This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed. The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.
Title
Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction
Published
2013-07-09
Full Collection Name
Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences Technical Reports
Other Identifiers
EECS-2013-129
Type
Text
Extent
11 p
Archive
The Engineering Library
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