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1. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

* Alexander Kazakov and Yuri Yarov Appointed Deputies of President's Staff

SEGODNIA (25.7.1996): Yuri Yarov, former Deputy Prime Minister, and Alexander Kazakov, former Deputy Prime Minister and State Property Committee chairman have been appointed deputies of the President's Staff head. Staff officials say that Yarov's appointment must be considered a demonstration of Yeltsin's gratitude for the contribution made by Yarov to his victory in the presidential election. According to Anatoly Chubais, during the election campaign, Yarov made many seemingly minor, though very important contributions.

Sources in the government say that presidential aides Alexander Livshits and Victor Ilyushin are most likely to take the posts of Prime Minister deputies in charge of economic and social issues, respectively. These appointments should be explained by the tasks to be tackled by the President's Staff and the government in the near future. The staff headed by Anatoly Chubais will tackle issues related to the regional governors elections. Meanwhile, the cabinet, which is to be formed in mid-August, will concentrate on current economic issues. In that case, new figures have little chance to be appointed to the government, says the daily. ("Yuri Yarov Promoted" by Elmar Murtazaev, p.2).

2. POLITICAL FIGURES

* Candidates for Key Posts in the Defense Ministry

MOSKOVSKI KOMSOMOLETS (25.7.1996): There are four key departments in the Russian Defense Ministry -- namely, the Chief Department of Operations, the Chief Department of International Military Cooperation, the Chief Department of Personnel Morale, and the Chief Organization and Mobilization Department.

The Chief Department of Operations was headed by Colonel- General Victor Barynkin. The main candidates for this post are Lieutenant-General Yuri Buloevski, Barynkin's former deputy, and Colonel Sautin. Sautin was former defense Minister Pavel Grachev's mate in the General Staff Academy.

However, Sautin had not been promoted by Grachev due to his reluctance to join the number of Grachev's "loyalists". At the same time, Sautin has close relations with Alexander Lebed.

The Chief Department of International Military Cooperation was headed

by Colonel-General Dmitri Kharchenko. The main candidate for this post is Colonel-General Valentin Bogdanchikov, Kharchenko's former deputy.

The Chief Department of Personnel Morale was headed by Colonel-General Sergei Zdorikov. The main candidates for this post are Major-General Sergei Nuzhin, Zdorikov's former deputy, Major-General Nikolai Stolyarov, and Major-General Alexander Cherkasov, Zdorikov's former deputy, Major General Nikolai Maryashev, General Staff Academy deputy head, and Frants Klintsevich. Klintsevich is a member of the presidential council on Afghan war veterans. Klintsevich successfully promoted Yeltsin's candidacy in the army in the presidential election. He has the reputation of a highly skilled expert in propaganda matters. He has connections with key figures in almost all power agencies. High-ranking officers believe that Klintsevich is the best candidacy for the post of the Chief Department of Personnel Morale head.

However, Alexander Lebed is reportedly promoting Major- General Vladimir Zolotarev's candidacy. Zolotarev is the head of the Institute of Military History. Lebed resolutely rejects the candidacy of Alexander Cherkasov. Informed sources in the Security Council say that Cherkasov, as

the head of a Defense Ministry inspection group, had given a very negative

assessment of Alexander Lebed's performance as the 14th Army Commander.

The Chief Organization and Mobilization Department was headed by Colonel-General Vyacheslav Zherebtsov. The main candidates for this post are Colonel-General Mikhail Klishin, Zherebtsov's former deputy, and Major-General Valeri Ostanin. ("Can Rodionov Conduct Military Reform?", p.2).

3. RUSSIA'S REGIONS

* Presidential Election in Northern Caucasus

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (19.7.1996): The first tour of the presidential election proved that the southern regions of Russia are "red". The republics of Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Kabardino-Balkaria voted for Boris Yeltsin. However, the republics of Adygea, Daghestan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, the Rostov region, the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories resolutely supported Zyuganov. Nevertheless, in the second tour, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Daghestan and the Rostov region changed their stand and supported Yeltsin.

