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## **FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION**

**Minidoka Relocation Center  
Hunt, Idaho**

**Compiled by:  
Elmer Smith, Community Analyst**

**Section Heads  
John E. deYoung, March 10, 1943 to February 16, 1944  
Elmer Smith, April 19, 1944 to October 25, 1945**

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## **FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION**

### **ITS HISTORY, AIMS, METHODOLOGY AND PROBLEMS**

The Community Analysis Section was more or less an afterthought as far as the administrative processes of a relocation center were concerned. At Minidoka the Analyst Section was not instituted until late in March of 1943, under the direction of Mr. John deYoung. It was a section under Community Management. The establishment of the Analysis Section was directly the outgrowth of experiences of Dr. Alexander H. Leighton and Dr. E. H. Spicer at the Poston Relocation Center and the organization of such a section was sponsored by Dr. John Embree and Dr. John Provinse of the Washington W. R. A. office.

#### **Aims of Analysis Section:**

The job of the analysis section was to interpret to the administrators the human beings whom the WRA program was designed to rehabilitate and to advise in the formation of policy and procedure. The analysis section was to furnish factual material about the center in terms of social composition of the community, problems of community life, reactions of the community to stated policies and rules set up by the administration, rumors and tension areas within the center and their backgrounds. The analyst was not to act in any administrative capacity nor was he to be identified with any particular group or groups within the center — either evacuee or appointed personnel. His sources of information were to remain confidential at all times, and he was never to be asked to investigate anything on a personal basis. The other members of the appointive staff were to give him full cooperation at all times and when requested to do so. The analysis section was to be composed of one analyst trained in the fields of social analysis and human relations, with an evacuee staff

of assistants. The number of evacuee assistants at Minidoka never numbered more than 4 or 5 at any given time, and during the months of June, July, and August, of 1945, not more than 3. During September of 1945 no evacuee staff members were available due to the rapid relocation rate and turnover of evacuee employees.

Reports from the Analysis Section were to be submitted on various aspects of community life to the Washington Office of WRA and to the local administration. No definite period of time was set for the submission of these reports until after the meeting of the community analysts at Denver in September, 1944. At the Denver conference it was decided to have each analyst on the respective projects submit a weekly report to the Washington office for the purpose of more adequately keeping a "running picture" of the life on the centers. The Washington office and the Project Director could and did request certain special reports on various aspects of community life from the analyst, and these were submitted as special reports. However, by and large, the analyst was left pretty much to himself as to how and what to study at given times. This was a necessary rule since the very dynamic aspects of center living made a cut and dried policy subject matter an impossibility. The analyst at Minidoka often sent specific memoranda to the local administration on certain situations that developed on a small scale and/or that had special interest at a given time in relation to a given situation.

### **History of Analysis Section at Minidoka:**

As stated previously, the analysis section became active in Minidoka in late March of 1943 under the direction of Mr. John deYoung. Dr. E. H. Spicer had been on the Minidoka project for a few weeks previous to that time laying the groundwork for the appearance of Mr. deYoung. There have been, since the analysis section was established in Minidoka, 24 evacuee staff members and three analysts. Mr. John deYoung was analyst from March, 1943, to February, 1944. Mr. Gordon Armbruster was analyst from February 3, to March 4, 1944, but due to personal and family reasons left the project before any analysis was carried out. The present analyst, Elmer R. Smith, has been the analyst since April 18, 1944 to the closing of the center, with the exceptions of the months of January and February, 1945, when Mr. deYoung returned as analyst while Smith was away on a special assignment in the Pacific Northwest.

The evacuee staff members have all either terminated on their own request for relocation purposes or for transfers to other jobs. No one has been terminated from the analyst's office for negative reasons.

As stated previously, the analysis section was under the Community Management Division, with very close relations worked out — at least in the earlier days — with the Project Director's office. As a matter of fact, in the early days, the analyst was under Community Management only in name. The analyst did all of his reporting both oral and written directly to the Project Director. The written reports were never filed with the Assistant Project Director in Community Management, but only with the Project Director's office. All reports of whatever nature went over the Project Director's desk, but personal letters were sent to the Washington Office direct. The present analyst (after April 18, 1944) began to carry on the same policy as that of the previous analyst in terms of reporting directly, and only, to the Project Director, but with the coming into the picture (week of August 12, 1944) of Mr. Edward Huberman as Assistant Project Director in Community Management more and more direct contact and reporting followed the channels set up through the Community Management Division. However, in important confidential and pertinent instances the analyst still kept direct contact with the Project Director, especially when oral reports and discussions were to be carried out.

