyed restless children. At the end of the line, the family gathers itself, rescues its meagre handbaggage from the pile, and climbs into a canvas-covered Army truck which will drop them at the door assigned to them. The hot sun fades redly, the bleak electric lights insult the lifting moon; the choking dust rises slowly in a solid shroud over the stage; and still the line moves on, the sleeping children on their parents' sagging shoulders, the ice-water gone from the iron buckets, the working crews

still checking the family lists and assigning them to rooms. The trucks transport the last family to its room and leave it there with its grandeur: 20x25 feet of pine floor, canvas Army cots rolled up and wired obstinately, a cotton bag for each cot's mattress, and a bale of straw to fill them with before the travelers can rest. The last harried mother has returned to search the luggage pile for mislaid bundles -- the lost nighties, the undiscovered blankets, the missing soap and toothbrush and the baby's bottle. The staff, the registrants, and the guides have trudged back to their rooms, aching with the burden of those thousand lonely, patient apprehensive people, robbed of what had been their past and future, and given in exchange this faceless poverty, these barracks and this straw. Only the moon is left to watch over the littered tables, the trampled ground, the exhausted sleepers: the moon, and the solid cloud of dust still standing in the motionless air.

Then, I would have you visit the block with me a week later. The meagre piles of scrap lumber, left by the contractor, have melted into tables, chairs, and shelves. Blankets have been hung for privacy, and all the block's washing hangs along improvised lines beside the laundry house. Beside some of the barracks, the ground is furrowed, seeds are in, laths make a fence and a shade for the doorway. A block manager, with one room for his office, issues keys and tools and toilet paper and soap. Hoses from the spigot outside each barrack are damping down the dust, or giving the cracked floors their daily washing -- a quick house-cleaning that also cools and lays the dust beneath the house. When the next arrivals pile out of the hot busses to go through the weary intake,

these earlier comers are old residents, who stand outside the ropes to shout "Hey, Bill!" and "Hi, Mariko!" and "Yoohoo, Nakamura San," at friends in the line.

-3-

The blue-print of these cities into which the evacuees were poured, in a sort of benevolent concentration, was made for young male soldiers in active field service. I can imagine no plan less suited to the living of a complex community of families, with all their necessities of work, of worship, of social life and play, of government and administrative services, of privacy and decency, morality and manners. Remember, that when the residents moved in, there was no stick of furniture in any house; no scrap of recreational equipment; no schools; no churches; but little water, even, and that undependable.

Soldiers need little privacy. They are efficiently fed in company mess halls, accommodated in common latrines and unpartitioned showers. But throw into such a naked camp whole families of people who regard privacy as precious. Take away the family dining table, and throw the families into a common mess, where age-groups tend to sit together, dissolving families, weakening the father's headship, destroying converation and manners.

Go further, now. Place the administration and provision of food, shelter, medical care, clothing, public assistance, in agencies over and above the people. There are no "dependents" on a Project; if Tommy doesn't like the family, he can go live with someone else. His food, his housing, his health, like his education and his placement in a job,

suspend individually from the ceiling of Administration, without the mediation of his parents. Was his family rich? Were the neighbors poor? There is no way to tell, here where all alike live in the shabby and crowded informality of a vacation camp. There are no cars. If some houses show more furniture, salvage from the meagre piles of scrap lumber and forgotten nails; if some yards show flowers or vegetables; if some rooms have crude partitions between the beds of the parents, the children, and the strangers who live with them -- this shows only the ingenuity and aggressiveness of the resident. A comfortable liveable household is the reward of what a man is and does, not of what he was or what he used to have.

But there are limits to what a man can do for himsel on the Projects. Most of his family's provision is from what is given. True, the older ones can work, while Grandma cares for the small children and Grandpa polishes his inevitable ironwood. But the Project wage is, generally, sixteen dollars a month; only pocket money for tooth powder and Kleenex and baby food, since the major subsistence is already furnished to worker and non-worker alike. Now, remember that this "managerial" scheme of living is superimposed on people made apprehensive through a succession of uprootings, losses of property, people who were taken from their jobs and homes, stabled where the horses were kept in race-tracks, moved again. People whose defense against apprehension was patient acquiescence. The Lord giveth, and the Lord taketh away...

Remember, further, that the previous culture of these people had been built around the Family, with authority in the father. The father

giveth, and the father taketh away...One obeyed the Government as one had obeyed the father, because that was Authority. And, precisely as a child whose father is rather arbitrary and unpredictable begins to learn to complain, to beg, to wheedle, to manipulate his parents to gain advantage for himself, so on the Projects the evacuees have begun to show that same pattern of response toward the Government that is the source of their hardships and their benefits. What should we have expected? All the familiar ambivalence of children toward a father with complete authority is reappearing in these children of Evacuation. They respect Government they are overwhelmingly loyal, they want to be told with authority what they shall do. And, at the same time, they resent, they learn to play the Administrators off against each other, they appropriate for their own use whatever the Project has on hand that they feel need of. Mr. Nakamura would never lower himself to steal from Mr. Tanaka; but both men have tables, cupboards, fences, that appeared mysterisouly at night, while the evacuee police guarding the lumber pile politely studies the stars.