The North Caucasus regions' political diversity cannot be explained by economic and social hardships as they are equally crisis-hit. Therefore, the main cause of differing approaches lies in these regions' past. The Stavropol and Krasnodar territories had been USSR's leading grain producers and resorts that received substantial preferences from Moscow. Many former and acting politicians originated from this part of Russia. Hence these regions' nostalgia for the Communist past.

Adygea and Karachaevo-Cherkessia which used to be parts of the Stavropol territory, do not differ on political issues from that territory. Only Moscow's order made Karachaevo-Cherkessia support Yeltsin in the second tour.

Dagestan is a unique republic that does not have a dominant ethnic group or political will. It was a beloved child of Moscow in the Soviet era. The radical change in its stand in the second tour of presidential election demonstrated the republic leadership's isolation from the society and its dependence on Moscow.

Rostov region's stand changed due to 20% of voters that followed Alexander Lebed's call to vote for Yeltsin.

North Ossetia feels nostalgia for the Soviet past as it is experiencing grave problems and is involved in conflicts with its neighbors. The problems caused by the territorial redividing and marginalization experienced by Kalmykia in the Soviet era made it resolutely support Yeltsin.

Presidential Election Outcome in North Caucasus:

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	1st Tour	2nd Tour
	Yeltsin Zyuganov Lebed Yavlinsky Zhirinovski	Yeltsin
Zyuganov		

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Regions that voted for Yeltsin:

Ingushetia	45.67	25.47	1.89	16.69	1.58	75.0
21.1						
Kalmykia	59.85	26.14	5.65	2.57	3.71	70.0
28.0						
Chechnya	64.1	18.1	2.5	4.2	1.4	70.0
19.0						

Regions that voted for Zyuganov:

Adygea	20.27	52.14	14.17	5.35	5.14	34.7
60.9						
Kabardino-						
Balkaria	44.83	38.17	10.04	3.43	1.47	63.3
33.4						
North						
Ossetia	19.53	63.15	9.72	1.82	3.28	43.4
52.5						
Krasnodar	26.57	39.88	17.69	6.43	6.45	43.9
51.5						
Stavropol	22.26	44.46	19.57	4.15	6.26	41.3
64.4						

Regions that Changed Their Position After 1st Tour:

Dagestan	26.40	66.47	2.01	2.05	1.34	52.0
46.9						
Karachaevo-						
Cherkesia	26.36	56.58	8.95	3.12	2.54	51.0
45.1						
Rostov	29.33	35.02	20.58	7.94	4.62	50.9
44.1						

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("Why Not the Whole of Caucasus Is Red?" by Rustam Chabiev, p.3).

* Communists Have Better Chances in Regional Governor Elections

SEGODNIA (25.7.1996): The regional governor elections are to be held in 41 regions of the Russian Federation from early September until mid-December this year. These elections political implications will far exceed that of the election for the State Duma.

Acting governors' victory in the forthcoming election would mean the Russian political system is stabilizing for a few years to come. If the ruling regional leaders stay in power, they will certainly support the party of power in the 1999 election for the State Duma.

The regional governor elections will offer the Communists a good opportunity for revanche for their failure in the State Duma election. The

table following below proves that at least for 11 pro-Yeltsin candidates for governors, the election will become a real challenge.

In all likelihood, in the governor elections, Yeltsin will put his bets on Anatoly Chubais, recently appointed head of the President's Staff.

Chubais is to coordinate the Kremlin's efforts to win the election. In parallel with that, the election issue will be dealt with by a center to be established on the basis of the movement in Yeltsin's candidacy support in the presidential election.

The regions holding governor elections can be divided in three groups. The first group are regions where the opposition has won both the parliamentary and presidential election. In the second group are included regions where the opposition won the elections for the State Duma, though lost the presidential election. The third group comprises the regions that supported Yeltsin in both elections.

Voting in the December 1995 Parliamentary Election and June- July Presidential Election in the Regions to Hold Governor Elections (per cent).