### **Problem of Methodology:**

The problem of methodology was ever present to the analyst at Minidoka, and since the situation was new in terms of the social-cultural factors involved, some experimentation was carried out. This is too long a procedure to be discussed here, but suffice to say that a number of approaches were attempted, and were found

wanting. It was found, furthermore, that methodology in a relocation center, when applied to analysis, could not be evaluated, at the time, exclusively in terms of its standard conformity to the more dogmatic procedures laid down by sociologists, economists, psychologists, and anthropologists. The standard by which, from the very nature of the problems presented by the administration to the analyst, the analyst evaluated his studies was by the effectiveness of the material for administrative purposes. This effectiveness of the material gathered by the analysis section as an aid to the administrative program depended upon (a) timelessness (b) the accuracy of the material collected as pointing to practical solutions and frames of reference (c) method of presentation. Always facing the analyst was the demand of the administration to be practical and forget the frills. This is not to say, however, that the analyst did not use the necessary checks and balances in gathering and organizing his materials, but the standards applied by the administration had to be seriously and continuously considered. These standards of the administration were:

1. Whether our suggestions and material aided immediately in the solution of the current problems.
2. Whether it was felt that our data was representative of the evacuee feelings and problems. Always, it seems, the analyst's data remained but one element in the total situation to be dealt with. At times, this seemed to be unjustified, but the analyst was forced not to lose sight of the fact that policies and plans cannot always be fitted to the scientific facts, and that properly, from the administrator's point of view, the analyst's findings were merely one element in the total situation of administration.

The problem of speed in making a study of a given situation — especially labor and administrative conflicts — left the analyst very much at a loss as to the application of “tried and true” techniques. The administration, in such cases as the above, would demand an immediate report covering the total situation, and this in many cases would preclude any elaborate system of “accepted and traditional technique” of approach. With these problems always present, the analyst used the informal approach as much as possible in the studies conducted of various situations. In his more leisurely (?) moments certain standardized studies were made. The informal approach was used in order to avoid as much as possible being identified with any given side in specific situations. This technique was used for another reason, mainly because the analyst had been associated with a study of persons of Japanese ancestry outside of a center, and formal questions, answers and other like interviewing methods were found to be unsuccessful (See - JAPANESE RELOCATION STUDY OF UTAH, Preliminary Report, Elmer R. Smith, April, 1944, University of Utah Report). The informal approach could be used with advantage because the persons and situations involved were not moving from place to place, the analyst lived and participated in the social life of the community and was acquainted with a large number of residents, thus formality was more or less a foreign element to inject into such a situation. Growing out of this basic informal approach the techniques used could be listed as follows:

1. General observation of what was happening and what was being said in all the parts of the community.
2. Intensive interviews which consisted in repeated discussions and “bull sessions”.
3. Records were collected, in whole or in part, from all available sources, such as statistics, relocation office, school, guidance office, etc.
4. Personality studies of a small number of persons involved in given situations.

Public opinion polls and survey sheets were not used by the analyst because of the skepticism of the residents toward any such technique and the danger of such forms being considered as part of the relocation surveys and welfare surveys and studies being carried on at various times in the center.

It is believed by the analyst that a synthesis of the material so collected by the analysis section will be of use in the developing of a series of theoretical studies upon a purely scientific basis, especially since the material collected here can be counter-checked with material from other centers. Many of the basis factors stimulating certain types of behavior patterns at Minidoka were born from the same standardized policies originating from the WRA office in Washington, D. C., plus, of course, the recognition that individual personalities involved in

the various centers are taken into consideration. It is also to be suggested at this point that a very constructive and analytical study of methodology could be worked out by a number of analysts from the various centers combining their experiences and techniques in some sort of report. This report would be useful for later studies as well as a method of evaluating the total analysis program within the relocation centers.

The Community Analysis Section and its position in the center structure in terms of its problems, relationships, with the administration and the residents, and its evaluation in terms of community life is of paramount importance, and we will now turn to these aspects of the question for discussion.

### **Problems and types of Material Studied:**

The problems of the analyst were many and varied, and may be divided into the following divisions: (1) Types of material studied by Analysis Section; (2) Trends in types of studies made and possible factors involved.

