Spectre and Meltdown represented a family of new vulnerabilities called transient execution attacks. They have shown that micro-architectural state was taken for granted and side channels were capable of exposing more than was previously believed possible. This thesis addresses the problem of determining whether a given program is vulnerable to transient execution attacks. Using an approach based on formal methods, we formalize a secure speculation property, adversary and platform models, and use the UCLID5 tool to verify whether a given program satisfies the secure speculation property.
Title
Secure Speculation: From Vulnerability to Assurances with UCLID5
Published
2019-05-24
Full Collection Name
Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences Technical Reports
Other Identifiers
EECS-2019-95
Type
Text
Extent
52 p
Archive
The Engineering Library
Usage Statement
Researchers may make free and open use of the UC Berkeley Library’s digitized public domain materials. However, some materials in our online collections may be protected by U.S. copyright law (Title 17, U.S.C.). Use or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use (Title 17, U.S.C. § 107) requires permission from the copyright owners. The use or reproduction of some materials may also be restricted by terms of University of California gift or purchase agreements, privacy and publicity rights, or trademark law. Responsibility for determining rights status and permissibility of any use or reproduction rests exclusively with the researcher. To learn more or make inquiries, please see our permissions policies (https://www.lib.berkeley.edu/about/permissions-policies).