1st GROUP

Republic Mari El:

Communist Party	18.51
Liberal-Democratic Party	20.72
Agrarian Party	9.41
Russia Our Home	5.01
Yeltsin	40.74
Zyuganov	52.78

Altai Territory:

Communist Party	25.98
Liberal-Democratic Party	15.59
Agrarian Party	12.38
Yeltsin	38.56
Zyuganov	55.52

Krasnodar Territory:

Communist Party	24.39
Liberal-Democratic Party	15.19
Russia Our Home	6.80
Congress of Russian Communities	6.55
Communists-Labor Russia for USSR	6.46
Yabloko	6.39
Yeltsin	43.49
Zyuganov	51.48

Amur region:

Communist Party	34.89
Liberal-Democratic Party	12.90
Russia's Women	5.86
Communists-Labor Russia for USSR	5.79
For Fatherland	5.02
Yeltsin	40.68

Zyuganov	53.05
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Bryansk region:

Communist Party	34.44
Liberal-Democratic Party	19.82
Russia Our Home	5.91
Yeltsin	36.29
Zyuganov	59.23

Voronezh region:

Communist Party	26.82
Liberal-Democratic Party	14.42
Russia Our Home	6.88
Congress of Russian Communities	5.85
Communists-Labor Russia for USSR	5.66
Yeltsin	36.97
Zyuganov	57.64

Kurgan region:

Communist Party	22.20
Liberal-Democratic Party	15.59
Agrarian Party	8.14
Russia Our Home	6.94
Communists-Labor Russia	6.31
Yeltsin	43.41
Zyuganov	50.22

Pskov region:

Communist Party	22.65
Liberal-Democratic Party	20.87
Russia Our Home	9.01
Yeltsin	45.23
Zyuganov	48.08

Ryazan region:

Communist Party	30.15
Congress of Russian Communities	10.40
Liberal-Democratic Party	8.04
Russia Our Home	7.66
Yabloko	5.68
Yeltsin	42.57
Zyuganov	51.62

Saratov region:

Communist Party	28.26
Liberal-Democratic Party	15.46
Russia Our Home	7.96
Communists-Labor Russia	5.79
Yeltsin	44.04
Zyuganov	49.98

Chita region:

Communist Party	21.56
Liberal-Democratic Party	20.59

Communists-Labor Russia	8.29
Agrarian Party	6.1
Russia's Women	5.76
Yeltsin	40.89
Zyuganov	52.50

2nd GROUP

Republic Sakha:	
Communist Party	17.61
Russia Our Home	13.75
Power to People	7.48
Russia's Women	7.48
Liberal-Democratic Party	6.8
Yeltsin	64.62
Zyuganov	29.87

Republic of Khakassia:	
Communist Party	21.57
Liberal-Democratic Party	14.34
Russia's Women	6.51
Russia's Democratic Choice-	
United Democrats	6.02
Communists-Labor Russia	5.97
Congress of Russian Communities	5.16
Yeltsin	47.18
Zyuganov	47.15

Khabarov territory:	
Communist Party	16.07
Liberal-Democratic Party	12.25
Party of Laborers' Self-Rule	9.56
Yabloko	7.54
Great Power	6.49
Yeltsin	58.98
Zyuganov	33.72

Arkhangelsk region:	
Communist Party	14.09
Liberal-Democratic Party	10.84
Russia's Women	8.85
Party of Laborers' Self-Rule	8.83
Russia Our Home	7.98
Yabloko	7.72
Yeltsin	64.37
Zyuganov	47.79

Vladimir region:	
Communist Party	20.72
Liberal-Democratic Party	14.7
Yabloko	6.53
Russia's Women	6.21
Yeltsin	51.56
Zyuganov	41.86

Vologda region:	
Communist Party	14.36
Liberal-Democratic Party	12.09
Russia's Women	6.69
Agrarian Party	6.17
Yabloko	5.53
Yeltsin	63.97
Zyuganov	28.49

Ivanov region:	
Communist Party	17.48
Liberal-Democratic Party	17.48
Union of Labor	9.60
Russia Our Home	6.88
Yabloko	5.49
Yeltsin	53.16
Zyuganov	39.10

Kaliningrad region:	
Communist Party	19.30
Liberal-Democratic Party	11.44
Congress of Russian Communities	9.18
Russia Our Home	8.55
Yabloko	8.16
Yeltsin	57.69
Zyuganov	35.34

Kaluga region:	
Communist Party	25.99
Liberal-Democratic Party	10.01
Russia Our Home	9.02
Yabloko	5.33
Yeltsin	48.59
Zyuganov	45.58