-4-

The Japanese clusters on the West Coast were self-governing and independent. Seldom did a Japanese name appear on a relief roll or a police blotter. Under the entrenched rule of strong councils of older men, the young men were being readied to take over leadership when the time came. But the time was not yet. The evacuation came too soon. It swept the older leaders into internment, leaving second-raters in charge of the group. It caught the young still in training, still in college and technical school, and in full centrifugal flight from the Japanese-ness

of their parents, out toward acceptance and status in the reluctant Hakujin communities.

In the Projects, political and economic power were stripped from the old men and given to the young. A few years later, it would have been all right. The old men's average age was 59, the young men's barely over twenty. The change was made at a time when the old were almost willing, but not quite; and when the young were almost ready, but not quite. The fathers found Administration and planning taken from their hands and monopolized by their English-speaking sons who worked with and for the Hakujin. So the old men took to their avocations, cultivated their plants, and criticized the young.

The young men had been preoccupied with their own training for individual function and status. The control of a Japanese community was the last thing they wanted. Deprived of the accustomed leaders, they felt insecure, inadequate; in consequence, they both relied on and resisted the Administration. They found themselves under fire both from their elders and from their supervisors; and few among them wanted or would accept conspicuous responsibility. Responsibility meant "sticking your neck out"; and the young men fell back on the Old Japanese habit of sharing responsibility among all the members of aggroup, without officers or ranks. They are uneasy in the American patterns of committees, chairmen, delegates. With the exception of a few whose American experience had habituated them to these forms, the Nisei preferred to remain on the sidelines or in the crowd, while he kept his eye out for his own individual opportunity of

advancement, status, or escape.

Nothing dismayed the young people so much as being thrown back into the enormous colonies of Japanese. Almost every young person I know on the Project has said to me, in despair, "I never saw so many Japanese people before in all my life"; and some have added, "You know, I don't like those Japs." But America had said to them, "You're all Japanese in here"; their parents had used that leverage to reestablish the old controls, the babies and school children found themselves talking Japanese instead of English, under Grandma's tutelage; and the Nisei youth felt himself trapped in a racial pool whose banks were too high to climb out of. Rejected by the Army, in which thousands of their kinsmen were serving, and listed as "4-C", "neutral aliens," their bitterness was real and deep. And a few of them went under.

Yet, to us who lived in these towns, the prevailing tone has always been astonishingly American. Every block has had its baseball and basketball teams. Sunday and Wednesday see dozens of church services, prayer meetings, Bible classes, and singspirations" in rooms set aside for the strong fundamentalist-revivalist religion of the residents. The Buddhist young people carry on ardent forums and socials. As one walked down the long streets in the dusk, when the fierce heat had abated and life was expanding into front yards and stoops, it was a peaceful village scene. Neighbors called across from door to door; young people in threes and fours exchanged the evening gossip and repartee of young people America over; from behind the barracks came the shrill yells of "1-2-3 for Janet" and (a version I

never heard outside Minneapolis before) "ole-ole-olson free!" The tone was familiarly American, its overtones the quick foreign syllables of the old people as one has heard such overtones in Milwaukee, in San Francisco, in Hamtramack and St. Louis.

Even the olders mothers were launched into an unheard-of emancipation. Freed of the drudgery of field and house work, they flocked into Englich classes, needlework and flower-making and art classes, into Mothers' Clubs where they made a valiant beginning at the job of pulling themselves up by each others' bootstraps, from the 1870 Japan of their former lives into the American 1940's where their children lived.

The old culture, the old music and poetry and drama, still flourish on the Projects. But if one had doubts about the Project being in America, they were forever stilled as he stood on the barren dust to hear two hundred young voices coming from improvised bleachers where, in Government issue mackinaws and homemade dresses, the Massed Choir sent "Hark, the Herald Angels Sing" and Adeste, Fideles" rolling out against the silence of the desert, the yelping of the coyotes, and the blazing stars. They were stilled when he stood in the hushed attentive ring of thousands around those bleachers again as the symphony orchestra of school children and old men and teachers played the music of Russia, of France, of England, of Vienna, and of Dixie.

-5-

In the newly-settled blocks of the Project, one saw at first the small children being carried everywhere by their parents. Around the barracks, along the roads, in the Canteen, at the shows, it seemed as

though half the shoulders had those lively round black eyes peering over them. At First I thought it was to keep the children out of the dust; but that was impossible. Then I thought the children were frightened, clinging to their parents; but I saw that they were not afraid, and wanted to be set down. At last I understood that it was the parents who were frightened, who were lost, and clinging to their children.

Gradually, the horizon of security widened, and the children were set down to run at liberty. But the dismal diapason of anxiety remains the deepest and most universal index to the behavior of the evacuees. To an unprecedented extent, their lives have become a quest for security. It is far from the only index; but every attitude, from that toward authority to that toward jobs and Relocation, is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of anxiety.

This is the thing that makes these people, after their shocks and losses and abrupt moves, cling to wahtever spot they happen to have fallen into in the Project. Like shipwrecked sailors on a raft, each family clings to its own room, its little pool or garden. Even overcrowded families, quarreling with each other, refuse to move to empty rooms a block or two away.

And this same anxiety, with all its origins and all its still-valid justifications, is making it difficult for us to persuade people to leave the Projects where it is suicide for them to remain. This is what I must make you understand.

The insecurity of the young employables dates from their struggle to escape from the well-integrated Japanese cluster, out into age-group