#### **1. Types of materials studied:**

The problem of choosing the type of subject to study was one always facing the analyst. However, for the purpose of classification and discussion two principal divisions may be made: General Social Structures and their Functions; second: Problems of Community Life in Relation to Center Experience. These two main divisions may be more completely broken down in terms of the following:

- a. Recreational activities (plays, games, etc.)
- b. Folklore (stories, superstitions, rumors, etc.)
- c. Educational reports
- d. Population studies
- e. Center Problems (special reports)
- f. Weekly reports
- g. Reports on business meetings

The following table will summarize the number of reports under the above 7 divisions:

#### **DIVISION NUMBER OF REPORTS**

Recreational activities —	55
Folklore —	48
Educational —	19
Population studies —	1
Center Problems —	97
Weekly Reports —	43
Reports on business meetings —	92
TOTAL —	355

It should be stressed in this connection that many of these separate studies often overlapped, since after all the phenomena being dealt with are parts of the total human experiences of people living in a given community.

The first studies conducted over at least a ten-month period were more along the lines of descriptive narratives of the social structures of the community with some historical material thrown in to give background to the customs, traditions, stories, games, etc. under description and analysis. During the earlier period of the life of the analysis section on the project only a few specific problem situations or conflict conditions were reported. The latter part of the analysis sections' reports and studies dealt more with the problem situations both in general and in specific instances. This change of approach will be specifically discussed later in this report.

The present analyst has had a number of specific studies planned, but due to the urgency of specific other types of reports (labor, administration and evacuee conflicts, weekly reports, special reports requested by the administration), other activities and to the shortage of labor these studies were never completed. These types of studies included:

1. Problems of Leadership in a Semi-Closed Society
2. Some General Social-psychological Principles underlying Prejudices on a Racial Basis in Minidoka
3. Social-Group Rules and Their Origins in a Relocation Center
4. Play Groups and appearance of "Dominant" Traits in Individuals
5. Some Psychological Aspects of Adjustment to Relocation Center Life

## **2. Summary of trends in types of studies made and possible factors involved:**

As stated above, there have been more or less two main trends noticeable at Minidoka in the types of material studied by the analysis section. Under the first analyst, Mr. deYoung, the reports run more to the studies of social phenomena as such with a minimum amount of attention called to the specific problem situations involved. This is understandable for probably a number of reasons. First, the community was new, and little was known about the total community structure and function of a given semi-closed society such as a relocation center, especially one made up of a given ethnic group. It was, therefore, necessary to get background material for a better understanding of the life of the community. Second, in the earlier days of the center, no pronounced conflict situations developed between the administration and the evacuees, between evacuees and evacuees, and between the various groups in the administrative staff that were comparable to later developments. The first really serious conflict situation that came out into the open was the boilermen's strike in February, 1944. Third, the analysis section was new and it was necessary, at first, to study and report only on general topics that would not arouse the negativism of the residents as well as the administrative staff. The establishment of rapport in both groups was necessary step, and one that had to be worked out very carefully if the analyst was to perform his job efficiently and objectively. Fourth, the training and interest of the analyst must not be discounted in terms of subject materials studied, and this factor perhaps had some significance as reflected in the reports submitted.

The present analyst, taking up the work of Mr. deYoung, on April 18, 1944, entered the project at the time of the beginning of a number of conflict situations. On the day of his arrival the project was in the middle of a strike at the warehouse area; this was followed by a series of conflict situations involving selective service, expatriation-repatriation, the "Irrigator" and the Reports Office, recreational relations, school complications, community council and administration relations, coal driver conflicts, trouble and misunderstandings between the administration and evacuees over the completion of the high school gymnasium, ending in a series of misunderstandings among the Council members, the residents and the administration. These situations were finally followed by an increased recognition of juvenile problems, especially in relation to the school, the lifting of the exclusion orders on the West Coast, and the announcement of the closing dates of the centers. Therefore, with this sort of a line-up of events, the analyst was forced to spend more of his time and attention to these types of relations than to some of the more general forms of social relations. This is, therefore, one of the explanations for the change in the type of reporting of the analysis section after March of 1944. The training, background, and interest of the analyst in this time also is significant, but will be discussed in SUPPLEMENT I.

The weekly reports which grew out of the conference of analysts held in Denver in September, 1944, presented another type of reporting, which brought the analyst closer to the general everyday problems of the administration and the residents as well as trying to spot possible trends in human relations growing out of the situations as they developed from week to week.