Kamchatka region:	
Yabloko	20.43
Communist Party	11.31
Liberal-Democratic Party	16.02
Russia Our Home	7.03
Yeltsin	61.80
Zyuganov	29.50

Kostroma region:	
Communist Party	20.15
Liberal-Democratic Party	11.45
Russia Our Home	8.65
Agrarian Party	6.98
Russia's Women	5.94
Yeltsin	49.86
Zyuganov	42.70

Leningrad region:

Communist Party	18.88
Russia Our Home	10.81
Yabloko	8.16
Liberal-Democratic Party	8.01
Communists-Labor Russia	6.19
Russia's Women	6.17
Yeltsin	61.35
Zyuganov	32.30

Murmansk region:

Liberal-Democratic Party	12.37
Communist Party	10.96
Russia Our Home	10.83
Yabloko	10.63
Russia's Women	7.03
Congress of Russian Communities	6.02
Party of Laborers' Self-Rule	5.19
Yeltsin	64.20
Zyuganov	29.89

Perm region:

Liberal-Democratic Party	14.75
Communist Party	11.08
Russia Our Home	9.65
Russia's Women	8.21
Russia's Democratic Choice-	
United Democrats	5.78
Yabloko	5.59
Yeltsin	70.85
Zyuganov	32.57

Rostov region:

Communist Party	26.29
Yabloko	14.11
Liberal-Democratic Party	10.25
Congress of Russian Communities	6.25
Russia Our Home	5.33
Communists-Labor Russia	5.32
Yeltsin	51.66
Zyuganov	43.15

Samara region:

Communist Party	22.27
Liberal-Democratic Party	12.26
Russia Our Home	11.94
Yabloko	5.05
Yeltsin	51.95
Zyuganov	42.69

Sakhalin region:

Communist Party	24.61
Liberal-Democratic Party	15.32
Yabloko	6.76
Russia's Women	6.14

Communists-Labor Russia	5.53
Yeltsin	53.27
Zyuganov	39.01

Tula region:

Communist Party	21.48
Liberal-Democratic Party	14.17
Russia Our Home	10.94
Congress of Russian Communities	8.13
Yeltsin	52.42
Zyuganov	41.13

Tyumen region:

Communist Party	15.42
Communists-Labor Russia	12.13
Liberal-Democratic Party	11.15
Russia Our Home	9.48
Party of Laborers' Self-Rule	5.89
Russia's Women	5.51
Yeltsin	55.82
Zyuganov	38.16

Cheliabinsk region:

Communist Party	14.70
Liberal-Democratic Party	10.06
Yabloko	9.89
Russia Our Home	7.94
Congress of Russian Communities	7.33
Russia's Democratic Choice-	
United Democrats	6.72
Communists-Labor Russia	5.79
Russia's Women	5.75
Yeltsin	58.50
Zyuganov	34.98

Agyn-Buryat Autonomous District:

Agrarian Party	32.32
Communist Party	18.02
Liberal-Democratic Party	8.94
Communists-Labor Russia	7.25
Yeltsin	49.16
Zyuganov	47.23

Komi Perm Autonomous District:

Liberal-Democratic Party	21.69
Communist Party	12.27
Russia Our Home	9.56
Russia's Women	7.69
Agrarian Party	7.28
Yeltsin	62.78
Zyuganov	32.58

Koryak Autonomous District:

Liberal-Democratic Party	13.14
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Communist Party	10.00
Yabloko	9.40
Russia's Women	8.70
Russia Our Home	6.94
Communists-Labor Russia	5.51
Yeltsin	69.78
Zyuganov	22.90

Nenets Autonomous District:

Liberal-Democratic Party	16.83
Communist Party	11.42
Russia's Women	8.64
Russia Our Home	7.58
Agrarian Party	5.20
Yeltsin	61.54
Zyuganov	28.89

Taimyr Autonomous District:

Liberal-Democratic Party	15.04
Russia Our Home	13.84
Russia's Women	8.00
Communists-Labor Russia	6.80
Yabloko	6.14
Communist Party	6.12
Yeltsin	71.62
Zyuganov	21.57

Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous District:

Communist Party	22.80
Agrarian Party	19.08
Russia Our Home	9.28
Russia's Women	8.78
Communists-Labor Russia	8.32
Liberal-Democratic Party	7.18
Yeltsin	48.67
Zyuganov	47.00

Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District:

Liberal-Democratic Party	15.28
Russia Our Home	14.08
Communists-Labor Russia	10.62
Russia's Women	8.78
Communist Party	7.96
Yabloko	5.68
Yeltsin	74.24
Zyuganov	20.20

Evenk Autonomous District:

Communist Party	13.73
Liberal-Democratic Party	13.02
Russia's Women	10.48
Congress of Russian Communities	8.52
Russia Our Home	6.66
Party of Laborers' Self-Rule	5.84

Yeltsin	65.97
Zyuganov	28.20

3rd GROUP

Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District:

Russia Our Home	23.05
Liberal-Democratic Party	14.95
Party of Laborers' Self-Rule	11.05
Russia's Women	6.62
Yabloko	6.23
Communist Party	5.63
Yeltsin	79.28
Zyuganov	15.18

Chukotka Autonomous District:

Russia Our Home	17.40
Liberal-Democratic Party	13.32
Communist Party	11.03
Russia's Women	7.60
Party of Laborers' Self-Rule	6.73
Yabloko	6.51
Yeltsin	74.29
Zyuganov	19.14

("Government and Opposition Have Almost Equal Chances in the Regional Elections" by Gleb Cherkasov, p.3).

* Political Implications of Governor Elections

VEK (1996, No.29): Both the Kremlin and the opposition seem fully aware that the regional governor elections are to have a most serious impact on the composition of the Federation Council, the Russian parliament's upper chamber. In the final end, this will influence the transaction of legislative and executive branches. Head of the Russia Our Home executive committee Vladimir Babichev said: "Our opponents have established control over the State Duma, and we cannot afford to let them do the same with the Federation Council".

The balance of forces in the regions is far more complicated than in Moscow as it cannot be defined as a "party of power vs. nationalist opposition" confrontation. At the same time, Russian politics in general are dominated by a two-party system that includes the movement in Yeltsin's candidacy support in the presidential election and Russian Our Home, on the one hand, and the opposition organizations led by the Communist Party, on the other hand. The other parties should be taken just as minor details that make the picture more complete though do not change it.

The governor elections will become only one development of the forthcoming autumn. Experts believe that a grave political crisis should be awaited no later than next fall and winter. Left parties representatives are not likely to be invited to the cabinet. Nevertheless,

they do not seek to take seats in the government anyway. Instead, they are waiting for a deeper crisis that would let them come to power.

Meanwhile, the government is seemingly making every effort on facilitating this task for the opposition. If inflation is curbed through wage delays, and the problems faced by regions are not overcome, the Communists' chances for victory in the regional election will grow significantly.

In the regional elections, no speculations on the voters responsibility for the election outcome in terms of Russia's future would be workable. This will make those voting against the party of power express their frustration even more actively. If as a result of the election the government has to deal with an opposition parliament as a whole and not with the State Duma alone, Russia will be back to a situation similar to that of 1993.

In conclusion, the Kremlin is faced with a most complicated task of winning the governor elections. This objective is even harder to attain in the absence of a developed network of regional organizations of the type the Communist Party has. Therefore, the party of power will have to diversify its tactics putting its bets on different parties in specific regions. ("Local Elections, Large Scale Implications" by Oleg Yurin, p.1).

4. DOSSIER:

A) BACKGROUND OF NEWLY-APPOINTED DEFENSE COUNCIL SECRETARY, YURI BATURIN

YURI M. BATURIN was born in Moscow into a family of engineers. Russian. Doctor of Law (the theme of his doctorate dissertation was the law on computer software). Divorced, has a daughter. Speaks English and Serbian.

In 1973, he graduated from the prestigious Moscow Physical-Engineering Institute (MFTI). Speciality by diploma - management.

In 1980, he got a diploma of the All-Union Institute of Law (External Studies) and in 1981, he got a diploma of the Moscow University, the faculty of journalism, which he also graduated from as an external student.

In 1973-1980, he worked at the Research and Production Association "Energia" (which is famous for manufacturing space missiles and Russian model of space shuttle - "Buran"), as an engineer and then as a senior engineer.

In 1980-1991, he worked at the Institute of the State and Law, the USSR Academy of Science, as a junior researcher and then as a senior researcher. In October 1991-January, 1992, he worked in the staff of the USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, as an adviser to the President's aide and as a consultant to the State Councillor on political issues. From January, 1992 until June, 1993, he worked in the Gorbachev Foundation as an expert (senior research officer) in the center of global studies headed

by Georgy Shakhnazarov. In early June, 1993, he was appointed as the

President's adviser on legal issues.

From January, 1994, - the President's national security adviser.

Since the beginning of "perestroika", Baturin started to take an active part in working out new draft laws and regulations which were in great need at that time. Together with Mikhail Fedotov, then professor at the All-Union Institute of Law and later the Russian Minister of Information and Mass Media, he drafted the law on press which was adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in early 1990. Fedotov's promotion to the ruling hierarchy, initially as a deputy of Mikhail Poltoranin, then the Russian Minister of Information and Mass Media and later Deputy Prime Minister, who has been Yeltsin's long-time and closest associate, has apparently provided to Baturin an access to some senior members of the Yeltsin team. In the Institute of Law and State, Baturin worked closely with Georgy Shakhnazarov, long-time President of the Soviet Association of Political Scientists (which embraced experts on law as well) and high-ranking official in the Soviet ruling hierarchy (initially, he was deputy chief of the International Department of the Communist Party Central Committee and since 1985 until the breakup of the USSR he was a key adviser of the USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev). It was obviously Shakhnazarov who promoted Baturin to Gorbachev's staff, in late 1991. Baturin has gained a public prominence as an expert since late 1992, when he became a co-founder of the analytical TV program "Itogy" ("Results"), produced by TV commentator Yevgeny Kiselev, which became one of most highly-reputed TV political programs. Baturin became a regular participant

in the program and his face became familiar to many TV viewers, including those belonging to the ruling elite. His comments were quite balanced and though he criticized at times some actions or decrees by President Yeltsin, on the whole he displayed respect for the President and put the blame for mistaken decisions and moves not on the President but on his advisers.

As the President's adviser on legal issues, Baturin contributed to drafting many decrees and enactments. But he reportedly was not a member of Yeltsin's "inner circle" who drafted most important decrees, such as, for instance the decree N 1400 on the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet.

As a typical academic by his background, nature and style, Baturin was an alien to the President's apparatus and observers expected that he will not survive for long in the capacity of the President's adviser and will be forced out by apparatchiks experienced in "palace intrigues". But Baturin has managed to adapt to the new environment, to some extent, and stayed in. According to informed sources, it is not that Baturin has fully

learned the rules of the clan games and become an active participant of the

staff intrigues. He has remained an alien. Major rival clans in the President's apparatus view him as a stranger and rather inconvenient person but not as a rival in the struggle for power and influence.

Many periodicals asserted that with the current appointment, Baturin became "one of most influential persons in the ruling hierarchy". Such assertions had little ground. Firstly, his appointment was a complete surprise not only for many in the President's staff but for Baturin himself. The draft decree on his appointment was worked out without his prior notification and he was informed by the President on January 5, and the decree was issued on January, 6. He was not even informed about a

scope of his new responsibilities.

Secondly, the decree on setting up the post of the president's national security adviser did not specify responsibilities of this official and did not demarcate his responsibilities from those of secretary of the Security Council Oleg Lobov and the President's aide on international issues Dmitry Ryurikov.

The above factors give reason to believe that the decree on setting up the institution of the President's national security adviser and appointment of Baturin to this post was not a well-thought and long-ranged

strategic decision but a rather spontaneous political reaction. To all appearances, its main motivation was to display the President's support for the democratic bloc (Baturin has the public image of a representative of the democratic bloc) under the circumstances when the democrats are losing their positions in the government and found themselves in minority in the new parliament.

The assessment has seemingly turned true. In the post of the national security advisor, Baturin has not acquired much political prominence and weight. Suffice it to say that he was not invited to attend the Security Council session that took the decision on the federal troops invasion to Chechnya in late 1994.