## **Analysis Section and Administration:**

The problem of relationships existing between the analysis section and the administration presented some real “cases”. Previous to March, 1944, the analyst (Mr. deYoung) had direct contact with the Project Director and was on a very friendly and intimate basis with him. However, this did not “go” for the rest of the appointed personnel, who considered the analyst as: (1) A stooge for the Project Director as well as for the Washington Office; (2) Too young for the job; (3) He did not associate with the “bunch” enough; (4) And there was the question of exactly what was he doing here in the first place? However, no harsh and out-and-out antagonisms were shown to the analyst—as far as I can learn — from the direct administrative officers.

The present analyst, taking over on April 18, 1944, has not found himself at all times and in all predicaments on the positive side of the administration, nor getting the cooperation of some of the administrative officers when it was the most desirable. This is especially true where it became necessary for the analyst to present the evacuees' point of view on problem situations, in contrast to the view of the administration, or more specifically the view of its administrative officers. The analyst has been criticised a number of times for the material he included in his reports to the Washington office. This criticism revolved around at least the following points: (1) The material presented gives only a small minority's viewpoint among the residents (when called upon to show cause for this remark, no comments were usually made); (2) The analyst was pro-evacuee, therefore, he was to be discounted; (3) The analyst did not have all the facts (in this connection some letters of objections were written to the Washington Office concerning reports of the analyst); (4) The analyst was a “false prophet” — no tension situations were in evidence all was going well; (5) the analyst was an anthropologist and was, therefore, impractical, and “read too many books”.

There were times, however (and they were more frequent in number than the above remarks would have one to believe) when the administration called upon the analyst for a number of suggestions and analyses and these were used in the determining of policy. A few examples will suffice: (1) The warehouse strike in April of 1944; (2) The problem of moving all persons out of block 22; (3) Background and handling of juvenile problems; (4) Sioux depot ordinance recruiting program; (5) Problems of the distribution of information for speeding up relocation; (6) Gymnasium conflicts on labor and labor relations.

The real problem existing in the relationships of the analyst and the administration was, namely, “how the gap may be bridged between the technical information supplied by a scientific worker and the actual needs of the practical man when he is forced by a specific problem or decision.” This gap, to some extent at least, was bridged by the following methods at Minidoka:

1. Special consultation between analyst and the Project Director
2. Special research requested of the analyst by the administration
3. The analyst became part of the upper administrative cabinet (until last 2 months of project — See Supplement I), and had a chance to discuss, both formally and informally, problems of policy, etc.
4. The freedom exercised by the analyst to present various points of view (even under protest from some quarters), and the freedom others involved had in presenting their reactions and criticisms to the analyst's reports both the local and Washington administration.

## **Evaluation:**

The evaluation of the efficiency of the analyst's section is one that must, for purely objective reasons, be left to others and to the time when comparisons can be made and perspective be attained concerning the total WRA picture. However, the following points may be made for what they may be worth:

1. The analysis section was effective in at least making some of the administrative officers conscious of other factors at work other than the purely “economic and political” ones.

2. Due to certain factual situations presented by the analyst, certain types of “steriotyped administrative techniques” for handling people were modified.
3. The residents, after they discovered what the analysis section was really for, became more positive toward certain administrative policies, because they “found out their points of view were being presented to the Washington office.” (This statement has been made a number of times to the analyst by leaders in the resident community).
4. The analysis section, on the center level, was able to supply the administrative groups in Washington with background material and situations that would not otherwise have been available to the policy-making bodies on the national level.
5. The Analysis section was able to gather much social-cultural material useful for more detailed studies of specific types of human relations.
6. The analysis section was unable to have as much of a positive influence on policy and techniques at the Project level as might have been desired because: (a) the skepticism among the administrators of the purposes and techniques of the trained social scientist; (b) the suspicion in which the analyst was held by many of the appointed personnel because of the “reporting” and “snooping” into the various activities of the center; (c) the belief on the part of some appointed personnel that due to his association with the evacuees and his “reporting”, that he was pro-Japanese, or at least a “Jap-lover”.
7. Due to the “rush” and the “rapidity of happenings” on the center that were the analyst's job to know about, the time was not always available to develop sufficient “check techniques” for certain “moot” points with which the analyst had to deal.
8. Some positive contributions were presented by the analyst in the training program of appointed staff members.

**NOTE:**

For a subjective presentation of the analyst's experiences and opinions SUPPLEMENT I Is recommended.