Informed sources say that in Yeltsin's 1996 presidential election campaign, Baturin supervised propaganda in the army. They say that Baturin

controlled General Sergei Zdorikov, head of the Personnel Morale Department of the Defense Ministry, in his efforts to win servicemen voices.

After the first tour of 1996 presidential election, Yeltsin replaced Baturin with Alexander Lebed at the post of presidential national security

aide. This was a tactical mover directed on attracting Lebed's voters. Baturin became presidential aide, though the sphere of his competence was not outlined.

On July, 25, 1996, Baturin was appointed secretary of the Defense Council under the RF President. Analytica's experts believe that the Defense Council establishment is aimed at setting up a body to act in parallel with the Security Council. Thus, the President will cut the powers of Alexander Lebed, Security Council secretary.

B) BACKGROUND OF NEWLY-APPOINTED FIRST DEPUTY HEAD OF THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF, ALEXANDER KAZAKOV

ALEXANDER KAZAKOV was born on May 24, 1948. He is a graduate of the Moscow S. Ordzhonikidze Engineering and Economy Institute (1971). He also has a Ph.D in Economics. The highlights of his career are as follows:

In 1973-1976, he worked at Gosplan (USSR State Committee for Planning).

In

1976-1984, he worked as a Communist Party functionary at the Communist Party Cheremushky district committee in Moscow. In 1984-1992, he worked at

the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology. In 1992, he was

appointed head of the chief department for organizing the work of territorial branches of the state property committee. In 1993-1994, he was

a deputy head of the State Property Committee. In 1994, he was appointed the head of the President's Staff department for relations with the member-territories of the Russian Federation. From January 25, to July 1996 - Head of the State Property Committee. As the State Property Committee head, Kazakov is also to take the post of the Deputy Prime Minister.

Observers point to the fact that in his capacity as head of the President's Staff department for relations with the member-territories of the Russian Federation, Kazakov managed to develop good relations with the

local elites. The fact that he had managed to stay at his post for two year means that he is not a non-entity as an administrator. At the same time, he seemingly did not demonstrate any outstanding skills, the source said.

Kazakov's new appointment should be considered as promotion. Experts explain Yeltsin's choice in favor of Kazakov in two ways. First, Kazakov has been appointed to spy on Anatoly Chubais, head of the President's Staff. Second, he has proved to be a skilled administrator who can effectively work for the President.

C) BACKGROUND OF NEWLY-APPOINTED DEPUTY HEAD OF PRESIDENT'S STAFF, YURI F. YAROV

YURI YAROV was born in 1942. Graduate of the Leningrad Technology Institute. Since 1964 he worked as the head of shift at an industrial plant at a Baltic plant. Later he became an engineer at the same plant. Since 1968, he worked at the Burevestnik plant in Gatchina (Leningrad region). 1976-1978 - head of transportation department of the Gatchina town Communist Party committee. 1978-1985 - director of the Burevestnik plant. 1985-1987 - first secretary of the Gatchina town committee of the Communist Party. 1987-1989 - deputy head of the Leningrad region Soviet's executive committee. 1989-1990 - chairman of the Leningrad region Soviet's

executive committee. 1990-1991 - chairman of the Leningrad region Soviet. October-November 1991 - RF President's representative to St. Petersburg and

the Leningrad region. November-December 1991 - deputy chairman of the RF Supreme Soviet. Since December 1992 - RF Deputy Prime Minister. In 1992, he headed Russia's delegation at the Russo-Ukrainian negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet. In November 1992, he headed the parliamentary commission on the Ossetia-Ingush conflict. In February 1996, he became the head of Yeltsin's election campaign staff executive committee. In this capacity he

closely cooperated with Oleg Soskovets, staff's head.

After the March reorganization of the election staff, Yarov was included in the new staff to supervise the sending out of printed campaign materials.

Yarov's appointment to the President's Staff, on the one hand signifies the recognition of his contribution to Yeltsin's election campaign. At the same time, it proves Yeltsin's growing attention to

social issues and his willingness to pick up a skilled administrator to tackle these issues.

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